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Al-Azhar and the Orders of Knowledge 
 
 
Dahlia El-Tayeb M. Gubara 
 
 
Founded by the Fatimids in 970 A.D., al-Azhar has been described variously as “the great 
mosque of Islam,” “the brilliant one,” “a great seat of learning…whose light was dimmed.” Yet 
despite its assumed centrality, the illustrious mosque-seminary has elicited little critical study. 
The existing historiography largely relies on colonial-nationalist teleologies charting a linear 
narrative of greatness (the ubiquitous ‘Golden Age’), followed by centuries of decline, until the 
moment of European-inspired modernization in the late nineteenth century. The temporal grid is 
in turn plotted along a spatial axis, grounded in a strong centrifugal essentialism that reifies 
culturalist geographies by positioning Cairo (and al-Azhar) at a center around which faithfully 
revolve concentric peripheries. 
Setting its focus on the eighteenth century and beyond, this dissertation investigates the 
discursive postulates that organize the writing of the history of al-Azhar through textual 
explorations that pivot in space (between Europe and non-Europe) and time (modernity and pre-
modernity). It elucidates shifts in the entanglement of disciplines of knowledge with those of ‘the 
self’ at a particular historical juncture and location, while paying close attention to the act of 
reading itself: its centrality as a concept and its multiple forms and possibilities as a method.  
It thus locates al-Azhar in the modern order of knowledge, even as it imagines another 
intellectual universe bounded by ideas, texts and authors who lived before and outside Europe: 
one which articulated itself in conceptual, epistemic, moral, social, cultural and institutional 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION 
 
For transliterations from the Arabic, I have generally followed the system of the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), with but with some variations. For certain 
words, I have used more common forms (e.g. Qur’an, ijāza, ʿulama, sunna, shariʿa, Sufi etc.), 
except when quoting from another source, in which case I have left the transliteration as it 
appears in the original. Full diacritical notations have been retained for the names of historical 
(and in many cases, contemporary) persons and for the titles of works in Arabic. 
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But now, that deep contentment in my breast, 
Alas, wells up no more, in spite of all my best 
Endeavours. Oh, how soon the stream runs dry, 
And in what parching thirst again we lie! 
How often this has happened to me! 
And yet, there is a remedy: 
We learn to seek a higher inspiration, 
A supernatural revelation –  
And where does this shine in its fullest glory 
If not in that old Gospel story? 
Here is the Greek text; I am moved to read  
Its sacred words, I feel the need  
Now to translate them true and clear 
Into the German tongue I hold so dear. 
 
 [He opens a volume and prepares to write.] 
 
‘In the beginning was the Word’: why, now 
I’m stuck already! I must change that; how? 
Is then ‘the word’ so great and high a thing? 
There is some other rendering, 
Which with the spirit’s guidance I must find. 
We read: ‘In the beginning was the Mind.’ 
Before you write this first phrase, think again; 
Good sense eludes the overhasty pen. 
Does ‘mind’ set worlds on their creative course? 
It means: ‘In the beginning was the Force’. 
So it should be – but as I write this too, 
Some instinct warns me that it will not do. 
The spirit speaks! I see how it must read, 
And boldly write: ‘In the beginning was the Deed!’” 
 








On The Importance of Being al-Azhar and Other Historiographical Spectacles  
 
In the aftermath of Egypt’s January 25
th
 revolution of 2011 that brought about the ouster 
of Hosni Mubarak’s regime and helped fuel a ‘new era’ of hope and mass politics throughout the 
region, a series of meetings were convened in Cairo by the current Grand Imam and Rector of al-
Azhar, Dr. Ahmad al-Tayib to which were invited a “group of Egyptian educated elite” of 
varying “religious opinions and beliefs” (and thus representative of “different parties of Egyptian 
society”), along with a number of senior scholars from al-Azhar itself. 
The mandate of the meetings as outlined in a statement issued and publicized on the 
Egyptian State Government website was to determine “the future of Egypt” and to direct it to 
“prosperity” in accordance with a set of “comprehensive principles and rules” that would ensure 
“the right path for the whole of society” understood as “rights in freedom, dignity, equality and 
social justice.”
1
  On this basis, the participants proceeded to determine a set of eleven “common 
principles” by which to attain the objectives of “cultural development, (...) democracy (…) social 
justice, (...) prosperity and peace with respect to human and spiritual values and cultural 
heritages,” that were in turn subordinated, or rather tallied, to “acceptable Islamic precepts.” 
Such principles, the statement warned, must be “protected from distortion or misinterpretation 
(…) by deviant parties which use religion according to their needs and desires, violate the 
moderate ways [of Islam] and Islamic principles of freedom, justice, (…) equality and the 
tolerance of all the heavenly religions.”
2
 
                                                 
1
 Al-Azhar Document: “Al-Azhar and a group of Egyptian Educated elite, Statement about the future of Egypt.” 
(Egyptian government website: (http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=56424) Accessed 28/9/2012). The text 
has been slightly amended for grammatical consistency. 
 
2




At the heart of this liberal profession of faith was a declaration of the importance of al-
Azhar as an institution integral to Egyptian society, and a putative claim for its historical and 
contemporary primacy in all matters concerning correct Islamic doctrine and practice, including 
principally the relationship between religion and the Egyptian state: “As a part of the 
understanding and the realization of the important role played by al-Azhar in guiding toward 
right moderate Islamic thinking, all the participants in the meetings stressed the importance of al-
Azhar and its role in determining the relation between the state and religion and clarifying the 
basics of the correct legislative policy that needs to be followed.”
3
  
Projecting this role back into history, and especially to the earliest stirrings of what is 
often referred to as the nahḍa in the early nineteenth century, and forward (with the celebrated 
reformer and rector of al-Azhar Shāykh Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār the first scholar to be named explicitly)
4
, 
the gathering grounded al-Azhar’s authoritative claims in its “great and wide experience,” which 
it then summarized in five points: 
1. A theological aspect – focusing on reviving the science of religion according 
to the principles of the Sunna [Prophetic tradition] and Gama‘a [consensus], 
which integrate between those who refer to reason and those who refer to the 
Quran and tradition, and which reveal the required rules for interpreting 
religious texts. 
2. A historical aspect – of serving and leading the national movement toward 
freedom and independence. 
3. A cultural aspect – of reviving the natural sciences, literature and arts 
including their various fields. 
4. A scientific aspect – of leading and guiding Egyptian leaders and the whole of 
Egyptian society. 





  On Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭar (1766 – 1835), see Gibb, H. A. R., “al-ʿAṭṭar”  Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. By 
P. Bearman, Th. Bianguis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2013. Last online 
(accessed, 17 November 2013); and Gran, Peter, Islamic Roots: Egypt, 1760-1840, (Cairo: American University of 





5. And a comprehensive aspect – which is a mixture between science, 




Together these five points establish the bedrock from which Azhari historiography 
departs, resulting in a body of literature tightly entangled in modern orders of knowledge and 
their spatio-temporal imaginaries. In what follows, I should like to begin by highlighting some 
aspects of this conceptual scaffold and its implications for the writing of the history of al-Azhar. 
 
* * * * * 
Spatio-temporal Collisions and the Persistence of Modernity 
 
“Thinking historically is a process of locating oneself in space and time.  
And a location is an itinerary rather than a bounded site (…),  




Modernity is notoriously difficult to define (and no such attempt will be made in this 
dissertation), but its constituent elements are almost instantly recognizable, recalling the famous 
judgment of the US Justice Stewart when he declined to define pornography but affirmed 
instead: “I know it when I see it.” Or perhaps the equally famous witticism of the Irishman who, 
when asked the way to Ballynahinch, pauses, ponders and responds: “If I were you, I wouldn’t 
start from here at all!”
7
  
                                                 
5
 Al-Azhar Document, op. cit. 
 
6
 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997): 11. 
7
 Both these statements have by now become regular axioms (and it is in this sense that I use them here). The first 
was originally uttered by Justice Stewart in his judgment in Jacobellis v. Ohio (378 U.S. 184. 1964); and the second 
was mobilized by Eric Hobsbawm in his reflections on the course and practice of narrative in historical scholarship 
(Hobsbawm, “The Revival of Narrative, Some Comments,” in Geoffrey Roberts (ed.) The History and Narrative 




What is clear, in any case, is that the concept refers somehow to a particular 
configuration of time and space. As Bruno Latour explains, “Modernity comes in as many 
versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to 
the passage of time.”
8
 And passage, of course, can evoke either a spatial or a temporal order, or, 
most significantly to us here, a relation between the two.  It would be perfectly apposite, then, 
that modernity’s alter-ego which helps to constitute it, decline, would use a spatial metaphor to 
evoke a temporal process. But this still leaves unresolved the important question of where to 
start, for which we must return to the foundation of the modern disciplines and their epistemic 
transformation in the wake of the new modes of thought and action, of time and space, arising 
with the High Enlightenment. 
If the actual birth of the disciplines of history and geography can only be thought in 
connection with their institutionalization, beginning with the foundation of the University of 
Berlin in 1810 by Wilhelm von Humboldt that completely revolutionized the very idea of the 
university and to which were appointed the founding fathers of our modern disciplines Leopold 
von Ranke (Chair of History) and Carl Ritter (Chair of Geography) and G. W. F. Hegel (Chair of 
Philosophy); their immaculate conception must be retraced to the major epistemological break 
introduced by thinkers of the later eighteenth century: to the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ of David 
Hume, James Burnett, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and Adam Smith, to Montesquieu, Turgot, 
Condillac, Condorcet, Voltaire and other philosophes and encyclopédistes of Paris, and, 
inevitably, to the culmination of this tradition in Immanuel Kant, from whose wide forehead 
modern arts and sciences may have sprung forth fully formed like Minerva. “Virtually all the 
figures who contributed to the establishment of the new university in 1810,” Michael Holquist 
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reminds us, “were disciples of Kant.”
9
 Indeed, the founding spirit of the radical experiment that 
was the University of Berlin lay precisely in an attempt to resolve the Kantian paradox of how to 
institutionalize autonomy; and this, in short, is modernity.
10
 To parody the quip about God 
emblematic of the Age of Reason, if, in the wake of the Enlightenment, Humboldt, Ranke, Ritter 
and Hegel did not exist, then we would have had to invent them. 
The discipline of history takes root in the Enlightenment secularization of time and space, 
reduced to homogenous categories with universal and intrinsic properties that can be mastered by 
an operation of volition. Just as the commodities produced in factories at the dawn of industrial 
capitalism were being fetishized (as Marx taught), so were the concepts of space and time crafted 
in universities at the dawn of institutionalized disciplines (including in the teachings of Marx): 
what were the products of human relations between people(s) were thus transformed into things 
with intrinsic, naturalized, universal qualities.  
“The 1694 Dictionary of the Académie Française, for example, had no entry at all for 
civilisation,” Lynn Hunt astutely notes.
11
 A century later, by contrast, the concept was granted a 
place in that pantheon of cultured words, albeit with only a basic definition: “the action of 
civilizing or a state in which one is civilized” (to which would be appended further elaborations 
in the following decades: “Retard the civilization of a country. The progress of civilization. The 
results of civilization. Advanced civilizations.”)
12
 In between lies the Enlightenment, and its 
forging of the foundational concept of progress.
13
 This was the mainstay of the Scottish moral 
                                                 
9
 Michael Holquist, “Why We Should Remember Philology,” ADFL Bulletin, 33/2 (Winter 2002): 18. 
 
10
 See more largely Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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 For the standard account of the concept of progress, see Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New 




philosophers (in particular Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and John Millar), who sought in their 
works to explore the idea that there is “in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to 
knowledge, and from rude, to civilized manners, the several stages of which are usually 
accompanied with peculiar laws and customs.”
14
 Indeed it hardly needs recalling that the 
celebrated ‘invisible hand’ of Scotland’s most famous son concerned as much the progress 
through successive stages as the stabilization of market forces, both natural processes nearly 
devoid of human agency.
15
 
The linear trajectory that the concept of progress plotted was, from the very start, both a 
matter of time (hence history) and of space (hence geography): just as the history of Europe 
could be traced diachronically according to the various stages of its progress (the famous 
hunting-herding-agriculture-commerce sequence), so too the actual distribution of world cultures 
expressed synchronically the panoply of the successive states of humanity, as Turgot perhaps 
first made clear:  
The people that first was slightly more enlightened promptly became superior 
to its neighbors: each progress facilitated another one. Thus did the march of a 
nation accelerate day by day, whereas others stayed back in their mediocrity, 
hampered by particular circumstances, and others yet remained in barbary.  A 
single glance at the [planet] earth even today places under our gaze the entire 
history of the human species, by showing us the remains of all of the stages 
through which it passed, from the still existing barbary of the American peoples, 
to the politeness of the most enlightened nations of Europe. Alas ! Our fathers and 





                                                 
 
14
 John Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks: or, An Inquiry into the Circumstances which Give Rise to 
Influence and Authority, in the Different Members of Society, 4
th
 edition (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1806): 4.   
 
15
 See Nisbet, op. cit.  
 
16
 “Plan de deux Discours sur l’Histoire Universelle,” in Oeuvres de Turgot et documents le concernant. Avec 





The keystone of the Enlightenment project, which would lock all its contingent parts 
together, and would become most manifest perhaps in the writings of Kant, is the equation of 
freedom with reason. From this derives the necessity of producing the twin concepts of 
universality and progress, in order, precisely to account for and/or pave the way for the 
realization of the transcendental subject. And thus was produced the specific double-sided coin 
of the Enlightenment, joining, in terms of analysis, a descriptive mode to a prescriptive one, and 
on the plane of political action, voluntarism to determinism, with reason/freedom as ultimate 
telos. This coin remains the primary standard of exchange in the contemporary marketplace of 
ideas.  
If the equation of freedom with reason produced universality and progress; it also had to 
create, in the very same maneuver, categories to make sense of difference (the absence of 
freedom, the absence of reason). It should come as no surprise, then, that it is by way of the 
philosophers of the High Enlightenment that were forged the scientific concepts of civilization 
and race that have organized knowledge production ever since (at first quite explicitly, but, 
following the disgrace of racial politics in the wake of decolonization, more or less 
surreptitiously). Indeed, if for Shakespeare, at the cusp of the (long) Enlightenment, 
representations of exotic otherness blurred racial outlines to espouse a pandemic outlandish 
geography (whereby Othello’s Africanness, for instance, flowed freely into other forms of 
barbarity, whether Turkish, Egyptian or Indian),
17
 by the end of the period, when Kant was 
regularly lecturing on anthropology and physical geography at the University of Königsberg, 
otherness was strictly framed into a scientific racial order, in which race was explicitly defined as 
                                                 
17




a “class distinction between animals of one and the same line of descent (Stamm), which is 
unfailingly transmitted by inheritance.”
18
 
As far as history and geography as disciplines of knowledge production are concerned, 
reification led to their momentous (if protracted) transformation into sciences purged from the 
weight of rhetoric. This meant radically distinguishing the ‘content from the form:’ for 
disciplined history, past reality presented itself in the form of a narrative as such; for disciplined 
geography, the world presented itself in the form of natural, organic units (regions, continents, 
etc). In both cases, the role of the scholar was simply to represent what he (and with 
disciplinization, it was almost always a he) found in reality, whether past (history) or present 
(geography) or both (philosophy): the form, for disciplined knowledge, has no content. This 
contrasted with past practice, by which historical writing followed the rules of rhetoric (i.e. the 
formal stylistic choices of the historian were constitutive of the subject of history), and 
geographical knowledge was organized unambiguously according to political entities (as 
opposed to absolute, objective ones). The gist of the famous words of Ranke that became the 
motto of disciplined history (“only to show what actually happened”) may well then be adopted, 
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The time of disciplined history then, was chronological time, while its spaces were made 
up of bounded units containing innate characteristics: in Europe, ‘the nation’ (one immediately 
thinks of the Frenchman and his baguette); elsewhere, ‘the Orient’ (mustachioed), ‘the Islamic 
world’ (turbaned), ‘Africa’ (naked). This differentiation was of course not unrelated to the dual-
helixed consolidation of European colonialism and capitalism: indeed, the institutionalization of 
disciplines of knowledge at home coincided with the absorption (both militarily and ideationally) 
of increasing swaths of the world. Indeed, just as Kant was formulating his various critiques and 
groundings, another epistemological break was introduced in the order of knowledge: philology.  
Most revealing perhaps about the ‘philological revolution’ was that it took place almost 
simultaneously in Europe and in the colonies. While European scholars of various inclinations 
busied themselves by resuscitating older paradigms of paradisiacal tongues, lost continents and 
the origins of the human family through meticulous scientific studies that rendered them a new in 
myths such as “language as a mirror” reflecting “the images that form the soul of a people,” the 
“distinctive traits of a Volk,” “the development of human minds” etc.; comparative philologists 
set out to systematically archive the languages of the world and their structural connectivities.
20
 
In 1779, Friedrich August Wolf refused to register in any of the four faculties that constituted the 
entire curriculum of the University of Göttingen at the time (philosophy, medicine, law, 
theology), but insisted rather to matriculate as studiosus philologiae. Greek was of course taught 
in the faculty of theology, but for Wolf, Greek was the language of Homer before it was the 
language of the New Testament. Successful in his request for special enrollment as a student of 
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the Word (in the full sense of logos: language, discourse, narrative, reason
21
), Wolf went on to 
redefine the field of the classics and modern Europe’s relation to it.
22
 While Wolf was engaged 
in his studies of ancient languages, the English polymath William Jones set out to Bengal to take 
up a post with the East India Company concerned with matters of indigenous law. By early 1784, 
Jones and his acolyte Charles Wilkins (famous for being the first European translator of the 
Bhagavad-Gita) established the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and within another two years, he had 
helped effect the cognitive revolution that was to remap the study of the world. The founding 
moment of modern Orientalism, is summarized in his most famous pronouncement on the 
matter, which connects him explicitly to Wolf’s new discipline:  
The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; 
more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely 
refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the 
roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been 
produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all 





Friedrich Max Müller would later describe this moment as “the starting point for a new 
science of human origins”: “Thanks to the discovery of the ancient language of India, Sanskrit as 
it is called (…) and thanks to the discovery of the close kinship between this language and the 
idioms of the principal races of Europe, (…), a complete revolution has taken place in the 
method of studying the world’s primitive history.”
24
 From the very start then, Orientalism was 
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about a particular configuration of knowledge and power, and about comparing (but also 
contrasting) two self-contained and differentiated spatio-temporal entities, the Orient and the 
Occident.  
The two strands of the ‘philological revolution’ would become incarnate in the figure of 
none other than Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt: philologer supreme, friend of Wolf, student of 
Sanskrit, translator of both Aeschylus and the Bhagavad-Gita, and founder of the University of 
Berlin. Humboldt’s pronouncements in his influential work On Language of 1853 would 
facilitate the catapulting of philology into a fully fledged discipline assured of its scientificity. As 
Geoffrey Harpham notes, philologists in the nineteenth century were already “insisting that their 
discipline should be considered a true science, a refined and sophisticated practice that could 




Indeed it was a distinctly ‘philological order of things’ that was being structured, for 
philology was to become the midwife of the modern disciplines. Philology was, as Ernest Renan 
could declare by the middle of the century “la science exacte des choses de l’esprit,” and in those 
very same pangs of labor, modernity en large was born: “L’esprit moderne, c’est-à-dire le 
rationalisme, la critique, le libéralisme, a été fondé le même jour que la philologie.”
26
  
In other words, blend Kant, Wolf and Jones with a twist of French Revolution and 
Napoleonic wars and you get Wilhelm von Humboldt, the University of Berlin and the stage of 
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modernity. Or, put differently, Kant’s famous essay on the idea of the university and the need for 
reform, The Conflict of the Faculties, might be read alongside the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, 
and not simply because they occurred in the same year (1798), rather because both, and not just 




Al-Azhar in the Philological Order of Things 
Founded by the Fatimids in 970AD, al-Azhar has been described variously as “the great 
mosque of Islam,” “the brilliant one,” “a great seat of learning…whose light was dimmed.”
28
 Yet 
despite its assumed centrality, the illustrious mosque-seminary has elicited little critical study. 
Not surprisingly the historiography can be easily mapped according to two definitive spatio-
temporal frames that rely upon and/or re-inscribe modernity’s philological order of things: the 
paradigm of decline (and its various critiques), and what we can call the ‘lighthouse model’ 
which posits a normative agentive core and a derivative receptive periphery.  
The conceptual lattice molding this narratological structure begins not surprisingly in the 
discourse of Orientalism. In good Hegelian fashion, Islamic civilization was considered to have 
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once provided a contribution to the Universal Spirit, but was now in sustained decline. The 
evidence of such a contribution lay hidden in written documents from some Golden Age, and the 
tool with which to decipher it was primarily philology. According to this framework, at some 
time or other, possibly the thirteenth or fourteenth century (but the very fact that arguments 
broke out over the cutoff date only buttressed the idea itself), Arab-Islamic civilization entered a 
period of degeneration. Only the intervention of Europe could bring modernization, catapulting 
the decaying civilization into the fold of the universal march of history. 
This is only a general model, and it concerns specifically the ‘central’ lands of Islamic 
civilization (that is, the eastern part of what came to be known as the Arab world). In the case of 
the Ottoman Empire, the curve was a variation of the above: rise in the early fourteenth century, 
apogee in the mid-sixteenth century, and decline from then on until the European-induced 
reforms of the nineteenth century. The essential parameters remain intact, despite chronological 
or geographical variations: the subjects of history are self-contained and separate (Europe on the 
one hand, Islamic civilization, of which the Ottoman Empire partakes, on the other), and they are 
defined in relation to the time of modernity: as European civilization sprang out of its Dark Ages 
into the Light, elsewhere there was decline. Hence the theo-logo-centric fixation of traditional 
Orientalist scholarship identified by Edward Said, which “saw Islam (…) as a ‘cultural synthesis’ 




This overall interpretation of Arab-Islamic history has been prejudicial to a lucid 
examination of the intellectual life of the period between 1400 and 1800 (the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries suffer particularly in this regard, as they are theater of both ‘Arab-Islamic’ 
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and ‘Ottoman’ decline): since the ideal norms were posited as having been established in the 
classical period, the intellectual production which followed had to be operatively mimetic. It also 
heralded a tendency to detach ideas and texts from their conditions of production and 
consumption and to examine them in abstract relation to each other. Moreover, it meant that ‘the 
Islamic world’ (or ‘the Islamic city’, etc.
30
) was envisioned in the form of a circle revolving 
faithfully around a center from which emanates normative orthodoxy. Any diversion was 
understood as a perversion of the norm due to some cause that was external to Islam (be it 
superficial Islamization or Western influences). This in turn explains the strong centralizing bias 
in the study of the Islamic world, where any number of centers – those that produced the central 
texts and sustained the central authorities of Islamic civilization – became the focus for the 
explanation of the whole.
31
 
In the same period was constructed an idea of Africa that mirrored Islamic civilization in 
almost symmetrical fashion. Primitive, isolated and oral, African cultures were to be analyzed 
primarily through the discipline of anthropology. The symmetry is in no way coincidental: 
indeed, it was constitutive, as philology parceled out the organic civilizations of the world 
according to languages and scriptures, or lack thereof. (A partial exception was thus made of 
long-Christian Ethiopia, which, although it knew the written word and its dominant languages 
were Semitic – was still ‘Black.’)
32
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A result of the weighty legacy of missionary literatures in Western Europe, the meeting 
of the connected discourses of Orientalism and Abolitionism moreover, produced a repertoire of 
images pertaining to the constitution of ‘the Arab’ (white and Islamic) and ‘the African’ (black, 
animist) that continue to shape the disciplines in “Pavlovian fashion.”
33
 Such categorizations are 
patently evident, for example, in the historiography of the former Republic of Sudan, that 
landmass bridging ‘the Arab’ and ‘African’ worlds, whose people Winston Churchill described 
as a “mongrel (…) mixture of the Arab and Negro types produc[ing] a debased and cruel breed, 
more shocking because they are more intelligent than the primitive savages.”
34
 By contrast, 
concentrated media attention on the protracted war in the South of the country and later in Darfur 
insisted on this very cleavage.
35
 Of course, the framework in all cases is identical: whether they 
mix well or not, there is an Arab type and a Negro (African) one. Constrained by these 
taxonomies, the study of Islam in Africa/African Islam has tended to reproduce the dialectic of 
Islamization (of Africa) and Africanization (of Islam), in which the former provides structure, 
and the latter, content.
36
 The result is the ‘African Muslim:’ unique and peripheral to the trends 
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and forms of the wider ummah – and “so interlaced with local practice and belief as to be 
unrecognizable to the truly “orthodox”.”
 37
   
The Arab and African intelligentsia that emerged from the colonial-capitalist encounter 
would, as Joseph Massad and Valentine Mudimbe demonstrate, internalize European scholarly 
tropes about the Orient and Africa. In harmony with the framework of universal history, nahḍa 
and post-nahḍa Arab discourse (enshrined eventually in the new sphere of “Arab Intellectual 
History”) focused on language and pegged the (novel) notions of culture [thaqāfah] and tradition 
[turāth] to European teleologies to explain the civilizational belatedness of their societies: much 
in the same way that African colonial elites implicated themselves in the European invention of 
an ‘Idea of Africa.’
38
   
By equal measure, these very same themes continue to re-inscribe themselves into 
discourses and debates up to the present, but also to relate directly to the parameters that have 
defined the study of al-Azhar.   
Encapsulated in the ever-present epithet of al-Azhar as “Manārat al-Islām fī kulli makān 
wa zamān” [“the Lighthouse of Islam in all Times and Places”], the historiography partakes of 
colonial-nationalist teleologies grounded in a centrifugal type of essentialism. Its narrative arcs 
rest upon dynastic periodizations to chart a linear trajectory of greatness (the ubiquitous ‘Golden 
Age’), followed by centuries of perpetual decline until the moment of European-inspired 
modernization in the late nineteenth century, that is in turn plotted along a center-periphery axis 
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positioning Cairo/Egypt (and al-Azhar) at a nucleus, around which faithfully revolve concentric 
peripheries, both geographically and ontologically distant. 
The historiography can thus be divided into two parts, distinct but structurally related in 
the ways analyzed by Joseph Massad in relation to turāth and modernity. There is, on the one 
hand, a fair-sized body of scholarship on the early history of al-Azhar up to its ‘Golden Age’; on 
the other hand, a concentration on the late nineteenth century onwards. What remains distinctly 
ignored is the period in between (in traditional historical terms, the Ottoman era). When 
addressed, often in a perfunctory manner, the interrelated themes of decline and the lighthouse 
are re-inscribed into a burgeoning Arabic historiography by virtue precisely of al-Azhar’s 
location at the intersection of two further differentiated spatialities (African and Arab) and 
domains of historical inquiry (institutional-Ottoman and intellectual/cultural-Arab/Islamic). 
From the earlier generation of ʿAlī Mubārak and Musṭafā Bāyrām, to later historians Shawqī 
ʿAta Allāh al-Jamal, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Shinnāwī and Muḥammad Sulāymān, the subject of al-
Azhar has been dear to Arab intellectuals and has elicited a prolific literature eulogizing its status 
as the eternal beacon of Islam. It valiantly upheld the inviolability of religion, language, culture 
and sovereignty [al-dīn, al-lughā, al-ṭābiʿ al-ʿarabī wa ‘l-ḥurrīyah] in the face of foreign 
invaders of all kinds and radiated its civilizational and political light [nūruhu al-ḥaḍārī wa’l-
siyāsī] to the dark corners of unbelief.
39
 
The narrative is at its most condensed in the ‘official’ histories produced by notable 
Azhari historians and affiliates, many of which occupy pride of place in the current curriculum of 
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the Department of History and Civilizations of the al-Azhar University. This body of scholarship 
(beginning with  Maḥmūd Abu’l-ʿUyūn’s, Jāmiʿ al-Azhar (1949) and Muḥammad ʿInān’s, 
Tārīkh jāmiʿ al-Azhar (1985), extending to the institutionally sanctioned history al-Azhar: 
tārīkhahu wa ṭaṭwīrahu (1983), to ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Shinnāwī’s seminal Al-Azhar, jāmiʿan wa 
jāmiʿah of the same year, and to the more recent works of his students, Musṭafā Muḥammad 
Ramaḍān and Mujāhid Tawfīq al-Jundī)
40
 rests upon what we might call, the “citationary nature 
of Azharism,” to borrow and adapt Edward Said’s identification of the fundamental quandary in 
Orientalist portrayals of the Arab Muslim East.
41
 Its main arguments are repeated almost 
verbatim and augmented precisely by the intra-textuality. The institution’s uninterrupted 
existence for over a millennium is duly commemorated, while its variable fortunes are pegged to 
the rise and fall of the great Islamic dynasties in a series of works emphasizing al-Azhar’s 
intrinsic autonomy. Particularly during the late Ottoman period, as the inflection of an Arab or 
Egyptian sentiment gradually attributed the erosion of Arab-Islamic culture in the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth centuries to the Turkish yoke, thus adding it own distinctive layer of ‘late 
Ottoman decline [al-inḥiṭāṭ fī’l-ʿuṣūr al-ʿuthmāniyya al-akhīrā] to the story. This is in fact 
flagged in the very title of some of these works, such as al-Shinnāwī’s Dawr al-Azhar fī’l-ḥifāẓ 
ʿalā al-ṭābiʿ al-ʿarabī li’miṣr ibān al-ḥukm al-ʿuthmānī, or Muḥammad Rajab Bāyūmī’s Al-
Azhar bāyn al-siyāsah wa ḥurrīyat al-fikr.
42
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Al-Azhar and its agentive ʿulama re-emerge once more at the end of the nineteenth 
century as the naturalized spiritual-intellectual appendage of the state, guardians of the ummah, 
and protectors of a largely inert and shapeless populace from tyranny, both foreign and domestic. 
Repositioned as such, al-Azhar is ‘Egypt,’ as it pivots effortlessly and dutifully between the 
ideals of “nation” and “state,” and emits its civilizational grace to Muslims and non-Muslims far 
and wide. The diffusionist spatiality undergirds such decisive interventions as al-Jamal’s al-
Azhar wa dawrahu al-siyāsī wa ‘l-ḥadḍārī fī Ifrīqīyah and Sulāymān’s Al-Azhar wa ‘l-Sūdān, 
and it further reinforces al-Azhar’s centrality as an Arab/Egyptian/Muslim institution as in the 
seemingly axiomatic proclamation that it is in but not of Africa.
43
  
Western histories of al-Azhar are comparatively fewer (and further in between). For the 
most part, they convey a modular narrative of traditional Islamic learning derived from Gibb and 
Bowen’s Orientalist canon, and equally hover between the thematic of ‘the seminary and the 
state’ and that of ‘Islam’s central institution of learning.’
44
 The resonance with the Arabic 
historiography is therefore acute: Al-Azhar is mobilized as a potent signifier in the articulation of 
the claims of the larger paradigm: it was the lighthouse from which exuded the Islamic norm; it 
fell from greatness under the oppression of the Ottoman Turks; it succeeded nonetheless in 
fostering a unique Arab-Islamic identity through its maintenance of the Arabic language during 
the Dark Ages; it was at the forefront of the modernist reforms that returned to Egypt its identity 
and maintained it in sync with world civilization; and it played a momentous  part in the spread 
of orthodox Islam to more ‘primitive’ lands (especially Africa).  
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Renowned British Arabist and former employee of Her Majesty’s imperial embassy in 
Cairo, J. Heyworth-Dunne’s An Introduction to the History of Education in Egypt remains 
authoritative in the field. The text opens with a caveat: this work, explains the author, was 
“originally intended to make a study of the language and literature of the Modern Egyptians, 
but it was soon realised that before any serious work could be done in this field, it would be 
essential to investigate the channels through which the Egyptians received European education 
and culture.”
45
  Having mandated the socio-historical character of his study, Heyworth-Dunne 
moves to construct a portrait of eighteenth-century Egypt as “predominantly Islamic in culture 
(…) and at the tail end of a period where Islamic thought had gradually become stagnant 
through the fact that it was in the hands of a body of scholars still with the medaeval outlook on 
life, practically isolated from the rest of the civilised world, and out of touch with the new 
cultural developments of the West.”
46
  
In this single move, decline is swiftly established from the very first page as the 
referential frame by which Heyworth-Dunne’s readers are to apprehend all that is to follow. 
The author makes clear that it is only by studying the eighteenth century that we might begin to 
comprehend the not-quite-yet-modern Egyptian nineteenth century where there was “not 
exactly a complete change in the social and intellectual life of Egypt, but the introduction of 
another culture, quite new to Egypt, the growth of which was encouraged at the expense of the 
old system,” resulting in the conflict between the two cultures,” that became the “dominant 
feature of the nineteenth century” and beyond.
47
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Having set the historical and interpretative stage, the ensuing drama can now freely 
unfold, and as far as al-Azhar is concerned it is the same familiar story. The measure of 
decadence is quantitatively deduced by the number of schools or colleges in existence at any 
given moment, which in any case “gradually (…) became annexes or dependencies of this huge 
college-mosque, at least for the purposes of teaching.”
48
 A dual spatiality (urban Azhar over 
rural madrasas, Istanbul over Cairo) is evoked evidencing the mutuality of the decline thesis 
and the lighthouse model, and is reinforced again in discussions of a few non-native (and extra-
originary) scholars in the eighteenth century: “Special reference should be made to the number 
of non-Egyptian shaikhs who took part in the intellectual activities of the country particularly in 
Cairo.”
49
 But, such “foreigners,” Heyworth-Dunne insists, “rarely assimilated the manners and 
dress of the Egyptians, but lived apart in much the same way as they lived in their countries, so 
that they formed rather communities within the community.”
50
  
Writing almost a quarter of a century later, the protestant missionary, graduate of theology 
from Princeton and Columbia Universities and later president of American University of Beirut 
(1923-1948), Bayard Dodge expanded Heyworth-Dunne’s observations to produce the first 
comprehensive history of the institution in the English language, Al-Azhar: A Millennium of 
Muslim Learning.
51
 With characteristic missionary zeal, Dodge never loses sight of al-Azhar’s 
spiritual, as well as its social or pedagogical, function to which he returns again and again 
throughout the work. For Dodge, it is this dual occupation that marked al-Azhar’s greatness, 
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particularly during the luminous period of its foundation under the Fatimids, who aptly gave it 
the appellation the “Most Shining” (al-Azhar). And while it subsisted in one form or another 
throughout the institution’s long history, it was neglected during periods of decline and 
augmented in those of regeneration and virtuosity.
52
 Accordingly, he describes in great length, 
and perceptible admiration, the organization of learning under Fatimid patronage, where 
“subjects like philosophy and astronomy were taught at al-Azhar in addition to the Quranic 
studies.”
53
 After addressing the less-impressive Ayyubid period and the glorious Mamluk 
revival, he finally arrives at the Ottoman era, which is treated by comparison in a perfunctory 
and unadorned fashion. Why? Because, “during [these] centuries of Ottoman rule the history of 
Egypt was filled with events of such local and unimportant nature, that instead of dealing with 
the period in detail, only a few of its characteristics [should] be discussed in a general way.”
54
  
One of these “characteristics” was the by now common-place ‘decline of Muslim 
learning,’ but in place of Heyworth-Dunne’s realist pragmatism, Dodge explains this 
phenomenon in more sympathetic terms. In place of the dim and sluggish creatures we encounter 
in Hayworth-Dunne’s Introduction, Dodge’s ʿulama are represented as timid conservatives, 
fearful of innovation and therefore “inclined to be imitative rather than creative, writing 
expositions of ancient works instead of presenting new ideas of their own.”
55
 And this “in spite 
of their learning and desire for social justice,” and the notable “practical improvements” that 
took place in the eighteenth century, such as the grand cultural projects and architectural 
innovations of successive Mamluk amīrs (notably ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Kathkhūda) that produced al-
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Azhar in its current impressive form, or indeed the establishment of the important office of 
shāykh al-Azhar earlier in the seventeenth century.
56
 
Dodge’s compassionate performance and concerned language however can hardly be 
understood as a refutation of the decline thesis or indeed its sibling lighthouse model. To the 
contrary, his narrative is structured by and through the Orientalist prism, replicating the 
assertions of his predecessors, Gibb and Bowen – but also Edward William Lane and Heyworth-
Dunne, in the simplest and clearest terms.
57
 It reaches its crescendo when he arrives at 1798: 
“Into the midst of this old-time way of life, with its tyranny, mysticism and mediaeval culture, 
burst Napoleon Bonaparte, whose invasion was the prelude to the modern history of Egypt and a 
new chapter in the fortunes of al-Azhar.”
58
  
Having established the “beginnings of modern history,” Dodge steers his readers through 
the familiar plot of revolutions, religious reforms and renovation, which miraculously 
transformed al-Azhar into the modern institution it is today. By the end of the century, “at the 
time when the first waves of modernism were beating upon the hard beach of conservatism,” it 
was the inspiring examples of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, and his courageous student Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh, who first imagined the theological harmonization of science and religion. The 
competent support of the then rector of al-Azhar, Shāykh Hassūna al-Nawwawī and his cadres 
made that vision a reality – but, of course, always under the all-knowing, all-seeing figure of 
Lord Cromer. The reforms then were necessitated and are articulated precisely through the 
assumption of al-Azhar’s location at the pinnacle of a newly coined idea of ‘Islamic education,’ 
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and thus the center from which the needed comprehensive overhaul of Islam in general must 
necessarily emanate. 
 
The new and improved al-Azhar would thus ascend from the debris of centuries of 
degenerative stagnation so that its greatness, its “heroic influence”, would be “felt [once more] 
from Morocco to Indonesia.”
59
 Dodge’s concluding words, pronounced on the eve of the 
institution’s millennial anniversary, eloquently encapsulate its transformation and firmly 
establish the contours by which its history was henceforth to be apprehended.  
The first millennium of one of the oldest existing universities in the world has 
come to an end. Al-Azhar stands on the threshold of something new and 
unknown. (...) When Baghdad fell in the East and Cordova in the West, al-Azhar 
kept the torch of wisdom burning. When Islam was threatened by Crusaders and 
Mongolians, al-Azhar filled men’s hearts with courage. During centuries of 
Mamluk and Ottoman rule, al-Azhar kept alive a knowledge of the Quran and the 
language in which it was written. (...) When ignorance and calamity caused 
Muslim thought to become barren, al-Azhar encouraged the ethical influence of 
mysticism. During years of foreign rule and occupation of European armies, the 
Egyptian people hailed al-Azhar as a champion of patriotism. Although it has had 






Since Roger Owen’s seminal critique of Gibb and Bowen’s Orientalist monument, 
Islamic Society and the West, significant effort has been devoted in the past three decades to 
contesting the paradigm of decline.
61
 In Ottoman history, numerous approaches had been 
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adopted to this end.
62
 Arab-Islamic decline, on the other hand, had engendered contestation 
focusing mainly on culture and thought (this is perhaps fitting, since, as noted above, the 
Orientalist perspective fixated on state and society to demonstrate Ottoman greatness and 
decline, and texts and ideas in the Arab-Islamic case). In the domain of sharīʿa, Wael Hallaq, 
Haim Gerber and Baber Johansen, among others, had laid to rest the thesis that the Islamic 
legal tradition had become static following a few formative centuries.
63
 In the field of Egyptian 
history, Peter Gran’s pioneering study shook the ‘1798 paradigm’ to its roots by decrying with 
Afaf Marsot and André Raymond assumptions about the tyranny of Mamluk Egypt until the 
French invasion (a view launched by the Description de l’Égypte, which thus justified the 
civilizing French presence).
64
 Reinhard Schulze had advanced the idea of a general ‘Islamic 
enlightenment’ in the eighteenth century (centered on Egypt) – a controversial proposition 
which subsequently produced a literature both too large and too specific to be detailed here.
65
 
Suffice it to say that a vibrant intellectual sphere was uncovered, whether enlightened or not, in 
turn generating a critique of the critique, with Khaled al-Rouayheb and Stefan Reichmuth 
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contesting the notions of enlightenment or revival altogether with respect to a tradition that may 
not have declined in the first place.
66
  
Such re-orientations of temporality, however radical, often remained conditioned by 
Eurocentric teleologies. Executing an in-depth study of the cultural production before 1798, Gran 
for instance identified an intellectual effervescence around 1760, which he envisioned as the 
superstructural correlate to structural developments in the economy, both global and local. 
However, by grounding his analysis in a Marxist political-economy template isolating neat fields 
of Islamic knowledge in relation to fixed phases of an evolving capitalism he inadvertently 
folded his cultural history into a Eurocentric chronology and assumed a separation between 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ knowledge. In much the same way as the notion of “an Islamic 
Enlightenment” provided a singular grid of interpretation (despite the cultural modifier), Gran 
obscured the possibilities of differing temporalities where the notion of tradition was not 
necessarily be determined by its place in relation to the modern.
67
 In that respect, Timothy 
Mitchell’s dissection of the disciplinary metaphysics of colonial power (temporal, spatial and 
intellectual) remains a germane and indispensible corrective.
68
  
Africanist historiography too has seen a concerted (if comparatively minimal) effort to 
revise temporal and spatial constraints, yet as we shall see the field of Islam in Africa remains 
largely fixed within discourses of African particularity, marginality and relative syncreticism 
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originally set by its pioneers.
69
 Recent works, by Ghislaine Lydon, E. Ann McDougall, Anne 
Bang and others, have lain to rest the thesis of isolation by locating historical ‘trans-regional’ 
networks that connected African Muslims to their co-religionists across both desert and sea.
70
 
In so doing they have helped to shift attention, geographically speaking, from a focus on ‘roots’ 
to ‘routes.’
71
 What remains to be critically considered however is the very idea of trans-
regionality itself, which nevertheless envisages separate self-constituted entities (continents, 
countries, regions), each with a specific sets of characteristics defined and imposed by the 
contemporary scholar. 
Equally, the effort to re-capture connections between oral and written African cultures 
has enriched our understanding of the historical, intellectual and social currents prevailing in 
these societies. The pioneering work of John Hunwick and R. S. O’Fahey, culminating in the 
edition of the multi-volume reference The Arabic Literatures of Africa for example, has been 
pivotal in shattering the myth of African orality (and isolation), and has inspired a generation of 
scholars exploring various aspects of the circulation of texts and the transmission of learning 
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within the continent and beyond.
72
 However, the frequent lack of attention to concepts and the 
absence of a sustained analysis of the guiding proposition that ‘Africa’ could and/or should be 
integrated through texts, libraries, and above all the Arabic language, into a domain defined as 
‘Islamic,’ does little to subvert disciplinary thinking. Rather it partakes, if inadvertently, of the 
self-same epistemic logics of what I have been calling here ‘the philological order of things.’ 
And on both accounts, the neglect of such critical appraisals can only reify existing spatio-
temporal orders, leaving the lighthouse model very much intact.
73
 
As regards al-Azhar specifically the last ten or so years have again witnessed a renewed 
interest in the subject. The recent works of Marwa Elshakry, Jane Holt-Murphy, Indira Gesink, 
and Yaser Ibrahim have all elucidated different aspects of the historic and contemporary al-
Azhar and in different ways posed important challenges to the traditional decline narrative and/or 
nuanced its adoption by the emerging modernizing elite,  and thus for the most part, have 
concerned themselves with the period after late nineteenth century and the confrontation with 
modernity as played out in the comprehensive reforms orchestrated by key figures. Often in 
relation to the extent to which they achieved their modernizing (or non-modernizing) objectives, 
and/or the additional details they might add to the biographies of their chief architects, and/or the 
degree to which they were accepted or contested by a prevailing religious orthodoxy.
 74
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Collectively these studies have moreover revealed the various processes and perils by 
which new concepts and ideas are transmuted into a colonial context;
75
 and often the terms 
themselves (science, religion, modernity, etc.) are subjected to critical analysis. For example, in 
her insightful exploration of the reactions and responses to Darwinian evolutionary theories 
across the political and religious spectrum in the late nineteenth - and twentieth-century Arab 
world, Elshakry (in line with Gesink) has convincingly argued that the depiction of these 
responses as traditional/modern (or in political terms, conservative/liberal) reinforces a simple 
opposition between Western science and non-Western religion and obscures the complex ways in 
which these debates were translated and adapted by different actors to local conditions and 
agendas. She concludes that the secularization of knowledge that ensued in the aftermath of the 
reforms “was in many ways a product, and not the starting point, of the debate over “new 
sciences” in the late nineteenth century Arab East. Debates over Darwin were a contest not so 
much between religious thinkers and secularists as among believers, both Christian and Muslim, 
each staking out different positions.”
76
 In this way she provides an alternative, contextualized 
reading of late nineteenth-century Arab/Islamic thought.  
Similarly, although not dealing specifically with the al-Azhar itself, Murphy’s exciting 
dissertation examines the cultural and intellectual role played by the sciences in late eighteenth-
century Cairene scholarly circles and thus also offers an important corrective to the earlier 
studies of Heyworth-Dunne, John Livingston and others. Positioning her work on the “eve of 
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widespread direct European political involvement in the region,” Murphy argues against the 
prevailing decline historiography by highlighting a vibrant scholarly community that occupied 
itself with the study, collection, and production of “magico-scientific” – astronomical, 
astrological, medical, preternatural and mathematical – works and instruments. This “recovered 
history,” articulated in the main through ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī’s ʿAjāʾib al-āthār (which 
she reads not ‘as a history’ per se but as a contemporaneous reflection on unfolding events 
conditioned by a mediation on the concepts of society and justice), destabilizes claims of the 
“timeless opposition of ‘Islam’ to ‘Science’” and “alters our reading of reactions to scientific 
and political challenges of the French occupation (1798-1801) and the early years of Mehmet 
Ali’s reign (r. 1805 – 1849) and highlights the importance of situating both opposition and 
promotion of the sciences against an intellectual and social history.”
77
   
At the heart of the late nineteenth century reform projects however, was the production of 
particular modern subjectivities: the Azhari, the scholar, the Muslim, and above all, the Citizen. 
Indeed this was the explicit aim of ʿAbduh’s pedagogical initiatives, which as Elshakry notes 
were premised on the belief that education was the only effective “cure” for the “declining 
spiritual health of Egypt:” the objective then was one of national renewal through the spiritual 
and intellectual molding of its citizens.
78
 As I hope to show in chapter one, the institution of 
formal certificates in place of the classic ijāza, the establishment of standardized examination 
procedures to replace the individualized, indeed performative, methods previously utilized 
(whereby a student would be challenged by his colleagues in the presence of shāykhs to respond 
to difficult questions and problems posed on the basis of his reading of a specific text) as well as 
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the promulgation of strict codes of student conduct and personal hygiene, all worked to refigure a 
largely domestic realm of tarbīyah [instruction/upbringing – indexed principally by emerging 
ideas of ‘the family’] and that of taʿlīm [learning] and were part of the effort at producing well 
informed, disciplined subjects whose progress and aptitudes could be officialized [within the 
dictates and working of state sponsored apparatuses] and quantifiably determined by their 
‘qualifications.’  
The conjunction of these newly configured domains was a significant one: in the process, 
was elided a variable notion of learning and certain modes of ethical self-disciplining integral to 
the attainment of knowledge as a spiritual endeavour grounded in a moral community of 
scholarship that provided for its vocabularies. Such ethical facets do not entirely disappear, 
rather it is their institutional reconfiguration through the prism of ‘education and the nation’ that 
was entirely new. 
A further concentration on the issue of hygiene, highlighted by Elshakry and Gesink, is 
equally revealing of these shifts. In the wake of the reform period, hygiene appears to have been 
a national as well as a colonial obsession (both metaphorical and actual) that played an integral 
part in the shaping of proper moderns, as evidenced by ʿAbduh’s desire to educate the ʿulama as 
to “their responsibility for the moral health of the nation’s people,” as well as “the needs of a 
happy household and a happy society.”
79
 It also helped to visually create and buttress the idea of 
decline through the accompanying organic metaphor of decay. As Elshakry documents, in his 
tirade against al-Azhar, ʿAbd Allāh al-Nadīm for example, portrays a most graphic description of 
the state of general disorder, poor sanitation and neglected personal hygiene at al-Azhar:   
If we examine the state of this great university today (…) we find large 
numbers of students with no medical attention or control, such that diseases 
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spread rapidly among them (…). [T]heir dormitories are filthy, one finds in them 
bits of food strewn over the floors, mingled with filth dragged in by their shoes. 




These vivid representations conjure such strong feelings of antipathy that one could easily 
take them for the racist rants of colonial officers bemoaning the poor hygiene of the natives. That 
they were the words of a prominent Arab nationalist, and that they are not qualified by existing 
‘indigenous’ grammars relating to purity in its various guises (moral, medical, spiritual etc.), 
exemplifies the extent to which colonial tropes were absorbed fully formed by the emergent 
nationalist elite, and foretell the larger processes of universalizing discourses and shifts in modes 
of inhabiting the world. In other words, cleanliness gradually comes to be equated no longer with 
the Muslim’s faithful conduct, but with a general civilizational standing. Indeed, following a riot 
in 1896 at the Syrian riwāq [residential lodge] of al-Azhar which involved the forcible removal 
by the authorities of a student who was suspected to have fallen ill with the plague, Lord Cromer 
explained the students’ resistance not as the legitimate fear to surrender yet another sick 
colleague who might die at the state hospital (as was the case for two others before him), but 
rather as an essentially non-political act best understood as “the dislike of sanitary measures felt 
by the most ignorant and fanatical classes.”
81
  
Aspects of this attitude can already be gleaned in the famous exchange between ʿAbduh 
and Shāykh al-Bukhāyrī in which the latter demanded, “Do you know that you are an Azhari, 
and yet you have ascended to where you are on the stairs of knowledge and have become an 
exceptional scholar?” To which ʿAbduh replied defiantly, “If I have a portion of knowledge, as 
you mention, I have attained it through ten years of sweeping the dirt of al-Azhar from my brain 
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and to this day it is not as clean as I would like.”
82
 Whether such an altercation actually took 
place or not (it being cited by ʿAbduh himself, and later his student, Rashīd Riḍa) is irrelevant; 
what is more revealing is the language it mobilizes to signify decline through images of 
deterioration and decay. Not surprisingly then, the theme with all its civilizational inflections and 
provocations of disgust, is rehashed almost verbatim in the historiography on reforms:  
The sanitary condition of the mosque was also to be improved. (…) The 
courts and loggias had become unhealthy, with the floors unswept, bits of food 
left to rot, water spilt on the ground, dirty clothing strewn around, overcrowding 
at night, a clutter of chests and lockers, disagreeable odors and a plague of mice. 
As the students and even the teachers did not appreciate the danger from 
infection, there were always many skin diseases and epidemics were likely to 
occur. In 1896, for instance, the authorities came to remove a Syrian student, 




Hence, a resident doctor was appointed in 1898 “to take charge of the students’ health. He 
limited the number of boys sleeping in one place, demanded greater cleanliness, established a 
clinic and dispensary in the Riwaq al-‘Abbasi and removed boys with infectious diseases from 
the mosque.” And “in 1904 a government hospital was built near al-Azhar, but the present 
system of health service was not organized until 1929.”
84
 
Finally, it should be added that the historiography’s focus on the modern period is also in 
part determined by structural variables: for the historian researching al-Azhar quickly finds (after 
awaiting protracted security clearances) that the material available to her at the Egyptian 
National Archives under the archival code ‘5004’ [“al-wiḥda al-arshīviyya li ‘l-azhar al-sharīf”] 





 Dodge, op. cit.: 127 
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contains little if any documents for earlier periods, the oldest sijil dating from 1869 -1872.
85
 This 
archival dimension in itself necessitates reflection – not only on obvious questions of source and 
narrative (and the accompanying existential processes of research and its many contingencies), 
but also on the manner by which it orders the possibilities of the types of statements that can be 
made about al-Azhar, something that this dissertation also tries to highlight at various junctures. 
And this is perhaps all the more urgent in the context of the post – and counter-revolutionary 
politics currently unfolding in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, and where the Azhar 
establishment, seemingly satisfied for decades to have remained in the shadowy dusk of a former 
despotic regime, finds itself now having to renegotiate its rather tentative position of authority. 
Even as it confidently postures its resurfacing, “like a phoenix from the ashes,” to assume a the 
moral and political leadership of a country that finds itself, as if by déjà vu, once again at the 
supposed daybreak of another era.   
 
In the end, there might be no fitting summation of this contemporary discourse and the 
historiographical displays of decline/renaissance, center/periphery than that given in the elegant 
prose of the missionary scholar:  
In this new age of doubt, when the horizon is clouded by so many baffling 
problems, may Allah give courage and foresight to the leaders of al-Azhar, that 
they may guide the youth of Islam to a deeper faith in God and a broader vision of 
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Words, Orders, Disciplines: Or, the Road to Ballynahinch 
 
This dissertation then seeks to contribute to the historiography of al-Azhar, but also to a 
rethinking of the very categories used to study history. It forces us to reflect on our debt to the 
Enlightenment, just as it seeks to reveal the dissonance between Reason and its victims (past and 
present). In other words, it explores the paradox that lies at the heart of the concept of modernity 
where in the very universalism that makes disciplinary thinking possible is embedded naturalized 
hierarchical difference – differences of race, morality, civilization, society; in short, differences 
of economy in the olden sense of household (oikos) management (nomos), which remained the 
dominant meaning of the term until recently (as in the theological derivation of the word 
implying a divine plan for humanity). For we are all, as David Scott (following Talal Asad) 
suggests, “conscripts of modernity:” from the Negro slaves of yesteryear who made John Locke 
rich to today’s students of Europe and Islam who, unwittingly perhaps, reproduce the 
universalized categories of historical time and geographical space.
87
 
Setting its focus on the (long) eighteenth century, it investigates the epistemic basis upon 
which certain ideas of ‘Islam,’ the ‘Middle East’ and ‘Africa,’ come to be crafted as organizing 
concepts for comprehending historical realities and patterns of thought, and questions the 
existential postulates that arise from the association of these fields with the consolidation of 
European ideational and military power from the end of the period onwards. It seeks less to 
uncover an alternative history of al-Azhar, one grounded for instance in ‘authentic’ or ‘really-
existing’ spatialities and temporalities, than to offset the existing one: for quite simply “any 
imagining of a history detached from the condition that is modernity,” in Wael Hallaq’s 
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unadorned phrase, “is simply ontologically inconceivable.”
88
 Its task rather is a more diffident 
one. It examines how the history of al-Azhar has been scripted through various textual 
explorations that pivot in space (between Europe and non-Europe) and time (modernity and 
pre-modernity), even as it imagines an intellectual universe bounded by texts and authors who 
lived before and outside Europe, one that articulated itself in conceptual, epistemic, moral, 
social, cultural and institutional ways modernity as such cannot capture. 
Broadly speaking, the analysis is organized around three inter-related themes. First, the 
question of ‘Order’, both as an epistemic condition and a proper noun connoting a systematized 
ideal state as well as the processes of restructuring by which it is effected and apprehended: Al-
Azhar is accordingly situated in the modern order of knowledge whilst made to bare other 
regimes of knowing and learning that might have previously taken place within its elusive 
walls, and their subsequent remolding to better fit the dictates of the modern.  
Second, the modes of ‘Discipline’ and disciplining, which implicated both the content of 
the knowledge to be transmitted, as well as the individuals involved in its diffusion and 
reception, and ushered a new conception of ‘education’ which elided a preceding state of 
affairs where edification (spiritual, moral, communal and practical) was at the heart of the quest 
for knowledge as an embodied ethical practice. In other words, it elucidates discursive shifts in 
the entanglement of disciplines of knowledge with those of the self at a particular historical 
juncture and location, focusing on ideas of God, Man, Cosmos, Law, Learning, World, Text 
and their several meanings, practices and interpretative modalities.  
Third, and perhaps most cogently: the power of the ‘Word.’ Indeed, while a great number 
of texts and tracts have been instrumental in shaping its arguments and directions, no single 
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work fuses the thematics of this dissertation better perhaps than Goethe’s Faust – the play as a 
whole in general, and the passage cited in opening epigraph (above) in particular. And this is to 
be expected, since Goethe’s masterpiece encapsulates with startling lyrical creativity the entire 
universe of modern knowledge and power. Like the chapters of this dissertation, Faust deals 
with the questions of learning and education, the problem of the adequate repository of 
knowledge, of identity and ethics, of colonialism and modernity, and, most evidently, of occult 
science. But first and foremost, as indicated in the cited epigraphic extract, Faust is about 
matters philological.  
This dissertation too is, when all is said and done, about the power of the word. And by 
the word here is not meant simply the basic unit of language and primary carrier of meaning, but 
also, more profoundly, the Word in the sense of order and command, and beyond, the Word of 
God, the embodiment of divine will and wisdom as revealed in the Scriptures.  
A short etymological detour here may be useful here. The multiple meanings of the word 
in English derives largely from the similarly polysemantic ancient Greek λόγος (logos), which 
itself results from the verb λέγω (lego), meaning variously: to lay down, order, arrange, gather, 
choose, count, reckon, say, speak, converse, tell a story, and, finally, mean. Thus, the verbal 
noun logos came to carry multiple connotations. The classic Liddell and Scott Greek-English 
Lexicon divides these into ten different clusters, beginning with the idea of computation or 
reckoning, and, connected to this sense, a relation, correspondence or proportion. A slight leap in 
abstraction leads to the next cluster of meaning, relating to the question of explanation more 
generally. Then, getting closer to the modern meaning of word, comes the notion the “inward 
debate of the soul,” in which the editors include all things relating to reason and reasoning, 




and also a particular utterance or saying. The word therefore can also mean the thing spoken of, 
the subject-matter, as well as speech regarded formally. And finally, the tenth and final sense of 
logos is “the Word or Wisdom of God, personified as his agent in creation and world-
government,” which, the entry ends, in the New Testament “is identified with the person of 
Christ.” 
In Arabic too, the polysemic power of the word has had a long life.
89
 Naturally, this was 
the case in the Christian tradition, kalima was the logos of the Scriptures, and it therefore carried 
with it the multiplicity of meanings: “fi ’l-badʾi kana al-kalima wa ’l-kālimatu kana ʿinda Allāhi 
wa kana al-kalima Allāh.” (Injil Yuhanna, 1:1). Many a theological commentary attended to the 
senses and implications of these opening phrases of the Gospel of John. In the Islamic tradition 
too, the question has held an equally important place, in various dimensions. The expression 
kalimat Allāh tended to mean a single divine utterance, with, of course, the extensive power that 
it may have. In addition, the expression kalām Allāh is used in the Qur’an, as is well known, and 
has over the course of the centuries ignited great debates within and without the tradition 
concerning the question of whether kalām was one of the divine attributes [ṣifāt], and, by 
extension, whether how the Qur’an as the spoken utterances of God relate to the Word as divine 
attribute. Finally, there is also the field of knowledge called ʿilm al-kalām, which has been 
defined (in the Mawāqif of al-Idjī) as “the science which is concerned with firmly establishing 
religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing doubts,” and on which there is a 
substantial scholarship, mostly of a philosophical bent.
90
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 The power of the word was moreover identified by Timothy Mitchell in Colonising Egypt 
as the locus and vector of radical transformations in late nineteenth century Egypt, (and in this 
respect too we may consider it to be part of the new philological order of things). By defining the 
essence of both writing and politics as “something essentially mechanical,” a simple “process of 
communication”, the new order of things in colonial Cairo “served to introduce a modern and 
mysterious political metaphysics.”
91
 Part of the mystery involved in modernity is precisely the 
masking of the power of the word. It took modern philosophy until 1962 and J. L. Austin’s 
ground-breaking lectures to rediscover that one could do things with words. For the Azhari 
scholar Husāyn al-Marṣafī, whom Mitchell mobilizes to help think through the question of 
writing, there “was no analytic separation in this approach between writing and politics, or 
between theory and practice. Every political act was an interpretation of words, and thus a 
textual act, a reading. (...) The political world was not a posited object, independent of written 
language. Words were not labels that simply named and represented political ideas or objects, 
but interpretations whose force was to be made real.”
92
  
Hence, at the level of methodology, this dissertation also grapples with questions of 
interpretation and engages ‘the word as text’ to be deciphered in ways that pay close attention to 
the act of reading: its centrality as a concept, its multiple forms as a method, and ultimately, the 
possibilities that different strategies of reading (over-reading, under-reading, slow reading, 
reading against, or reading between the lines) might afford.  
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If Faust encapsulates, in a sense, the spirit of this project, three key theoretical 
inspirations (as difficult as it is to attempt such a distillation) frame much of its discussions. 
Crucially, all three refer directly, if differently, to the power of the word: Michel Foucault, 
Anthony Grafton, and Talal Asad. The first shows that an important part of that thing called 
modernity has to do with words; the second, that the power of words and texts persisted much 
later than assumed (and was certainly not displaced by the so-called Scientific Revolution); and 
the third, that the way we ought to conceptualize this thing called Islam as a coherent whole is as 
a tradition of engagement with the Word. 
From Foucault, I derive the basic idea that there occurs a transformation in the very late 
eighteenth-century of total epistemic salience in the Western European tradition: paralleling the 
similarly abrupt changes that occur in the form and content of the very logic of different domains 
of labor, language and life. This is decisive, for it not only explains the deep seismic shifts that 
frame the emergence of notably history, geography and philology as disciplines, but also the 
modern structure of race as a concept. It also points to the necessity not to simply translate such 
concepts and disciplines freely across time as stable, organic and eternal cognitive objects, but to 
investigate instead their particular genealogies, in function of varying discursive formations. It is 
then not a coincidence that the modern disciplines should emerge at the same moment, and 
operate according to remarkably similar parameters rather, the concurrence is itself a product of 
the profound epistemic arrangement that organized the horizons of possibilities of thought. As is 
well known, Foucault analyzes shifts in the “order of things” as they concern the three different 




cases involves the emergence of the new category at the core of modern knowledge: man, as a 
living being, both subject and object of science, defined first and foremost by historicity.  
Foucault makes sense of the innovations leading to the birth of the human sciences in 
various related maneuvers.
93
 One of the new disciplines which he explores is philology. Once 
again, the original features of the novel scholarly practice corresponds to the common epistemic 
reordering of words and things, involving a move away from representation as the organizing 
principle and towards the sovereign coherence of organic systems. The break arises first with 
William Jones, and then, fully-fledged, with Bopp and others in the early nineteenth-century, 
when “the word is no longer attached to a representation except in so far as it is previously a part 
of the grammatical organization by means of which the language defines and guarantees its own 
coherence.”
94
 This new conception of words involves a number of significant implications, and 
the ones that concern us most directly are twofold. Firstly, that language no longer pivots upon 
“the things perceived” but rather on “the active subject”, so that “it is a product of will and 
energy, rather than of the memory that duplicates representation.”
95
 By consequence, “language 
is no longer linked to civilizations by the level of learning to which they have attained (...), but 
by the mind of the peoples who have given rise to it, animate it, and are recognizable in it.”
96
 In 
turn, this “means that the conditions of historicity of language are changed at once: its mutations 
no longer come from above (...) but take being obscurely from below, for language is neither an 
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instrument nor a product (...) but a ceaseless activity...”
97
 For modern philology, then, the bearer 
and speaker of the language is the people as a whole – and linguistic change corresponds to the 
development of the people, not the elite. The other crucial development is the one that is 
common to the larger epistemic break. With the capacity to determine languages as formal, 
organic totalities comes their intrinsic historicity: a temporality that can be charted in 
evolutionary terms, and which permits the establishment of “systems of kinship between 
languages” thereby also involving spatio-temporal links (as described above).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, Foucault’s work has been helpful in many ways but 
two in particular are worth reiterating. Firstly, at the theoretical and methodological levels, it 
demonstrates the necessity of never assuming the constancy of historical objects, so that even the 
human as an analytical category is an effect of the cavernous discursive configurations that the 
author’s archaeology excavates. Indeed, disciplines of knowledge can no longer be traced as one 
continuous self-becoming leading to modernity, but should be understood instead as being 
particular to larger epistemic formations. Thus, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī’s (1753-1825) 
practice of history, for example, which I explore in detail in the second chapter, should not be 
read along, or even necessarily against, modern historiography or concepts, but rather as 
belonging to a specific tradition that provided his truth-claims with their conditions of 
possibility.  
Secondly, Foucault observes that the simultaneous emergence of the autonomous 
disciplines (the human sciences) alongside the novel scientific concept of race in the early 
nineteenth century is not coincidental but constitutive. It is the modern order of things as a total 
epistemic organ that creates the space for the deployment of these innovative disciplines and 






concepts. The profound relations between history, geography, anthropology, biology, philology 
and race then, are not inadvertent, and may not simply disappear with superficial renunciations 
of one element or another (such as say scientific racism) if the underlying discursive logics of 
which they are mere symptoms remain.  
It is thus imperative to keep in mind, when exploring times and spaces outside of the 
structures of our modern orders of knowledge, that divisions now taken for granted, such as that 
opposing science from textual exegesis, or real science from occult science, or indeed 
scholasticism from experimentation, are inoperative. Again: particular genres and disciplines 
must be understood and analyzed within their larger cognitive and discursive operational fields, 
and not on the basis of later divisions of labor and knowledge. And here salient parallels may be 
drawn in relation to the epistemic shifts outlined by Foucault, and Katharine Park and Lorrain 
Daston’s rendition of scientific practices in early modern Europe. ”The medieval Latin scientia,” 
they argue, “although cognate with the modern English “science,” referred to any rigorous and 
certain body of knowledge that could be organized (…) in the form of syllogistic demonstrations 
from self-evident premises,” and thus included rational theology, but excluded “disciplines that 
studied empirical particulars” such as natural history.
98
 In place of the now common division of 
knowledge according to “subject matter (e.g. non-living versus living beings)” or “method 
(experimenting in laboratories versus reading books in libraries and classrooms), the division of 
knowledge in premodern Europe was,” they maintain classified according “to whether it served 
purposes that were “speculative” (i.e. theoretical), “practical” (i.e. related to leading a good and 
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[e]arly modern career trajectories can often appear to modern eyes at once 
dazzlingly diverse and oddly circumscribed: A Renaissance engineer such as 
Leonardo da Vinci painted, designed buildings and machines, drew maps, and 
built fortresses and canals. But (despite his curiosity about human anatomy) he 
would not have treated patients nor (despite his speculative ideas on the nature of 
water) would have taught a university class in natural philosophy. The 
multifaceted “Renaissance man,” they conclude is thus “to some extent a trick of 
historical perspective, which creates polymathesis out of what was simply a 





The various authors of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Cairo whom will be 
encountered in the course of this dissertation too did not see a contradiction between practicing 
science and exegesis, mysticism and scholarship, so neither should we. Furthermore, we mustn’t 
superimpose on their intellectual productions anachronistic meta-categories such as “science” or 
even “history”, but rather pay attention to the specific disciplines and genres that conditioned and 
made possible their work. As I elucidate in chapter one, in the particular institutional history of 
al-Azhar, on which much of this dissertation is focused, a discourse of the “two cultures” only 
emerged in the first decade of the twentieth-century. 
 
This brings us to the second key intervention framing the explorations of this dissertation, 
Anthony Grafton’s lifelong work on the enduring importance of the routinely textual tradition of 
Renaissance humanism (and beyond). Most compactly formulated in his collection of essays 
Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800, the basic 
idea is simple but powerful: the meta-narrative that plots the scientific revolution as rendering 
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obsolete the older textual hermeneutics is mistaken.
101
 Instead, what Grafton demonstrates, with 
characteristic erudition and lucidity, is that the intimate attention to textual matters continued to 
direct scholarly practices for much longer (in amongst other things, both the careful balancing of 
the “tralatitious,” the authoritative, the individualistic, and the general, as well as in the very 
movements within and of texts). To the extent, that there need not be any easy contradiction 
between the categories ‘modern science’ and ‘traditional textualism (or even scholasticism)’ to 
begin with.  
Indeed the assumptions that oppose humanism to science are themselves predicated 
ultimately upon the professed assertions of the self-styled founders of the new, modern science 
themselves. Bacon, Descartes, Pascal and even Galileo, and all the “manifesto-writers of the 
New Science,” Grafton argues, tended to dismiss “those who tried to decode the book of Nature 
with the methods of humanist philology rather than observation and computation.”
102
 Most 
flamboyant, though quite exemplary, is perhaps Bacon’s famous edict: “Down with antiquities 
and citations or supporting testimonies from texts; down with debates and controversies and 
divergent opinions; down with everything philological.”
103
 Such claims, Grafton cautions, should 
not be taken at face value for the interactions between ‘humanism’ and ‘science’ were intimate, 
multiple and continuous – so that the terms themselves are far less coherent and impermeable 
than the prevailing orthodoxy presupposes. Just as the “humanists did not confine themselves to 
strictly literary areas of study,” so too the scientists “often did work of great penetration and 
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originality in the humanist fields of textual exegesis and cultural history.”
104
 In other words, the 
“two cultures” is quite simply a creation of a much later age: namely, Western Europe of the 
nineteenth century, which sought to segregate knowledge into separate domains of 
classics/letters and science/technology. Or as Owen Hannaway would have it: “the antithesis 
between science and humanism is of fairly recent origin and came into being only in response to 
the maturation and professionalization of science in the academy at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.”
105
 The chronology here too corresponds roughly to Foucault’s, as this is the 
moment of the consolidation of the modern episteme.  
The relationship between words and things, then, as both Foucault and Grafton affirm, is 
central to modernity, and to the novelty that it introduces into the orders and disciplines of 
knowledge. This dissertation too is perforce about the power of the word and the ways through 
which different discursive configurations regulate, or order, specific fields of knowledge. Thus, 
just as the question of the power of the word hovers above all its parts (in ways both apparent 
and subtle), each chapter explores a specific institutionalized ordering of things: beginning with 
the institutionalized order of ideas and teaching (in the university of chapter one); then, the order 
of texts and books (the library in chapter two); followed by the order of peoples and places (with 
chapter three’s focus on race, geography and history); and ending with the order of arts and 
sciences (as reflected in the question of the occult in chapter four).   
And what emerges simultaneously, is that the understanding (or in Foucault’s terms, the 
“experience of order”) was rather dissimilar in the world of the eighteenth-century al-Azhar. 
Among the different meanings and linguistic uses he provides, Murṭaḍā al-Zabīdī (1732-1791) 
for, example, defines order [niẓām] as “composition and the correspondence of a thing to 
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something else, and everything that one compares to another, one has ordered, [Also] … to order 
a thing like pearls and beads” is analogous to saying “it is an order of pearls. [al-taʾlīfu wa 
ḍammu’l-shāyʾ īlā shāyʾin ākhar, wa kullu shāyʾ qarīntah bi’ ākhara fa qad naẓamtah. Wa’l- 
niẓāmu: (al-manẓūmu) bi’l-luʾluʾi wa’l-kharazi waṣfan bi’l-maṣdarī, wa yuqālu: naẓmum min 
luʾluʾin.]”
106
 Al-Zabīdī is of course making a linguistic point here, but two aspects of his 
definition are notable. First is the resonance of this notion of order with the descriptions that 
scholars gave of their own methods of composing their works (for instance, al-Jabartī through his 
discussion of his assemblage of the sources upon which he relied, and al-Kashnāwī’s 
rationalization for reordering his abridgement of an earlier classic text – discussed in chapters 
three and four). To be sure the metaphor of ordered pearls was a common one in the tradition 
often deployed as a title for many works (including al-Kashnāwī’s own al-Durr al-manẓūm wa 
khulāsāt al-sirr al-maktūm).
107
 Second, are the echoes between this idea of order and that 
described by Foucault for the pre-modern episteme where things were ordered primarily on the 
basis of their resemblances “as elements related to one another by identities and differences in 




The methods of “reordering reality” that were instituted at al-Azhar and, as Mitchell 
demonstrates, in Egypt more largely, after the nineteenth century would not only introduce new 
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words and concepts, but an all together “new way of regarding things and their interrelations.” 
Realities are no longer found in chains of resemblances between related elements, but in the 
existence of “organic structures,” connected to one another by the analogies between them as 
“discrete structures” and “hence between their functions.”
109
  In the case of al-Azhar the shift 
emerges suddenly and forcefully just as the new designations of ‘student,’ ‘text,’ ‘university,’ 
‘diploma,’ etc. are introduced for the first time as “discrete structures” and made legible through 
their connections to one another and to an overarching concept of ‘education,’
110
 and thus just 





Finally, the third, and perhaps most manifest, intervention defining the contours of the 
following chapters is by Talal Asad. His genealogical reflections on the concepts of religion and 
various engagements with the epistemic orders of liberalism and secularism have been critical in 
provoking the thought processes underlying this dissertation and its arguments. But especially 
pertinent has been his classic essay on The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam.
112
 First published 
in 1986, it has been influential in stimulating the consideration of what it is exactly that scholars 
(in his case anthropologists) study when they claim to take ‘Islam’ as an object of analysis. The 
primary problem, as usual in the forging of analytical concepts of this sort, has been how to 
account for internal diversity. The most common maneuver to organize and make sense of this 
                                                 
109






 Mitchell, Colonising Egypt: 86. 
 
112





plurality has been to draw a distinction between orthodox and unorthodox Islam, or between a 
Great and Little Tradition. While Asad restricts his comments explicitly to the discipline of 
anthropology (and in particular to the work of Clifford Geertz and Ernest Gellner), it is 
noteworthy that this analytical ploy is equally, if not more, common in historical accounts of 
‘Islam,’ (and, as I discuss in chapter four, it is especially ubiquitous in the scholarship on Islam 
in Africa for the reasons outlined above).  
In all cases, the dichotomy is far-reaching. On the one hand, there is the orthodox 
Islam/Great Tradition of the towns: scripturalist and puritanical in its faith; fixated on sacred 
texts; authorized by written doctrine and law; invariable, singular, and universalizing in its form. 
On the other hand, there is the unorthodox/Little Tradition of the countryside: characterized by 
saint-worship and rituals; attached to sacred persons; authorized by memories of oral culture; 
locally conditioned; endlessly multiple and particularistic in its contours.
113
 Although Gellner 
and Geertz are usually seen as belonging to opposite anthropological approaches, Asad cogently 
demonstrates that in the case of their conceptualization of Islam, they share much more than is 
perhaps generally acknowledged. Indeed, both are shown to conceptualize Islam as a religion 
representative of a social structure, and to chart their analysis in a dramaturgical narrative. In 
both cases, this leads to the exclusion of the subjects’ own Word: “for Geertz, as for Gellner, the 
schematization of Islam as a drama of religiosity expressing power is obtained by omitting 
indigenous discourses, and by turning all Islamic behavior into readable gesture.”
114
 In other 
words, the actors in this epic theater that is Islam “do not speak, they do not think, they 
behave.”
115
 Instead, Asad urges that we take “historically defined discourses seriously, and 
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especially the way they constitute events.”
116
 And thus, he famously concludes, if one seeks to 
study Islam, “one should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that 
includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’ān and the Hadith.”
117
 Thus, Islam, he 
continues, “is neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, 
artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition.”
118
 To the question “what is a tradition?” Asad, 
referencing his debt to “the insightful writings of Alisdair MacIntyre, in particular his brilliant 
book After Virtue,” then answers: “A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to 
instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely 
because it is established, has a history.”
119
 This particular formulation of the way Islam as an 
analytical object should be conceptualized has extensive consequences, both in general (and as 
pertaining to the word) and specifically for the arguments contained in this dissertation.  
First, though Muslim discourses will, like all traditions, place Islamic practices in the 
present in relation to explicit understandings of the Islamic past (as well as the future), this does 
not mean that it is therefore imitative of the past, for what matters is “apt performance (...) not 
the apparent repetition of an old form.”
120
 Therefore, a particular practice is Islamic not because 
a scholar deems it so, but rather “because it is authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam, 
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Second, though orthodoxy is clearly “crucial to all Islamic traditions,” what is missing 
from the existing accounts is that “orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive 
relationship – a relationship of power.”
122
 Again, Islamic orthodoxy is not what erudite 
Orientalists or historians or anthropologists make it to be, it results from situations “wherever 
Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to 
condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones.”
123
 What needs to be explored by the 
scholar, then, is not the behaviors of dramatis personae and how these belong to one social 
blueprint or another, but rather the “way these powers [to regulate correct practices] are 
exercised, the conditions that make them possible (social, political, economic, etc.), and the 
resistances they encounter.”
124
 And this is just as applicable to the city and the countryside, the 
past and the present.  
This leads to the third major consequence of the conceptualization of Islam as a 
discursive tradition: argument, conflict and reasoning are integral to it, since the “process of 
trying to win someone over for the willing performance of a traditional practice (...) is a 
necessary part of Islamic discursive traditions as of others.”
125
 Indeed, “reason and argument are 
necessarily involved in traditional practice whenever people have to be taught about the point 
and proper performance of that practice, and whenever the teaching meets with doubt, 
indifference, or lack of understanding.”
126
 In other words: always.  
 



















The chapters to follow may, in this sense, be read as explorations of various instances of 
“instituted practice (set in a particular context, and having a particular history) into which 
Muslims are inducted as Muslims.”
127
 Indeed, the various authors, institutions and concepts that 
will feature in its pages all partake in the yearning to impart to their subjects the proper practices 
of Islam. This is not only true in the most obvious case of al-Azhar as a self-professed Muslim 
university (as it will begin to conceive of itself in the twentieth century), but also in relation to 
the treatise on the occult sciences of the Katsinan scholar explored in the fourth chapter.  
Thus, in addition to the word and to orders of knowledge, this dissertation is concerned 
with embodied ethics and disciplines of the self. This is because at the forefront of the concern of 
all of the scholars and institutions in and around al-Azhar that are addressed in this dissertation 
there remained the crucial objective of fostering the proper practices for one to lead the good life 
as a Muslim. For Azharis and their acolytes, past and even present, disciplines of knowledge 
ultimately could (and perhaps, should) not be cut off from disciplines of self. The intimate 
imbrication of the two is perhaps best encapsulated in Ibn Khaldūn’s profound designation of 
knowledge as a sort of “habit” embodied by the scholar (and conditioned by the practices of its 
transmission): 
 Habit [malākah] is different from understanding and knowing [al-fahm wa’l-
waʿy]. (…) Understanding of a single problem in a single discipline may be found 
equally in someone well versed in [it], and in the beginner, in the common man 
who has no scientific knowledge whatsoever, and in the accomplished scholar. 
Habit, on the other hand, belongs solely and exclusively to the scholar (…).” 
Moreover, “all habits are corporeal [jismānīyah], whether they are of the body, or 
like arithmetic, of the brain [al-dimāgh] and result from man’s ability to think and 
so on. All corporeal things are sensibila [maḥsūsāt]. Thus, they require instruction 
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[al-sanad fī’l-taʿlīm]. Therefore, a tradition of recognized teachers [who instruct] 




One caveat is in order concerning my adoption of Talal Asad’s work. Recent critics of his 
approach to the anthropology of Islam have articulated their disagreement by an appeal to the 
concept of everyday life which they mistakenly view as being in opposition to his emphasis on 
Islam as a discursive tradition.
129
 I too will make use of the idea of everyday life, but, in an 
entirely different manner since my focus will be on the ‘everyday life of ideas and texts,’ and not 
people. I therefore do not see this concept as divergent from that of a discursive tradition 
outlined by Asad, but rather integral to it insofar as my project is precisely to “extend the idea of 




Framed by these various theoretical interventions, this dissertation, to repeat, is about the 
power of the word, whether evidenced by the nefarious consequences of the incitement to racial 
discourse, or by the compulsion to establish a Library adequate to Islamic heritage, or by the 
embodied ethics performed by the scholar, or by the pervasive energy of a talismanic 
combination of letters. And though positivist modernity has claimed emancipation from the 
Word, the greatest attestation to the power of the word which this dissertation grapples with is 
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the enduring discursive weight of post-Enlightenment Europe on how we write about the past. 
Indeed, though most nineteenth-century European thinkers did not pay great attention to the 
intricate effects of language on discourse, their successors and critics, beginning with Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, de Saussure, and culminating in figures such as Austin and Derrida, who, whatever 
their many differences, all devoted tremendous attention to words and writing.  
 
Chapter Outline 
In the conceptual back and forth between different and overlapping times and spaces 
then, each chapter interrogates a particular theme in the interstices between the strictures of the 
modern and the potentialities of the amodern.  
 Chapter one focuses explicitly on al-Azhar as an institution, and on how it comes to be 
seen as the Islamic University par excellence. In fact, al-Azhar properly became a university 
only in 1961, and it only came to represent self-consciously the apex of something called Islam 
in the early 1900s. Indeed, Arabic sources (even in the texts of the much acclaimed modernizing 
reformers) before the twentieth century only refer to the place as a mosque. The chapter proceeds 
on two fronts: it re-visits the reforms of al-Azhar, showing that they are best conceived as a 
series of abrupt ruptures, or moments, rather than the natural historical becoming of the 
institution at the pinnacle of an always existing Islamic education; even as it begins an 
exploration of what al-Azhar may have been before the twentieth century if not an Islamic 
university. What is most reveling, perhaps, is that, as far as al-Azhar’s constitution as a space of 
modern time is concerned, only in 1908 was the category Islam made relevant, and the concept 
of religion rendered native. The chapter also evokes the intimate connections between modern 




non-modern ordering and transmission of knowledge depended upon an intimate nexus of 
relational chains connecting persons, things and words that sought to engrain first and foremost 
an embodied ethics of learning. 
 Chapter two hones in on a story within the story: the Library, both in its larger 
articulation as a metonymic stand-in for civilization and illumination generally in Enlightenment 
Europe, and then in the internalization of the bibliographic paradigm in the case of al-Azhar in 
the midst of its late nineteenth century reform. Again the problem of the constancy of historical 
objects arises here: as the Library came to be a vector of civilizational worth, the value of 
Arab/Islamic culture was pegged to its constitutive libraries (even though these associations are 
shown to make no sense to earlier scholars such as al-Jabartī), whether by academics seeking to 
credit Islam with the birth of time honored libraries (e.g. Baghdad), or their destruction 
(Alexandria), or by the desire of modernizing Azhari reformers and scholars to create a library 
worthy of embodying the heritage of Islam and the Arabs. Ultimately, the rise to dominance of 
the bibliographic imagination participated in the purging of learning from its embodied ethics, 
explicit politics, and assumed rhetorics in favor of a positivist technicality of archiving 
(classification, arrangement, cataloguing, sequencing, ranking etc.) that is integral to modern 
library and information science.   
 Chapter three moves from institutions and things to people explicitly. People, first, as 
they are classified and prearranged in the modern order of knowledge, and, in a second motion, 
as they are conceived in another different epistemic mode. The exegesis converges onto one 
classic text, al-Jabartī’s ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fi’l-tarājim wa’l-akhbār.
131
 It first addresses seriously 
the yearning of some Western scholarship to locate ‘Africans’ in the text (and in this way 
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evaluate the place and standing of said Africans in Cairo of the late eighteenth/early nineteenth 
century, or even in the Arab/Islamic mind more generally). Having demonstrated that such a 
search involves more current concerns and concepts, the chapter then explores the text’s self-
presentation, and its depiction of people and knowledge. In place of geo-racialized identities and 
subjects of the modern episteme, the analysis reveals that al-Jabartī’s squarely places his text in a 
pre-modern generic formation and an embodied ethics of writing, which conditioned the 
methodology, epistemology and objectives of historical writing in particular and scholarly 
practice more largely. 
 Chapter four pursues and congregates the previous lines of analysis, by narrating the life 
and work of a scholar from what is now northern Nigeria, who traveled to the Hijaz and then to 
Cairo, where he spent the rest of his life around al-Azhar. A celebrated scholar, he wrote, among 
others in various other fields, a highly influential synthetic introduction to the field of the occult 
sciences. Here too are eschewed the common racialized readings of this bio-bibliographic 
trajectory as well as the strictures of a trans-historical category of Science to explore instead the 
man and his writings in their own words. It follows first his peripatetic trajectory, then examines 
the abstract question of magic both in modernity and non-modernity as well as its implications at 
al-Azhar past and present, before concentrating on al-Kashnāwī’s text and how it seeks to 
present itself. Again, as with al-Jabartī, what emerges is a thoroughly integrated world of 
scholarship, where “Africans” and “Arabs” (and no doubt many others) rubbed shoulders 
continuously, and, most importantly, one in which the domains of the occult were not cordoned 
off from other forms of sciences, but rather partook in a wider scientific cosmos grounded in an 





A Word on Sources 
 Finally, a few words must be said about sources. The dissertation draws on an eclectic 
variety of sources (primary and secondary, European and Arabic) in a mosaic-like fashion with 
no particular schematic in mind. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī’s historical chronicle ʿAjāʾib al-
āthār fi’l-tarājim wa’l-akhbār, however looms so large over many of its chapters.  
Completed in the early 1820s, the ʿAjaʾib did not appear in print until 1882, in four 
volumes at the presses of the Bulāq printing house in Cairo. A complete translation of the Bulāq 
text edited by Thomas Philipp and Moshe Perlmann was published as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Jabartī’s History of Egypt: ʿAjāʾib al-Āthar fī ’l-Tarājim wa ’l-Akhbār, as four volumes in two 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994). Although I rely much on this translation in my citations, 
it is not without its problems, many of which emanate from the conceptual travails mandated by 
the modern order of knowledge itself. I have accordingly amended the translation where 
necessary at various points. Thus, throughout this dissertation, references will be given to both 
the Arabic and English editions in the following manner: ʿAjāʾib, [volume number (shared by 
both)]: [Arabic page number] / [English page number].   
The reason for this recurrent citation is basic enough: this text is, quite simply, the 
foundational source for the history of Egypt from the mid-eighteenth century up until the early 
1820s, when it breaks off. This has long been acknowledged, and indeed much of the 
historiography of Egypt for the period relies extensively on al-Jabartī’s account, and this 
dissertation is no exception.
132
 The tendency, however, has been to mine this narrative source 
mainly for positive data. Like the work of Jane Holt Murphy and others, the following chapters 
seek to highlight an additional dimension that explores the text as an authored composition; and 
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beyond that, to reveal worldviews and forms of ethical self-fashioning by reading it in its full, 
complex and epistemological density, and thus neither exploiting it as a trove of facts nor 
apprehending it simply as an individual reflection on events unfolding.  
To use LaCapra’s terminology, my approach to the ʿAjāʾib addresses both the worklike 
and the documentary components of this classic text. To begin with the very notion of ‘text’ is 
more complicated than historians (especially of the Middle East) are wont to admit. A text, 
LaCapra explains, “may initially be seen as a situated use of language marked by a tense 
interaction between mutually implicated yet at times contestatory tendencies.”
133
 This is 
important, as it consequentially implies that what is inside and outside a text becomes fuzzy, for, 
indeed, “the “real world” is itself “textualized” in a variety of ways.”
 134
 This is why it is 
necessary to engage a text as intimately embedded in its wider field of operation (its conditions 
of production, consumption, transmission, etc), and to analyze in tandem its worklike and 
documentary aspects. For: 
[t]he documentary situates the text in terms of factual or literal dimensions 
involving reference to empirical reality and conveying information about it. The 
worklike supplements empirical reality by adding to, and subtracting from, it. It 
thereby involves dimensions of the text not reducible to the documentary, 
prominently including the roles of commitment, interpretation, and imagination. 
The worklike is critical and transformative for it deconstructs and reconstructs the 
given, in a sense repeating it but also bringing into the world something that did 




 Thus, like the new intellectual history advocated by LaCapra, this dissertation focuses 
methodologically on slow and deep reading of texts and (often of particular classics). It 
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acknowledges its debt to, and appreciation for, the advances provided by the various social 
histories that have transformed the field of Islamic and Middle East history beyond detection, 
away from Orientalist prejudices and towards the recognition of the rich and dynamic 
dimensions of all periods and places in the history of the region. Though these Orientalist biases 
were indeed often textualist in nature, the approach put forward here takes seriously Talal Asad’s 
challenge to save the baby from the proverbial bathwater:  that is, it involves a quest to engage 
texts in the Islamic tradition without subjecting the analysis to the weight of the Orientalist 
canon. In the possibility, however preliminary, of realizing this objective it finds solace and 
inspiration in Nietzsche’s pronouncements on philology. An early student of the classical 
discipline, he then distanced himself from it in no uncertain terms, before famously writing, 
towards the end of his active life:  
 
[A] problem like this, is in no hurry; we both, I just as much as my book, are 
friends of the lento. It is not for nothing that I have been a philologist, perhaps I 
am a philologist still, that is to say, a teacher of slow reading: - in the end I also 
write slowly. Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste – a malicious 
taste, perhaps? – No longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair 
every sort of man who is ‘in a hurry.’ For philology is that venerable art which 
demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become 
still, to become slow – it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the word 
which has nothing but delicate, cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it 
does not achieve it lento. But for precisely this reason it is more necessary than 
ever today, by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us the most, in the 
midst of an age of ‘work,’ that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, 
which wants to ‘get everything done’ at once, including every old or new book: - 
this art does not so early get anything done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, 
to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with 
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The Spaces of Modern Time 
 
I went through many unfamiliar streets for what seemed a long time. At length 
we came to a large building and my father told me that it was al-Azhar – a 
mysterious quantity.  I was still to learn what that name would mean to me and 
had no inkling of the patterns and procedures, the workings and prospects of life 
within it. In bewildered apprehension I heard a strange noise at the gate, a buzzing 
like that of bees, the sort of noise which strikes the ear but cannot be distinguished 
into articulate sounds. What I heard filled me with misgivings. I saw my father 
take off his shoes at the gate and take them, folded, into his hand. Following suit, 
I went forward with him a short distance along a path which brought us into a vast 
court, the farther side of which was scarcely visible. It was entirely covered with 
matting. Its columns extended in rows, and beside each stood a tall winged chair 
bound to the column with an iron chain. A turbaned sheikh, like my father, sat in 
every chair with yellowing pages in his hand, surrounded by circles, straggling or 
strong, as the case might be, of students, their shoes beside them, dressed in long 
white, full-sleeved gowns or white galabiyyahs and black clokes [sic], each with 
the same text-book in his hand as the sheikh, who read aloud and commented 




This stirring passage from the memoirs of the Egyptian historian, former Azhari and 
famed author of the multi-volumed history of Islamic culture (Fajr al-islām; Ḍuḥa l-islām, Ẓuhr 
al-islām, 1928-1953), Aḥmad Amīn, describes his first encounter with al-Azhar in 1900. In it, 
Kenneth Cragg reads a not so harmonious confluence of two worlds or “tempers,” that of 
“[t]hose turbans and text-books and the habits of tradition they represented [as] symbol[s] of 
taqlīd, or bondage to the past,” and the world that Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s modernist vision and 
rationalist theology sought to replace it with.  
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Both the passage and Cragg’s distillation of it embody many of the themes with which 
this chapter will grapple. For most simply put, this chapter is about how al-Azhar became an 
‘Islamic university’ – indeed, the foremost one – about how it came to be seen as such, and what 
logics and spatio-temporalities such a perspective assumes and promotes. The implicit premise is 
that it was not always so, and that all the relevant qualifiers (“foremost,” “Islamic,” “university”) 
need conceptual and genealogical exploration. The reference to ‘university’ here is not meant in 
the narrow, legal sense of an institution providing tertiary education, a status which al-Azhar 
achieved only in 1961, but rather in a more general meaning of an institution of higher learning, 
sitting atop a pyramidal structure of education and dispensing instruction far and wide. In fact, 
the very law of 1961 projected itself backwards in time (not without paradox), by affirming as its 





The Idea of the (Islamic) University 
Two concepts need unpacking, then, in this commonplace formulation: Islam and 
university. In the case of the former, it is a difficult subject to relate in scant words, but one thing 
about it is clear: for the longest time, Muslim writers did not think of an autonomous and 
structured sphere of life and of the world called Islam. The modifier Islamic [in the Arabic 
adjectival form, islāmīy] would have made little, if any sense, to Muslims until the late 
nineteenth century. To begin with, it required the accession of ‘religion’ to the status that it has 
achieved as a translatable concept across cultures and traditions, something which scholars such 
as Talal Asad and Tomoko Masuzawa have shown was not always the case, and even today 
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continues to be fraught with problems.
3
 The emergence of “Islam” as such a sovereign concept 
parallels the story that we shall tell in this chapter, and is often associated with the figure of 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and his efforts to formulate a domain of Islamic theory and practice that 
could accommodate the modern. Naturally, to formulate such a conception, independent ideas of 
Islam and of modernity had to be assumed. Still, the case of ʿAbduh is often misinterpreted: 
when he led the reform of al-Azhar as the chief religious authority in the land (invested by the 
British occupiers, no less), he did not carve out an autonomous space where “Islam” could 
unfold. As we shall see, this would happen a few years later – and the difference is stark. Even 
so, in the field of social history at least, the modifier ‘Islamic’ has long been shown to be 
inadequate. As Richard Bulliet has written in the preface to his classic study of Nishapur, 




As for the concept of the university, it too has a long and variegated genealogy, but it 
came to espouse the form that we associate with it today in early nineteenth-century Prussia.
5
 In 
the wake of the humiliating defeat to the Napoleonic armies, the Prussian monarch decided to 
create a new university close to his court in Berlin to lead a regeneration of state and society. A 
number of features made the University of Berlin (now named after its founder, the great linguist 
and man of letters Wilhelm von Humboldt, and his brother, the geographer and naturalist 
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Alexander) different, a vanguard model that would be reproduced throughout Europe, and 
eventually, the world. The first innovation of the university was its harmonious combination of 
teaching and research. Its faculty, as a result, consisted of specialized professionals, who lived by 
and for their positions. The curriculum was organized according to the newly autonomous 
disciplines (such as history and geography), separated from the aegis of rhetoric, theology, or 
philosophy. And finally, in terms of the student body, the main objective was to produce out of it 
a technocratic class to staff the state bureaucracies, and spearhead the reforms necessary to 
compete again following the crushing loss to post-revolutionary France.  
   The argument of this chapter, in a nutshell, is that the transformation of al-Azhar into a 
paragon of Islamic education was not the natural evolution of a structure always already there. 
Rather, it occurred suddenly, as a rupture, in the late nineteenth-century, though it included in its 
own construction the idea that it was simply a matter of historical becoming, in which the object 
(here al-Azhar) just realizes the destiny included in it from the start. In other words, its very 
labeling as a university made teleological self-realization by way of progressive reforms a 
necessity. It is this artifice that makes the idea of a ‘foremost Islamic university’ instantly 
recognizable as a self-explanatory, and trans-historical, entity – even though it took multiple 
laws, and significant state violence, to produce it as such. It could now be not only the foremost 
Islamic university, but indeed also the oldest university tout court. Crucially, it invented a 
particular idea of Islam, and nativized the concept of religion, in the process. 
In contrast to the projected self-image, this chapter shows that al-Azhar’s transformation 
into an Islamic university was in fact part and parcel of a larger structural and discursive shift in 
Egypt and beyond, by which the very notions of space and time were reoriented. Indeed, what 




a series of pre-ordained spaces of modern time: spaces, that is, through which a modern 
temporality could be channeled, thus arranging, but also limiting, the horizons of its possibilities. 
These spaces range from the smallest to the largest, from the individual to the global, running 
through ‘the family,’ ‘the classroom,’ ‘the library,’ and ‘the university,’ among many others, all 
of which could (nay should) be set along a prescribed path of reform.
6
  
In other words, the sudden appearance of al-Azhar as an educational institution (indeed, 
a university) at the turn of the century should be understood within the ambit of a larger and 
deeper reconfiguration of a number of fundamental categories of life in Egypt, namely, 
learning/instruction, law and history. Connected to this were attendant changes in related 
notions, such as geography, morality and population – and it was all anchored in the emergence 
of a novel understanding of the individual. This notion of the individual was, in turn, conjoined 
to the colonial condition and Orientalist categories of knowledge. Indeed, as Bryan Turner has it:  
Individualism is the golden thread which weaves together the economic 
institutions of property, the religious institution of confession of conscience, and 
the moral notion of personal autonomy, it serves to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. In 
orientalism, the absence of civil society in Islam entailed the absence of the 





The specific contours of my argument in this chapter may be sharpened by a comparison 
with a recent summation on “Islamic knowledge and education in the modern age” in The New 
Cambridge History of Islam. Robert W. Hefner begins his intervention by stating that “[t]he 
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transmission of religious knowledge (ʿilm) has always been at the heart of Islamic tradition.”
8
 
Leaving aside the variegated genealogies implicit in the term ʿilm that problematise its simple 
rendition as “religious knowledge,” Hefner is nonetheless intent on countering the tired  
Orientalist trope of stagnation and decline, by affirming that “[c]ontrary to recent stereotypes, 
from the late medieval period to the nineteenth century, Islamic education was not unchanging.”
9
 
And before delving into multiple details to make his point, he announces “[t]wo conclusions 
[that] stand out from this survey”: 
First, in the modern period Islamic education has been neither institutionally 
monolithic nor pedagogically conservative, but characterized by a dizzying 
plurality of actors engaged in continuous educational experimentation. Second, 
and more generally, the central issue with which Muslim educational reformists 
have been preoccupied has been the question of just what is required for an 




Having thus set the stage, Hefner mobilizes far-reaching examples of the multiple 
developments of “Islamic education” throughout the ages, with a special emphasis on the last 
two centuries. But, the conclusion is predictable: “There is no single modernity.”
11
 The epic 
encounter between “Islam” and “modernity” was able to produce a hybrid offspring.  
Hefner is hardly alone in assuming the constancy of an identifiable and consistent 
‘Islamic education’. Benjamin Fortna’s work is another interesting example of the weight of such 
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assumptions in the molding of historical narratives. Indeed, he too formulates his equally 
important and rich findings on the history of late Ottoman education as contesting the biased 
teleology of a singular modernity. This, he does by “focusing on collective and individual 




In both of these cases (and there are many other similar examples), the objective is to 
counter Orientalist biases by advancing the plurality and dynamism of ‘Islamic education’ as it 
confronted ‘the modern world’ – these two entities, therefore, must remain constant to be able to 
formulate the argument. Inadvertently then, the procedure again reifies the very categories that 
the authors sought to salvage (Islam) or deconstruct (modernity). Precisely for the proposition 
“Islamic education was not unchanging” (Hefner) to make any sense at all the abstract category 
‘Islamic education’ must remain stable; and for there to be alternative modernities with local 
flavors, there must be a dominant modernity with a singular logic of global purchase. This is, in 
the end, and despite the authors’ sincere intentions to the contrary, reflective of the very logic of 
the narcissistic West in pluralist guise.
13
  
What this chapter seeks to show is that the very idea of “Islamic education” is itself 
inevitably intertwined with “the modern world”, in ways involving multiple legal and narrative 
imbrications, and which necessitated a rupture with what came before. And hence, partakes of 
the reformulation of the self-same ideas, outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, of time 
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(past, present, future) and space (here, there, in, out, center, periphery) that defined Egypt, Cairo, 
and al-Azhar as particular spaces of modern times. 
The result is doubly limitative: on the one hand, it restricts a genuine engagement with 
the types of knowledge production and transmission involved in the non-modern Azhari 
episteme, just as, on the other, it skews the historiography towards a teleological narrative of 
reform (which, in however more sophisticated a manner, rehashes the Golden Age-Decline-
Modernization paradigm), and makes it adopt the much later perspective of the would-be 
reformers themselves, who explicitly set themselves against the preceding mode of thought 
viewing it with mounting progressivist partiality and negativity. And these features as we have 
seen are common to most of the contemporary scholarly literature concerning al-Azhar. In large 
part, this has to do with the colonial-nationalist discursive formations within which most of these 
studies operate, as well as the common historiographical fallacy of the constancy of historical 
subjects, primarily, in this case, education, law, Islam, the Arab – but also Egypt, Africa, 
orthodoxy, mysticism. 
Indeed, what these arguments do not quite consider is the possibility that the now much 
maligned Eurocentric teleology of ‘modernization theory’ may be embedded in the very category 
of education itself. This is the foundational translatable category, which must absolutely remain 
stable for arguments concerning its ‘Islamic’ or ‘traditional’ nature to logically cohere.
14
 What 
the exploration of al-Azhar before the late nineteenth-century shows, however, is that there was 
no distinct sphere of ‘education,’ neither in the life of the individual nor in society at large. Such 
a category does not make an appearance in the principal source of the period, such as al-Jabartī’s 
ʿAjāʾib al-āthār, for example, where the process of learning involves a quest for knowledge 
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[ṭalab al-ʿilm] that was not structured according to the logic of an autonomous concept of 
education, in its modern form: ṭarbīyah wa taʿlīm. This renders any analysis of 
traditional/Islamic education’s supposed encounter with modernity problematic. What the 
reformers of the late nineteenth-century sought to operate on at al-Azhar then was a wholly new 
creature, not a timeless essence.  
Again, Talal Asad’s work is insightful in this regard. He insists that power often operates 
by dividing and pluralizing, not only homogenizing, so that, for instance, multiculturalism in 
Great Britain is deeply embedded in, not resistant to, the extension of state power. “[W]hat is 
crucial for the government,” he writes in his analysis of the Salman Rushdie affair, “is not 
homogeneity versus difference as such but its authority to define crucial homogeneities and 
differences.”
15
 The objective concerning ‘Islamic education’ then would be less a matter of 
indicating how it changes over time and how it encounters ‘modernity’, than an analysis of the 
grammar of the concepts themselves: when do they arise, under what conditions, with what 
baggage, and who has the authority to define them in such and such a way.  
Connected to the theme of power is the question of ‘agency,’ and in this case too, Asad 
warns against the facile rush to seek in this concept a providential formula out of the conundrum 
of eurocentricity. The instinct has been, among conscientious post-Orientalist scholars of Islam 
(and others), to return agency to the natives, in the effort to show how they ‘make their own 
history’. Asad argues that this is a confusing solution to the problem, inasmuch as it connects 
agency and subjectivity in unwarranted ways. “My argument, in brief,” he writes, “is that 
contrary to the discourses of many radical historians and anthropologists, agent and subject 
(where the former is the principle of effectivity and the latter of consciousness) do not belong to 
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the same theoretical universe and should not, therefore, be coupled.”
16
 This is because, to begin 
with,  
“[c]hoices and desires make actions before actions can make “history.” But 
predefined social relations and language forms, as well as the body’s materiality, 
shape the person to whom “normal” desires and choices can be attributed. That is 
why questions about what it is possible for agents to do must also address the 




In other words, “the systematic knowledge (e.g., statistical information) on which an 
agent must draw in order to act in ways that “make history” is not subjective in any sense. It does 
not imply “the self.” The subject, on the other hand, is founded on consciousness of self.”
18
 This 
has significant consequences when it comes to understanding historical processes and writing 
about them. For example, and most importantly, Asad asserts that though the “project of 
modernization (Westernization), including its aim of material and moral progress, is certainly a 




Contra to the logic of the constancy of the historical objects: what took place at al-Azhar 
in the late nineteenth-century was not the modernization of an Islamic education already there, 
but the abrupt eruption onto the scene of new concepts, new grammars, new practices, and new 
subjects, which participated in remaking the world in particular ways. It had to do with a deeper 
and wider shift in discursive configurations, involving multiple levels of operations, big and 
small, global and local. As Timothy Mitchell has argued, “the setting up of learning as a process 
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separate from life itself corresponded (…) to the apparent separation of the world into things in 
themselves on the one hand, and on the other their meaning or structure.”
20
 The appearance of 
the educational innovations, then, could not but be sudden, just “when the new techniques of 




As with much else, the first encounter of the modern order of knowledge and Cairo came 
via the French invasion of Egypt and its mammoth scholarly addendum in the nascent human 
sciences, the Description of Egypt. As Edward Said has observed, “the keynote of the 
relationship was set for the Near East and Europe by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, 
an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one 
culture by another, apparently stronger one.”
22
 The modern episteme, so aptly captured by 
Foucault, was born around that time, and the Napoleonic invasion provided it with an arena of 
operation, so that Egypt became “the live province, the laboratory, the theater of effective 
Western knowledge about the Orient.”
23
 The Description however is, admittedly, not fully 
integrated into the modern epistemic order of words and things, and maintains much of the early 
Enlightenment worldview that the savants had been trained in. In many ways, this is why it is so 
revealing a historical document: a foundational source of the modern, “truly scientific” capture 
of an Oriental land and people, it nonetheless remains, in form, content and approach, of a hybrid 
nature.  
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Al-Azhar in particular, and education in general, appear repeatedly in the Description, 
and when dealing with educational matters, the institution is generally referred to as a university 
(elsewhere, it is simply a mosque). This was not the first iteration of this designation, and indeed, 
the description of al-Azhar as a university (however decrepit in this so-called age of decline) had 
a certain currency in the eighteenth century. The French consul general Benoît de Maillet 
described it thus in his own Description de l’Égypte (1735):  
In the days when Egypt had its own kings, that mosque was a kind of 
university, where all the sciences were taught. Those princes brought to it from all 
the countries subject to Mohammedanism the most profound men in theology, 
jurisprudence, medicine, astronomy, mathematics and history, and kept them 
there by means of large pensions and with even more flattering distinctions. (…) 
How those times have changed in every respect ! Nothing is taught in this mosque 




He then goes on to say that one must admit that Grammar is there taught proficiently.  
Also emphasizing its current decrepitude, the famous Orientalist Claude-Étienne Savary 
defined al-Azhar, in his Lettres sur l’Égypte (1785), as an academy, which supposedly replaced a 
university that had been instituted by Saladin:  
The academy, Djameh Elashar (the mosque of flowers) has replaced it. The 
sciences and the arts flourished there until the Turks captured Egypt. That period 
became their tomb. Enemies of all human knowledge, they extinguished them 
throughout their empire. The only ones cultivated today are theology, which the 
countless Koranic commentators have transformed into a dark chaos, grammar, 
which is needed in order correctly to read the book which encloses their religion, 





With the publication of Napoleon’s Description de l’Égypte, and over the course of the 
nineteenth century, the definition of al-Azhar as a university would become a naturalized 
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commonplace. In the “Mémoire sur les Finances de l’Égypte” by the Comte Estève, for example, 
a table listing the allocation of public foodstuff mentions al-Azhar twice, first simply as the 
“grande mosquée”, then as a “university” that has students.
26
 Similarly, in Jomard’s “Description 
de la ville du Kaire,” al-Azhar is singled out as a (or rather, the) local university. Speaking of 
schools in the city, he writes:  
The notions learned in those schools are in truth, very elementary, as they are 
limited to reading writing and arithmetic; but, on the other hand, this instruction is 
just an introduction to that of the university, that is to say, the great mosque of al-




Al-Azhar, then, is here set apart, atop a pyramidal structure of education, albeit a rather 
loose one, with kuttābs at the bottom, madrasas in the middle and al-Azhar at the pinnacle.  
The most sustained treatment of the matter in the Description occurs in Chabrol’s “Essai 
sur les moeurs des habitants de l’Égypte,” the third and fourth sections of which discuss 
respectively “Première éducation” and then “Science et arts,” before moving onto “Littérature et 
poésie” and the rest. Having addressed the question of literacy in the third section, Chabrol turns 
his attention more fully to al-Azhar in the fourth. Those young people who want to continue their 
studies after the “primary schools,” explains Chabrol to begin the section on the arts and sciences 
of Egypt, “go to the great mosque of al-Azhar to hear the speeches and explanations of the 
sheikhs.” He adds that this mosque is de facto the only university in Egypt.
28
  
By this simple oft-repeated formulation, an entire structure of space and education is 
henceforth conjured up, with al-Azhar at its apex. It places al-Azhar at the center of an assumed 
integrated unit called Egypt. Yet the actual description of the dynamics at al-Azhar that follow 
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indicate nothing of the sort that can be associated with such an ordered field. He writes, for 
example, that its “corps de professeurs” (estimated at forty to fifty) were also, and indeed 
primarily as far as their revenue was concerned, “men of law”:  
There is no notable advantage attached to the post of professor; they only 
engage in public instruction to make themselves a reputation, a numerous 
clientele, and to acquire the right to the largesse of zealous Muslims: they subsist 
on the modest revenues they receive, the presents they get, and the product of the 





Furthermore, Chabrol notes, with perceptible astonishment, that the students were not 
what were to be expected either:  
The pupils are not simply passive auditors; they may also engage the professor 
on a point whose meaning they have not understood, oppose their opinion to the 





The manner by which one moves from being a student to being a professor also required 
some detailed explanation by the author:  
When a young man has finished his courses and feels sufficient eloquence and 
erudition to occupy a chair at the grand mosque, he request certificates of capacity 
from his professors, and presents himself to the sheikh of the grand mosque so as 
to obtain his permission to lecture there as well. He invites to the first lesson all 
his friends and the principal ulema. First they listen to him… 
 
In fact, Chabrol ends up undermining the absolute centrality of the “university” – indeed, 
of its very stability and coherence even: “One may teach in a mosque other than that of al-Azhar. 
It requires only the approval of the sheikh, who assigns the place where the lessons must be 
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  Importantly, he further adds, “there is no precedence of rank among them. The depths 
of their knowledge, their age and their virtues ensure them more or less esteem.”
32
  
 Thus, though Chabrol’s chapter announces the plan to subsume the topic into the grand, 
linear and hierarchical, logic of education, what is revealed is something quite different, with 
none of the expected pre-ordained order implied by the term in its modern appellation.  
Chabrol concludes his discussion on Arts and Sciences with a rather surprisingly 
laudatory equation of the modern Egyptians with their forebearers of the times of ancient glory: 
“One can in general attribute to the modern Egyptians the same fault that the Greeks attributed to 
their ancestors: they outline everything and perfect nothing.”
33
 This is a far cry from his opening 
assertion that at the university of al-Azhar, “the sciences they teach are limited to very little 
substance…”
34
 While it certainly creates an idea of a timeless Egypt and Egyptian soul that 
traverses epochs, but actually it does little to support the idea of general decrepitude and decline. 
The next sustained treatment of al-Azhar as a formal educational institution by a 
European Orientalist is to be found in Edward Lane’s own best-selling portrait of Egypt, whose 
title echoes the essay by Chabrol: An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern 
Egyptians (first published in 1835). Lane was seemingly more familiar than either Jomard or 
Chabrol with the institution, its faculty and its history. He mentions a few acquaintances from its 
halls (notably Ḥasan al-ʿAttār, who, it is reported, had explicitly requested from the author to be 
mentioned in the study if it should see the light of day,
35
 but also “the Imam of the late Muftee 
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(the sheikh El-Mahdee),” from whom he relates an anecdote concerning the force of the 
apparition of the Prophet in dreams to show the superstition of Azhari Shāykhs; Muḥammad 
Shihāb, who “is also deservedly celebrated as an accomplished Arabic scholar and poet,” whose 
literary salon Lane attended and described; and he approvingly cites al-Jabartī’s history, which 
he had clearly read.
36
 
Lane opens the ninth chapter of his Account, titled “Language, Literature, and Science,” 
with a simultaneous affirmation of both the decline of Arab culture and the special case of Cairo. 
“The metropolis of Egypt,” he writes, “maintains the comparative reputation by which it has 
been distinguished for many centuries, of being the best school of Arabic literature, and of 
Muslim theology and jurisprudence. Learning, indeed, has much declined among the Arabs 
universally, but least in Cairo: consequently, the fame of the professors of this city still remains 
unrivalled; and its great collegiate mosque, the Azhar, continues to attract innumerable students 
from every quarter of the Muslim world.”
37
 He thus surreptitiously formulates both a larger 
Arab/Islamic/Oriental subject of history whose current state is one of decline, as well as the 
centrality within it of Egypt, Cairo, and, indeed, al-Azhar. The move is symptomatic of what I 
have termed above the “lighthouse model” of Islamic learning, and history more generally, 
positing a central core around which revolve varying peripheries, a model which was to become 
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hegemonic in the field, partaking and precipitating the idea of al-Azhar as a university.
38
 As this 
dissertation shows, the “lighthouse model” is equally prejudicial: it squeezes experiences, 
narratives, and ideas into a binary of center/periphery that is authorized not by the Arabic 
historical sources themselves but rather by current spatio-cultural imaginaries, which it then 
serves to validate in turn.  
These various assumptions are reconfirmed most succinctly when Lane says of al-Azhar 
that it is “regarded as the principal university of the East.”
39
 This is an interesting turn of phrase, 
and the distance created by the use of the passive voice is confirmed explicitly in a footnote 
affixed to the word university in which he explains: “The Azhar is not called a “university” with 
strict propriety; but is regarded as such by the Muslims, as whatever they deem worthy of the 
name of science, or necessary to be known, is taught within its walls.”
40
 One is unfortunately left 
to wonder what word precisely Lane’s Muslims would have utilized to think of al-Azhar as a 
university, since there is no evidence of the use of the modern standard Arabic term for 
university (jāmiʿah) before the very late nineteenth-century – neither in the classical Arabic 
dictionaries such as Ibn Manẓūr’s Lisan al-‘Arab, nor even in Lane’s own Lexicon of 1863.
41
 
Incidentally, in another text of his, written earlier but not published until recently, entitled 
Description of Egypt, Lane had been more categorical, describing al-Azhar in his own voice, and 
without reservations, as “the University of the East.”
42
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It is revealing indeed that, just like Chabrol, Lane too, should have felt the need to qualify 
the ascription of ‘university-ness’ to al-Azhar: it was too different from anything resembling an 
institution of higher learning that their modern readers would have expected. Yet, it evidently 
could not be made to correspond to any idea of Oriental decadence. Calling al-Azhar a university 
was thus a way of using a concept familiar to their readers to describe a foreign thing – but it 
could not be made too familiar, without losing the effect of distance between Self and Other 
upon which the discipline of Orientalism was built. So the difference of ‘their’ university and 
‘ours’ had to be made clear. In the very label then was embedded the superiority of the West; and 
this is precisely what the reformers of the late nineteenth-century and beyond would inherit: they 
sought to close the gap, rather than simply describe it. 
 The field is now set up for a rationally ordered trajectory of European-inspired reform to 
transpire. Thus, though Lane extols some singular scholars of the time associated with al-Azhar 
(such as Shāykhs al-ʿAttār, al-Quwaisīnī, al-Jabartī), the implicit logic naturally guides the 
chapter to its necessary, predestined conclusion:  
Such being the state of science among modern Egyptians, the reader will not 
be surprised at finding the present chapter followed by a long account of their 
superstitions; a knowledge of which is necessary to enable him to understand their 
character, and to make due allowances for many of its faults. We may hope for, 
and, indeed, reasonably expect, a very great improvement in the intellectual and 
moral state of this people, in consequence of the introduction of European 
sciences, by which Mohammad ‘Alee, in some degree, made amends for his 






  It is quite revealing indeed, that neither Napoleon’s savants nor Lane spoke of al-Azhar 
as an Islamic university – something that would become ubiquitous in the twentieth century, and 
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indeed beyond, so that until today, most scholars, even those acutely aware of the power of 
names and words, describe al-Azhar as an Islamic university when speaking of the nineteenth-
century. Both Chabrol and Lane saw al-Azhar and its scholars as being woven into matters of 
religion (and they both decried this), but the larger subject of which the university of al-Azhar 
was the educational pinnacle was ‘Egypt’ in the case of the former, and the East in the case of 
the latter, not Islam. But this is not particularly astounding: Al-Azhar could only become Islamic 
when Islam itself became the operative concept in apprehending the history of the region, and 
when there was something non-Islamic (namely ‘secular’) from which it could be separated, 
something that would only happen in the last third of the nineteenth century.  
 And that (an “université musulmane”) is precisely how the Swiss educationalist Victor 
Édouard Dor defines al-Azhar in his book L’instruction publique en Égypte, which appeared in 
1872. Indeed, to the appellation “Islamic university,” Dor gives instant social scientific depth by 
adducing to the name a table containing the statistics of its internal constitution.
44
 Neither date 
nor author are fortuitous: Dor Bey was hired by Ismāʿīl Pasha as Inspector General of the 
Schools, to oversee the establishment of a modern public educational system in the early 1870s, 
with the institution of a sort of teacher’s college (Dār al-ʿulūm) to train the staff of the extensive 
new primary school networks throughout the country.
45
 As it happens, 1872 was also the date of 
what would come to be known as the first of a series of modernizing reforms at al-Azhar as well 
as, the first step in the direction of its pre-ordained professionalization as a proper Islamic 
university. (And again, rather than the reform of a stable subject there from the beginning, this 
was an abrupt and momentous creation of the very idea of “the Islamic university.”)  
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Dor opens his book (written in French, and clearly for a European – or at least 
Europeanized – audience), with a panoramic vista onto the “Egyptian character.” This maneuver 
was of course typical of such Orientalist works of the late nineteenth century (and remained 
operative in the later works of Heyworth-Dunne and Bayard Dodge), whereby the objective was 
first and foremost to grasp the essence of the particular race/culture/mind under study. Following 
this synthetic capture of the Egyptian mind, Dor moves on to deliver a synopsis of “L’instruction 
primaire Arabe” (Book II) and then “L’instruction supérieure Arabe” (Book III), thus confirming 
the idea, already present in Chabrol and Lane in primitive form, of the existence of a structure of 
Oriental/Arab/Islamic education that corresponds to a pre-existing order. Indeed, this order is 
even universal, or, at the very least, transferable from one culture to another, with few 
impediments. Never mind, of course, that the other culture in question did not conceive of such a 
two-tiered system of education, nor did it even have a word corresponding adequately to 
‘education’ at the time Dor was writing. In fact, Dor was hired precisely to impose such an 
ordered system on the country. Framing the law of 1872 in the authoritative prose of progress, he 
saw in it the sign of the beginning of the overhaul of al-Azhar’s structure and methods, and with 
it “Arab learning” more largely, while advocating the necessity for the introduction of many 
more laws and much more order.
46
 For Dor, the matter was primarily one of the extension of 
state power. The problem with al-Azhar was its oppositional autonomy from the state (a point 
that official Azhari historiography is determined to emphasis again and again), and the first 
modernizing reform was state supervised: it created a uniformity and regularity in the accession 
to the status of professor at al-Azhar, which was validated by the authority of the state (with the 
seal of the khedive himself). Perhaps for the first time in its history, the arrangement and 
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constitution of al-Azhar’s faculty had explicitly become a matter of state concern in as much as it 
was now directly inserted into the regulatory practices of the Law and the bureaucracy of the 
state. 
 Yacoub Artin Pasha was another of the important figures in the theorization of such a 
bifurcated notion of education. A polyglot Egyptian-Armenian from a prominent intellectual and 
political family (both his father and his uncle were members of the first Council on Public 
Instruction set up by Mehmed Ali in 1836, among other official positions), Artin was educated in 
Istanbul and Europe before becoming tutor of Khedive Ismāʿīl’s children, and then holding a 
number of important posts in the government (notably secretary for European affairs and 
undersecretary of Education), as well as becoming a member of the Insitut Égyptien (renamed 
Institut d'Égypte) and writing numerous influential studies.
47
 In 1889, he published a 
foundational tract on education, also entitled L’instruction publique en Égypte, which would 
appear a few years later on the khedival presses in an Arabic translation by ʿAlī Bahjat as Al-
qāwl al-tām fi’l-taʿlīm al-ʿām.
48
 The title was surely in explicit echo to the previous book by 
Édouard Dor. Indeed, Artin followed Dor’s narrative quite faithfully, except that he was much 
less disdainful of the natives and disparaging of ‘Islamic education,’ and certainly did not feel 
the need to commence with a portrait of the Egyptian/Oriental character, as Dor had, to explain 
the natives’ backwardness and their need for enlightened assistance towards self-help.   
After two short opening chapters introducing the importance of learning in Islam (or 
more precisely, “du point de vue musulman,” with Islam as a grand anthropomorphic subject that 
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can have a point of view) and its institutional support structure (patronage and pious 
foundations), Artin moves on to the heart of the narrative, also divided into two chapters, 
following the logic of the argument: the third chapter, entitled “L’instruction en Égypte” is 
entirely devoted to al-Azhar and the influence of its pedagogical methods, while the fourth, 
concerns the “introduction of the European method of public education into Egypt” more 
broadly.  
Artin’s argument is engrained in the larger logic of the progress of humanity along 
positive stages identified in the introduction to this dissertation. Denying any claims of racial or 
civilizational separation, he connects differences by the medium of time and evolution:  
It follows from everything which precedes that Muslim society, since its 
appearance in the world and until our times, has, like all other societies, not 
ceased to concern itself with education, and if it dealt more with religious 
instruction than other sciences, it has in that followed the same intellectual 
genesis as that followed by Christian society until the fourteenth century, that is to 
say, until the end of the period of the crusades and the eve of the invention of 
printing, the discovery of the compass and that of America, in a word, until the 




The next step is, naturally, to suggest that for the secular sciences to flourish in the 
Islamic world, a similar rebirth is necessary – that one, precisely, launched by Mehmed ʿAli, and 
continued by his grandson, Artin’s patron.     
Al-Azhar he asserts to be a university from the very outset: the sub-chapter entitled 
“Fondation de el-Azhar” begins with “That university was, we have just seen, founded by the 
kaïd (army general) Jawhar, around the year 975 of the Christian era.” Having described the 
institution and its modes of operations, he writes: “In short, at the head of every institution or 
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vehicle of instruction was the Al-Azhar mosque.”
50
 The edifice is thus now completely 
formalized and with it the spatial imaginary of the lighthouse: education is a pyramid, with a 
base of primary schools that map out the extent of the nation-state of Egypt and a pinnacle 
constituted by the university of al-Azhar, the center of centers, whenceforth a light shines onto 
the country as a whole: “the radiating outward which, from this center, covers the entire country 
from the intellectual point of view.”
51
  
To that end he breaks down the organization of Azhari learning into ordered stages of 
regular temporal stretches, corresponding to specific domains of instruction. Thus appears the 
structure, as if standing separate from material reality. It is announced explicitly, as an ordered 
pedagogical method: “The pedagogical method followed at Al-Azhar and consequently in all of 
Egypt was, and still is nowadays, in its general outlines, the following…”
52
 It must however be 
noted that at the end of this section, Artin is forced to remind his readers of the absence of any 
idea of a diploma in traditional Azhari learning, which poses a threat to the very notion of 
structured order:  
But we should here remember what has already been noted above, namely, 
that no diploma, no official document from the University conferred any title on 
the student. It was up to him to prove his merit, to create his reputation and to 





Having set up the model of Azhari education (countering, also, the accusation of the rigid 
repetitiveness of the core method of learning by heart by way of its role in maintaining the rules 
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of Islam and Arabic following the absorption of foreign elements into the Arabo-Islamic empire), 
Artin moves on to the introduction in Egypt of another pedagogical model: the European 
method:  
Let us now examine the work which took place under the impulse of the man 
of genius to whom we owe modern Egypt [i.e. Muhammad Ali Pasha], and under 
the influence of European civilization and culture which were so suddenly 
introduced in the country since the beginning of this century, and which marched 




There follows an account of the sending of Egyptian student missions to Europe and the 
establishment of European-style schools in Egypt itself, beginning with the massacre of the 
Citadel in 1811, and reaching Artin’s own time, following the British occupation of 1882. A 
further chapter celebrates the embryonic beginnings of female education in his century. The 
conclusion of the book then sums up the fundamental argument: “From everything that was 
exposed in this study, it emerges that as a general proposition, there are nowadays two very 
distinct methods of education and instruction in Egypt.”
55
 On the one hand, the “national 
method”, with immutable rules set around the twelfth century, headed by the university of al-




Artin’s hope, in the end, is for the ultimate resolution of the bifurcation into a single 
overarching unity, calling optimistically for the reform of the old into the new:  
The time will come when progress, like a huge wave, will carry away and 
cause to disappear all the elements which have thus far resisted it. There is no 
doubt that then, the antique and celebrated university-mosque of al-Azhar, 
likewise driven by that scientific spirit which pushes us forward, will take its 
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place next to the most justly praised universities of modern Europe, its younger 




Here again, there is evidence of the defensive, non-discriminatory approach of Artin, who 
seeks to place Europeans and non-Europeans within a single family (with sibling institutions) 
and along a similar path of advancement. The result on the level of the category of ‘education’, 
however, is rather similar, for everywhere, it is put forward as a neutral concept of universal 
validity, which can be mapped out along an ideal model that appears to be separate from material 
reality.   
 
Force of Law, Force of History 
The logic of reform found its culmination in the grand historico-legal document, printed 
(first in Arabic, as Mashrūʿ Lajnat Iṣlāḥ al-Azhar al-Maʾmūr, then in French) at the government 
presses in 1910 and 1911, entitled Project of Reform, presented to the president of the Council of 
Ministers Moḥammad Pacha Saʿīd, and penned by the Commission of Reform of the University 
of al-Azhar. This is a remarkable document, a true treasure-trove for the historian, but a 
treacherous one. It greatly facilitates the work of the researcher by presenting itself as an archival 
collection, including all the legal decrees pertaining to al-Azhar from the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century onwards, now held at the Egyptian National Archive (Dār al-Wathāʾiq). But, 
like all collections of primary sources, it is obviously not neutral. In fact, the primary sources are 
explicitly formulated as a validation – though a naturalized, realist, historicist one – of the 
Commission’s project. Enlightening in its material, it is treacherous in its narrativization.
58
 It 
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makes the outcome – the law of 1911 that structured al-Azhar as an identifiably modern 
educational institution, specializing in the “religious sciences” and “Arabic philology” (fields 
that must have seemed then as neologisms, though they have by now become terms of common 
sense) – appear as the welcome result of a natural process of internal development.
59
 
From the very first page and the dedication (signed Ahmad Fathy Zaghloul, 
undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice, an important player in the intellectual and political 
arena of the time, though less well-known than his brother Saʿad), the efforts of the Commission 
and its objectives are framed in familiar terms: the objective was “to draft a new constitution for 
al-Azhar and the Muslim religious establishments,” to which end it scrutinized “the past as well 
as the present of the institution, and “studied all of the laws and constitutions which were applied 
to it since the year 1288 of the Hegira.” This, in order to determine which constitution could best 




Here, in a nutshell, is the concentrate of all the analytical maneuvers described above: it 
cordons off a field of things “religious” at the pinnacle of which is al-Azhar; it asserts a pressing 
need for order (a constitution, no less) where presumably there is none; it brings forth a 
temporality involving a Golden Age and subsequent decline; and it maps out a spatiality of “the 
Muslim World” that revolves around the lighthouse that al-Azhar ought to be. The table of 
contents that follows announces the general contours of the master plan (in the typical serial 
mirror effects of the world as picture, it is a model of a model of a model). The project for the 
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reform of al-Azhar, the document explains, contains three parts: the first is a historical overview 
of the institution that justifies the new order set up in the reform project, ending with a series of 
tables explaining the execution of the organization and the distribution of courses; the second 
contains the actual draft of the law for the al-Azhar university, including the rules and principles 
of administrative organization, the mode of teaching and the proper manner for the nomination 
and promotion of its faculty and staff; and the third puts forward the internal regulations of the 
institution. Furthermore, the outline ends, in good historicist fashion, by announcing that the 
Projet included a proper “constitutional history” of al-Azhar in the form of a historical sketch of 
the institution and the reproduction of all its laws. This sketch creates an historical narrative 
divided in turn into three unequal parts: the past (from its origin to 1872, in two pages), the 
present (the series of reform laws enacted between 1872 and 1908, in 24 pages), and the future 
(the current project for a new order, to which are dedicated almost 300 pages).  
The actual text then begins with a short programmatic statement of purpose: “Al-Azhar is 
the great mosque erected in Cairo nine and a half centuries ago, and which contains the Great 
Muslim Religious University.”
61
  After modest beginnings, it became the source from which 
were drawn the healthy principles of religion and the enlightened theories of human 
knowledge.”
62
 The lighthouse model is reaffirmed, again and again, reaching a crescendo in the 
statement: “This establishment is recognized throughout the entire world as the Muslim religious 
university par excellence and every Mohammedan considers it as the source of principles which 
must guide his steps and regulate his conduct.”
63
  
                                                 
61










Not only has al-Azhar become the leading intellectual seat of the religious sciences of the 
Islamic world (the university no less), it is the standard-bearer of acceptable practice and 
movement of every Muslim. This of course, is what the modernist reformers wanted the al-Azhar 
to become, though it is formulated in terms that make it seem like it was always already so. But 
it also had to be not quite so – or else why the need for reforms, let alone a new constitution. The 
resolution lies in the (unformulated) idea of some sort of Oriental patrimonialism. The 
commission had to affirm that “[n]one of the modern rules of discipline and administration were 
known to it.” Modern discipline was obviously a positive thing for these reformers, but, they 
insisted, the system worked because the “Rector was in himself exclusively the constitution; he 
personified the law.”
64
 And predictably, the patrimonialism extended to the state: we are thus 
told that only the Prince knew who would be Rector, since, when the position was vacated it was 
he alone who could select a successor from among those great ʿulama “known for their piety and 
their capacity.”
65
 Yet the faculty remained outside the purview of power and order: the choice of 
a particular teacher remained completely unsupervised and was entirely based on audience 
attendance. The authors conclude, with a tone of inevitability: “This was the situation at Al-
Azhar until the year 1288 of the Hijra (1872).”
66
  
The second part of the document (on the era of reform), opens with an explanation of 
why the system could not endure – and it was, no less, for natural reasons: “the institution 
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having failed to evolve along with the society in which it existed, since it lacked any kind of rule 
which would permit it to adapt to evolving social conditions.”
67
 Two assumptions/conclusions 
validate such a statement: a) “the society” hadn’t evolved perceptibly in the first nine centuries 
since the institution’s creation, and b) reform was naturally of utmost urgency and necessity. It is 
only normal, then, that some legal reform should have intervened to regulate al-Azhar in this 
period. This happened, of course, in 1872, with a law that specified the manner of joining the 
faculty, and the examination procedures leading towards it. The point of this ground-breaking 
law, then, was to regulate and discipline both the faculty and the curriculum – and again, a 
significant feature of the law concerned the validation of the khedive (with points 3 and 4 
specifically mentioning royal approbation).  
The report then formulates an interesting evaluation of the 1872 law. In establishing 
eleven fields upon which candidates had to be examined, the law had canonized a certain 
orthodoxy, so that any other field (specifically mentioned are the life of the Prophet, religious 
morality, the spirit of legislation, terminology of prophetic tradition, calligraphy, dictation, 
composition, legal notarial skills, cosmography, the calculation of time, the art of discussion and 
literature) were deemed external, modern, even heretical, though they were indispensable for the 
Azhari curriculum, and had been taught at al-Azhar in the past.
68
 This critique, incidentally, 
would itself become canonical, reappearing in the very same terms in much of subsequent 
scholarship.  
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Having disciplined the faculty and the curriculum, the next hurdle was to domesticate the 
student body, who had been, the report says, “completely free in their comportment...”
69
 Thus, a 
law regulating student registration was promulgated by the Council of Ministers on the 15
th
 of 
October 1885. This law did not, however, succeed in its stated disciplining aims, the report 
explains, because it only made official registration mandatory – it did not police the presence or 
absence of students. And, more largely, the Projet then continues, the reform of the institution 
was not sufficient: it still relied too much on the dynamism and whims of the Rector.  
It is only in January 1895 that a new era of reforms truly commenced, with a khedival 
order instituting an Administrative Council for al-Azhar, so that finally, “the university became 
the object of healthy and orderly regulation.”
70
 Unsurprisingly, one of the first issues tackled by 
the Council was the proper distribution of revenues to its properly appointed faculty and 
properly registered students.
71
 In parallel, the khedival government also canonized into law al-
Azhar’s station at the top of “Muslim education” in the country, by formally subordinating 
centers of learning in Tanta, Dessouq and Damietta (and, later, in Alexandria) to it.
72
  
In the summer of 1896 a series of general by-laws governing the institution as a whole 
were passed. These begin by enshrining, first and foremost, the strict hierarchical order of the 
structure, embodied in the supreme power of the Rector, in his responsibility for the proper 
functioning of the instruction, and in his capacity as head of the administrative Council. This 
Council, named by a Khedival Ordinance, has, according to the Report, absolute powers,  
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[l]egislating as it does regarding the way courses are taught, the disciplining 
of students, any work to be carried out. It deals with any and all questions 
concerning al-Azhar and related institutions, determines the conditions accorded 
lecturers and professors, names and dismisses sheikhs and professors. The 
Council likewise distributes al-Azhars’s revenues, establishes regulations 
regarding registration and the right to a bread ration, organizes vacations and 
disciplinary matters for each riwaq or section and each quarter (hara). Finally, it 
chooses books to be assigned and may permit professors who are not al-Azhar 




The second section concerns the formalization of the student body, defining who can 
become a student at al-Azhar, setting, for the first time, strict age limits to the status. The third 
section of the by-laws is perhaps the most radical in its novelty: dealing with the content of the 
curriculum, it divides subjects into two categories, ‘ends’ and ‘means’ [al-maqāṣid w’al-wasāʾil] 
– and these are named, explained, and assigned a place in a model order of learning. The content 
and structure of instruction is thus established, as is its length. Furthermore, the use of secondary 
commentaries is forbidden in the first four years of study, though permitted thereafter. The next 
section moves to define the students’ examinations, which are described as of two kinds: one 
leading to a certificate (allowing its holders to become orators or preachers, as well as primary 
school teachers), the other is the proper “ʿulama diploma.” [i.e. al-shihādah al-ʿilmīyah].  
Finally, the by-laws also provide for extensive disciplinary measures to be adopted in 
cases of breach, indicating the formalized bureaucratic order that it sought to bring forth.  
The next episode relating to al-Azhar recounted by the Projet is the law of 1908, of 
which it was itself a direct product. These laws had caused wide-ranging student strikes and 
demonstrations, which led to the closure of the institution for the following two years, and the 
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Commission for the Reform of al-Azhar had been formed explicitly to investigate the matter and 
suggest the appropriate solution. The result was the Projet de réforme.  
The law of 1908 made two important innovations when it came to matters of concern to 
this chapter. It again delineated the curriculum, dividing it this time into three branches: religious 
sciences, Arabic philology, and mathematics and other sciences. It likewise delineated the levels 
of instruction into three equal parts of four years each: elementary, secondary, and superior. This 
catapulted al-Azhar fully into the basic framework of the concept of ‘modern education’: the 
disciplines (and stages) corresponding to European ones, with ‘the religious’ ones safely 
cordoned off from ‘the secular’, in which a further dam disconnects science from art, 
mathematics from philology. The Projet then outlined its criticisms of this law and described the 
demands of the student protestors, before finally delivering its full report on a new constitution 
for al-Azhar. What stands out most, perhaps, about both the Commission’s criticisms and the 
students’ demands is that neither rejected the actual content of the reforms (in terms of the 
reformulation of the curriculum for example), but more the modalities of their application. In the 
case of the students, their protest involved also issues of modes of subsistence and work 
opportunities following graduation. But nowhere is the alignment of the curriculum according to 
norms of the modern university questioned. Thus, the “Projet de constitution nouvelle,” the main 
objective of the whole intervention, in fact validates much of what the law of 1908 set forth. 
Indeed, it has succeeded in formulating the history of the preceding half century in such a way as 
to make itself seem like the natural, rational, even logical culmination of a single process of 
evolution. It begins, first of all, by reaffirming the hierarchical pyramidal structure of authority 
that emanates from the lighthouse:  
The al-Azhar mosque is the Great University. The sheikhdoms of Alexandria 




establishments of Muslim religious education to be created in Egypt in the future. 





These last sentences are truly far-reaching: “religious authority” (whatever that means) 
does not emanate from an embodied piety or sanctity or learning, but from an ordained place in a 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure. Connected to this neologism of “religious authority” is the 
very idea of a “religious institution” (or indeed of a religious science), which this projected 
constitution puts forth with unassuming force. Indeed, al-Azhar is not only at the head of a set of 
really-existing institutions in the material world, it is rather at the pinnacle of the very idea of 
things “religious,” so that any institution ever claiming purchase on religious education in the 
future must necessarily be dependent upon it. The rest of the project further elaborates on the 
principles of the law of 1908: it confirms the authoritarian hierarchical structure culminating in 
the Rector, it expands the bureaucratic bodies in charge, it outlines the disciplinary regime, and, 
most importantly, it adds to the regularization and the homogenization of the student body, and 
explains in great detail the content of the curriculum. About the student body, the concept of 
‘education’ in its modern sense (that is, borrowing from Mitchell, as “an isolated process in 
which children [and young adults in the case of higher education] acquire a set of instructions 
and self-discipline”
75
) is here fully adopted: criticizing the lack of devoted attention to the matter 
of the age of the students in previous codes, the report puts forward a maximum window of five 
years in the admitting process (between 10 and 15 years of age), because “students of a given 
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class must be approximately of the same age, so that the same pedagogical principles can be 
applied, “and their characters formed homogeneously.”
76
  
As for the curriculum, the Projet introduces the section by stating that “the subjects 
taught at al-Azhar whether religious or not have not always been the same, and that they are 
divided, by the Azharies themselves, into three categories.”
77
 These categories are, of course, 
those of the 1908 law, which separated matters religious, philological and scientific. The text of 
the Projet makes this division go back to the law of 1314H/1896G – but this is erroneous. As we 
have seen, that law divided the curriculum into the two primary categories of ends and means, a 
completely different categorization from the secular one put forward starting in 1908, in which 
religion becomes an identifiable and autonomous field. The anxiety of the writers concerning 
this question is evidenced by their feeling the need to add “d’après les Azhariens” to avoid what 
appears otherwise as a statement of both fact and law.  
The rest of the report is essentially a description, in minute detail, of the modalities of 
enactment of the various provisions of the law. But the bulk of the ideological work has been 
carried out well before we reach the actual provisions of the new constitution; indeed, the very 
narrative plot of the text as a whole, and the wording of the various segments, is set up to lead to 
this position, but expounded as the natural, rational, logical culmination of a single same process 
begun well before. Perhaps the greatest power of this legal edict was that it became the founding 
storyline of an entire historiographical paradigm, frequently repeated in subsequent scholarship. 
Thus, regarding 1872, Bayard Dodge writes: “This law was important because it was the first of 
a series of reforms, which turned al-Azhar from a mediaeval mosque-college into a modern 
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 Daniel Crecelius, a decade later, would also rehash the narrative of the Projet de 
réforme, at one and the same time asserting the foundational nature of 1872 and criticizing its 
lack of efficacy, which results in both giving historical depth to a singular process of reform, and 
advocating for the current bout of new regulations. “The law of 1872,” he writes, “must therefore 
be judged a false step in the long and tortuous path towards modernization and we must look to 
the decade of the 1890s for the true beginning of reorganization and reform at al-Azhar.”
79
  
This is quite a lesson in the mutual constitutive interdependence between modern law and 
modern historiography, noted long ago already by Hegel, and recognized by Hayden White. In 
one direction, the Projet was an explicitly legal document, and the committee was put together 
precisely with the idea of producing law. But the document grounded itself in an explicitly 
historical, and indeed historicist, logic. Much of the labor involved in the production of the 
document was the unearthing/production of an archival record, worthy of the most Rankean of 
historians; and much of the justification for the conclusions is anchored in an appeal to the past. 
This method is in total contrast to the texts produced just a few years earlier, surrounding the law 
of 1896, in which there is nothing noticeably historical in any modern sense. In the other 
direction, this juridical moment was also a foundational historiographical one with hegemonic 
impact, so that it is very difficult to think of “the al-Azhar laws” outside of the grand paradigm 
of reform ordained by the Projet and its juridical apparatus. If one accepts the constancy of the 
historical object “al-Azhar”, which the historico-legal moment of the Projet consecrates, then 
one is almost inevitably compelled to accept its attendant historicist argument, wherbey all that 
came before 1911 was simply a precedent to a telos, both legal and historical.   
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Reform, In Three Acts 
In fact, the change between 1896 and 1908, let alone between 1872 and 1911, when it 
comes to the ways al-Azhar and its curriculum are conceived, is one of quality, not of quantity, 
involving the grammar of concepts, rather than technicalities of application. Rather than an 
extended self-realization of an idealized process of reform towards a preset telos, we might 
instead identify three very different moments in the institutional developments at al-Azhar since 
the mid-nineteenth century. 
The first moment, beginning in the early 1860s and leading to the law of 1872 and 
beyond, involved a centralizing, absolutist principle, which paralleled the similar process of 
centralized state building in Egypt – a sudden rupture during the days of the khedive Ismāʿīl, not 
the coming into being of a primordial national identity.  
The changes of the “1872 law” concerned the locus of authority inside and outside al-
Azhar, now re-imagined as an institution over which the state had purchase, and which ought to 
have an internal order, or a new niẓām in the vernacular. Rather than a law in the modern sense 
(of a structured document providing a reasonable and justifiable constitution to its object), this 
was a khedival order, emanating directly from the beneficence of its author. As the famed 
nineteenth-century bureaucrat ʿAlī Mubārak narrates the story, the new rector Shāykh 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥifnī al-ʿAbbāsī al-Ḥanafī, building upon the noble though stifled 
attempts of his predecessor Shāykh al-ʿArūsī, “got permission [istaʾthana] from the Great 




examination of whoever sought to teach...”
80
 So he gathered the Azhari scholars together and 
they agreed that the examining committee should be made of six scholars (two from each of the 
three juridical schools, for the Ḥanbalīs were very few at al-Azhar, indeed in Cairo/Egypt more 
largely, explains Mubārak) and the examination should cover eleven disciplines taught at al-
Azhar: tafsīr, ḥadīth, usūl, tawḥīd, fiqh, naḥu, ṣarf, maʿānī, bayān, badiʿ, manṭiq.
81
  
ʿAlī Mubārak’s description of the process shows how different it was from any notion of 
examination that one might expect today: a candidate applied by sending a petition [ʿāriḍa] 
putting forward his qualifications to Shāykh al-Azhar, who then inquired about the applicant 
among those who knew him, first orally and then in writing.
82
 An examining committee was then 
assembled, and the candidate was examined for each subject an entire day (from four in the 
morning to four in the evening) without interruption except for prayer and food. After the eleven 
days of examination, if the committee judges the candidate successful (in any of three levels of 
proficiency), a diploma was prepared and sent to “the khedival retinue” [al-māʾīyah al-
khudūwīyah], which then issued to the candidate an official “bestowal of honor” [ʿāriḍat tashrīf] 
graced by the stamp of the Khedive. This diploma gave the scholar not only the possibility of 
teaching at al-Azhar, but also other privileges, both great and small (such as a ribbon with edges 
embroidered in gold [sharīṭ muqassab], to place on his turban, and a fifty percent reduction on 
steamship trips [al-safar fī ‘l-vapūr]). Mubārak then adds that the new system of examination has 
                                                 
80
 Mubārak, Al-Khiṭaṭ al-tawfīqīyah al-jadīdah li-Miṣr al-Qāhirah wa mudunihā wa bilādihā al-qadīmah wa’l-
shahīrah, vol. IV (Cairo: Bulaq Press, 1305 AH): 36. 
 
81
 Ibidem. That is Qur’anic exegesis, prophetic traditions, theology and jurisprudence, as well as grammar/syntax, 
morphology, and disciplines pertaining to rhetoric (sentence structure, similes/metaphors/metonymies, 
embellishment etc.) See further Heyworth-Dunne’s listing of the curriculum at al-Azhar which he divides these into 
religious, rational and linguistic sciences. (An Introduction to the History of Modern Education in Egypt, 41-2. 
 
82




increased the seriousness and efforts of the students, though “it is also said that there is 
corruption in the system [wa lākin rubbamā yuqāl inna dhālika fihī ifsād].”
83
  
Having concluded the discussion of the law, Mubārak moved on to another innovation 
introduced by Shāykh al-Mahdī: he eliminated the ownership of columns by the different 
madhhabs. The columns were now distributed to individuals by the administration directly, and 
not through intermediary collectivities. 
The 1872 law certainly put forward a fundamentally novel structure, but it was not, as the 
scholarship interprets it to be, a first step on a pre-ordained path to progressive reform that led 
organically to the 1911 law (and beyond, to 1961). The logic of this law was entirely about 
power and structure: it reformulated the idea of authority as being embodied in a single office 
(that of Shāykh al-Azhar inside, conjoined to the Khedive’s outside), and it introduced the 
system of the curriculum (the “eleven disciplines”) as well as the process of examination (for 
professorships) as a means to execute that new locus of authority. This explains why the law also 
abrogated the collective rights of the madhhabs to a set of columns (whose occupants would be 
chosen internally by each madhhab’s members): the distribution of teaching space should now 
flow directly from a single fount of authority, Shāykh al-Azhar, himself henceforth only a 
representative of a higher power, namely the Khedive.  
This is not to say that the political authorities had never been involved in Azhari affairs 
before this moment. Of course they did (though by no comparative measure as often or 
systematically as they did to the period following the increasing bureaucratization of the state). 
Al-Jabartī narrates for example a famous episode in which a rivalry for the position of Shāykh al-
Azhar in the late eighteenth-century implicated multiple levels of the political elite. He also 






mentioned incidents where Azhari shāykhs were put to death by powerful amīrs for contesting 
their views, and these stories are not surprisingly rehashed in all manner of triumphalisms in the 
official Azhari historiography.
84
 And certainly the political and commercial elite played a crucial 
role of patronage vis-à-vis the scholarly class. But the relationship was never enshrined in such a 
patrimonial structure, as it would be in 1872 and thereafter. 
 
The second moment is one of intense creativity in redefining the terms of the curriculum 
at al-Azhar, yet still remaining explicitly within the bounds of Islam as an organic discursive 
tradition. Personified in the figure of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and effected in the context of direct 
British occupation, the reformulation of the space of knowledge divided various fields into ends 
and means (maqāṣid wa wasāʾil) –an innovation to some sense, but one that still maintained the 
larger framework of the discursive tradition within which it was conceived. 
The moment begins with the institution, by khedival ordinance, of an Administrative 
Council for al-Azhar, and culminates in the promulgation of the famous ‘law of 1896’ – itself a 
set of foundational by-laws that sought to define al-Azhar as a coherent structure in toto, but 
from within the Islamic discursive tradition. In other words, however radical and novel this or 
that regulation might have been (and many indeed were thoroughly contemporary), they were all 
framed from within the tradition – i.e., there was no place for such a thing as a separate, 
sovereign ‘Islam’ (or ‘religion’, really) in this arena. The law of 1896 clearly sought to be 
totalizing: its clauses relate to issues ranging from biopolitics to cosmic theology, from student 
hygiene to the believer’s faith. 
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The law began by confirming the pyramidal authority structure within the institution: the 
first article states that “Shāykh al-Azhar is the president [raʾīs] of the administrative council of 
al-Azhar, and he has the right of surveillance [haqq al-murāqabah] over the personal behavior of 
people as it relates to the integrity of knowledge and religion.”
85
 Article two confirms that from 
his office emanate all laws and regulations relating to al-Azhar. The regulations then continue to 
detail the prerogatives centralized in the individual authority of the Rector and the collective 
authority of the Council, which has the duty to regulate, notably, both the faculty and the student 
body. Part of the requirements for the latter was medical certificates concerning vaccines and 
contagious diseases (Article 16).
86
 The most important innovation of this law, however, appeared 
in Article 17, which instituted the maqāṣid/wasāʾil distinction. This was clearly much discussed 
by the Administrative Council in previous formulations that would eventually make it into the 
law.
87
 A document signed by the secretary and the president of the Council included an extensive 
apologia for the fields of history [ʿilm al-tārīkh], geography [ʿilm taqwīm al-buldān], religious 
ethics [ʿilm al-ādāb al-dinīyah], and mathematics [ʿilm al-hisāb] on account of their value for 
distinctly Islamic purposes. An earlier rendition of the by-laws (issued only on the authority of 
the Council itself) had  included eight fields as ‘ends’ and twelve as ‘means;’ Article 17 of the 
actual law cited only six of the former and nine of the latter. The subjects excluded (namely, the 
history of Islam and composition, both oral and written, in the case of ends; and linguistics, 
literature, geometry, and geography) were assumed under Article 18, as fields specified by the 
law, though not offered at al-Azhar. The law had given the Council the prerogative, (Article 10), 
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to hire non-Azhari faculty to teach fields not covered in its actual curriculum, while 
simultaneously (Article 20) asserting the primacy of the maqāṣid fields to which it allotted more 
time of study.  
As for the reading material, Articles 21 and 23 formally required the Council’s approval 
of all books read by the students and prohibited the use of glosses and commentaries in the first 
four years of study. After that time, secondary commentaries [ḥawāshi] may be consulted at the 
discretion of the professors; but the use of glosses [taqārīr] remained absolutely forbidden 
without an explicit authorization from the Council itself. This was quite radical, since most of the 
intellectual production and creativity of the previous few centuries was founded, precisely upon 
those commentaries and glosses. Indeed as textual genres, they (along with 
abridgments/mukhtaṣarāt) encompassed some of the most canonical works in the tradition. And 
it was somewhat ironic that the Council should give itself so much control over the reading 
material, since later commentators and hagiographers of Muḥammad ʿAbduh made so much of 
his humiliation by the authorities of al-Azhar for having been caught reading a unapproved book. 
The laws certainly introduced novel procedures to the curriculum at al-Azhar and amplified the 
bureaucratic centralization of its ordered structure, but in terms of the content, it was 
nevertheless framed in terms indigenous to the Islamic tradition. The idea of maqāṣid and 
wasāʾil for instance had theoretical antecedents in the domains of sharīʿa and theology dating 
back to earlier centuries (and would come to be mobilized precisely in that vein by later 
reformers and commentators).
88
 At the same time, it should be noted that the law also affirmed of 
the space of ‘Egypt’ as a sovereign and coherent unit within which education could be dispensed, 
from the top of the pyramid downwards: Article 58 gives the right to those who teach at al-Azhar 
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to teach in any other equivalent institution in the Egyptian region [fī bāqīyyat al-madāris al-
mumathilah fī’l-quṭr al-miṣrī]. 
Thus, while the notion of modern education had here clearly gained currency at al-
Azhar and in Egypt more largely, it was not quite the liberal conception of education that 
would later achieve hegemony. Take for example the equally elusive concept of ‘science’ and 
the debates surrounding its introduction in ‘European’ guise at al-Azhar as mentioned above: 
Marwa Elshakry has argued that the reduction of responses to Darwinian evolutionary ideas (at 
al-Azhar and elsewhere) as simply ‘reactionary’ or ‘traditional’ reinforces a naive opposition 
between ‘Western science’ and ‘non-Western religion.’ Rather than revealing the complex 
ways in which these debates helped shape “local understandings” of science and religion as 
“catalysts for emerging views on social development, cultural advancement and political 
struggle,” it occludes the multiplicity of expressions and contestations surrounding these 
developments that do not neatly sit in either a modern or traditional camp.
89
  
Elshakry further contests the “hagiographic and revisionist” depiction of ʿAbduh as “a 
lonely voice of reason and liberation, standing alone amidst a tide of overwhelming 
conservative opposition”: a view that “misreads both ʿAbduh and his critics.” Instead she 
reminds her readers that ʿAbduh was in the end a mujtahid, and in this sense he was above all a 
“traditionalist.”
90
 Similarly, while his critics, “suspected [and ultimately condemned] ʿAbduh 
of heterodoxy,” it was “his association with the British” and not necessarily his proposals on 
reform per se or the bulk of his ideas which they directly opposed, for they too “wanted to 
improve facilities, raise stipends and reduce over-crowding [at al-Azhar] – all key items of the 
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 The debates on science and religion (whether guised in the mode of 
adaptation or contestation in the case of Darwinian ideas) were thus a “contest not so much 
between religious thinkers and secularists as among believers, both Christian and Muslim, each 




The third moment, of which the Projet de réforme comprises a leading part, involves the 
breaking down of precisely this tradition, so that religion emerges as a discrete field to be studied 
independently, and al-Azhar is that institution of higher learning where one can best learn the 
code that defines that field (in addition to other, separate fields of inquiry such as philology or 
science).             
These are all different articulations of complex arrangements, involving different 
discursive formations. Each had a different grammar of concepts, with differing social and 
political implications, where the ideas of God, Man, Cosmos, Law, Learning, World, Text, had 
varying meanings and connotations. We should not allow the crookedness of the history to be 
tidied or straightened out by assumptions concerning an illusory constancy of the object 
‘university’ – which, always already there, just needed to be reformed to be brought up to par 
with the modern line.   
It will surely be said that it is normal to describe foreign institutions and places by terms 
that are familiar to the author’s readers. Fair enough, but that should not be confused with critical 
historical scholarship, then, the purpose of which, to follow Hayden White, is not to domesticate 
the past but on the contrary to let us be perplexed by it. And this is precisely what makes 





 Ibid.  308-9. This is paralleled in ʿAbduh’s work in legal reform, as analyzed by Talal Asad, on which, see further 




Timothy Mitchell’s work, especially in Colonising Egypt, so compelling, in as much as it aims to 
“point us towards an understanding of some of our own strange ideas about the nature of writing, 
and the political assumptions to which they correspond.”
93
 The objective here then would be 
similarly to let the alternative understandings of learning purveyed at al-Azhar until the late 
nineteenth-century help us in thinking through our own strange ideas about modern education - 
with its hierarchies and exclusionary practices, its role in state politics and in fostering capitalist 
efficiency, its delusional expulsion of ethics from its purview, its rigid flattening of differences 
and uniform individualizing, its dutiful disciplining, and its emancipatory promises, all the more 
tyrannical for being unspectacular. In the world of al-Azhar before it became an Islamic 
university, the idea of a ‘blind lady of science’ (so to speak) was as grotesque as the idea of a 
‘blind lady of justice:’ neither, to follow Hallaq’s astute observation, could demur to attend to a 
cosmos that was fully integrated in its textuality, sociality and materiality.
94
 There could be no 
science for its own sake, since as an autonomous field, separate from rhetoric and ethics, it 
simply did not exist. This, in the age of neoliberal experts, exported universities, and drone wars, 
ought at least to make us think. And the way to begin thinking about it, suggests Michael Allan 
in his discussion of how the multi-semantic field of adab became literary, is not simply to wield 
a semiotic analysis to critique the symbolic purchase of particular representations, but also to 
reflect on “the disciplines and practices that make representations intelligible.”
95
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It is thus not simply a matter of understanding the role of symbols and concepts, but also 
to pursue how this or that symbol and concept emerges and takes on currency, and what the 
epistemological and ontological consequences of it may be.  
 
The University through Arab Eyes 
The life story of Taha Hussein (1889-1973), perhaps the most famous modernist critic of 
al-Azhar in particular and traditionalism in general, is enlightening with regard to the distinct 
novelty of the idea of the university. Though obviously beholden to an ideological line that held 
al-Azhar to be regressive in both the content and the form of its pedagogical approach, Hussein’s 
autobiography is written in that frankness and directness of speech for which his prose has 
become famous.
96
 His narrative is truly remarkable in its capacity to evoke sympathetically and 
candidly each period of the protagonist’s life, his horizons of emotions and expectations, rather 
than subject them from the perspective of the author’s later present. So much so in fact, that 
Hussein’s friends would advise him not to publish the memoirs, as they were too open about the 
author’s humble background, something that his critics could use against him. Moreover, Taha 
Hussein played a vanguard role in institutionalizing the human sciences in Egypt (mainly history 
and literature): a lower middle-class boy from a village in Upper Egypt, blind from youth, he 
made his way first to al-Azhar, then into the new Egyptian University (later Cairo University), 
from which he was the first student to obtain a doctorate. He then proceeded to France and 
earned a doctorate there, before returning to Cairo to become the first native to be hired at 
professorial rank at the Egyptian University (to teach history and philosophy of history).  
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For our purposes here, the most revealing passages in the autobiography involve his 
move from al-Azhar to the Egyptian University. Reaching the peak of this time of personal 
crisis, Taha Hussein’s judgment of al-Azhar is explicit and less sympathetic than that of Amīn’s 
quoted in the opening of this chapter:  
It was a life of unrelieved repetition, with never a new thing, from the time the 
study year began until it was over. (...) Throughout these studies it was all merely 
a case of hearing re-iterated words and traditional talk which aroused no chord in 
my heart nor taste in my appetite. There was no food for one’s intelligence, no 
new knowledge adding to one’s store. The Azhar upbringing had nurtured me in 
the sort of talent it required: I had become competent to understand what the 




The heightened narrative tension is relieved in the end by a single, new word: “It was in 
the midst of all this that the name of the “university” was first mentioned. I had not heard this 
word before and, initially, a peculiar sense of strangeness possessed me.”
98
 While his depiction 
of al-Azhar might be dismissed as problematic, Hussein is undeniably correct in identifying the 
novelty of “the university” – indeed; the word itself was new, evoking a novel concept and 
different discursive arrangement. As Constantine Zurayk surveys in his entry for the word 
djamiʿa in the Encyclopedia of Islam, the use of the term seems to begin in the mid-nineteenth 
century in its adjectival form, as a modifier of madrasa, in reference mainly to European 
institutions of higher learning (at least in the references cited by Zurayk, i.e. those of Aḥmad 
Fāris al-Shidyāq and Jurjī Zaydān). As a noun, the term emerged only in the early twentieth 
century, precisely that period remembered by Taha Hussein. “The first definite use of djamiʿa in 
the technical meaning of university,” writes Zurayk,  
[a]ppears to have been in the movement of some intellectual leaders and 
reformers in Egypt in 1906 for the establishment of a djami’a misriyya. On 12 
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October 1906 a group of such leaders, the most acive among whom seem to have 
been Kasim Amin, met in the house of Sa’d Zaghlul and formed a preparatory 
committee to appeal to the Egyptian people for funds for the establishment of a 





This was also the same period as the third moment of institutional transformation of al-
Azhar that we identified above, precisely that during which al-Azhar formally espouses the form 
of a fully-fledged university, where autonomous disciplines are taught each for its own sake, and 
where the very idea of religion and philology are produced and institutionalized in the 
curriculum. About his first impressions at the University, Taha Hussein has a number of 
insightful comments. The first involved a new idea of education as a service conditioned by the 
payment of fees: “It was an odd thing, in our eyes, that we had to buy learning with money, small 
though the sum might be. It was unfamiliar and uncongenial too. We were used to the Azhar 
practice of having provender of daily loaves for our pursuit of learning, solving in part our 
subsistence problem.” But in the end, he came around to the system: “Paying that guinea was 
simply a measure of how much we were in love with what it purchased.”
100
 This is a crucial 
matter, which profoundly affects not only the approach to learning, but also the social 
background of those who can seek it. The situation at al-Azhar could not have been more 
different. As Hussein mentioned, the structure there was geared entirely to providing for the 
devotees of knowledge – and it was indeed, in the eighhteenth century, one of the primary 
avenues of social advancement for talented individuals of humble background. Shāykh al-
                                                 
99
 C. K. Zurayk, “Djamiʿa,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, (eds.) P. Bearman, Th. Bianguis, C. E. 








Damanhūrī, for example, one-time Shāykh al-Azhar and perhaps the greatest scholar of his age 
(or so thought al-Jabartī at least), was of a very poor background; and he was no exception.
101
  
This is related to another feature of the University that surprised the young Taha Hussein: 
“The University was obliged to organize the entry into the class-rooms, admitting only those 
who showed a registration card. In this way they kept out a sizeable number who were making 
their way into classes as thought they were public lectures.”
102
 Unlike al-Azhar, which was by 
definition in its capacity as a place of worship open to the world outside it, the University was a 
controlled space that provided a technical service to those who were properly registered and had 
paid the requisite fees. The new idea of education was thus exclusive and exclusionary. Taha 
Hussein recounts, with delightful cynicism, the dilemma that he faced, since he was blind, when 
the guards would not let his poor and dark-skinned escort into the university because he was not 
a regular registered student. From that day on, he would be left at the gate by his regular guide, 
and led instead by one of his classmates.  
Finally, Hussein was also struck by the ultimate aim of knowledge, as encapsulated in the 
manner by which the teacher greeted his students at the opening of a session: 
In the Azhar I had been used to a different form of words from the shaikhs. 
They were not directed to the students but addressed to God (“His be the Might 
and the Majesty”) in praise and adoration. The shaikhs did not greet the students, 





Whereas at the University the Professor’s greeting invoked the student, the recipient of 
the lecture, at al-Azhar, the course (and its content) was placed under the cosmological canopy of 
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the divine and the tradition, which served as the very condition of a knowledge that was not set 
apart from virtue. It is not that the University Professor did not invoke the divine at all – indeed 
he did: “Gentlemen! I greet you in the fellowship of Islam, and I say: ‘Peace be upon you and 
God’s mercy.’”
104
 The point rather involves less the question of ‘belief’ but of embodied ethics, 
discipline and practice: whereas knowledge, for the Azhari, was directed to and conditioned by, 
in the last instance, God and his Prophet, whose life provided the paradigmatic template upon 
which to mold a virtuous subjectivity, for the University Professor, it was directed to and 
conditioned by the student, the recipient of science reconfigured as an autonomous field, in 
which religion becomes relegated simply to personal conviction or communal identity.  
And of course, the astonishment was capped by the fact that at the University, Hussein 
was taught the modern disciplines of the human sciences, such as geography, history, literature:  
When the third day’s lesson came, my ardour was keener and sharper than 
ever. It was to be by an Italian professor, and in Arabic – an Italian talking to 
Egyptians in their own language, learnedly, about a theme of which I and my 
Azharite contemporaries had never even heard till that very day. And when we 
did – my friends and I – we failed to take it in. “The Literature of Geography and 
History” it ran. But what were our ears, and our inward comprehension, to make 




Within the prototype of the modern university, education thus becomes a service that one 
pays for (sometimes a lot) that one obtains through a regular and linear course of study in 
autonomous disciplines. It trains an exclusive group of constituents, guaranteed by an 
exclusionary, gated space. If this sounds familiar to us in the early twenty-first century, this is 
because it is. Notwithstanding the various chapters in the trajectory of the modern university, 
espousing equally numerous reiterations of its purpose and identity and involving myriad 









concepts by association (culture, nation, experts, freedom, etc), the features that so surprised 






But if al-Azhar before the twentieth-century was not a university, then what was it? There 
is neither a single nor a simple answer to this question. One answer is of course that al-Azhar 
was quite simply a mosque – but it is one that leaves much to be desired in terms of exploring 
how learning was conceived and organized there in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. More fundamentally, there is no simple answer to the question because access to such 
an answer is buried underneath the layers upon layers of multiple biases and assumptions 
concerning words and things that separate us from the world of an Azhari in the late eighteenth 
century, and which cannot simply be wished away. It is further obscured by the absence of 
sources, due in part to historical contingency (such as the lack of a centralized state bureaucracy 
or the disappearance and dislocation of documents over the years),
107
 but also because, as we 
shall see, al-Azhar was not organized according to an abstract order that could be bequeathed to 
posterity in any coherent composed form (such as that implied by a constitution or, indeed, a 
curriculum). 
 There is, nonetheless, a long tradition of Arabic writings on al-Azhar, as a place, a 
symbol, a mosque – and none of them, until the twentieth century, speak of it as a university.  
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The locus classicus of Arabic descriptions of al-Azhar is that of the Mamluk historian 
Ṭaqī al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Maqrīzī’s (d.1442) al-Mawāʿith wa’l-iʿtibār bi dhikr al-khiṭaṭ 
wa’l-āthār, usually referred to simply as the Khiṭaṭ al-Maqrīzīyahh. Al-Azhar appears repeatedly 
in this text, and, though it is clearly an important landmark in Cairo, it is not put forward as 
sitting atop a pyramidal structure of ‘Islamic learning’: its khāṭib, for example, is not the first to 
speak at special occasions. Most often, it is referred to simply as a spatial landmark, in 
accordance with the generic form of the text, which consists of a sort of textualized 
topographical mapping of the city and its environs. When he directly addresses al-Azhar, it is 
under the rubric of mosques more generally, and in compliance with the structure of the khiṭat 
genre, al-Maqrīzī provides a sketch of the architectural history of the buildings, and especially, 
the patrons involved. Revealingly, what is emphasized throughout the narrative is the ethical 
dimension involved in various acts of patronage and endowment. Al-Maqrīzī ends his 
description with an almost mystical evocation of al-Azhar’s sanctity, which one feels 
immediately upon entering the mosque.
108
 His text would become canonical in later histories of 
al-Azhar: it was, for example, reproduced in both its form and content (indeed practically 
verbatim) by ʿAlī Mubārak in his gargantuan new khiṭaṭ: Al-Khiṭaṭ al-tawfīqīyah al-jadīdah li-
Miṣr al-Qāhirah wa mudunihā wa bilādihā al-qadīmah wa’l-shahīrah.
109
  
Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭawī (1801 – 1873) was perhaps the first to attempt to shuttle back and forth 
in translation between Parisian and Cairene institutions of learning. In his famous travelogue 
Takhlīs al-ibrīz fī talkhīs Bārīz, he uses al-Azhar in in a most revealing manner: he mentions it as 
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a way to describe to his readers the notion of the French academies, and especially the Académie 
Française. Following a short discussion of the ancient akādamīyah of Plato the Sage, al-Taḥṭawī 
then writes: “Today, however, the word ‘academicians’ is used by the French solely to denote 
members of the Académie Française [akādimat al-Faransīs], who are the most eminent French 
scholars. Taken more narrowly, the meaning is obvious, and is similar to when one talks of the 
Egyptian Academy [akādimat Miṣr] to mean the Azhar mosque, since this refers to the 
association [diwān] of the greatest scholars of Egypt.”
110
 Thus translated, al-Azhar is not at all a 
university dispensing education, but simply of a collection of great scholars – and their writings.  
As noted above, Timothy Mitchell provides a good antidote to the logic that seeks to fold 
varying histories of learning into a linear trajectory traced by the anachronistic concept of 
education. Instead of defining mosques or madrasas as places where education is doled out, he 
suggests instead to think of them (and he has in mind al-Azhar in particular) as centers “of the art 
and authority of writing.”
111
 Such teaching mosques, he explains “had been established in earlier 
centuries by those who held political power, as endeavours to secure and extend through those 
learned in law, language and philosophy the authoritative support of its word.”
112
  Mitchell then 
draws on Ibn Khaldūn to describe this type of activity as “sina’a, a profession or craft,” and on 
George Makdisi and Richard Bulliet to identify the object of this craft as being the domain of 
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 For Mitchell, al-Azhar, rather than a school of law per se, was “the oldest and most 
important centre in the Islamic world of law as a profession.”
 
Learning in such a context is 
simply part of the practice of the profession, rather than a domain set apart in a particular process 
of a youth’s development. Moreover, Mitchell adds that ‘the law’ in his usage “should be 
understood to include a large body of linguistic, philosophical and theological scholarship.”
114
 
Later in the book, he again cautions that “Islamic law” should not be confused with “law in the 
modern sense.”
115
 Whereas the latter might refer to “a community’s code of rules,” the former 
“was never understood as an abstract code setting limits within which ‘behaviour’ was to be 




This is crucial, for it gives a sense of the ways in which learning at al-Azhar was 
embedded in a social fabric and cosmological order radically different from the sense associated 
with the idea of the modern university. In a recent article that seeks to explore the question 
“What is Shariʿa?” Wael Hallaq pushes the reflection on the nature of law and the travails of 
translation to brilliant effect. The shariʿa, he explains, “was not only a judicial system and a 
legal doctrine whose function was to regulate social relations and resolve disputes but a 
discursive practice that structurally and organically tied itself to the world around it in ways that 
were vertical and horizontal, structural and linear, economic and social, moral and ethical, 
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intellectual and spiritual, epistemic and cultural, and textual and poetic, among much else.”
117
 
Shariʿa was thus not a specialized code in which one could be educated, but a socially 
entrenched discursive practice that was shielded neither from the community nor from morality, 
and other non-legal realms of thought and action. Furthermore, this mutual embeddedness went 
in both directions: not only from the legal to the social, but also vice versa. “Unlike modern 
society,” Hallaq continues, “which has become estranged from the legal profession in multiple 
ways, traditional Muslim society was as much embedded in a sharʿi system of legal values as the 
court was embedded in the moral universe of society. It was a salient feature of that society that 
it lived legal ethics and legal morality, for these constituted the religious foundations and codes 
of social praxis.”
118
 As a result, there was in this world no such species as “lawyers who spoke a 




The consequences of all this for the realm of ‘education’ is obviously extensive. Hallaq 
points to this, if only in passing, when he asserts that the shariʿa “originated from, and cultivated 
itself within, the very social order which it came to serve in the first place.”
120
 “The qadi’s court, 
as well as the professor’s classroom and the mufti’s assembly,” he continues, “was the yard of 
the mosque, and when this was not the case, the market place or a private residence.”
121
 This was 
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The first characteristic feature of a portrait of al-Azhar then that seeks to escape the 
anachronistic logic of modern education is its absolute openness to the public – not solely to a 
specialized, scholarly audience, but to everyone. Not only was there no registration, but the 
courses themselves were not necessarily geared towards ‘students’ as a specific group of people. 
A. L. Tibawi pointed this out long ago: “It must not be assumed that the circle (ḥalaqah) of a 
learned man in any mosque was solely intended for, or attended by, aspiring scholars, for it was 
often open to whoever could profit from it, irrespective of age or academic standard.”
123
 Thus, 
the point about ‘registration’ is not merely a bureaucratic matter – it shifts the very essence and 
practice of instruction, and, as Hallaq points out, this leads to a very different relationship 
between ‘education’, ‘the law’, and the ‘society at large’ than the one expected in the context of 
the modern state. Indeed, those very terms themselves emerge and make sense only in dialogue 
with ‘the state’ (hence the scare quotes).  
Moreover, the form of the ḥalaqa, as an infinite circle, a perfect sphere with no beginning 
nor end, not only carries mystical meanings and spatialities that bespeak of an entire 
cosmological order implied in the notion of ʿilm,
124
 it also facilitates a certain intimacy and 
dialogue between student-student and not just student-teacher that is lost in the formal layout of 
the modern classroom, where students sitting in rows face only the teacher who sits 
hierarchically atop his podium.  
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The question of audience is equally telling and is organically related to another basic 
attribute of al-Azhar, which makes it fundamentally different from a modular university:  before 
and above being a place of learning, it was a place of worship – it was, therefore, by its very 
purpose open to all. The need to note this simple fact is due in large part to a problem of 
translation: meant here both in the literal, linguistic sense of rendering al-Azhar as a ‘university’, 
but also the more conceptual sense, of crossing domains that the modern mind has been taught to 
separate, namely the religious and the secular. This would have been obvious to anyone reading 
works about al-Azhar in Arabic from before the twentieth-century (and indeed, even beyond), in 
which the institution is systematically and simply referred to as a jāmiʿ, a congregational mosque 
(which word, incidentally, differs from the Modern Standard Arabic for university by the single 
final letter).
125
 This too has significant consequences as to the production, transmission and 
consumption of learning: in such a setting, the process was part and parcel of piety and 
worship.
126
 Even the modernist reformists of the late nineteenth century, both within and outside 
of the institution itself, simply refer to it as a mosque. Muṣṭafa Bāyram, who wrote the first 
booklet devoted explicitly to the history of the institution (and first delivered at an Orientalist 
congress) calls it a jāmiʿ.
127
 More explicitly even, ʿAlī Mubārak discusses al-Azhar as an entry in 
the volume of his Khitat exclusively devoted on mosques. This is not merely a semantic point. 
As Bulliet notes (though his subject concerns a rather different time and place, some parallels are 
striking): since “all instruction was ultimately religious,” it should not “be refused to any Muslim 
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desirous and capable of receiving it,” and therefore “whom a man taught” was “irrelevant.”
128
 
There was, in other words, no coherent idea of the student, as an individual or a class: it was, 
rather, a matter of a search of knowledge and the good life, formulated not simply as the right but 
a duty of all able Muslims.  
A place of learning and worship, as the House of God it was also a place of refuge: 
anyone seeking escape or solace was in principle protected by the sanctity of the space.
129
 This is 
not only true for extraordinary cases of individuals or communities fleeing some particular fear 
or oppression (and though extraordinary, these could very well be common, as in the case of the 
military draft dodgers), it was also true for the ordinary and regular yearning of the poor to evade 
destitution and hunger. It is for this reason that al-Azhar was one of the most important channels 
for social mobility in Cairo of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As one commentator 
has it, “practically the entire religious élite of [that period] had risen from humble origins to the 
highest positions in the native religious hierarchy, positions from which they controlled 
enormous wealth and exerted great political influence.”
130
 The case of Shāykh al-Damanhūrī is 
worthy recounting again here in greater detail for, though special for the extreme heights 
reached, it was not unusual. Born an orphan in a small town of the Nile Delta, Aḥmad al-
Damanhūrī came to al-Azhar as a child with no financial or social support base, and rose, 
seemingly with sheer talent and dedication, through the ranks to reach the highest peak of the 
scholarly elite. Eventually becoming Shāykh al-Azhar, he rubbed shoulders not only with the 
highest scholarly authorities, but also with the most powerful political figures, of his age, such as 
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ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr in Cairo, and even Sulṭān Muṣṭafa III in Istanbul. Indeed, al-Jabartī mobilizes 
him as a marker of a historical transition, describing him as “the shāykh of the older 
generation.”
131
 (Revealingly, it was important for al-Jabartī to receive an ijāza from him). 
This should not be romantically understood as a distinct feature of some essential 
‘Islamic education’: it was, for example, evidently very different from the situation in Nishapur 
in the tenth and eleventh centuries, as described by Bulliet, where “[d]espite its theoretical 
democracy, the system [of learning] actually served to buttress and maintain the exclusiveness of 
the patriciate.”
132
 The proof for this (as that for the opposite case of al-Azhar in the eighteenth 
century) is unequivocal: “all teachers were patricians.”
133
 And, as Bulliet shows, the teaching 
was the key to the entire system. 
The role of al-Azhar as a refuge from the demands of the state in particular was moreover 
noted  by ʿAlī Mubārak, who remarks (with a sensible tone of annoyance) that al-Azhar served 
as an escape from the draft into military or civil state projects for many who did not even seek 
knowledge there.
134
 This was probably the reason, he continued, for its increasing over-
enrollment. 
This function of al-Azhar as a space of refuge and social mobility was one that the 
reformers of the late nineteenth-century sought to eliminate. Their writings on al-Azhar betray an 
antipathy and even digust – heavily mediated by class condescension, it goes without saying – at 
the living conditions and mores of its students. ʿAlī Mubārak mentioned the poverty and 
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rudeness of the Egyptian students at al-Azhar (the foreigners, he explained, tended to be of richer 
stock), and elsewhere he had already explicitly mentioned the “unacceptable odors” of the 
classes.
135
 ʿAbdallah al-Nadīm as we have seen above similarly decried the stench and squalor of 
the students, which he attributed to their ignorance and to the fact that they did not have servants 
to clean their sleeping and eating spaces.
136
 
Further complicating the picture (from the perspective of a viewer expecting to see the 
basic contours of a modern university) is the startling fact that, although al-Azhar-the-mosque is 
one single building, al-Azhar as a place of learning is better understood as a disseminated and 
multi-sited space, a proliferating network of personal relations rather than a discrete locality (or 
“large building” in Amīn’s words). This is a feature of “Islamic learning” (to use this common 
anachronistic label) that was noted already by A. L. Tibawī writing about the early history of 
madrasas, and pursued in greater depth by Richard Bulliet and, more recently, by Jonathan 
Berkey (in their research on Nishapur and Cairo, respectively). As Bulliet notes, “Where a man 
taught was beside the point. Madrasa or mosque, home or store, the quality of the education 
depended upon the teacher, not the place.”
137
 Berkey echoes this sentiment, explicitly evoking 
Tibawī: “for all the establishment of endowed and structured institutions of learning, Islamic 
education remained fundamentally informal, flexible, and tied to persons rather than 
institutions.”
138
 It was also certainly so in the case of al-Azhar in the eighteenth and nineteenth  
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 Like the biographical dictionaries examined by Bulliet and Berkey, those of 
Ottoman period similarly hone in on persons rather than institutions: always stating which 
subjects or books a scholar read and with whom, but only occasionally mentioning the specific 
site of their studying or teaching. This was evidently still the case in the early twentieth century, 
if one follows Taha Hussein’s memoirs, where the boundaries of al-Azhar as a place of learning 
are not at all fixed. Both students and teachers sought knowledge in multiple locations: mosque, 
home, marketplace, as noted above by Wael Hallaq and Richard Bulliet (who even adds the 
charming “riverside”).  Berkey rightly concludes that this suggests an altogether different notion 
of the transmission of knowledge: “[c]ontemporaries, in other words, considered the venue of 
instruction and education to be of secondary importance: what was critical (as even the savants 
of the Description would note) was the character and knowledge of the individuals with whom 
one had studied.”
140
    
The relational nature of the acquisition of learning in the non-modern Islamic tradition is 
moreover exemplified in the generic form of the biographical dictionary. As anthologies of sorts, 
often organized as ṭabaqāt (literally referring to “any one or two things that are placed one above 
another, a strata, or layer”) such works chronologically structure in a generational order of 
learned status, the teacher-student relations that characterize any given field of knowledge 
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 Theoretically, they are both productive and emblematic of a notion of ṭalab 
al-ʿilm that involved a quest for knowledge that cannot be apprehended by the autonomous 
concept of education, in its modern form (of ṭarbīyah wa taʿlīm). This was rather a more ethereal 
undertaking whereby the seeker would remove themselves from their existing networks and 
social relations for the purpose of attaching themselves for protracted periods of time to a teacher 
who would pass knowledge (textual and oral) to them. At its core then, the idea of ṭalab al-ʿilm 
is a spiritual endeavour characterized by sacrifice and the hardships necessary for the cultivation 
of an ethical self upon which the attainment of knowledge is qualified and effected, and it is 
guided by two integrally related principles that condition its meaning: that of riʾāsah (academic 




Together, these two concepts operate to define the very essence of the ṭabaqāt of a given 
locality. They comprise the record of scholars who have risen in academic rank along with their 
principal disciples (aṣḥāb). What is important to emphasize here is that it was the community of 
scholars that recognized one’s scholarly pre-eminence or leadership and not the sultan or his 
agents. In that respect, riʾāsah (like it counterpart in the jurisprudential domain, ʿijmāʾ, i.e. the 
articulation of consensus at a given moment) was essentially an open and fluid concept. 
Similarly, ṣuḥbah often expressed itself in the solidarity of the whole group associated with a 
scholar that often remained closely attached even after his death, and would sometimes transfer 
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its allegiance to his principal disciple (ṣaḥib).
 143
  Such loyalties based as they are on personal 
relations inevitably rendered inconsequential any institutional attachments and instead grounded 
scholarship in the moral community from which it emanates.  
 
Furthermore, a particular scholar was not attached to a particular institution to the 
exclusion of others. Indeed, it transpires indirectly from al-Jabartī’s account that one of the 
purviews/duties of the Shāykh of al-Azhar himself was to give a lesson in another mosque. By 
symmetry, the ‘student’ was not bound a priori to attend courses in a specific place as opposed 
to another. This may seem like an obvious point by now, but its implications are far-reaching, as 
shown above. Such organization could not be more different from the model of the modern 
university, as Taha Hussein’s experience of the gates of the university evoked above makes ever 
more clear.     
Indeed, there was in a system thus organized no such thing as a modular student, whose 
disciplining and training in one field or another was the duty of the institution. This is evidenced 
perhaps most clearly by the fact that so much of the content of the modernizing laws was 
devoted to defining precisely that category. To begin with, anyone could attend lectures, a fact 
which dilutes any stable category of students to the point of irrelevance. Furthermore, people of 
different sorts did attend, including fellow ‘professors’. This disrupts any regular hierarchy that 
may be assumed between the speaker and the public, something that is essential to the professor-
student relationship of the modern university. In the audience of an Azhari learning session, then, 
could be present, theoretically at least, a passing mendicant as well as an established scholar. 
This also affected fundamentally the operative modalities of the teaching itself: it was never a 
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matter of the passive reception of data by the student from the teacher. Much to the contrary, 
active engagement with, and discussion of, the material on the part of the audience was expected 
and encouraged. Learning was about fostering human relationships, not simply obtaining data, 
and above all, it remained principally bound to the ethical (Stoic) ideal of edification and the 
moral cultivation of the self. This too the reformers of the late nineteenth-century sought to 
eliminate: the law of 1896 explicitly regulated the number of times a student could interrupt the 
teacher (to three times only).
144
   
The different structure of the particular ‘classroom’ had parallel repercussions regarding 
the technical goal of the ‘curriculum’ as a whole: rather than a diploma, license or a certificate, 
‘graduating’ out of al-Azhar in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, one would obtain ijāzas. 
The plural form is crucial here, for one did not receive a single title from the institution one 
attended, but rather from a person (this is consistent with the previously described absence of 
discreet institutions in favor of networks of personal relationships). The fact that it did not 
emanate from the institution is key; indeed, the ijāza was not “an authorization to teach” in a 
technical sense, as was conferred upon students in European universities; it was, rather, the 
insertion of an individual into a chain of trustworthy authorities (isnād), akin to the initiation into 
a line of Sufi practitioners.
145
 As in the case of Sufi transmission, the genealogy often returned 
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all the way back to a founding figure, such as the Prophet himself, or an eponymic founder of 
one of the schools of fiqh, or someone of the sort.  
There were, of course, debates about the proper conditions under which an ijāza could be 
granted: some scholars were generous with their ijāzas and could deliver them from afar (both 
spatially, by correspondence, but also even temporally, by for instance granting it for a parent to 
a baby child in anticipation), others scorned such practices and insisted the ijāza could only be 
delivered upon sustained study with the scholar. But whatever the disputes about the appropriate 
modalities of ijāza-granting, theoretically, its function was uncontestable: it was all about placing 
oneself in a personal relationship of learning with another scholar (who was himself connected 
to another, and so on and so forth). Accordingly, Jonathan Berkey draws attention to a curious 
feature of Jalāl al- Dīn al- uyūṭī’s (1445–1505) career, which is most revealing with regard to 
the principle of the ijāza. As narrated in his autobiography, al- uyūṭī, perhaps the greatest of the 
scholars of Mamluk Egypt, did not feel entitled to teach qirā’āt, the polyvalent art of Qur’anic 
recitation, because he was unable to pass on a genealogy of authorities.
146
 It was not that he 
lacked knowledge of the topic – indeed, he penned an influential book on the subject – but he 
simply could not transmit it for want of an authoritative pedigree.
147
  
The ijāza returns in its origin, like so many arts and sciences in the Islamic tradition, to 
the discipline of ḥadīth studies. In the strict technical sense, it was, according to the French 
Orientalist William Marçais drawing on al-Nawawī, the “third of the eight methods of receiving 
                                                                                                                                                             




 Jalāl al-Dīn al- utūṭī, Al-Taḥadduth bi-niʿmat Allāh, ed. E. M. Sartain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 







the transmission of a ḥadīth.”
148
 As Georges Vajda explains this technical term, “[i]t means in 
short the fact that an authorized guarantor of a text or of a whole book (his own work or a work 
received through a chain of transmitters going back to the first transmitter or to the author) gives 
a person the authorization to transmit it in his turn so that the person authorized can avail himself 
of this transmission.”
149
 This procedure and its modus operandi, expanded to include knowledge 
more largely as a systematic whole and lay at the very heart of teaching, in turn resisting ready-
made distillations of a duality between oral and written cultures: 
Although serious students normally wrote down what they heard recited and 
most teachers taught from written texts, still independent study of a written text 
was not the equivalent of hearing the same text recited by one who had heard it 
recited by a predecessor and of on back to the original author of the work. For 
example, the Sahih of Bukhari, one of the most authoritative hadith collections, 
was well known in Nishapur in the fourth/tenth century; but those students who 
aspired to teach it themselves travelled some two hundred miles to the town of 
Kushmaihan near Marv where there was a man who recited the text from a copy 




Crucially, the classic ijāza served to validate a moral community of scholarship and at the 
same time confirm its normative parameters, methods, vocabularies, and above all, its claims to 
truth. In some sense then, one might suggest that the ijāza, as historical document grounded in 
personal relations and networks and modes of comportment, enshrines what Steven Shapin has 
called the “social history of truth,” and its sibling quality, virtue.
151
 For at its core is a complex 
nexus pivoting around the relationship between teacher, student and text that moves across 
speech and writing and operates in both temporal and spatial orders through the organizing 
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concept of the sanad, which functioned differently in different fields of inquiry.
152
 In all cases 
however, sanad constituted a type of ‘moral-ethical habitus’ situated in the lived example of the 
Prophet (and later in generational hierarchy, al-ṣaḥābah, al-tābi‘īn, al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ etc) as final 
progenitor and locus [al-khātim] for the content (that is to say, idea) in question. Such primary 
linkages guaranteed the sunna’s place as both the font of subsequent historical inquiry and the 





The divergence between the classic ijāza and the modern diploma is immediately evident 
in their formal contrast and deserves some further discussion. To that end, the example of the 
first that I will use [Figure 1] is an ijāza from the renowned eighteenth-century Meccan scholar 
ʿUmar ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAqīl (d. 1760) that was written for Ḥasan al-Jabartī, a leading scholar of 
eighteenth-century Cairo and copied by his son, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, the historian 
mentioned above.
154
 Through it Ibn ʿAqīl authorizes Shāykh Ḥasan to transmit the six canonical 
ḥadīth compilations of al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, al-Nisāʾī, al-Tirmidhī and Ibn Māja, 
and the principal manual of Mālikī jurisprudence [though Ḥasan be a Ḥanafī himself], a 
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collection of names of God – known as al-Arbaʿīnīyah al-Idrīsīyah al-Suhrawardīyah, along 
with an evidently potent prayer: “O God, bless our master, Muḥammad, and his family, for thy 
perfection is endless; and make his perfection pass over (to us).”
155 
 
As for the diploma, the earliest version issued at al-Azhar that I was able to obtain dates 
from 1934 AD, and it is the one used here for the purposes of the comparison (reproduced in 
[Figure 2]).  
The contrasts between these two texts speak directly to the types of issues I’ve been trying 
to outline in this chapter. In the first instance, the diploma appears as an impersonal document, 
uniform and official, and conferred upon completion of the “first section of the secondary level”. 
Its bureaucrat texture is confirmed by the framing heading “Kingdom of Egypt,” in largest font, 
to which the granting institution al-Azhar (depicted here as the mosque and qualified by the 
conglomerate of “religious Islamic colleges” appended to it) is subordinated, so as to appear 
almost as an organ absorbed into the apparatus of the state.  The recipient’s information again 
has that civic quality that we would associate with a passport or some other official state 
document (enumerating, name, date and place of birth) after which is mentioned the recipient’s 
mathhab (Shafiʿī in this case), the date of his successful examination and standing (given as a 
percentile within his cohort). The document is then dated and sealed (not personally signed) by 
the office of the Rector, underneath which is allotted a space for the recipient’s signature.  
Interestingly, and beyond of course the overarching descriptive of the al-Azhar’s colleges 
(as al-maʿāhid al-dīnīyah al-ʿilmīyah al-islāmīyah), there are only two other references that we 
might consider of a “religious” order or inflection: the bismillah, or the customary opening in the 
name of God (which comes below the royal signia adorning the top of the document); and at the 
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very end, the words - “we ask God to make him [the named recipient] succeed in the service of 
knowledge and religion [an yūwafiqahu lī khidmāti al-ʿilmi wa ‘l-dīn].”  
By contrast Ibn ʿAqīl’s ijāza to Ḥasan al-Jabartī is an entirely personal and personalizing 
text. Both its recipient and grantor are named by their various patrilineages and their respective 
individual qualities are enumerated: by way of laudation in the case of the former and as a form 
of staged humility in the case of the later. Moreover, the virtues (or faḍāʾil) of the knowledge to 
be imparted as well as its conditions (in the first case the sunna) are enunciated in tandem with 
those of the recipient:  
[h]e who investigates the glorious sunna in order to follow the guidance of the 
lord of the prophets, (…) gains the prize and is raised to the highest station. (….) 
Therefore, the serious man will devote himself to learning as much as he can; he 
will strive to understand the text, investigate its import, and discuss it with the 
men from whom he derives benefit. And such is the great and high minded 





The inversion of an expected hierarchy between recipient and grantor, with the latter 
referring to the former as “my master,” is further noteworthy. As is the fact that there is no 
mention of any institution in a modern sense: even the Sufi affiliation that is alluded to is in 
reference to the words to be transmitted (i.e. prayer itself) and not to any organized ṭarīqah as 
such. The authority of the text emanates from the listed isnāds that connect both shāykhs to an 
earlier generation (in the case of the prayer for example, it trails all the way back to the Prophet 
through Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in the tabaqa of the tabiʿīn/Successors and before him, in the second 
tabaqa of the ṣaḥābah/Companions, to Imām ʿAlī the Prophet’s nephew and fourth caliph). In 
this way, Ibn ʿAqīl is not only granting Ḥasan al-Jabartī permission to transmit the knowledge on 
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his own authority, but in the name of several consecutive generations of teachers (including the 
Prophet himself), who are specified in each section of the document. The uninterrupted and 
deliberate seriality of the chain of transmission points to the model of ṭalab al-ʿilm described 
above: knowledge is embodied by and through persons, and its attainment is not authorized by an 
institution but by the virtuous disposition of its bearers and transmitters. Thus, in place of the 
examinations of the diploma, the only qualification that Ibn ʿAqīl placed on Shāykh Ḥasan’s 




The conjunction of knowledge-belief-praxis (fundamental to the Islamic ethical tradition) 
is more forcefully affirmed in the ijāza and the instructions it imparts on its recipient, the idea 
being that it was reprehensible for one to amass knowledge and keep it to themselves. ʿIlm is 
thus qualified by its utility: “ʿilmun yuntafaʿu bih.” In this respect even a scholar as esteemed 
and authoritative as Shāykh al-Azhar ʿAḥmad al-Damanhūrī could not escape criticism by al-
Jabartī who accuses him of having been “thrifty in imparting his knowledge and writings to other 
people, including his own.”
158
 And finally, the location of knowledge within a moral community 
reinforces the primary conjunction with praxis, and is repeatedly performed in the very language 
in which the ijāza text is couched with its recurrent emphasis on God as the source of all things, 
the modular example of the Prophet and the cultivation of piety as conditional to the knowledge 
itself. 
As successful as they were in transforming the institutional dimensions of learning, even 
the reform laws could not eliminate the role of the sunna as embodied everyday practice by 
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which the seeker acquires the virtuous dispositions and manners [al-akhlāq wa’l-ādāb] necessary 
for its attainment, application and dissemination. And perhaps they did not explicitly seek to do 
so, for these continue in a disembodied fashion (as detached curricular subjects or benchmarks 
for disciplinary routines) to inculcate Azhari students even today, and have come to provide a 
locus for contemporary calls for the revival of ‘traditional’ learning [al-manhaj al-ṭaqlīdī] 
premised upon relational epitomes that connect transmission [riwāyah], cognizance [dirāyah] 




*       *       * 
 
To repeat and conclude:  teaching in such a system was grounded in personal relations 
and had little to nothing to do with imparting positive data. It thus betook of a cosmology 
wherein knowledge was not separated from world, and disciplines of self were not separated 
from discipline of knowledge. Through their fixing of a curriculum for consumption by a 
specified audience (registered students divided by age), and various accumulative examinations 
at particular stages along the way that culminated in the bestowal of an officialized diploma, the 
series of laws that were initiated in the late nineteenth- and especially early twentieth-centuries 
resolved to discipline precisely such features of the non-modern Azhari orders of knowledge, 
which it now framed as backward disorder. To the extent that they were successful, they would 
effectively circumscribe al-Azhar as a space of modern times. 
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[FIGURE 1] Degree granting diploma, 1934  (al-Azhar Library, Cairo)  
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[FIGURE 2] Text of an ijāza from Shāykh ʿUmar ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAqīl (d.1760) to Shāykh 
Ḥasan al-Jabartī (d.1774)  reproduced  by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī  in his father’s 






Disciplining the Bibliographic Imagination 
 
 
In 1882, ‘Alī Mubārak (1823 – 1893) published ‘Alam al-Dīn, an eclectic educational 
travel epic. Covering almost 1500 pages, the text is divided into 125 “conversations” 
[musāmarāt] between an Azhari shāykh (‘Alam al-Dīn) and an English Orientalist as they 
partake on a voyage of translation and discovery from Egypt to France.
1
 Though seemingly 
written more than a decade before, the timing of the publication was rather significant, as it 
shortly followed upon the beginning of Colonel ‘Urābī’s popular revolt, and just preceded the 
violent British occupation of the country. The place of publication itself, that immortal city of 
Alexandria, would be savagely bombarded by Admiral Seymour’s fleet only few months later.  
From the preface, a panegyric of his own service to the country, it is clear that ʿAlī 
Mubārak intended the book as a series of pedagogical lessons leading towards patriotic progress. 
The topics discussed cover a wide range of themes (involving institutions, practices, customs, 
disciplines, personalities, commodities, etc), beginning with the first musāmarah on travel [al-
safar] and ending with the 125
th
 one devoted to “trees and flowers” [al-ashjār wa’l-zuhūr]. 
Chapter 104 is simply entitled the “house of books” [bāyt al-kutub]. The narrative here follows 
upon a number of previous encounters involving the interaction of the Egyptian shāykh with the 
members of the “Oriental Society” [al-Jamʿīyah al-Mashriqīyah]. These encounters provide 
some of the most interesting passages concerning knowledge, history, language and politics in 
the book, as they maintain a tensional ambivalence towards the West and its superiority. 
Certainly, the West was to be emulated – and Mubārak played a leading role in the state-
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sponsored modernizing reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century that were explicitly 
based on European models, for which  Alam al-Dīn was evidently an apologia. Yet, in a move 
typical of nationalist thought in the colonial world, as analyzed notably by Partha Chatterjee, this 
had to be done even as a spiritual realm, involving notably religion, custom and language, was 
reformulated as traditional and authentic.
2
 Thus, ʿAlam al-Dīn is simultaneously a pageant to 
Western superiority, and an affirmation of autonomous self-worth. And this, just as Egypt was 
moving from being under European financial tutelage by way of the Caisse de le dette publique, 
to a fully-fledged, direct British colonial occupation under the absolute rule of Sir Evelyn Baring 
(later Lord Cromer), whose title and function changed accordingly from Controller-General to 
Consul-General. 
The approach to the ‘house of books’ follows this general pattern. The first few pages are 
entirely devoted to describing the marvel of the shāykh at the library of one of the members of 
the Society.
3
  Alam al-Dīn is impressed by the ‘order’ of the place in all its forms [fa uʿjiba al-
shāykh thālik al-niẓām]: the placing of the shelves and the reading table, the numerical 
cataloguing of the books, the completeness of the collection, the breadth of subjects. None of 
this, he says, could be found anywhere in the East. He seems particularly impressed by the 
presence of a wide variety of books on language [kutub al-lughah], “which do not exist jointly in 
any library [kutubīyah] in any of the lands of Islam.”
4
 It should not come as a surprise that our 
author, then Khedive Ismā‘īl’s Minister of Education, should have instigated and presided over 
the foundation in 1870 of the royal library in Cairo, al-Kutubkhānah al-Khedīvīyah, which would 
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become in due time Egypt’s national library, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah. It was also around this 
time that  Alī Mubārak initiated the establishment of Dār al-‘Ulūm, a college that would prepare 
its students (mainly al-Azhar graduates) to become school teachers in the newly revamped 
system of public instruction.    
Having celebrated the quality of the Western library, however, ‘Alam al-Dīn is put 
forward not as dumb-founded inferior, but rather as a source of unequalled knowledge in the 
realms of language, religion and exegesis. The rest of the musāmarah is devoted to ‘Alam al-Dīn 
explaining a number of difficult points of interpretation to an Italian Orientalist, and it is now the 
Westerner’s turn to be full of awe and marvel.
5
 It is this specific colonial-national ambivalence, 
or “anxiety” as Joseph Massad terms it, vis-à-vis the West that animates the discussion in this 
chapter.
6
 There is indeed, as evidenced in the above passages from  Alam al-Dīn, a simultaneous 
yearning for both separation from and assimilation to the West in the discourse of the 
modernizing native elite in the context of European hegemony. And the West, in  Alam al-Dīn 
and, as we shall see, elsewhere in that period, is identified by metonymy with the Library, which 
in turn becomes a metaphor for progress, culture and even humanity tout court.  
 
This chapter thus proceeds in two parts: the first section explores the place of the idea of 
the Library in the modern episteme, while the second analyzes its importation and application in 
Egypt, and the implications thereof in the context of reforms at al-Azhar. These parts are further 
divided into two subsections each, with an initial broad sweep elucidating what I will be calling 
the bibliographic imagination, before moving on to a more historical discussion of the 
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imbrication of libraries in national and imperial projects; and then, an examination of how this 
meta-narrative is (mis-)applied to   Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī, who can as a result only be read as 
a ‘figure of lack,’ and finally, an analysis of the internalization of Western bibliographic 
discourse in Egypt of the late nineteenth-century and beyond, culminating in the much-lauded 
‘Azhar Online’ digitalization project, where technical, didactic and ideological aims are 
discursively positioned in a dialectic of ‘education for heritage, heritage for education,’ with 
which the chapter concludes.  
 
More than Words: Traversing the Bibliographic Imagination 
The modern order of knowledge has entailed the production, proliferation and 
preservation of cultural artifacts, both texts and objects.
 
Carefully collected and classified in 
libraries, museums, and archives, they provided the material base upon which societies, past and 
present, were to be apprehended.
7
 Recent scholarship thus has underscored the centrality of 
collecting institutions to the ascendancy of the rationalized capitalistic state and its concomitant 
disciplinary systems of thought. There is also a parallel story to be told: the figurative, but no 
less real, story of a collective humanity and its triumphant progress from darkness to light, from 
nature to culture, from speech to text, in which ‘The Library’ is a central protagonist. During the 
High Enlightenment, The Library became not only a place among others where books were 
stored and where knowledge could be obtained, but rather the site of culture par excellence, and 
the emblem of humanity’s civilizational advancement. Indeed, as the very concept of a common 
humanity was being forged along with the attendant theorization of racial/civilizational 
difference, The Library was identified as signifier of Progress. As such, it could only exist fully 
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in the beating heart of modernity, the West – everywhere else, libraries had to be established 
along a pre-determined model if the desired progress was to be achieved. It is the imbrications of 
the library’s epistemological and its representational substance that this section elucidates.  
 
On the whole, there has been remarkably little scholarly attention paid to the historical 
and discursive life of libraries,
8
 and this despite the recent flurry of studies dealing with the 
institutional production of collective memory, which have further multiplied as a result of what 
is now termed the ‘archival turn’ in the humanities. Though of recent vintage, with a genealogy 
often attributed to Michel Foucault,
9
 the ‘archival turn’ can be seen as yet another attempt to 
grapple with what French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs termed, already in 1925, “the social 
frames of memory.”
10
 Halbwachs’ basic insight was quite simple, but its implications were 
profound: though memory is obviously personal, it requires “social frames” in order to exist. In 
other words, individual memory could only cohere and make sense (to its holder as well as its 
analyst) as part of the larger collective memory of the group to which the individual belonged: 
“A man must often appeal to others’ remembrances to evoke his own past. He goes back to 
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reference points determined by society, hence outside of himself. Moreover, individual memory 
could not function without words and ideas, instruments the individual has not himself invented 
but appropriated from his milieu.”
11
 The idea, then, is that memory, and by extension identity 
and subjectivity, are all products of complex interrelations, and that the past can never be thought 
of outside of present collective concerns. From the late eighteenth century onwards, one of the 
principal ‘social frames’ of collective memory, both national and indeed more largely human, 
was identified in the West as the library. Part of the power of the library as monument was that it 
represented itself as a vector of human cultural accumulation, at once rational, universal and 
transparent.  
This is perhaps most readily expressed in discussions of the Library of Alexandria and 
the Tower of Babel, which have come to represent two of the most powerful literary and 
civilizational cenotaphs of the West.
12
 The biblical legend activated the memory of Man’s 
conceited ambition to “reach the unreachable heavens, (…) to conquer space, a desire punished 
by the plurality of tongues” that forever disbanded human unity. The Alexandrian Library 
represented the “hope to vanquish time” in a quest to “assemble, from all over the world, what 
those tongues had tried to record,” but was itself vanquished in a blaze.
13
 The trauma of the 
Burning of Alexandria is of particular importance, but it is interesting to note, with Daniel 
Walsh, that it is only in the nineteenth century that “instead of representing the accumulated 
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follies of the ancients, or the stultification of Western culture,” the Alexandrian Library “came to 
symbolize the historical memory of humanity.”
14
 European theists condoned the burning and 
attributed it to the caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who when “consulted on what should be done 
with the Library of Alexandria, [apparently] replied in these terms: if the books in this library 
contain things opposed to the Koran, they are bad and must be burned. If they contain only the 
doctrine of the Koran, burn them anyway [for] they are superfluous.”
15
 Europeanized Arabs in 
the twentieth century would by contrast immortalize the memory of ‘Muslim libraries’ and 
famous bibliophiles, as in Yusuf Shahin’s celebrated historical film, al-Maṣīr (1997): at once an 
ode to the prominent Andalusian scholar Ibn Rushd, and a carnival of Arab civilization’s love of 




To be sure, the archive and the library do differ in important ways; however they unite in 
two respects. The first: is the distinctive position of the power of the word that is signified by 
Foucault in the term ‘law’ (“the archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that 
governs the appearance of statements as unique events”
17
), about which James Boyd White 
notably stated, “law for me is a kind of writing, at its heart less an interpretive process than a 
compositional one.”
18
 The second: is the stress on order that the concept of law presupposes, and 
that is of course extendable to both the library and the archive. There is thus room to theorize the 
library within the ambit of the ‘archival turn’ critique because both the archive and library 
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partake in regulating discursive statements, albeit by different rules. It is in this regard that 
Edward Said finds “all of Foucault's work an attempt to make the history and indeed the 
experience of knowledge something as specifically ordered as “nature” has become for modern 
physics or chemistry. The setting of this order is the library.”
19
 
For some years now, scholars in the field of library and information science (LIS) have 
drawn from Foucault and other critical theorists to examine the institutionalization of power 
structures in the library, and expose its epistemological role in the production and authorization 
of knowledge.
20
 In these formulations the library becomes the space both in and through which a 
multiplex of facts come to be governed by general laws. As Jeffrey Garrett notes, there exists a 
“collective belief, unchallenged until recently, in the existence of a scientifically derived and 
classifiable body of knowledge,” and “the Library is one of the most visible and important 
temples that society has erected to this belief.”
21
 
The pioneer oracle of this temple is Melvil Dewey, who played a central role in 
transforming nineteenth-century librarianship into a proper science. What later came to be 
known as the Dewey Decimal Classification (DCC) incorporated precise cataloguing rules that 
relied on predetermined indexing models, standardized vocabularies and controlled subject 
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divisions to “explain, predict and control” complex bibliographical phenomena.
22
, and it remains 
the most widely used system in modern libraries today.
23
 
The transformation of library science also meant that the authority to prescribe what is 
read, and how it is accessed, was concentrated in the expertise of the librarian, possessor of a 
“body of esoteric (specialized) knowledge (…) relative to what is good (enduring and valuable) 
and what is bad (ephemeral and worthless) in reading material.”
24
 In the process, pertinent 
questions of social control and subjectivity, what Richard Brown and Beth Davies-Brown call 
the “explicitly political who,” become overshadowed by “the technically instrumental how,” that 
is, by the precise and mundane details of selection, classification and organization.
25
  
Paradoxically combined with the mantra of neutrality, is a very loaded sense of a 
professional Self by which librarians are viewed as “apostles of culture.” Like archivists, the 
self-proclaimed guardians of the past, librarians readily assume “responsibility for the cultural 
and moral uplift of readers,” and the guardianship of “an intellectual heritage in danger of being 
swept away by a “decadent” mass culture.”
26
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The rise of this positivist model is aptly illustrated in Gary Radford’s reading of 
Foucault’s sustained reflection on the library, his essay “La Bibliothèque Fantastique” devoted to 
Gustave Flaubert’s The Temptation of Saint Anthony.
27
  
This work depicts a series of macabre visions that Saint Anthony endured in the Egyptian 
desert. The fantastical but densely referenced hallucinations display striking mastery of a wide 
array of classical works. It is, Foucault suggests, nothing less than a “monument to meticulous 
erudition” in which ““Temptation” among the ruins of an ancient world populated by spirits is 
transformed into an “education” in the prose of the modern world.”
28
 Foucault locates in this 
very tension a fertile field through which the idea of the library-knowledge may be articulated. 
“It is indeed surprising,” he writes, “that such erudite precision strikes us as a phantasmagoria.” 
He posits that Flaubert was “responding to an experience of the fantastic, which was singularly 
modern and relatively unknown before his time, to the discovery of a new imaginative space in 
the nineteenth century.”
29
 Within this new configuration, the “domain of phantasms is no longer 
the night, the sleep of reason, (…) but, on the contrary, wakefulness, untiring attention, zealous 
erudition, and constant vigilance,” the exact rationality of written truth itself:  
Henceforth, the visionary experience arises from the black and white surface 
of printed signs, from the closed and dusty volume that opens with a flight of 
forgotten words; fantasies are carefully deployed in the hushed library, with its 
columns of books, with its titles aligned on shelves to form a tight enclosure, but 
within confines that also liberate impossible worlds. The imaginary now resides 
between the book and the lamp. The fantastic is no longer a property of the heart, 
nor is it found among the incongruities of nature; it evolves from the accuracy of 
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Foucault’s signature juxtaposition of the binary concepts that predicate the modern order 
of knowledge (in this case rationality/irrationality, order/disorder, truth/fantasy) offers Gary 
Radford an “alternative perspective” or “a postmodern epistemology,” by which to overturn 
“concepts of knowledge, meaning and communication, dominant within the discourse of library 
and information science.”
31
 Radford thus seeks to discard LIS’s scientific pretentions and 
presumably return libraries to a preferred dominion of art. The problem with this perspective is 
that it assumes the separateness of the library’s epistemological charge and its representational 
meanings. The library does not simply organize knowledge (scientific or otherwise); it stands in 
for the very idea of knowledge itself. What Foucault calls elsewhere “the sum of all texts that a 





that national or civilizational Self, which libraries have come to 
create and embody. 
In so far as modern science – rational, secular and ordered – is the great achievement of 
Europe, the kernel of her power and singular identity as the “civilisation écrite”, non-Europe 
must necessarily be the province of fantasy, irrationality and disorder. Indeed Foucault points to 
this in “La Bibliothèque Fantastique” at various points: “No sooner have the first signs of 
temptation emerged from the gathering shadows, no sooner have the disquieting faces appeared 
in the night, than Saint Anthony lights a torch to protect himself and opens a large book.”
33
  And 
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 Foucault, “Fantasia,” op. cit. 94.   
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it is not any book in which the Saint seeks refuge, but the Bible, “a book intended to lead to the 
gates of salvation,” which instead returns homo literatus to the primordial and unleashes the 
paranormal: it “opens the gates of Hell” and “the full range of fantastic apparitions that 
eventually unfold before the hermit” Saint.
34
  
The symbolic weight of ‘the Book' as an index of progress and intellectual maturity in 
modern Western thought is evident. The Book here is not the innocent product of the printing 
press, but an abstraction – “a volume transmuted to a symbol,” “an inscription of the social order 
writ small” as well as “a canon: a selective tradition of the best that has been thought and written 
in Western tradition” – reflecting a “particular view of (…) history” wherein “the book aids in 
the realization of both a more democratic and more rational form of political life.”
 35 
The irony of 
course is that the very word for ‘book’ in Greek (βιβλίον, biblion, from whence ‘the Bible’ and 
numerous compound words implicating books such as bibliotheca, bibliography, bibliomania, 
etc) has an ‘oriental’ etymology, going back to the papyrus that recorded ancient Egyptian 
knowledge and through the city of Byblos, in modern day Lebanon. 
Foucault likens the Temptation to “a discourse whose function is to maintain (…) the 
simultaneous existence of multiple meanings.”
36
 Dissecting the sequence of scenes that unfold 
before Saint Anthony, Foucault observes a seriality that exposes the core of nineteenth-century 
philosophy of history (as noted in the Indroduction to this dissertation): the (re)configuration of 
time and space plotted along the linear trajectory of progress, through which “the resurgence of 
time also produces a prophetic vision of the future.” “All of European culture,” Foucault explains 
in his exegesis of Saint Anthony’s recollections:  
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[i]s deployed in this Egyptian night where the specter, the ancient history, of 
the Orient still haunts the imagination: the theology of the Middle Ages, the 
erudition of the Renaissance, and the scientific bent of the modern period. As a 
nocturnal sun whose trajectory is from east to west, from desire to knowledge, 
from imagination to truth, from the oldest longings to the findings of modern 
science. The appearance of Egypt converted to Christianity (and with it 
Alexandria) and the appearance of Anthony represents the zero point between 
Asia and Europe; both seem to arise from a fold in time, at the point where 
Antiquity, at the summit of its achievement, begins to vacillate and collapses, 
releasing its hidden and forgotten monsters; they also plant the seeds of the 






The sun marking an east-west movement is reminiscent of Hegel’s Universal Spirit. It 
was the (modern, European) state that represented the fulfillment of the Idea and the 
crystallization of consciousness. “The only appropriate and worthy method of philosophical 
investigation,” Hegel tells us, “is to take up history at that point where rationality begins to 
manifest itself in worldly existence.” World history, thus, concerns the Spirit’s self-realization in 
actuality with freedom as ultimate telos, which means “nothing more than a knowledge and 
affirmation of such universal and substantial objects as law and justice, and the production of a 
reality which corresponds to them – i.e. the state.”
38
 For this reason, non-Europe is relegated to 
the dungeons of static immobility. And it is the archive that takes central stage at this point in the 
process.  
Hegel famously analyzed the homonymy of the term ‘history” (both historia rerum 
gestarum as well as res gestae) as transcending “mere external contingency,” supposing instead 
that “the writing of history and the actual deeds and events of history make their appearance 
simultaneously, and that they emerge together from a common source.” This common source is 
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the state, “which first supplies a content which not only lends itself to the prose of history, but 
actually helps to produce it.”
39
 Other forms of social organization and recollection are for Hegel 
“pre-historical” in so far as they are “merely subjective dictates of authority” that fall short of the 
objective requirement of “formal commandments and laws, i.e. general and universally valid 
directives” through which the state “creates a record of its own development,” to produce “a 
lasting memory.” “It is only within a state,” Hegel asserts, “which is conscious of its laws that 
clearly defined actions can take place, accompanied by that clear awareness of them which 
makes it possible and necessary to commit them to posterity.”
40
  
Within this dominant chronological and geographical trajectory, the archive, library and 
museum are modern institutions (or spaces of modern time, if you will) precisely because they 
emerge with the particular ascendancy of the rationalized capitalistic state in the history of the 
West and, as such, they consecrate spaces for the production not of sacred or communal memory, 
but of secular national History.
41
 What appears as fantasy in the Temptation then, is the textual 
articulation of that very trajectory. It is “no more than the simple transcription of documents, the 
reproductions of drawings or texts, but their sequence conforms to an extremely complex 




Orientalism as Library 
Foucault’s reading of modernity’s deployment of space and time recalls Edward Said’s 
observation that specialized knowledge of the Orient in the nineteenth-century Europe entailed a 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 135.  
 
40
 Ibid. 134-6.  
 
41
 See Brown and Brown, op. cit. 
 
42
 Foucault,  op. cit. 104. 
147 
 
gradual “process of selective accumulation, displacement, deletion, rearrangement, and 
insistence within what has been called a research consensus.” No longer legitimated by religious 
authority but by “what we can call the restorative citation of antecedent authority,” it is this 
process that lends Orientalism its inherent citationary nature. As a distinct way of coming to 
terms with the East, Orientalism drew a sharp onto-epistemological distinction between the 
Orient and Occident, through a series of aggregate symbols and images which were re-invented 
and reworked through quotation and recurrence both within and throughout different 
generations: adding to one another “as a restorer of old sketches might put a series of them 
together for the cumulative picture they implicitly represent.”
43
 That is, both Europe and the 
Orient are bibliographically assembled in diametric opposition as representations, and what is 
portrayed is not a real place but “a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to 
have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone's work (…) or 
some bit for previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these.”
44
  
The library is both productive of that discourse and a monument to its symbolic power. It 
includes the same elements: knowledge produced by citation, the sense of accumulative 
information tending to completeness, the cosseted space for spiritual reflection, and the 
permutation of reality and representation. This explains why the Temptation for Foucault is the 
“book of books,” for it “unites in a single “volume” a series of linguistic elements that derive 
from existing books and that are, by virtue of their specific documentary character, the repetition 
of things said in the past. The library is opened, catalogued, sectioned, repeated, and rearranged 
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in a new space.”
45
 
It comes as no surprise then that the earliest modern libraries and museums of the 
Orient were founded, starting in the late eighteenth century, by learned colonial administrators 
with the specific aim of advancing the discipline of Orientalism, such as principally, the 
Library (and Museum) of the Asiatik Society in Bengal, whose first president was that doyen of 
modern philology, Sir William Jones.
46
 This was a significant move at a time when philology 
was undergoing critical disciplinary transformations. Nicholas Dew has shown that the 
“baroque Orientalism” of the early eighteenth century differed fundamentally from its 
nineteenth-century counterpart.  While the former engaged Oriental texts as part of a “universal 
library” of God’s common family, the latter rejected Biblical universalism in favor of a modern 
universalism, both totalizing and particular, at once secular, rational, and scientific, and which 
above all else posited hierarchialized notions of Self and Other. The scholars of baroque 
Orientalism then, were committed to the idea of the Republic of Letters as an intellectual 
country, without borders in either time or space within which humanism and science (as 
appositely described by Anthony Grafton)
47
 still coalesced with ease and fluidity. Likewise, 
their notion of the “Orient” was neither conceptually fixed nor geographically constituted. In 
other words, the Orient was a “floating signifier with a wide range of referents, from the 
Islamic world to East Asia” that was framed and understood not through alterity but within a 
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“universal history [based] on biblical account of human origins and diversity, [in which] 
harmonizing the unfamiliar with the familiar was necessary.”
48
 
With the shift from the Republic of Letters to modernity’s Empire of Reason, which can 
be dated, for practical purposes, to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, the production of 
knowledge entered a new, scientific and specialized (in other words, disciplined), phase, within 
which institutions of collection (libraries, archives, museums) were critical conduits. Thus, in 
1807 Napoleon bewailed the “lost art of distinguishing original source materials from the work 
of secondary commentators, good and bad,” and the need to establish a school of historical 
training (that would complement other institutes, especially the Académie des Inscriptions et 
Belles Lettres) within which “bibliography” would be taught. This so that a “young man should 
not spend months lost in a maze of inadequate or unreliable reading, but instead would be 




In the field of history, this was also the era of Ranke’s assiduous efforts to transform the 
discipline into a rigorous science (grounded in the archive and the philological seminar). And as 
far as the Orient was concerned, it meant that no longer was the “information brought back from 
‘contact zones’ to European libraries (…) the product of a series of finely balanced exchanges 
[and] bargaining positions” and/or scholarly curiosity, but the instrument of national power and 
exacting identitarian formations.
50
 (It is in this context for instance that Barthélemy d'Herbelot’s 
Bibliothèque Orientalis of 1697 comes to be regarded by Pierre Martino in 1906 as the first 
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proper archive for the science of Orientalism: "le livre de D'Herbelot devint une source où 
directement chacun alla puiser, quand il voulout parler de l'Orient;” The “clarity of its title” (A 
Universal Dictionary of General Knowledge Pertaining to Oriental Countries), testifying to its 
exhaustive and well-ordered coverage of the “history, traditions, religion, politics, science, art, 
biography etc.,” of the Orient.)
51
 In other words, the multi-variant “narratives” of the Orient were 
replaced by the discipline of Orientalism as “‘science’ [was] extracted from ‘learning,’ [and] 
Oriental Studies from humanist philology” more largely.
52
   
 
The Repositories of Nation-Empires  
The Library, as consecrated by the bibliographic imagination, was thus the decisive 
embodiment of high culture and learning the history of Western civilization, projected, along 
with and through colonial power, as an eternal and universal model (which the colonized 
should, and would, seek to emulate). And here, the locus classicus stems from the homeland of 
the philosophes: “The national library did not enter history effectively until the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, with the final conversion of the Bibliothèque du Roi into a centralized, 
vigorous state agency under the control of the Abbé Jean-Paul Bignon,” as one commentator 
has it (note the anachronistic use of the adjectival modifier national to the word library).
53
   
The consolidation of the Bibliothèque du Roi was a central element in Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert’s propagation of the new ideology of royal absolutism under Louis XIV. The library 
which Colbert painstakingly built was designed precisely to display the “magnificence of the 
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king” and to awe those who visited his court.
54
 Moreover, the royal library was thus, according 
to Dew, both “an archive of documents that supported theologico-political claims,” as well as a 
public demonstration of “the curiosity of the [savant] king” and of the extent of his power, and 
thus by not an archive in the modern sense described above.
55
 In the eighteenth century, it was 
Abbé Bignon, then overseer of the royal academies of science and belles letters, who undertook 
responsibility for the reorganization of culture and learning initiated by his predecessor. 
Bignon’s installation of subject specialists (rechercheurs de livres) drawn from the academies 
and specifically from the Collège du Roi, helped transform the Bibliothèque du Roi “into the 
most effective research library of the ancien régime,”
56
and subsequently earned Bignon the 
honorific appellation “Maecenas of his century and guardian angel of the sciences and of 
savants.”
57
 Significantly, Bignon’s “last major service to his beloved library” resulted in the first 
comprehensive seven-volume catalogue of the Bibliothèque du Roi, which was “filled with 
erudite notes and countless citations to other sources,”
58
 and served in and of itself as a 
monument of royal power which the King recurrently gifted to important personalities.  
Following the Revolution, and as the public became the primary object of state concern, 
the new National Assembly renamed the library in its own image: the Bibliothèque Nationale 
was now a property of the People and not the Crown. Ecclesiastical and aristocratic collections 
were sequestered, centralized and catalogued, and various legislative commissions (for Public 
Monuments, Public Instruction and the like) closely cooperated to integrate library initiatives 
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into the broader reforms of state and society being initiated and that sought to effect moral and 
civic renewal through modes premised upon the unquestionable supremacy of reason.
59
 And 
since the nation is in Tom Narin’s felicitous term Janus-faced (that is, it characteristically looks 
both forward and backward), along with the carousing of Modernity came the discourse of 
Heritage. Indeed, the nation-form is quite particular in that it simultaneously affirms its radical 
modernity by looking towards an ideal (and idealizing) future and appealing in the same 
maneuver to a long-lost, but ever-living, past as a source of enduring legitimacy.
60
 Accordingly, 
library collections which once served as testimony to royal glory now had to be preserved as a 
national (cultural) heritage. And civic training was everywhere emphasized, and programmed in 
provisions for the establishment of a school in every department in France, along with a “public 
library, a botanical garden and a cabinet of natural history.”
61
  
Orderliness then, quickly became an administrative fixation. In addition to bolstering the 
aspirations of the Revolution, library reform initiatives at this time were aimed candidly at 
resolving a perceived disorder: political of course, but also epistemological and ultimately, 
bibliographical. The cardinal instrument for instituting the requisite order was what became 
known as “bibliographical control” – the systematizing effort to contain, following the explosion 
of print publishing, the unmanageable volume of intellectual output, which Leibniz had 
previously described (though in a different mode) as “cette horrible masse de livres qui va 
toujours augmentante,” a monstrous disorder that threatened “European intelligence”
 
as much as 
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 Interestingly, this compact representation of the systematization of order by 
means of classification would be echoed again by that archetypal contraption of the 
Enlightenment, the Encyclopédie, which, incidentally (or rather not), was dedicated by Diderot 
and D’Alembert to the Comte d’Argenson, in whom knowledge and power was most clearly 
manifest: secretary of state for war, he had formally been inspecteur de la librairie.
63
 
The simultaneous growth and transparency of archival and library collections then, 
operates, in the words of Papailias, as “a technology of liberal governmentality aimed at 
constituting citizens as rational, self-governing, and self-improving political subjects.”
64
 This 
connection with the state is most evident in the case of archives, which both embody the history 
of the relationship between the state and its citizens (of the Nation), and, as per Hegel, it indexes 




It is thus not by virtue of coincidence, that prototypical modern archives were being 
established in the same period. In the case of both libraries and archives, the transformation of 
the structures of the ancien régime into national institutions signaled the de-monopolization of 
knowledge: from a small hereditary and scholarly elite that coalesced and antagonized around 
the figure of the monarch, to the now awakened ‘people’ that was ready to assume its national 
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fate. In the process, knowledge itself was redefined, reordered and transubstantiated by the new 
state, no longer for the service of the King (whether in heaven or on earth) but for its own 
intrinsic, indeed mythical, value. Libraries and archives in that respect can be seen as utopist 
institutions of national (and imperial) identity. 
Predictably, then, it was at this moment that what may be called the “science of 
collection” was born, with the foundation in 1821 of the École des Chartes, where courses in 
“paleography, romance philology, bibliography, [and] library service” combined with the study 
of “diplomatics, history of (…) French archives, archives service, (…) French history and 
literature, history of civil and canon law [and] medieval archeology.”
66
 Its esteemed graduates 
filled senior posts, in provincial archives, the Archives Nationales, and the Bibliothèque 
Nationale, that were by law reserved exclusively for Chartistes, and have for generations shaped 




This all evokes the direct relations that connect institutions of collection, historical 
consciousness and historiographical practice, with the novel political projects of both national 
and imperial ambitions. Salient parallels can thus be drawn in the Egyptian case, both in the 
transformation of the khedival library into Dār al-Kutub as well as the establishment of the 
‘Abdīn House of Records, subsumed after 1952 into the Egyptian National Archives, Dār al-
wathā’iq al-Miṣrīyah al-Qawmīyah. Both institutions were crucial to the development of 
Egyptian and indeed Arab historiography more broadly.
68
 And through their intertwined past and 
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present incorporation into a single ordered structure, they both “incarnate[d] the historical 
trajectory of the Egyptian nation itself.”
69
 
In relating the “founding myth of ‘Abdīn, the powerful archive that shaped Egypt’s 
historiographical horizons,” Di-Capua shows that from its inception as part of the royal library, 
the institution served the dual purpose of being both an official archive of historical documents, 
as well as a “state-governed royal workshop for politicized writing.” 
70
 In 1928, King Fu’ād 
enlisted the help of French diplomat and historian, Gabriel Hanotaux, in a project that would 
narrate, in French (“the language of universal culture,”) the entire history of Egypt from the 
perspective of its dynasty: “I want my people to know their history and I want others to know the 
history of my people,” Fu’ād told the Frenchman.
71
 Describing the type of work he had in mind, 
the King explained, 
There is indeed much to say about ancient Egypt under the pharaohs, and you 
now know how attached I am to these studies. However, for now, start with the 
modern period! (…) The history of my grandfather Muḥammad ‘Alī is hardly 
known; tell it, speak of the ingenious soldier Ibrāhīm, of the great transformations 
accomplished under Sa‘īd, and of my father Ismā‘īl. Tie us again to the living 




The raison d’être of the ‘Abdīn project then was to both institutionalize (by way of 
archivization) and simultaneously narrate “the modern Egyptian experience as part of a story of 
modernization and transition whose center was the dynasty itself.” In that sense, Di-Capua 
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rightly concludes that ‘Abdīn “was a classic nahḍawī project built around a certain interpretation 
of the modern nation” by “dictat[ing] what would be historically thinkable.”
73
 The discourses 
surrounding ‘Abdīn continually emphasized the rupture between present order and a previous 
state of turmoil: thus asserts the French historian Édouard Driault, “The historian could see in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries only pitiful distress; for it was the ransom of this troubled 
époque to be able to leave neither monuments nor documents nor any clear testimony, and thus 
to be as if they had never been.”
74
  
Moreover, it was in the context of mass democracy in twentieth-century United States 
that the social and ideological dimensions of the national library would become fully 
institutionized in the form of the Library of Congress, which above all else sought “[to] reach out 
... to the country at large [by means of] a service to be extended through the libraries which are 
the local centers of research involving the use of books.”
75
 Echoing the similar transformations 
in the field of education (described in the foregoing chapter), this notion of service (which here 
assumes total political neutrality even at the height of the Cold War) recalls the integral function 
of archives as serving “the public good,” and is constitutive of today’s hegemonic national 
library, which comes to be defined exclusively by contrast to the older (European) types to evoke 
a American new era of pragmatic and didactic realism. In Dewey’s concise formulation: “The 
time was when a library was very like a museum. (…) The time is when the library is a 
school.”
76
 And the liberal education to be meted out was quintessentially modern and global: 
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universal catalogues, universal classification systems, universal search, selection and appraisal 
regimes, all ushered the amalgamation of autonomous national libraries into a new ‘international 
library network’ that would make accessible to scholars and laymen the complete wealth of the 
human record. As Michael Gorman homiletically proclaims: 
Civilization and learning depend, to a very great extent, on the textual and 
graphic part of our cultural heritage – the human record – created by human 
beings since the invention of writing many millennia ago. Librarianship is about 
many things, but none more important than the stewardship of that human record 
– a stewardship that consists of (…) ensuring that the carriers of texts and images 





A Figure of Lack: Al-Jabartī, ‘Science’ and the Library  
From the very start then, the establishment of the modular library rested on several key 
pillars: the celebration of writing, represented as culture, heritage and/or the accumulative human 
record in its textual form; the imperative to control, classify and systematize bibliographic 
output, and by extension ‘knowledge,’ through the execution of order; and the democratization 
of said knowledge in the service of generating conscious literate citizens. Libraries thus become 
the ur-representation of cultural progression, the inception of which is located squarely in 
European national modernity. They also affirm the idea that knowledge is, and must always be, 
rationally ordered and scientifically classified, if it is to serve its emancipatory function and 
secure what is in the national good. At the same time, the very existence of too much knowledge, 
such that would necessitate bibliographical control in turn reifies the unique ascendancy of 
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European knowledge. Moreover, the modular library transcends time, in its utilitarian vision of a 
progressive future that is made possible by its continual reactivation of the legacy of the past, 
and even the physical confines of its own space, by way of the international library network.  
An equal investment in the exemplarity of libraries in the Islamic or Middle Eastern 
context is hard to find, despite the repetitive slogan-ridden, and often defensive, efforts of some 
scholars to highlight the proverbial pen over the sword.  The irony here is that the type of textual 
fetishism that animates Western epistemologies is reproduced through the disciplinary modalities 
of philology, specifically Orientalism’s theo-logo-fixation that explains Islamic societies across 
time and space in reference to classical texts. Library histories are thus replete with nostalgia for 
the glorious ‘libraries of Islam,’ without which there could not have been a Renaissance nor an 
Enlightenment. The references are simply too numerous to cite, but the following passage is 
somewhat representative: 
[The Caliph] Omar’s dictum was not the final word on Islamic policy towards 
Greek “philosophy.” (…) Muslim scholars soon appropriated Greek learning 
wholesale (…) They (…) spread libraries and scholarship (…), founding learned 
centers from Baghdad’s House of Wisdom in the east to the libraries of medieval 
Spain in the extreme west; from Samarkand, on the Eurasian silk road, to 
Timbuktu, south of the Sahara Desert. (…) But Muslims were no more passive or 
derivative than the Romans, who likewise pursued knowledge on a firm Hellenic 
foundation. Islamic scholarly institutions were in fact for centuries a good deal 
more vibrant and original than Western Roman ones, but to appreciate this we 
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And it would seem overtake, for while the Muslims of the Golden Age ostensibly had a 
vivacious appetite for learning and libraries, today’s Muslims are paraded as book burners, and 
obstructers of academic freedom and other hard won scholarly and political liberties.
79
  
To be certain, the discourse on the value of books permeates Arabic writings across the 
ages. Often evoked in intensely personal ways, books are anthropomorphized as friends, 
teachers, and lovers, even murderers as in the famous case of al-Jāḥiz.
80
 As artifacts, books 
represented both symbolic and material capital.   Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī for example, cites 
numerous instances of scholars who enhanced their income by copying and trading books 
(practices incidentally that can be observed amongst Azhari student today). There is also much 
discussion concerning the etiquette governing the borrowing of books, much as that concerning 
proper speech and utterances, debate and argumentation; all within a universe where the oral and 
the text were never separated but codetermined, and where the pursuit of knowledge itself could 
was never dislocated from that of social justice and personal virtue.  
The collection of books was likewise enjoined, and the existence of individual, palatial 
and mosque collections, reflecting this symbolic and material value of books, is well attested. In 
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 The ten-century poet al-Mutanabbiʾ for example wrote in his diwān, “The most honourable seat in this world is 
the saddle of the horse, and the best companion will always be a book;” while Ibn al-ʿArabī is said to have once 
declared, “The book is the tongue of the dead and voice of the living. He is an evening visitor who never sleeps until 
you sleep and never utters a word except what pleases you, never reveals a secret or abuses a deposit. He is the most 
faithful neighbour, a just friend, obedient companion, submissive professor, expert and useful comrade with no 
desire to argue or to weary of his owner.” For his part, al-Jāḥiz comments in his Kibāb al-ḥayawān: “Beyond all 
comparison [a book] is cheap and easy to procure, it contains the marvels of history and science, the fruit of sound 
minds and wise experience and reports of previous generations and distant lands. Who can have such another guest 
that may either make a short sojourn or stay with you as your shadow or even as a very limb of your body. The book 
is silent so long as you need silence, eloquent whenever you want discourse. He never interrupts you if you are 
engaged, but if you feel lonely he will be a good companion. (…) He is a friend who never deceives or flatters you 
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all accounts, however, the emphasis is on books as opposed to the Book (which in any case 
would have referred only to the Quran) or its representative Library. Indeed, while collecting 
books was encouraged, knowledge could and should never be gained through books alone. And 
yet contemporary scholars continue to peg the fate of “Islamic libraries” to a preconceived state 
of learning for successive epochs encoded by the narrative of decline, where libraries – as free 
and public spaces of learning – emerge as the chief signifier of the intellectual and social vitality 
of Islamic civilization. Ahmad Shalaby thus recounts the great libraries of the  Abbāsid period, 
reminding us that these were above all “educational institutions besides performing the function 
of modern libraries.”
81
 Muhammad Shafi for his part affirms that “libraries have existed since the 
dawn of civilization,” and highlights the role of the Muslim-Arab pioneers, who “spread the cult 
of books throughout the then known world by founding and supporting public libraries open to 
the high and the low, the rich and the poor alike.”
82
 “What a contrast to the present conditions!,” 
he wails, for despite the “good beginning,” the literary ascendancy of Muslims dwindled fast.
83
  
Others abstain from crediting Islam for the rise of ‘Muslim libraries,” explaining them 
instead by the influence of older civilizations (Persian, Greek, Roman, etc).
84
 Thus Arnold Green 
puts forward a “diffusionist model” for the development of “libraries in the Arab World.” 
Accordingly, he stresses the notion of “borrowing” of “cultural traits” among different peoples 
(…),” “Hellenistic/European” on the one hand, and “Muslim,” on the other.
85
 All of these 
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approaches (whether “nativist” or “diffusionist”) then, share the idea of ‘the library’ as an 
eternal, universal and stable concept, and one which serves to index civilizational levels.  
Within such a grid, the persistent theme of Arab/Muslim incredulity at Western 
intellectual, scientific, and technological accomplishments (actualized through the form of ‘The 
Library’) is a logical deduction. Exemplary of this trope, and of the discursive disconnect 
between book and library more largely, is al-Jabartī’s account of his visit to the library of the 
Institut d’Égypte established by Napoleon’s savants: 
The administrators, astronomers, and some of the physicians lived in this 
house [in which they placed] a great number of their books, with keepers 
[khuzzān] and librarians [mubāshirūn] to guard them and give them out to readers. 
Anybody who wished to do so consulted the books for his purposes. The scholars 
among them gathered everyday, two hours before noon, and sat in the anteroom 
facing the bookcases on chairs arranged parallel to a large wide board. One would 
ask for any book which one wishes to consult and the keeper would bring it. Then 
they would leaf through it, consult it, and take notes – even their lowest ranking 
soldiers (would do this). If any Muslim came to them who wanted to watch this, 
they would not prevent him from entering their most honoured places, but would 
receive him with cheerful smiles (…) They would show him illustrated books and 
maps of countries and regions, animals, birds and plants, histories of ancients, the 
way of life of nations, stories of prophets with pictures of them and their signs and 






In the characteristic vernacular of decline thesis, the question of how al-Jabartī perceived 
this “library” and its relation to French knowledge has been used to demonstrate the low state of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hellenistic legacy and via global trade routes acquired techniques like paper-manufacturing. Subsequently, 
while madrasa libraries flourished, library development stalled as cultural interaction ebbed from classical 
levels. Arab societies have recently interacted with modern Europe. While colonialism entailed strategic 
constraints on Europeans' willingness to lend and psychological constraints on nationalist Arabs' inclination 
to borrow, through travelers, notables, and Western-trained Arab librarians, modern libraries and library 
education have been among the institutions diffused from Europe to the Arab world during the last two 
centuries. As an explanatory model for library history, diffusion may well apply to other societies having 
traditions of interaction with neighboring high cultures and/or with modern European powers.” (Arnold H. 




 Al-Jabartī, ‘Ajā’ib, III:  34/53-4.  
162 
 
learning of his time. John Livingston for example, imaginatively states: “Jabarti writes of the 
Institute’s regularly scheduled public lectures that were of a scholarly nature and open to the 
public, of the library and reading room where even the lowest ranked soldiers came to read and 
write, as though the literacy of common soldiers was as wondrous a thing as the silent library 
and lecture room with their chairs, tables and books neatly arranged in even rows.”
87
 
Livingston’s fancy is probably reinforced by the fact that al-Jabartī speaks very little of 
“libraries” in general anywhere in his text. Significantly, in this specific passage, he refers 
simply to a space containing bookshelves, chairs, tables and books. It suggests that the very idea 
of a constituent library (in the modern sense) was not an operative one for al-Jabartī. By contrast, 
he does speak a great deal about books, starting from the very first pages of his history. 
Historians have nonetheless generally interpreted this passage as indicative of the 
confrontation between “Western science” and “Islamic culture,” and thus as one marking the 
threshold between the old and the new Egypt that was shortly to emerge. Delineated so, the 
framework produces two possible resolutions, either a “traditional” view opposed to Western 
science in the name of Islamic purity, or a “modern” perspective calling for its assimilation.
 
These perspectives can even take on individual embodiments, as in the opposition between al-
Jabartī and his friend and contemporary Ḥasan al-  Aṭṭār. Whereas al-  Aṭṭār “braved the 
conservative stream” of his fellow Azharis, “who were bogged in their sterility of mind over 
pondering the same old texts time and time again in numbing imitation of ancient authority,” and 
“fully devot[ed] himself to learning from the French” to become the “father of the Egyptian 
intellectual renaissance;” al-Jabartī died a man burdened by “a split-mindedness, a reflection of 
the wrenching reality of God’s community being suddenly confronted by the superior power and 
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The trouble is, the  Aja  ib provide no such clear-cut interpretation (let alone the 
accompanying triumphalism it performs). Al-Jabartī’s report on his visit to the Institute appears 
alongside descriptions of conditions following the French invasion, with all its good, bad and 
ugly manifestations – segments, incidentally, that are not devoid of some light-hearted sarcasm, 
such as the elimination by the French of stray dogs from the streets of Cairo, which, although 
purely a product of the necessities of surveillance, led to the benefit of the people.
89
  
In marked contrast to his prose elsewhere (where the narrative is heavily mediated by 
personal opinions and barefaced language of condemnation or approval) these sections, in which  
al-Jabartī weaves examples of French tyranny and munificence, sacrilege and veneration, are 
surprisingly matter-of-fact in tone. Many reasons might be posited for this, including various 
political exigencies that the author may have faced. One might even accept that al-Jabartī, like 
most people, held different views on the events unfolding around him. But the attribution of such 
a complexity of opinion, or perhaps even indifference, to some sort of psychological trauma of a 
“traditional mind” struggling with “modernity” reveals only the psychologizing assumptions 
regarding Self and Other of a much later period. 
The description of the Institute is admittedly not neutral, but to surmise that “he described 
it in terms of “wonder” befitting the title of his great chronological work,  Aja  ib al-Āthār,” is 
exaggerating.
90
 Rather, the Azhari’s reaction befits the curiosity of a scholar already familiar 
with the domain of ‘science:’ having grown up in a milieu of scholarship fostered in the main by 
his father, the great Ḥasan al-Jabartī, as well as his teacher and mentor, Murṭada al-Zabīdī; the 
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rector of his alma mater, Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī; and of course his friend, Ḥasan al-  Aṭṭār – all 
men singled out in the historiography as “geniuses in the dark,” exceptional figures standing tall 
in a broad sea of ignorance, superstition and stagnation.
91
 Ḥasan al-Jabartī’s home, his son 
writes, was the “gathering place for master craftsmen,” for “clockmaker[s] (…), locksmith[s], 
cutler[s], [and] unequaled produc[ers] of compounds, extracts and other oils.” He was renowned 
for constructing “astronomical instruments (…) celestial spheres (…), instruments for measuring 
altitudes and azimuths, armillary, observation instruments, astrolabes, quadrants and geometrical 
instruments,” as well as a “great number of inclinations, sundials on marble, tile or tuffa stone 
[that were] installed on many buildings and famous mosques (…).”
92
  
Al-Jabartī further describes with great veneration the extent of his father’s book and 
instrument collections. His generosity in freely lending these out is also duly noted, along with 
his erudition in multiple domains of knowledge, both “religious” (theology, exegesis, narrations), 
linguistic and “scientific” (from physics and mechanics to chronology and calibration of scales, 
from medicine and astronomy to mathematics and geometry). It is even recounted that in  
1159 (1746-47) some European [afranj] students came to [Ḥasan al-Jabartī] 
and studied geometry. They gave him gifts of valuable objects and instruments of 
European manufacture. When they returned to their country they published what 
they had learned, raising the level of such learning there from potentiality to 





There is simply no indication in al-Jabartī’s text of any autonomous category of Western, 
rational or secular science, let alone one executed by some modular idea of ‘the Library,’ by 
which he might be amazed. This ought to be expected as there were no sharp distinctions 
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between the various branches of learning prior to the late nineteenth century. And lest we be 
tempted to dismiss these passages by way of some “filial desire” of al-Jabartī’s to distinguish his 
father, as some have suggested,
 94
 we need only look to the many examples in the  Aja  ib of other 
polymaths, and avid book collectors and bibliophiles, or to the myriad references to scholarly 
collections being established as waqf, donated to al-Azhar or other institutions, or even destroyed 
by one calamity or another.  
Indeed, the repeated use of the terms “marvel,” “fascination,” “impression” and so on, on 
the part of Orientalists describing al-Jabartī’s attitude, is revealing. Heyworth-Dunne tells us that 
al-Jabarti ends his description of the Institut with the words: “things which minds like ours 
cannot comprehend;”
95
 In reference to the public scientific spectacles (orchestrated in full fanfare 
by the French with the explicit purpose of demonstrating imperial strength) Shmuel Moreh 
concurs that “Al-Jabarti expressed his own amazement at these experiments” in his chronicle of 
the Napoleonic invasion, “but concluded pessimistically that these were things that “minds like 
ours cannot comprehend”;”
96
 while Livingstone renders it as “beyond the comprehension of 
minds such as ours.”
97
 Al-Jabarti’s actual printed words it should be recalled are “min ma yuḥīr 
al-afkār.” This may be rendered as ‘things astonishing to the mind’ perhaps, but there is certainly 
no mention of the qualifier “like/such as ours.” The slippage presupposes an evolutionary frame 
that posits bio-cultural variation in mental aptitude, which indeed would have been impossible to 
comprehend for a mind like al-Jabartī’s. 
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Too much has also been made of al-Jabartī’s use of the words ʿajīb and gharīb to 
describe the objects he encountered at the Institut: “strange astronomical instruments [al-ālāt al-
falakīyah al-gharībah] made with great precision [muṭqinat al-ṣunʿah], instruments for altitudes 
of new and unusual structure [wa ālāt al-irtifā‘āt al-badīʿah al-ʿajībah].” Or likewise “there 
were telescopes with which to regard the stars (…) and watches that measured seconds of time 
[which] were marvelous and valuable [gharībat al-shakl wa ghāliyat al-thaman].”
98
 These 
however were utterly common terms connoting multiple meanings: the latter was a usual 
denominator for a domain of learning (ʿilm al- gharīb), and the former made its way into the 




In the context of her explorations on the production and dissemination of knowledge 
pertaining to the gharīb sciences, Jane Holt Murphy has convincingly argued that al-Jabartī’s 
reaction or supposed hostility to French marvels, in this case an incident involving a failed hot 
air balloon demonstration, cannot be understood in terms of religious opposition to rational 
science, why then would he launch such “lengthy explanations of the mechanisms of French 
demonstrations.”
100
 These, she maintains, point to a particular intellectual sensibility that 
connected truth/knowledge to justice, metaphorically represented in the ‘Ajai’b by al-Jabartī’s 
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unremitting “meditation” on the Book and the Scale whereby “justice guided the proper 
enactment of knowledge, and knowledge was required to achieve justice.”
101
 
The point here then, is not to replace one empirical narrative with another more 
‘accurate’ one, but to draw attention to the discursivity of both the Western accounts and that of 
al-Jabartī, with the latter as a sort of philological litmus test for the types of historiographical 
contentions that I am attempting to contest. Far from accepting what is mentioned in the ‘Aja'ib 
as historical truth, or the text and its author as representative of ‘Islamic history,’ I have tried to 
emphasize that this work, like al-Jabarti’s conception of history itself (to which we shall return 
more fully in the next chapter), defies the preset temporal and spatial grids by which we seek to 
decode it and through which we impose our distinctly modern understandings of ‘science and 
religion,’ ‘library and learning,’ ‘awe and contempt.’ 
 
As the nineteenth century rolled on, however, Arab intellectuals did become enthralled by 
the representational power of libraries as indexes of progress just as they began to describe their 
own “civilizational” predicament in the vernacular of “decline” and “renaissance.”  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī, perhaps first, saw a direct link between libraries and cultural progress. 
Libraries held an important place in his influential Enlightenment-inspired prescriptions for 
modernizing educational reforms: they would create a conscious reading public fixing the link 
between state and citizens. In his famous Parisian travelogue, he repeatedly praises libraries of 
France (for which he utilized the older Arabic term, khazā’in al-kutub, rather than the modern 
maktabah), both private and especially public, as one of the primary causes for the “superiority 
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of Europeans [maziyyat al-afranj] over others” in the realm of the arts, sciences and crafts.
102
 
The Azhari scholar proceeds to describe in detail the various public libraries of Paris 
(Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Bibliothèque Mazarine, Bibliothèque de l’Institut, etc.), along with 
other sites devoted to the display and propagation of knowledge, (from the musical conservatory 
to the daily newspaper), before concluding the chapter with an elegy to books and their public 
availability, interestingly enough, in these words: “what is astounding to the mind in Paris is its 
bookstores and libraries and the commerce in books” [wa mimmā yubhir al-ʿuqūl fi Bārīs al-
dakākīn al-kutūbīyah wa khānātihim wa tijārat al-kutub].
103
Already in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s account 
then, we begin to glean the beginnings of the transplantation of the bibliographic imagination to 
Egypt (and by extension, al-Azhar). The procedure however is still somewhat curtailed by his 
broader engagement with the ideas of knowledge and self and other that for the most part remain 




Later in the century, the nahḍa pioneer, Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq, was also clearly 
invested in the idea of the library. Indeed, it had, according to historian Geoffrey Roper, become 
a matter of civilizational life and death. For al-Shidyāq, “the preservation and revival of Arab 
culture (…) depended on gathering texts together and making them available to readers who 
could not otherwise acquire them - in other words, on the development of good libraries.”
105
 
From Paris to Berlin, Vienna to Cambridge, Oxford to London, al-Shidyāq seems to have been 
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dazzled by the libraries and museums of Europe, which he described as symbolizing “this 
generation’s desire for knowledge.”
106
 This he contrasted to the “state of decay and 
disorganization” that he had witnessed throughout the Ottoman world.
107
 His writings after this 
period are sated with appeals for library reform.  
One of al-Shidyāq’s principal complaints was the dispersal of the collections in various 
locations where “matters are based for the most part on custom, not on the necessities of the 
time.”
108
 This disarray was, he thought, indicative of the decline of Islamic culture and might 
only be corrected by the centralization of collections. A proposal, which Roper regards as 
“nothing less than the nucleus of a national library, or at least the beginnings of a national 
repository for manuscripts,” aimed at salvaging Islamic texts from their “ruinous state, [their] 
pages stuck together and the ink offsetting (…) because they were too seldom used and too little 
exposed to the sunlight - rather the opposite of some problems identified by modern 
conservationists.”
109
 Incidentally, it was this logic of “conservation” that justified the 
acquisition/theft/borrowing of countless texts and other cultural artifacts by colonial 
administrators convinced of the necessity to rescue these objects, and by extension the 




The imbrications of Roper and al- Shidyāq’s views on libraries as both cause and effect 
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of the “level of literacy of a culture,” provide pertinent examples yet again of the Orientalist-
nationalist dyad of tradition and modernity. For the absorption of Enlightenment ideas and 
epistemologies that rested on the secularization of knowledge not only bracketed Islam as the 
cause of decadence but it also meant its evaluation, as Reinhardt Schulze explains, “not as a 
theology, but as a culture, in the sense employed by Herder, Kant or Schiller (…). As culture was 
used as a synonym for humanity, reason and freedom, the European spectators of the Orient had 
to define Islam as “un-culture.”
111
 
As Massad has meticulously shown, nahḍa and post-nahḍa discourses on “Islamic 
culture,” evaluated within the cohering frame of progress, were grounded in the binding 
dichotomy of “turāth (heritage) and modernity/contemporariness.” “Culture” became the bastion 
of the Arab intellectual response, animated by an “anxiety” produced by the “desire to define 
one’s ethnic and cultural uniqueness” against an encroaching hegemony,” on the one hand; and 
the powerful “urge to abandon that uniqueness in order to conform to the hegemonic pressures of 
[white] liberal humanistic culture” on the other.
112
 This attitude, it must be noted, was in no way 
unique to ‘Arabs’ alone: in much the same way as ‘Indians’ would forge a partitioned national 
conscienceness, ‘African’ colonial elites would later implicate themselves in the European 
invention of an ‘idea of Africa.’
113
 Centralized preservative libraries thus provided the 
convenient means by which the two opposing forces of cultural separateness and assimilation 
might be seemingly reconciled in the drive to reveal a pristine Arab-Islamic tradition/culture as a 
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means of assimilating into the new modern. And this maneuver was certainly not missed by 
reformist minded Azharis. 
 
Al-Maktabah al-Azharīyah  
Like the institution of which it is a part, the al-Azhar library in Cairo has had a varied 
history. Formally established in 1897, it remains one of the richest manuscript repositories in the 
region, and recently much resource has been mobilized to digitalize its vast collections with 
expectable congratulatory pomp.  
Yet the library has barely elicited any sustained critical attention in its own right. The 
existing narrative, rehashed in the historiography often in the most perfunctory of manners, runs 
something like this: in 1853, Dīwān al-Awqāf (the government department controlling pious 
endowments) conducted a survey of all books and manuscripts in the different educational 
institutions of Cairo. It recorded 18,564 items at al-Azhar, distributed amongst the various 
riwāqs and affiliated madrasas.  This survey is apparently now lost. In 1896, and at the request 
of the then rector, Shāykh Ḥassūnah al-Nawāwī with the instigation of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, the 
government allocated a small budget for the purpose of furnishing a new library at al-Azhar 
(which at the time held some 7703 volumes, representing twenty-seven branches of learning), 
with wooden bookcases and slaries for an initial staff of four persons including a head librarian, 
who reported directly to al-Nawāwī. In 1909 a committee was appointed to purchase new books 
and the library steadily grew through private gifts and bequeathed collections, so that by 1936 
plans were drawn to move it to the new administrative building constructed a little further up the 
hill from the main mosque. Later, collections were also made from affiliated religious institutes, 
and the budget was increased to 1448 pounds. In 1943 the library’s holdings had swelled to 
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20,000 manuscripts and over 60,000 books dealing with 58 fields of study. By the time Bayard 
Dodge wrote his seminal history of al-Azhar, there were 120,000 volumes in the main library, 
and Abu’l-Wafā al-Marāghī was the chief librarian engaged along with expert colleagues at Dār 




What is certain is that the project of creating the library, as an integral part of the late 
nineteenth-century institutional reforms orchestrated by the modernizing figures of ʿAbduh and 
al-Nawawī and others, was chiefly a matter of power: all knowledge now had to flow from one 
single source.  These programmatic reforms, as outlined in the preceding chapter, took the shape 
of a series of administrative laws and procedures intended quite explicitly as the production of 
new subjects through the subtle but deliberate machinations of modern bio-power. This, in 
tandem with a fundamental reshaping of a now traditional canon perceived as being threatened 
by centuries of gangrenous intellectual decline.  The institution of a centralized library was a 
vital pillar of this new system serving both to reify the reorganization of learning (as stipulated in 
the law of 1896
115
) and ensure control of that system. The library’s location within these wider 
developments speaks to its epistemological task in modernity’s power-knowledge nexus. And it 
would seem that  Abduh perfectly understood this causative link between libraries and their 
environments as formulated by the modern episteme. To fully grasp the implications of this, let 
us return briefly to the reforms once more.  
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Distrustful of “the pedantic fundamentalism of the period,” and owing to “his contacts 
with progressive European culture,”  Abduh, we are told, “realized that Muslim scholars must 
become awakened, not only in Egypt, but in the world of Islam as a whole.”
116
  The broad 
reforms he instituted were conceived as a necessary means by which to effect such an 
awakening. These included inter alia, the establishment of examination and registration 
procedures, the issuing of formal certificates, the standardization, classification and expansion of 
the curriculum, the institution of quantifiable salaries, stipends and other administrative/financial 
processes, but also the adoption of rules pertaining to discipline, hygiene and correct behavior, in 
addition of course to the founding of a centralized institutional library. The impact of these 
measures on the content and the form of traditional canon were considerable. Obliterating a 
system whereby knowledge was produced through intensive and fluid, personal and intellectual 
exchange anchored mainly on the scholar-student-text mutuality, the new system dismantled this 
critical nexus into three separately defined components: the ‘registered student,’ who no longer 
controlled the subject or method of his learning; the ‘salaried, ranked professor’ who also 
relinquished these prerogatives and who was now in the service of knowledge, no longer 
approximated by the abstract ethico-religious injunction of ṭalab al- ilm, but by the secularized 
programmatic and remunerative dictates of the institution which employs him; and finally, the 
approved text, the ‘original’ classical works. To modernists, these were intellectually and 
symbolically honored above “secondhand explanations written by less capable teachers,”
117
 
namely, the countless commentaries (hawāshī), abridgements (mukhṭasarāt) and glosses 
(taqārīr): categories which as discussed, had paradoxically encompassed some of the most 
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important works in the tradition, but which students were now prohibited from freely consulting 
except in certain limited circumstances.  
More than simply denoting a type of puritanical classicism, this measure advanced a 
scientific philological method and scholastic hierarchy within which all post-classical 
scholarship was denigrated as derivative. It also produced the exact logic of a new ‘Islamic’ 
temporality that found vindication in discourses of decline. This idea of the return to the primary 
texts (naṣṣ), notably advocated by  Abduh, further contributed to the production of ‘Islam’ as a 
homogenous operative, explanatory and contestable category with universal and intrinsic 
properties that can be mastered by an act of will.  
Moreover, the effect of, and resistance to, these canonic reformulations were palpable, for 
example, in Ṭaha Hussein’s recollections of his time at al-Azhar, which he found awfully 
disappointing due to the poor quality of instruction, with the exception of one shāykh whom he 
likened to the scholars of Baghdad and Kūfa, and who “preferred the pristine classics to the later 
condensations and commentaries from which most Azharis taught.”
118
 
The bifurcation of so-called ‘Islamic’ thought and practice at al-Azhar is perceivable too 
at the institutional level, in the introduction of new subjects of study, “even if,” Dodge reminds 
us, “they were modern and secular”.
119
 Debates ensued, fatwas were sought and new orthodoxies 
were formed which permanently and decisively delineated the boundary between the older more 
permeable and nebulous grouping of subjects according to “transmitted/received” [(manqūl] and 
“mentally deduced” [maʿqūl] disciplines, now reconfigured into two separate, even oppositional, 
epistemes, with the latter signifying real knowledge, rational, objective and scientific, and the 
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former, simply ‘religious.’ The 1896 law as we have seen enshrined this distinction even 
further.
120
 By separating the content of learning from its form in this way, these attempts of 
institutionally backed, indeed policed, reform standardized the canon in line with European 
epistemologies, initiating the now hegemonic binary of religion/science. In so doing, they 
bolstered an image of al-Azhar as an essentially religious institution, distinct from other 
‘modern’ educational institutions that had been established in the preceding decades (such as 
Dār al-‘Ulūm for instance); as well as those that were shortly to become, including notably the 
institution we now know as Cairo University (established in 1908).  
To appreciate the impact of these developments fully, it is necessary to view them in the 
broader educational remodeling of this period. The promulgation in 1868 of a “comprehensive 
plan for institutions of elementary instruction throughout the country,” gave new life to the 
educational reforms previously laid down by Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, and ushered the long and 
fraught overhaul of all aspects of schooling: from recruitment of teaching staff, curricula and 
timetables, to which books would be studied, what clothes would be worn and how buildings and 
classrooms would be structured. In short and as previously described, “learning, in every detail, 
had suddenly become the state’s active and extensive concern.”
121
  
What is important to note here is that much of the scholarship on educational reform has 
tended to portray the history of education in nineteenth-century Egypt in Manichean terms, 
pitting the forces of tradition (exemplified by al-Azhar) to those of modernity. It should be 
recalled, however, that the initial system established by Muḥammad ʿAlī was never intended to 
rival that of al-Azhar. On the contrary, the government had relied mostly on al-Azhar graduates 
to staff the new schools and institutions it created in order to buttress the military and social 
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developments that were under way. Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Azhari training for example in no way 
prevented him from becoming founder and first director of the School of Languages (Madrasat 
al-Alsūn). Nor did traditional learning thwart the career of Saʿad Zaghlūl, perhaps the most 
important politician of early twentieth-century Egypt, and erstwhile Minister of Education. Even 
at the height of educational polemics from the end of the century onwards, prominent Azharis, 
including Taha Hussein, Ḥasan al-Marṣafī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh continued to partake in 
shaping Egyptian educational (and thus, national) policy in important ways. Although it is 
usually heralded as the beginning of the end for traditional education, the establishment of Dār 
al-‘Ulūm itself was intended to complement, rather than compete with, the Azhari curriculum. 
And by then, al-Azhar itself was at any rate being reformed along common discursive 
parameters, beginning in 1872.
122
  
A main reason for the accelerated transformation of the educational structure of the 
country had more to do with fundamental social, economic and juridical changes than with any 
grand narrative of prophetic modernization. Still, educational discourse and proposals at this time 
pivoted (if to varying degrees) upon an opposition to the seemingly disordered and archaic 
learning of al-Azhar. This is not surprising given that order (whether that of the library or that of 
the city or the school) is itself “precarious, negotiated and continually in flux.” “Our image of it,” 
Mitchell explains, “is required and given value by the wider set of assumptions in which it 
stands, that of order versus disorder.” Disorder is thus “not a condition that precedes thought,” 
but rather it exists “only to allow ‘order’ its conceptual possibility.”
123
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The establishment in 1895 of an Administrative Council [majlis idārat al-azhar] under the 
impulse and aegis of ‘Abduh was instrumental to the bureaucratic centralization of power that 
ensued. The ordinance passed in the summer of 1896 was of strict clarity: the Administrative 
Council, made up of five scholars headed by the Rector of al-Azhar, would have “absolute 
powers” over all matters of admission, life, discipline, learning and funding, including the 
explicit control of books to be read.
124
 After 1908, the accumulative result of all these acts was 
the further bureaucratization and centralization of al-Azhar, whose mandate was extended to 
include all “other similar religious Muslim schools,” through the consecration of the office of 
Shāykh al-Azhar as supreme head of religious scholarship and learning in the land. 
To repeat, at the heart of all these efforts (be it the institution of examinations and formal 
certificates in place of the classic ijāza, or the promulgation of strict codes of student conduct 
and personal hygiene) was the production of modern subjects: the new Azhari, and indeed the 
new Muslim tout court, now refigured now through the disciplining prism of the ‘nation.’ 
It is with this mind that we must approach the discursive underpinnings of the writings on 
the al-Azhar library. Mujāhid Tawfīq al-Jundī, professor of history and Islamic civilization at the 
Faculty of Arabic Language at al-Azhar University [kullīyat al-lughah al-‘arabīyyah, qism al-
tārīkh wa’l-ḥaḍarah] is among the rare scholars to directly address the library’s history, in an 




Al-Jundī opens by affirming the primacy of the al-Azhar collections to the institution 
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since its foundation. The effort is to establish continuity between these older collections, 
(anachronistically labeled maktabāt) and the current centralized library, which, he writes, “is 
composed of the libraries of the arwiqah [sing. riwāq] over the ages (…).”
126
 These older 
libraries, he explains further, had well-established systems of librarianship that sound remarkably 
modern. True to Azhari dogma, al-Jundī swiftly establishes the centrality of the institution (and 
of Egypt) to ‘Islamic education,’ which he argues is evidenced by the sheer number of 
manuscripts and copyists there.  Al-Jundī seems here to dispel the modernist bias against pre-
print scribal culture, seeking instead to integrate its vibrancy into the story of the al-Azhar 
library. This is coupled, however, with the late nineteenth-century reform narrative, so that its 
effect is mainly to monumentalize both the idealized past (true Islamic heritage) and al-Azhar’s 
role in preserving it.  
Indeed, having explicated the vitality of libraries in the medieval al-Azhar, al-Jundī 
moves on to modernity, but not without some difficulty, which is (to extend Massad’s analysis) 
evidence of a uniquely ‘Azhari anxiety:’ the endorsement of the decline narrative to explain the 
need for reforms but unwillingness to blame it on the backwardness of its scholars. Indeed, there 
is until today a strong urge to ground Azhari authority in a scholarly identity that emphasizes a 
continuous chain of intellectual excellence. For reasons hopefully made evident above, the 
library is the natural symbol and vector of cultural stature (in this case, of al-Azhar and its 
members). In the grandiloquent words of the late Shāykh Moḥammed Sayyed al-Ṭanṭāwī: “the 
Venerable al-Azhar (…) gathered those seeking knowledge and learning from the far corners of 
the earth. It was their intellectual qiblah in Egypt (…) as the Ka‘ba in Mecca was their religious 
qiblah. They acquired from its abundant knowledge at the hands of its singular ‘ulama and 
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Al-Jundī, thus, faces the challenge of sustaining continuity between the old and the new 
library, without doing away with the narrative of decline. After multiple rhetorical maneuvers, 
the historian concludes that in any case, “the date of the establishment of riwāq libraries is not 
known for there is no true historical text [upon which to rely], only a report that al-Azhar did 
have a general library [maktabah ‘āmmah] before the current one about which it is said that it 
was old, nay very old.”
128
 With that little hurdle out of the way, al-Jundī proceeds to sketch the 
reasons for the centralization effort in accordance with the self-same themes of decline (as for 
example described by Roper in relation to al-Shidyāq), namely, the disorder, dispersion and 
destruction of manuscripts. “These libraries stagnated [labithat],” he writes, “from lack of 
supervision and neglect until the time when al-Azhar was awakened [afāq] by the voice of its 
reformer and instigator of its renaissance [bā‘ith nahḍatahu] Shāykh Muḥammad  Abduh may 
God rest his soul.” To this end,  Abduh, al-Jundī tells us, established “a library that centralized 
this scholarly dispersal of books scattered across the different riwāqs [maktabah tajma‘ hatha al-
shatāt al-ʿilmī min al-kutub al-mutafariqah fi maktabāt al-arwiqah].” Thus, he concludes, “was 
preserved what was left of [the library’s] intellectual heritage by its guardians, the scholars of al-
Azhar across the ages, from the [perils] of loss and transgression.”
129
 The decay and disorder, 
however, it is important to note, is attributed to fringe or foreign elements and framed in terms of 
opportunist betrayal, so that al-Azhar’s true identity remains unscathed.  
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In recounting what is known of the chain of events that led to the centralization of the 
library in 1897, al-Jundī describes the process as an arduous but critical one, involving the 
“unification [wiḥdah],” a term he repeatedly uses, of all the collections. The main difficulty was 
the resistance of some of the riwāqs in handing over their collections, but no reasons are given 
for this. One can only surmise that it was due to a desire to preserve institutional autonomy in the 
face of an increasingly bureaucratizing and centralizing administration. Significantly, al-Jundī 
notes only the refusal of the riwāqs of the Maghāribah (North Africans) and the Atrāk (Turks) to 
hand over their collections, omitting to mention the protracted battles with the riwāq of the 




Al-Jundī’s account of the al-Azhar library then manages earnestly, if a little 
apprehensively, to straddle the space between turāth and modernity: fetishizing both the pristine 
past and the modern reforms (with a nationalist-hagiographic account of  Abduh as both the 
modernizing engineer of the faith and preserver of its legacy). With his feet on solid 
historiographical ground, al-Jundī concludes his discussion with a series of practical suggestions 
for the library’s improvement. He proposes the establishment of an “Azhar museum [matḥaf]” 
within library premises in which its rare manuscript collections and other Azhar-related 
paraphernalia may be kept.
131
 He also suggests the “establishment of an “Azhar archive [dār 
wathā’iq],” that would include all documents pertaining to the history of the institution leaked to 
foreign establishments and archives, in the possession of private individuals in Egypt and 
elsewhere, as well as copies (if not originals) of those currently held at the Egyptian National 
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Archive and other government institutions.
132
 Interestingly, he further advocates introducing into 
the curriculum “a specialized course on the study of al-Azhar documents,” and, as if by déjà vu, 
“the sending of missions from al-Azhar to specialized countries to learn the technologies and 
methods of archiving,”
133
 and thus, he doubly consecrates the legacy of al-Ṭahṭāwī, who, having 
more than a century earlier lead educational missions to Europe, became the “first [Egyptian] to 




That al-Jundī saw a direct connection between libraries and archives, or more specifically 
that his reflections on the al-Azhar library’s improvement should find logical culmination in an 
all out ‘incitement to archive,” a proposal which would allow for the narrativization of the 
history of al-Azhar (and by extension of ‘Islam,’ Egypt etc.), is in itself monumental. It speaks to 
the central argument of chapter: more than simply neutral repositories of texts, modern libraries, 
like museums and archives, partake fully of the modern order of knowledge, and entail collecting 
practices which en-frame (or more aptly perhaps, en-case) order to display an amassed 
intellectual output, whilst actualizing the operative organizational logic through which this 
accumulated productivity is materially accessed, historically narrated and presently interpreted. 
In the words of Timothy Mitchell, the type of library-cum-museum-cum-archive advocated by 
al-Jundī is intended to exhibit past and present scholarship while codifying the parameters of its 
future production in an assemblage where the “methods of order and arrangement create the 
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 Libraries thus participate centrally in modernity’s special splitting of 
representation from reality.  
 
 Education for Heritage, Heritage for Education 
It appears al-Jundī’s wishes may come true (if only partially) in the much-lauded recent 
digitalization efforts at the al-Azhar Library.  The $5 million “Al-Azhar Online Project” is 
funded and managed (with Al-Azhar University) by a private company under the patronage of 
General Shāykh Muḥammed bin Rashid al-Makhtūm, Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Defense 
Minister, and aims to conserve and make available the entire library collection. Al-Makhtūm, 
whose interest in collecting Islamic heritage more widely is well documented, is said to have 
approved the project after visiting al-Azhar in April 2000 following Shāykh al-Ṭanṭāwī’s plea 
to “preserve” the al-Azhar library's “priceless manuscripts and books.”
136
   
Executed in phases, the project has involved the installation of state-of-the-art 
technologies provided through IBM, the same corporation that supported digitalization efforts 
at the Library of Congress, the Vatican library and the Hermitage Art Museum Library in 
Leningrad. It has also entailed the training and employment of over 100 personnel (mostly 
Egyptian nationals) and the furnishing of new facilities within the library’s premises. In the 
words of al-Ṭanṭāwī, the al-Azhar Online project, “with all the advanced technological tools it 
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incorporates, represents a tremendous scientific leap forward which will simplify knowledge 
acquisition for all who seek [it] from inside Egypt or abroad.”
137
  
Combining “educational aims” with “heritage preservation,” the project’s benevolent 
aspirations surpass simply the desire to uphold the prestige of the al-Azhar, the “university 
[whose] archives” it aims to safeguard. They are expressly ideological. By digitally archiving 
and democratizing the al-Azhar manuscripts, it seeks to create a particular representation of the 
corpus of Islamic knowledge and its modular users. The manuscripts that will gradually be 
made available online will first be sifted, evaluated and selected “in accordance with their 
importance and historical significance” by a carefully chosen committee of “noted scholars 
from al-Azhar.”
138
 This committee is also assigned the task of providing the portal “with 
information on various Islamic topics of interest to all Muslims such as Fatwa, Fiqh and 
Islamic Civilization,”
139
even as it “will introduce Islam to the public and quash allegations 
against it.”
140
 Much like Mitchell’s colonial engineers of modern Egypt then, it will both level 
the ‘real’ and (re)construct its ‘representation,’ here a “universal Islam,” centralized and 
globalized through cutting-edge technologies. It will “enable global access to the genuine 
wealth of Islamic culture and heritage from the oldest extant university and religious institution 
worldwide, promoting Islamic values and tolerance.”
141
 Moreover, it will “serve the entire 
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Muslim nation,” allowing scholars throughout the world to receive and provide Muslims with 
answers to everyday religious questions. Accordingly, it will contribute to the projection of “a 
true and honest image of Islam.”
142
  
The espousal here of the liberal concept of “tolerance” is not simply intended to 
enhance the palatability of the project to Western and Westernized audiences, but is juxtaposed, 
even made possible, by the scientific advancements that inform it. It firmly places al-Azhar and 
its scholars, the self-fashioned guardians of Islamic and Arabic heritage back into the universal 
fold of history out of which they had been written a century earlier. 
 
*        *        * 
 
The very idea of the library then was at the heart of singularly modern designs of time 
and space. It not only signified the developmental promise of a future – as a key vector (along 
with the printing press and the school) by which literacy and learning would facilitate the 
production of a progressive Arab culture on par with the scientifically advanced civilizations of 
Europe – it also signified a glorious past or Islamic heritage as it contained the “the civilizational 
documents of knowledge, culture, and intellect that are said to have been passed down from the 
Arabs of the past to the Arabs of the present.”
143
  
If turāth, so aptly analyzed by Massad, “is in a sense a time traveler,” the library is its 
vehicle, it is the time machine. 
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On Searching for Africans in al-Jabartī 
  
In the first part of Ramaḍān, a Takrūrī appeared at al-Azhar claiming to be a 
prophet. He was brought before Shāykh Aḥmad al-ʿAmmāwī. When he was 
questioned, he stated that while he was at Shirbīn [in the Daqahlīyah province 
northeast of Cairo], the angel Jibrīl had descended upon him and transported him 
to Heaven on the evening of 27 Rajab [where] he led all the angels in two 
prostrations of prayer, and that Jibrīl had given the call to prayer for him. When 
he had finished the prayer, Jibrīl handed him a paper, saying “You are a prophet 
sent forth. Go down, convey the message, and perform miracles.” 
Having heard his story, the shāykh said to him, “You are mad.”  
“I am not mad!” said the man, “I am a prophet sent forth.” 
The shāykh [then] ordered him beaten. So they beat him and threw him out of 
the mosque. 
ʿUthmān Katkhudā heard about the man and had him brought and questioned. 
He repeated what he had said to Shāykh al-ʿAmmāwī; so [ʿUthmān Katkhudā] 
sent him to the insane asylum. However, the citizens and common people, both 
men and women, gathered around him; so the authorities separated him from the 
people. 
The Governor then called for the man and questioned him. He replied as he 
had in his first interrogation. The Governor ordered him imprisoned in al-ʿArqāna 
(Prison) for three days, after which he assembled the ʿulama in the middle of 
Ramaḍān. They also questioned the man, but he did not deviate from his story. 
They instructed him to recant, but he refused and persisted in saying what he had 
previously said. The Governor [finally] ordered that he be executed. As they 
killed him in the courtyard of the diwān, he spoke these words: “So be thou 
patient, as the messengers possessed of constancy were also patient,” [“fa aṣbir 
kama ṣabara ūlū al-ʿazmi min al-rusuli..”  {Qur’an, 46:35}]. His body was taken 
down and cast in Rumāylah Square, where it stayed for three days. 
 
(…) Men of learning commemorated the date in the motto:  





This story appears in the ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī’s ʿAjāʾib al-āthār as one of the 
notable events that occurred in year, 1147 A.H. It comes just before another peculiar episode 
only two months later in which the author describes an outbreak of violent hysteria amongst the 
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city’s inhabitants following the spread of eschatological rumors declaring the advent of the Day 
of Judgment on the Friday of that week.  
Two points immediately strike us about this story: First, is the seeming oddity of the little 
information that is provided about the main protagonist of the story, the Takrūrī prophet 
(presumably, a heretical African mendicant). Second, is the question of why al-Jabartī should 
choose to include these two ‘notable’ events in an otherwise broad and fragmented discussion of 
political appointments and the regimes of specific rulers and statesmen. For al-Jabartī, whose 
negative judgments of the lower classes are evident throughout the text, such forms of popular 
“nonsense [hidhyānāt]” would have certainly warranted dismissive derision on his part. 
However, these events clearly also provoked a sense of anxiety for him over a prevailing state of 
affairs, best expressed, he felt, through al-Mutanabbiʾ’s verse: “How many laughable things 
there were in Egypt! But it was a laughter like crying,” with which he concludes the second 
story.
2
   
 
The next two chapters will address these ostensible enigmas more squarely by exploring 
two principle themes and their related ontological manifestations as embedded in different 
readings of the story of the Takrūrī prophet: that of racialized difference predicated upon the 
binary opposition of Arab and African, and the formation of religious orthodoxies at al-Azhar of 
the eighteenth century.  
To that end, this chapter returns to a central problematic of this dissertation, namely the 
relationship between disciplines of knowledge-power and disciplines of self, and the rupture 
between these two disciplinary regimes that was introduced with modernity, to ask whether and 
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how one can read across this gulf now. At a theoretical level, the chapter is informed by two 
main clusters of ideas. The first concerns the simple but radical realization (outlined in previous 
chapters) that history as a we know it, and as a discipline in its own right, is a product of a 
particular time and place, i.e., Western Europe, nineteenth century – and that previous or other 
modes of figuring the past were not more primitive or inferior versions of the same thing, but 
rather different concepts altogether with their own specific logics. The second involves the 
renewed interest in ethics as practice, which is critical, as it allows us to think beyond the stale 
dichotomy between the ideal and the concrete, between a moral code and a particular individual 
behavior. Ethics here is neither simply morality (the rules and values set by normative 
institutions) nor the real actions of individuals and how they accord or not to such norms; rather 
it involves the various practices or technologies of self by which an individual molds herself into 
an ethical subject in the world.
3
  
The chapter conjugates these various strands of critical thought by focusing on the figure 
of eighteenth-century Azhari scholar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī (who looms so large over the 
fields of Middle East studies, Arab historiography, and Egyptian history) by way of his last, 
largest and most ambitious work, ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fī ’l-tarājim wa ’l-akhbār.
 4
 
The ʿAjāʾib provides, following a theoretical and methodological introduction, a 
chronicle of events unfolding in and around Ottoman Egypt that is punctuated by necrologies of 
prominent individuals from the early twelfth century A.H. (1688 A.D.) until the end of year 1236 
A.H. (1821 A.D.), just a few years before the author’s death. Though various interpretations have 
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 Such a conjugation is suggested by the literature: de-ethicalization and disciplinization occur simultaneously, and 
coalesce notably in the pioneering figure of Kant.  
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generated an array of mottled meanings that have been superimposed on the text and its author 
throughout the years, most scholars agree on its importance as a primary source, a pool of 
positive data.
5
 What remains unexplored, however, is how the text performs itself, and how it fits 
in a specific scholarly tradition. 
What follows will focus on the text’s mode of self-presentation (generic and formal, but 
also, and mainly, ethical) in an attempt to suggest ways by which the very alienness that makes it 
unusable as a mine of positive data may shake us into a type of reading and thinking, and 
therefore of historical truth-making, of a different kind, that bears directly on questions of orders 
of knowledge. The chapter will proceed in four distinct though interconnected parts. A first 
section returns to the disciplinization of history within its larger discursive formation, of which 
race is a primary determinant. It traces the making of the Arab and the African as differentiated 
subjects of history, which are indeed pitted against each other in a body of literature that projects 
a universal and eternal concept of race (and geography and history, slavery and so on) onto 
different planes and epochs. The second section narrows in on the Arabic text in question, and 
the yearning for a ‘search for Africans’ in it, as encapsulated in a quote by an eminent scholar. 
Such a search is indeed attempted, but shown to be doomed to failure, because it fails to take into 
account the historical author’s own conceptual grammar. The third segment begins to explore 
this grammar, by analyzing how the text presents itself within a generic tradition. The final piece 
evokes the potentiality of reading differently as well as its implications for meanings of life, 
labor and learning in and around the eighteenth-century al-Azhar.   
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All history, the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce reminds, is contemporary history. 
But all history, one might add, is also local history. That is, to the critique of chronological 
linearity must be added a critique of spatial or geographical homogeneity, whereby all history is 
subsumed into a pre-ordained trajectory following set, self-contained, naturalized units (such as 
nations, peoples, races, civilizations, continents, etc). In others words, even though ‘white’ and 
‘black’, for example, seem like obvious descriptors that need no explanation, they are very much 
a product of both a particular time and a specific place. While my focus will be directly on 
discourse production, the point of this exploration, ultimately, is to let ourselves be taken and 
shaken by other times and places: and the challenge is to face these not as inferior or outdated 
version of ourselves, but simply as other, as different - answering to their own logics, echoing 
their own hopes, painting their own dreams, and all in their own colors. 
 
History, Language and Race: The Arab, the African 
As outlined in the extended introduction to this dissertation, the institutionalization of 
disciplines of knowledge production in the nineteenth century engendered a vital rupture 
between the literary and exegetical tradition of Renaissance humanism and the scientific 
classificatory epistemologies of the Enlightenment from the late eighteenth century on.
6
 This 
move indexed the radical transformation of Western culture from one that sought lessons in 
classical texts that were philologically decoded through techniques derived from established 
canons, to one that sought intellectual certainty above all else in the book of Nature. Crucially, it 
also led to the protracted transformation of history and geography into sciences purged of the 
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weight of rhetoric, thus, radically distinguishing the content from the form. For disciplined 
history, past reality presented itself as narrative; for disciplined geography, the world presented 
itself in the form of natural, organic units, and in all cases it was the issue of composition that 
had to be banished.
7
  
These various disciplinary proceedings also produced particular geohistorical 
subjectivities – notably, as regards the themes that concern this chapter, Arab-Islamic 
civilization on the one hand, and African cultures or customs on the other.
8
 
Of course, the disciplines have changed since their moment of birth, and the border zone 
between the two geohistorical units has in recent scholarship been made relevant to the flow of 
history more broadly. Yet the focus of these important contributions has tended to be on 
identifying historical links across the two regions, Africa and Islam/Arab world/Middle East, 
which themselves remain unproblematized. The spatial designations are reinforced by the very 
idea of trans-regionality, which carves out separate geographical entities, each with specific 
sets of characteristics that can be plotted in time. Within such a framework, the contribution of 
“African Islamic” scholarship, no matter how much it is celebrated, necessarily remains 
subordinated to its Arab counterpart (whether at al-Azhar or elsewhere).
9
 The flow of 
knowledge (whether celebrated as culture and prestige, or denigrated as imperialism and 
slavery) is still in the last instance unidirectional. What this scholarship fails to adequately 
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 A good example is Stefan Reichmuth’s The World of Murtada al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks and Writings 
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scrutinize, then, is the complex and pregnant genealogies of the operative concepts themselves: 
race, slavery, civilization, law, and, first and foremost perhaps, history and geography.   
Take for instance the recent publication uniting a number of the most interesting 
scholars of the field: Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans 
in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, Sudan and the Ottoman Mediterranean, edited by Terence Walz 
and Kenneth Cuno.
10
 The lack of attention to matters of concepts starts with the very title. To 
begin with, it echoes word for word the title of the frankly iniquitous book by Bernard Lewis, 
an established Orientalist and major player in the incitement to racial discourse – surely not a 
sign of sensibility to the politics of knowledge.
11
 But more importantly, its mystifying subtitle 
succeeds only in muddling things further, especially by mobilizing the term trans-Saharan to 
refer to persons. The Sahara thus remains a great dividing gulf between distinct civilizations, 
peoples, races, separating North from South, Black/African from White/Arab. The authors do 
display a cognizance of the serious problems associated with the categories ‘race’ and ‘slavery’ 
as objective universals, but this is never adequately theorized. The most obvious ambivalence is 
in the bizarre use of scare quotes: some words deserve them (‘white’: but only sometimes), 
while others evidently do not (black). Such confusion persists throughout, and signals the 
authors’ discomfort with conventional terms, but also their reluctance to problematize them 
head on. The similitude of indigenous vocabulary found in some sources (e.g. sūdān, bīḍān) 
does not justify their simple translation into our language of black and white: at stake is the 
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cultural and conceptual grammar within which terms operate, which is contingent on time, 
place and discourse.  
The imperial universalism of Euro-American categories is typically extended to slavery 
(and the very cohabitation of the terms race and slavery in the title is symptomatic of this 
genealogy). Compare the American one-drop rule and plantation slavery to the different 
configurations gleaned in Cuno and Walz’ volume, where skin colors include white, blond, 
wheat-like, red, green, blue, brown, and black, and the activities of slaves [even of the so-called 
‘African’ or black’ variety] involved domestic and agricultural work, military and civilian 
duties, governorships, trade, various marital and/or sexual and/or household arrangements, and 
much more. But again, this is given little attention by the authors, despite the serious 




A Liberal Incitement to Racial Discourse 
In short, my argument here takes for granted the idea that when we write history, we are 
also involved in telling a story. This is not to rehearse tired debates on truth or objectivity, for it 
does not engage the domain of simple facts – which would involve another (and of course 
equally valid) type of approach. What is addressed here is the ways in which such facts are 
produced, processed, and put together to form a narrative, a plot if you will, and my focus here 
will be on the literature on the history of slavery and the slave trade in the Middle East, what is 
usually referred to as ‘Islamic slavery’ or the ‘trans-Saharan slave trade.’ These expressions 
themselves already call for exegesis. Before any sort of ‘fact’ can be collected about these 
complicated historical processes, they already have a numbers of other facts attached to them: 
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the idea that they ought to be understood as belonging to ‘Islam’ in one way or another to begin 
with; or that the Sahara is a divider between two poles, separating the source from the recipient 
of the slaves; or, most profoundly perhaps, that ‘slavery’ itself  is a stable concept across time 
and place, which need simply be modified by a cultural or geographical adjective to evoke the 
necessary difference between instantiations in specific times and places.
13
  
Indeed, one of the most pervasive symptoms of post-enlightened liberal modernity is the 
continuing fascination with slavery. Historical studies on slavery can be divided into three broad 
categories, each with its own vocabularies, methodologies, and concerns, reflecting in large part 
area studies specializations and in keeping with the racialized, philological production of 
civilizations as subjects of history. Subsuming in its fold but clearly distinguished from classical 
studies on slavery in antiquity, there is, first and foremost, ‘Atlantic slavery’ with its well 
established literature: in traditional Eurocentric fashion, it provides many of the tropes and form 
for the study of slavery in general. The second subdivision may be termed ‘African slavery’ – a 
complicated and fraught domain of inquiry, which has produced interesting studies and much 
controversy particularly in relation to questions of African culpability and reparations. And 
finally, a third subdivision that has grown exponentially, of what is conceptualized as ‘Arab-
Islamic slavery’ (AIS).  
Although it is with this third category that I am more specifically concerned, the fields 
are never hermetically sealed, the problematics of the Atlantic variety tending always to lurk 
somewhere in the background of any discussion of slavery (this is perhaps most evident in the 
concept of race as it pertains to the institution, whereby the dynamics of a specific historical 
experience in the Atlantic world, and even more particularly in the North-American arena 
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becomes a universal grammar of race dominated by an absolute black-white dichotomy abiding 
by the one-drop rule). The category of “Islamic slavery” has, as befits the Orientalist association 
of Islam and Arabness, more recently been labeled in some quarters “Arab-Led Slavery of 
Africans.”
14
 Though this is mainly in polemical and political literature, it expresses in many 
ways the unstated associations of ideas that undergird much of the scholarly output on the topic. 
It is indeed in this literature on “Islamic slavery” that the production and reification of the 
categories of ‘Arab’, ‘Africa’ and ‘Islamic’ are most manifest, and largely unchallenged. 
The most striking feature of this literature is the systematic insistence on its novelty. 
Though the subfield goes back at least to abolitionist pamphleteering of the late eighteenth 
century, virtually every scholarly intervention affirms its originality, and laments the purported 
silence and censorship on the issue. At the cusp is Bernard Lewis who speaks of “the remarkable 
dearth of scholarly work on the subject.”
15
 His statement is reiterated verbatim by Hakan Erdem 
in the Walz and Cuno volume discussed above,
16
 and quoted approvingly (and then analyzed) by 
John Hunwick who writes in his introduction to The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean 
Lands of Islam: “It is probably true to say that for every gallon of ink that has been spilt on the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade and its consequences, only one very small drop has been spilt on the 
study of the forced migration of black Africans into the Mediterranean world of Islam and the 
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– in law, in doctrine or in practice – could be printed on a single page.” (Race and Slavery in the Middle East; vi)  
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 Hakan Erdem, in his chapter in Walz and Cuno (ed.), Race and Slavery: 125. 
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broader question of slavery within Muslim societies.”
17
 His co-editor, Eve Trout Powell, repeats 
the point in her own introduction (revealingly subtitled “The Silence of the Slaves”).
18
 The 
lexical field is again reproduced in Ehud Toledano’s most recent study on slavery, As if Silent 




The alleged historiographical gap is most often explained in part by a purported taboo or 
culture of self-censorship amongst Arabs, Muslims and Middle East historians, again drawn from 
Lewis’ pontifications on the subject: 
Perhaps the main reason for the lack of scholarly research on Islamic slavery 
is the extreme sensitivity of the subject. This makes it difficult, and sometimes 
professionally hazardous, for a young scholar to turn his attention in this 
direction. In time, we may hope, it will be possible for Muslim scholars to 
examine and discuss Islamic slavery as freely and as openly as European and 
American scholars have, with the cooperation of scholars from other countries, 
been willing to discuss this unhappy chapter in their own past. But that time is not 
yet; meanwhile, Islamic slavery remains both an obscure and a highly sensitive 
topic, the mere mention of which is often seen as a sign of hostile intentions. 
Sometimes, indeed it is, but it need not, and should not be so, and the imposition 





Such statements and their multiplication in AIS literature can only evoke Michel 
Foucault’s reflections in the opening sections of his first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
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which he resolves by way of his notion of the ‘incitement to discourse’. Foucault's idea of the 
'incitement to discourse' emerges from a simple, basic empirical observation, but concerns that 
most complex and fraught of issues: subjectivity and its constitution. The observation consists of 
an apparent paradox: just at the time when a strict regime of repression and censorship of 
sexuality was meant to be taking hold in Western Europe with the consolidation of Victorian 
culture, there was an unprecedented explosion of public discussion and analysis of sex and 
sexuality from a multitude of vantage points. In other words, at the same time as sex was 
supposedly being suppressed and restrained, there developed an almost compulsive discourse on 
sex. But this is only a paradox if one assumes that power is merely repressive. Instead, Foucault 
shows that power is creative; it is productive of new subjects, objects and sites for its exercise. 
The explosion of the discourse on sex then was part and parcel of the larger apparatus of 
disciplining power, of regimenting, regulating, controlling, dominating the sexuality of Victorian 
subjects. The structure of power of which repression was a face thus also incited its subjects to 
talk and write about sex.
21
  
We are faced with a similar phenomenon when it comes to the question of race in the 
Arab-Islamic world. The unprecedented compulsion to address the subject of race (and its 
corollaries: slavery, exploitation, color-prejudice, discrimination, minorities, etc) in the last half-
century, coupled with the suggestion that the theme is taboo, that it is censored, that it is 
repressed, operate in the very same manner. And most importantly, like sexuality in the case of 
Foucault, it assumes and incites the idea that race is an essence that is unchanging over time and 
space, that is eternal and universal. It reproduces the Arab, the African as subjects of history that 
follow their trajectories from the dawn of time until today. It also goads the idea that these two 
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figures of the human drama are separated, different and indeed, often pitted against one 
another.
22
  Thus does it become meaningful to write of such a thing as the views of medieval 
Arabs on African geography and ethnography (and their legacy, no less) – even though none of 
the authors he discussed could have thought in terms of Arabs and Africans as understood later: 
certainly, none of the quotes he cites contain either identitarian epithet.
23
 The back-and-forth 
relay between contemporary and medieval Arabs is a common one in the scholarship of race in 
Islam, and it is a maneuver repeatedly effected by Hunwick in this article: just as the views of the 
eleventh-century Baghdadi Ibn Buṭlān are said to be “echoed in literature and popular perception 
down to the nineteenth century,” ethnographic evidence from today (“the continuing usage in 
several Arabic dialects of the word ʿabīd (‘slaves’) to refer to black Africans”) is mobilized as 
evidence for a timeless stigma of blackness.
24
 
Such ‘incitement to discourse’ is basically recognized and indeed celebrated by scholars 
in the field, such as Toledano who notes in his latest book that his own 30-odd year career 
devoted to ‘Islamic slavery’ “has been a unique opportunity to observe firsthand how historical 
research and writing can affect, perhaps even motivate, current events.”
25
 He is speaking here, 
notably, of the ‘Declaration of the Conference on Arab-led Slavery of Africans’, drawn in 2003 
by various intellectuals and activists from the continent, which affirmed “that slavery continues 
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to the present day in the Afro-Arab borderlands, and particularly in Mauritania and Sudan.”
26
 
The Declaration then blatantly, and carelessly, pits two hermetically sealed subjects against each 
other: on the one hand, “we the people, Africans and African descendants striving for the unity 
of the African Nation, intend to reclaim our voice, and speak for ourselves on the above and 
related issues, after centuries of silence and non-self-expression,” on the other, ‘the Arabs’, who 
lead “the largest, and in time, the longest involuntary removal of any indigenous people in the 
history of humanity,” who are struck by “collective amnesia,” and who continue to perpetrate an 
“ethnocide of African people through forced cultural Arabization.”
27
 
This liberal incitement to racial discourse has certainly succeeded to some extent – and 
not only in the ever-multiplying production in the West of data on the ‘taboo’ subject of race and 
slavery in Islam. Indeed as some Africans convene to denounce “Arab-led slavery of Africans,” 
some Arabs are rushing to apologize for the sins of their forefathers. In October 2010, the late 
Colonel Qaddafi thus publicly apologized to Africa on behalf of the Arab states for their role in 
enslaving Africans. “On behalf of the Arabs, I condemn, apologise and regret the behavior of 
Arabs towards their African brothers.” He too regretted the by now proverbial culture of silence; 
it was, he said, “a sensitive issue that has never been tackled before.”
28
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In this lies the first formal character of the genre, then: the plot is one of condemnation, 
redemption, and heroism: condemnation of the perpetrators; redemption of their helpless victims 
and their muted invisibility (encapsulated in the mixed metaphor of silence and absence that 
pervades the field); and celebration of the heroism of the scholar-activist.  
Indeed an important element of the AIS discourse is precisely the stated goal of giving 
voice to the victims, equated with the recovery of their agency in the historical drama. But this is 
problematic on multiple levels: first, the unqualified assertion that speech equals agency betrays 
a considerable lack of theoretical depth; second, the sense that the archival record actually 
records voices is curious at best; third, there is nothing particular about the “voicelessness” of 
slaves – most groups for most periods of the history of the region did not leave a direct mark on 
the archival record. In parallel, AIS scholars often feel the need to explain why there are today 
no visible markers of slavery, such as constituted former slave communities in the Middle East. 
The question is only perplexing, however, because strict American-style racial markers are 
assumed to apply (slaves are black, slave-holders are white, therefore, one should be able to see 
such difference and its legacy), ignoring the fact that Arabic-language sources bespeak a totally 
different grammar, where the spectrum of skin colors was infinitely variegated, as were the 
multiple, and sometimes overlapping, activities of slaves were equally manifold.  
While it is true that a recurrent idiom in AIS literature revolves precisely around the 
multiple functions and origins of slaves, it is often distilled and domesticated in a division 
between high and low, or soft and hard, slavery bolstered by a color code. Thus we read of the 
mamlūks, the so-called white slaves. Originally captured in the northern provinces bordering of 
the empire and primarily recruited in military service, the Mamluks emerge as a notably force in 
the history of the region, and not only rose to the most prominent positions in the Ottoman state, 
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but ruled Egypt – de jure until 1517 and de facto until 1798 when Napolean landed on her 
shores. To explain this anomaly, whereby slaves became masters, they, and indeed mamlūk 
system of slavery (what Toledano terms kul slavery) had to be excised from slavery proper. 
Since they disrupted facile post-Enlightenment understandings of the free mature subject (the 
very antithesis of the slave – the anti-slave if you will), the Mamluks had to be classified under a 
separate category altogether, by which theirs was a wholly different predicament of enslavement 
owing largely, and this is the point, to their skin color. It was soft/high slavery, sharply 
contrasted to that of other ‘enslaved’ subjects in the Empire. 
But such an analysis just does not account for the complexity of the economic, social and 
political structures and hierarchies of Ottoman history. The “black” slave Beshir Agha for 
example, a “chief harem eunuch” in the eighteenth century, was (in the words of historian Jane 
Hathaway) “the most powerful person in the Ottoman Empire” at the time. Indeed, his proximity 
to centers of power allowed him to greatly shape “Ottoman court culture, provincial political 
culture, and imperial policy (including foreign relations)” and he also “played a key role in 
molding officially sanctioned Sunni Islam.”
29
  
And lest we should think that Beshir Agha’s case is circumstantial, we must also then 
account for that of the seventeenth-century judge Mullah ʿAlī, yet another ‘black/African’ slave 
(whether eunuch or not is debated) who rose within the ranks of the Ottoman educational and 
judicial hierarchy to become judge of Bursa and Edirne, and who eventually joined the imperial 
council commanding the chief judgeship of the Empire’s important European provinces, 
including its capital, as well as occupying the prestigious retirement office of Qadi of Mecca. So 
                                                 
29
 Jane Hathaway, Beshir Agha: Chief Eunuch of the Ottoman Empire (London: Oneworld Publications, 2005). 
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powerful was his position in fact, that the French ambassador to Istanbul at the time described 
Mullah ʿAlī as the “man who governed the Empire.”
30
 
These are, perforce perhaps, exceptional cases, simply because they became of the 
uppermost elite strata. And “slavery” was of course a much larger, and more varied, institution. 
But, the difficulty in identifying “former slave communities” by purely biological/physiological 
factors leads AIS scholars into laborious (and sometimes, frankly amusing) demonstrative 
exercises: proof of Africanness (which is equated a priori with slave ancestry) had to be 
explained culturally by instinctive anthropological determinants such as food, music (rhythmic 
drumming especially), and above all a ritualistic engagement with the occult, in the form of spirit 
possession in particular – in other words the very same features that classically structured racial 
thought in Europe and are being transposed now on to Arabs/Muslims and subsequently 
condemned. Thus, Behnaz Mirzai, finding no visible markers among her subjects in her search 
for the “African Presence in Iran,” has to posit that they “unconsciously remained agents for the 
continuation and survival of their cultural links to Africa” based on such things as “the 
circumcision of girls,” the use of “black tobacco,” the playing of the “damdam (a kind of drum),” 
and the “sickness of the zar” – all implicating, evidently, their “association with Africa.”
31
 
Though this is a somewhat extreme rendering of the approach, it is not at all unusual in 
its sentiment: it is repeated almost systematically in the literature, from the colonial ethnological 
discourse of the 1940s and 1950s to the most eminent historians of the regions, such as Terence 
Walz and Kenneth Cuno, who write, in the introduction to their book: “Trans-Saharan Africans, 
though uprooted, were not deracinated. They networked in their new locales, preserving and 
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recombining cultural elements from their homelands and influencing their host cultures. Perhaps 
spurred by John Hunwick’s interest in the religious life of black Africans in the Muslim world, 
other historians are re-examining the zar/bori cult and finding it a response by Africans to their 
enslavement in Muslim lands.”
32
  
The wording here could not be more clear: the Sahara remains the great barrier, 
profoundly separating North from South, Black from White, despite the recent attempts at 
historicizing and problematizing that very space as a vibrant place of shared living. On one side 
is a homeland, on the other, a host culture, Africans are deracinated in Muslim lands, and 
zār/bori is an African cult. And, as if to confirm the natural objectivity of the Saharan divide, one 
of the most startling and frequent images of the literature on Islamic slavery is the harshness of 
the trans-Saharan crossing, reinforced by the raw cruelty of the ‘Arab’ slave traders. As 
McDougall shows, the idea that the physical remains of slaves all over Saharan trade routes (as a 
type of ‘Middle Passage’) was a staple of the field, which recurrently evokes the presence of 
countless skeletons, often of women and children, throughout the Sahara.
33
    
The question of the color code is crucial. Reliant almost without fail on a north-American 
inspired one-drop rule, it is one of the most revealing indicators of the conceptual travails of the 
field. John Hunwick thus declares that: “By the seventeenth century blackness of skin/African 
origin was virtually synonymous in the Arab world with both the notion and the word “slave”; 
they were ‘abid.”
34
 Similarly, Liat Kozma describes late Ottoman Egypt as “a society where 
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most black women were still slaves.”
35
  Black is here clearly meant as an obvious and direct 
visual marker – as it would be according to the one-drop rule that makes ‘passing’ close to 
impossible.  
But how does this square with another oft-repeated feature of some of these societies: that 
a child would inherit the ‘ethnicity’ and ‘status’ of her father, whatever the color or status of the 
mother? This is precisely the inverse of the one-drop rule, and would make it simply impossible 
that blackness of skin be synonymous with slavery, or that ‘most black women were slaves’ in 
Egypt. 
This all points to another dominant feature of the genre: its highly moralizing tone. 
Rarely does contemporary scholarly discourse espouse such an explicit ethical stance. This has to 
do with a dual logic: the West has transcended its past, and atoned for its ills (at least partly); the 
Arab-Muslim world remains incapable of a similar reformation, notably because it is, 
somewhere, inherent to their very identity. In the words of John Hunwick slavery was/is an 
organic component of the Islamic world for it was not just “part of the natural order of things 
[but] indeed part of the God-given order of things.”
36
 This was a long-lasting Christian 
missionary and colonial trope, incidentally. In the late nineteenth century, the French Cardinal 
Lavigerie, a famous abolitionist, accused Islam for the evil of slavery in Africa. Later, the great 
British military man and administrator, and erstwhile theoretician of indirect rule, Sir Frederick 
Lugard repeated it too: “It is the most serious charge against Islam in African that it has 
encouraged and given religious sanction to slavery.”
37
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The ever-quotable Toledano reveals his political subtext as follows: “Threatened by the 
knowns and unknowns of globalization, many [Arab and Muslim writers] find solace and a sense 
of security in local culture, in Islamic tradition, and in the margins, in radical violent activism.”  
And yet the author repeatedly refuses to bear his own subject position: “Because human bondage 
in its various forms existed in almost all known historical societies and cultures, no writer may 
claim the moral high ground vis-à-vis any culture in this regard.” And again: “this book is 
neither about assigning blame nor about absolving guilt. (…) This book is about humanity and its 
failing, about the struggle and survival of the enslaved, about the universal desire to be free.”
38
 
Implicit in this statement are many things, not least of which is a dispensation towards the 
paradigm of steady progress into the light of (Western) liberal modernity. Historicity is the 
mechanism that allows to trace a coherent, homogenous trajectory from Ancient Greece (or even 
Neanderthal Man?), to the West of today, without having to bear the sins of the forefathers too 
heavily. Indeed, moving forward was always part of the West’s identity, even when it didn’t. 
Hegel famously theorizes this by differentiating between the actuality and potentiality in the 
realization of the Universal Spirit. Even though the Idea (say, general freedom or equality in the 
slave societies of Ancient Greece and Rome) may not have actually existed at that point, it 
existed as a potential that needed to follow its course to self-realization.  
These thematic contours of the AIS discourse provide formal coherence and narrative 
arcs to the stories told. They are also suggestive of generic characters for the protagonists. There 
is, firstly, the mature, autonomous ‘Kantian Subject’, anchored in his natural rights, reason, 
freedom and above all, self-ownership. This is the subject of liberalism (and humanity) write 
large, and the slave is its polar opposite. There is then the ‘Religious Subject’, nowadays 
                                                 
38




identified with its Arab and Muslim identity (though previously associated with the Semite more 
largely, as in Ernest Renan). This subject’s narrative unity is signified by the relentless reference 
to the mobilizing of “Islam” (and its representative texts) to delineate an ageless essence 
juxtaposed here with another self-contained category (slavery). Thus, most studies of AIS engage 
in a discussion of slavery in the Qur’an, the hadith and the shariʿa, and in early Meccan society, 
from which specific attitudes and behaviors are derived. These then become the grid by which 
slavery in Islam is read, regardless of temporal or spatial criteria.
39
  
Most strikingly perhaps, the constancy of the Muslim-Arab as ‘religious subject’ is 
perpetuated by regular reference to the integral connection between past slavery (and race) and 
its supposed present continuation or at least manifestation.  Exemplary of this is the recurrent 
ascription of linguistic and racial continuity, as in the ubiquitous translation of ʿabd (plural 
ʿabīd) as ‘black slave’. Though it is without fail projected backwards onto far away times, the 
evidence for this translation is almost always spurred by paltry ethnological observations, 
whether of the scholar herself (such as the case of Eve Troutt Powell who explained the origin of 
her research project by her experience in a Cairo taxicab, whose driver referred to her black 
friend as ʿabīd [the astonishing use of the plural masculine in reference to a female singular is 
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Finally, the third inevitable protagonist of the story is the black, African ‘Victim Subject’, 
destined to be saved in these narratives of redemption. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Hegel spoke of this fixed personage in no uncertain terms: “In the interior of Africa 
proper, (…) the mind of the African remains shut up within itself, feels no urge to be free and 
endures without resistance universal slavery.”
41
 His terms are perhaps particularly blunt, and 
certainly lack the moralizing edge of the missionary abolitionist literature, in which it is a more 
forlorn figure that appears, often women and children, or castrated males, viciously abused by 
the cruel slavers.  
A few points make the very structure of this discourse as a whole rather moot. Firstly, a 
fundamental paradox, namely, that notions of humanity, the rights of man, and the abolitionist 
movement emerged alongside and in tandem with the novel theory of scientific racism and the 
hierarchical pyramid of civilizations, all integrally linked in multiple ways. Indeed, as the work 
of Bernasconi on Kant (and others) reveals, they were sometimes produced and connected by the 
very same authors, some of whom played a critical role in the emergence of scientific notions of 
race. In other words, and to put it bluntly, freedom and self-ownership are contiguous to eugenics 
and genocide in the modern order of things.
42
 
By contrast, scientific notions of race were simply unthinkable in non-modern Islamic 
(and non-Islamic) discursive formations – something that escapes AIS scholars, for two related 
                                                 
41
 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind - Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 
Together with the Zusätze (trans.) W. Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971): 46. See 
also: Alexis Wick, “Beyond Art and Science,” op. cit. 117; and more broadly, Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and 
Universal History (Pittsburgh: Universityu of Pittsburgh Press, 2009). 
 
42
 On Kant specifically, see Bernasconi, Robert, “Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the 
Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in R. Bernasconi (ed.) Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001): 11-36. For a more 
general introduction, see: Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Race and the Enlightenment: a Reader (Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1997); and Nicholas Hudson, “From “Nation” to “Race”: The Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century 




reasons: on the one hand, they take for granted the universality of Western ideas (race, slavery, 
individual, society, family, freedom, autonomy, etc) with little reflection as to their constitution, 
on the other, they rarely give appropriate dues to the textual tradition from which they select 
fragments as canonical representatives of a civilizational essence. Take the basic term ʿabd, for 
which AIS scholars have so much attachment: one may perhaps be able to articulate the term in 
relation to forms of unfree labor and regional-linguistic origin in particular settings, but it is truly 
astounding that these scholars elide that the concept of ʿubudīyah and its derivatives (not least 
ʿibadāt) hold a place of utmost importance in the Islamic discursive tradition. The fact is that, 
from the Qur’an down to Buṭrus al-Bustānī’s nineteenth century dictionary and through the 
major classical dictionaries, and including Murṭaḍa al-Zabīdī’s the principal lexicon for the 
period under examination here, Taj al-ʿArūs, the term does not carry the sense of the 
‘stigmatized black slave’ of the AIS imagination. Quite the contrary, it evokes profound and 
positive connotations: it lies at the basis of proper piety, indeed, it is (counter-intuitively perhaps 
for us moderns) an essential path to freedom. As the early eleventh-century scholar al-Qushāyrī 
put it most succinctly in his Risālah: “let it be known to you that the real meaning of freedom 
lies in the perfection of slavery (ʿubūdīyah).”
43
  
Moreover, particular concepts with specifically Christian and European genealogies (such 
as ‘religion’, ‘history’, ‘law’ and ‘morality’) are facily transposed onto different cultural and 
discursive settings with no hesitation whatever. Yet as noted in previous chapters, Talal Asad 
and others have shown the serious consequences of rendering universal the concept of religion. 
Even more relevant perhaps in the specific case of slavery is the rendition of shariʿa as ‘Islamic 
law’. Ubiquitous among AIS scholars is the reference to a body of sayings, scattered citations of 
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the Qur’an, ḥadīth and fiqh, that assume their place as elements of an Islamic code of law on the 
subject, whereas Wael Hallaq has shown that the shariʿa operates in a fundamentally different 
manner, one antithetical to such canonization and codification. 
Finally, one might also consider (on a lighter note) the favored pseudo-ethnological 
approach of AIS scholars. It is indeed remarkable that no pause is given at the fact that ‘abd- is 
the first part of widely common name constructions throughout the region, and its usual 
diminutive ‘abed is a term of distinct affection. Just think, for the sake of a giggle, of the 
transposition in a north-American setting: could one imagine ‘slavey’ or ‘blackey’ being a 
popular and affectionate name amongst whites in the American South through the ages? 
 
‘Al-Jabartī and the Africans’ 
Stefan Reichmuth has devoted much of his scholarly efforts to the in-depth exploration of 
the multiple ‘trans-regional networks’ of Islamic learning, culminating in his impressive 
biography of the captivating eighteenth-century polymath Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī.
44
 In an important 
article from 2001, entitled “Murtada al-Zabidi and the Africans,” Reichmuth reveals the 
extensive personal connections that al-Zabīdī cultivated with African scholars.
45
 To this end, he 
principally exploits an unfinished Muʿjam (compendium), on which al-Zabīdī was working 
towards the end of his life, with the help of none other than al-Jabartī, his intimate friend and 
disciple, in collaboration with the Damascene scholar Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murāḍī (also d. 
1791). 
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This collection of biographical entries provided an important source of information in the 
composition of the ʿAjāʾib. A comparative analysis of both texts leads Reichmuth to extol al-
Zabīdī’s open-mindedness vis-à-vis African scholars which he contrasts to al-Jabartī’s narrow 
(biased?) focus:  
Among the biographies included in Zabidi’s Mu’jam, there are about twenty-
five entries related to scholars from Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa. Jabartī, 
despite his extensive use of his master’s collection, ignored all of them. He 
obviously regarded these people, together with many similar visitors from other 
distant countries, as insignificant “vagabonds” (āfāqiyyūn) not worthy of 
attention. This illustrates the difference in outlook and interest between the Indian 
sharif and traveller Zabidi and his Egypt-centered student whose account focuses 




Contained in this quote is a condensed medley of the problematic consequences of 
disciplinary thinking described above. Reichmuth’s article, like the rest of his corpus, is of 
unmistakable erudition. This critique then is not intended to uncover a mistake or another, but 
rather to further provoke a reflection on the concepts and categories according to which the 
information of the past is filtered, or rather ordered.  
To begin with, the question of al-Zabīdī’s Indianness is a knotty one, especially since al-
Zabīdī (who was born in Bilgram), chose evidently not to identify as such.
47
 Neither do 
biographical dictionaries of the period (and beyond) refer to al-Zabīdī as an Indian. Reichmuth’s 
imposition of a clear-cut Indian identity on him is similar to the forceful application of a 
black/African identity to people who may not so identify (on a much more sinister register, for 
example by Euro-Americans on certain people in Darfur). In all cases, the cognitive violence 
involved is significant, and the self-confidence of the Westerner to ascribe identities where and 
as he sees fit is astonishing.  Likewise, al-Jabartī’s Egyptianness must be qualified. Although it is 
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true that his ancestors had been settled in Cairo for a long time, his family maintained the 
affiliative (nisba) ‘al-Jabartī’ (in reference to the Horn of Africa) throughout – and seemingly, 
quite proudly so. 
Reichmuth is not wrong in stating that al-Jabartī’s “account focused mainly on his 
country,” but only if we accept that “his country” here means not any sort of nation-state of 
Egypt, which simply did not exist in any form at the time, but that place where he was born and 
raised: Cairo and its environs. And this has more to do with the generic form of the text than with 
any sense of personal identity. Al-Jabartī makes no direct reference to Egypt as “his country” 
anywhere in the ʿAjāiʾb: while he does mobilize categories such as al-diyār or al-bilād al-
miṣrīyah and miṣriyyīn, nowhere is there any evidence that these had the national or ethnic 
associations implied by the modern sense of “his own country.” They referred rather to a vague 
and ever shifting administrative unit and a bureaucratic-military corps, respectively.  
In affirming that al-Jabartī excluded all “scholars from Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
“obviously” on account of them being “insignificant vagabonds from distant countries,” 
Reichmuth implies a type of intent on the part of al-Jabartī that lends itself to being read as  some 
sort of central Arab contempt for peripheral Africans (and others). Of course, Reichmuth does 
not state this explicitly (at least not in this article),
48
 but part of the argument of this dissertation 
is that such statements do not need to be made explicit. They are embedded in a logic determined 
by the discursive field. The choice of focus on “scholars from Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa” 
suggests important insinuations, and surely means something beyond the simple idea, say, that 
al-Jabartī was primarily interested in happenings involving Cairo – or else, why frame it within 
such racial/geographic terms? This is especially significant if one considers the simple fact that 
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the designations Saharan or Sub-Saharan Africa would have, in all probability, meant absolutely 
nothing to al-Jabartī himself.   
As for the term āfāqiyyūn, Reichmuth’s use of it is also contentious. The term appears in 
al-Jabartī’s necrology of al-Mūrāḍī (al-Zabīdī’s collaborator) when discussing the use of his 
teacher’s biographical notes for writing his own ʿAjāʾib: 
When I obtained the papers which my late master had assembled, they were 
about 10 fascicles which he had arranged and had named al-Muʿjam al-mukhṭaṣ. 
(…) Most of what was in them were distant people [afāqiyyūn] from the Maghrib, 
or Turkey, or Syria, or the Hijaz, even the Sudan, and who had no fame, nor a 
great deal to show, either of the living or the dead. He neglected those who were 
worthy of being written about from among the greatest scholars and important 




What Reichmuth renders as “vagabonds,” the translators of the ʿAjāʾib render as “distant 
people.” But both are perplexing in many ways. The latter has the advantage of clearly existing 
in the various standard dictionaries (both modern and not),
50
 and of having greater logical 
consistency for surely al-Jabartī did not mean people who “moved from place to place without a 
fixed home” or people who were “leading an unsettled, irresponsible, or disreputable life” (as the 
Merriam-Webster translates the term vagabond). Nonetheless, the choice of al-Jabartī’s 
translators is not quite exact either: assuredly, for a Cairene scholar of the late eighteenth – early 
nineteenth-centuries, “ahl al-Maghrib wa’l-Rūm wa’l-Shām wa’l-Ḥijāz bal wa’l-Sūdān” could 
not have meant distant people. Moreover, the ʿAjāʾib mentions people from such places 
recurrently, and without any qualifying sense of distance whatsoever.
51
 What is indubitable is 
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 Equally problematic, incidentally, is the translation of al-Jabartī’s phrase “bal wa’l-sudan” as “and even the 
Sudan.” Without an a priori acceptance of the lighthouse model and its accompanying racial grid of interpretation, 
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that the phrase amalgamates al-Sūdān with other dominions, both Arab and non-Arab, in a 
seamless sequence, and in no way implies a severed or separate realm of Africanity, nor indeed 
of Arabness (let alone the generic whiteness that alone can be implicated by symmetry to 
Reichmuth’s organizing category ‘Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa’).  
The category ‘Arab’ is mobilized in al-Jabartī’s text, but never as a coherent protagonist 
of an identifiable story. It appears first in the opening sketch of a universal history as a distant 
genealogical moment from an almost mythical past in reference to the inhabitants of pre-Islamic 
Arabia to whom the Prophetic Message was eventually sent. Following this passage, and 
throughout the rest of the text, the term ʿarab is used to refer to something closer to a socio-
economic category, which the translators reproduce as ‘Bedouin’. There does not appear to be 
any significant connection between these two iterations of the term.  
There does however, emerge quite palpably a concern on the part of al-Jabartī to 
distinguish his own authorial voice. This is achieved by a double maneuver that stages the text’s 
authority by affiliation to two senior scholars, whilst simultaneously insisting on its originality. 
Moreover, the reader senses the necessarily fraught tension between student and master in this 
passage where al-Zabīdī’s biographical endeavors apparently “left many blanks under the 
letters.”
52
 The tension (we may perhaps call it oedipal) emerges more cogently in al-Jabartī’s 
necrology of al-Zabīdī, an entry marked in both content and register by an oscillating stance, 
both showering praise on the biographee on the one hand, while undercutting him on the other by 
suggesting negative attributes, such as shrewdness, deception, careerism and ambition.
53
  
                                                                                                                                                             
the emphasis on the Sudan, coming as it does in the sequence, might just as easily be translated in the manner of 
“last but not least.” 
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As far as linguistic and narrative purposes are concerned, then, Reichmuth’s sense of al-
Jabartī’s narrow-mindedness seems hasty. But what of the evidence of quantitative data on which 
he seemingly relies? A rudimentary calculation of the biographical entries contained in the 
‘Ajā’ib reveals roughly that of a total of 682 necrologies, almost two-thirds (416), pertain to 
ʿulama and other members of the intelligentsia. Of these, approximately one third might be 
considered ‘non-Egyptian’ (to use the anachronism) judging by genealogical ascription or 
affiliation (ie. nisba). A further geographical breakdown of this group shows that roughly 39 are 
from the Arabian Peninsula (29 for the Hijaz; 10 from Yemen); 29 are from Western Asia 
(namely, Syria and Iraq); 11 are from Anatolia and the Balkans; and 6 from farther Asian lands 
(such as Iran or India). In joint second place, the largest constituency of foreigners totaling 39 
entries, or a little over 31.5%, are from Africa , excluding Egypt of course, but including North 
Africa writ large (which Reichmuth structurally omits from his category of ‘Saharan and Sub-
Saharan Africa’). 
Indeed Maghribīs of all types (making up about 35 entries, probably the single largest 
nisba-derived denomination, after ‘Egyptians’), including some from al-Sūs, and other far 
corners of the Maghrib [al-Maghrib al-aqsā], figure prominently in the ʿAjāʾib, sometimes as 
teachers of the most central scholarly luminaries.  
And in any case, ‘Africans-proper’ do appear in the account, often in glowing terms, 
rendering Reichmuth’s contention (that al-Jabartī would have excluded all Africans as 
insignificant vagabounds) quite simply moot. Perhaps the most famous example is that of 
Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī, the master and dear friend of al-Jabartī’s own father 
(and subject of chapter four in this dissertation). Africans further appear more frequently beyond 
the actual necrologies of personalities: for example, a distinguished scholar whose nisba points 
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to a place in today’s Mali, Muḥammad ibn Saʿīd al-Tunbuktī, is mentioned more than once as an 
eminent teacher in Medina.
54
 In another necrology, al-Jabartī mobilizes a judgment by al-
Kashnāwī on a particular figure stating emphatically that this is sufficient testimony for his 
evaluation – evidently, these were not people he thought were “insignificant” or “unworthy of 
attention.”
55
   
Furthermore, the foregone conclusion that inclusion in a biographical dictionary always 
implies a positive judgment should likewise be qualified. Like others in the genre, al-Jabartī 
employs a composite dialectic between jarḥ (disparagement) and taʿdīl (authentication), drawn 
from the science of ḥadīth that bound biographers in differing ways and degrees to relate all 
known aspects of a personality: the good, the bad and the ugly.
56
 Thus, al-Jabartī not only 
includes biographies of subalterns: a pious lamp-lighter and keeper of the shoe-rack at a shrine, 
even a woman (“the Honored Lady Khatun, the concubine of ʿAlī Bey Bulūṭ Kapan al-Kabir”), 
but also a great deal of necrologies that are clearly negative, such as that of Sulaymān al-Jawsaqī 
for instance. Incidentally, there does not appear to be a necessary connection neither between the 
length of a necrology and its subject’s social standing: Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd I, for example, gets 




The more interesting question concerns the value of such a quantitative assessment for a 
search through al-Jabartī’s ʿAjāʾib. Scholars have mined biographical dictionaries for numerical 
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and statistical data, in the quest for a more socially grounded account of past reality, since at 
least the 1970s.
58
 But this method is not without its difficulties, particularly as it relies on a 
complex and by no means rigid onomastic system (patronymic [kunyā], familial [nasab]; 
honorific/deprecationary [laqab], affiliative [nisba] etc.), evincing that there is indeed much 
more to a name.
59
  
The trouble with nisbas in particular is that they defy any type of systematic treatment 
that we might seek to impose upon them. In the structure of names, the noun of a nisba can 
designate the name of a place, occupation, ancestor, quality, scholarly affiliation, even a specific 
text that the bearer may have read.
60
 Most importantly for our search here, nisbas can be both 
inherited and acquired through travel and other means, which complicates matters significantly 
as a particular person may carry two, or even three, distinct geographical nisbas (e.g. al-Rumī al-
Miṣrī, al-Ḥamawī al-Makkī, al-Miṣrī al-Juddāwī, etc) the boundaries of which are in any case 
constantly in flux. And what of cases that are even more explicitly ambiguous? For some 
biographees, a geographical nisba could function as a nickname, as in the case of the “Amīr ʿAlī 
Bey, known as al-Hindī [al-ma‘rūf bi’l-hindī],” but who was Georgian in origin, [jūrjī al-jins]?
61
 
Or indeed that of al-Jabartī’s friend Sayyid Aḥmad ibn Ismāʿīl, whom he described as rūmī and 
ṣaʿīdī [Turkish and Upper Egyptian] as well as “originally belonging to the Turkish people 
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[aṣlahu min jins al-ʾatrāk].”
62
 Another telling example of the fluidity by which identities were 
assumed is the case of the clever Ḥasan Efendī, who called himself al-Darwīsh al-Mawṣilī 
(presumably in reference to Mosul of Iraq) but who “traced his descent from varied ancestry and 
associated with people of every nation [yaʿtazī likulli qabīli wa yukhliṭ kulli jīli]” so that he 
sometimes “claimed to be Persian by descent, and other times of Meknes” [fammara yantasib ilā 




At best then, the exercise can only be an approximate one: for the search for Africans (or 
any others) in al-Jabartī, no matter how careful and rigorous is always already speculative and 
inconclusive.
64
 Moreover, forcing the text to be a straightforward archive in this way effaces its 
literary and discursive qualities, and ultimately advances little our understanding of difference in 
a period still largely outside of Europe in time and space.  
 
Embodied Writing  
If the ʿAjāiʾb cannot be read as a simple pool of data under the aegis of modern 
categories (history, geography, race, identity), how are we to approach it then? Part of my 
argument is that we should attend first to the self-presentation of the text and its author in the 
effort to replace our reading of it in discursive tradition of which it is a part. 
 To repeat: when discussing non-modern historiography, it is crucial to remember that 
there was no autonomous discipline of history. The author of the ʿAjāʾib did not see himself as a 
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professional historian, and nor did his audience. He was quite simply a ʿālim, an erudite scholar, 
who, like the other members of this class, could discourse on a number of fields, often with equal 
authority. To speak of the ʿAjāʾib as history is nothing more than an analytical shorthand, which 
must be extricated from the actual discipline of history as we know it, for al-Jabartī and his peers 
were not bound by strict disciplinary margins (and this may go towards explaining what I 
described above as the many mottled meanings, from journalism to diary, ascribed to the text). 
Their works were multi-layered and poly-textured in ways that perplex our straightforward 
classifications – and this was an accepted and established fact in the long tradition of historical 
writing in which al-Jabartī explicitly placed his text. As he says himself:  
The art of history [fann al-tārikh] is a discipline [ʿilm] combining many 
disciplines. Without history, their principles would not have been established, and 
their ramifications would not have branched out. Among the branches of history 
are books of biographies [ṭabaqāt] of Koran readers, commentators, and 
transmitters of ḥadīth; biographies [siyar] of companions of the Prophet and of 
the successor generation; books of biographies [ṭabaqāt] of mujtahids, 
grammarians, wise men, and physicians; chronicles [akhbār] of the prophets; 
chronicles [akhbār] of the maghāzī; stories of the pious [ḥikayāt al-ṣaliḥīn]; 
books for the entertainment of princes [musāmarat al-mulūk], composed of 
anecdotes [qiṣaṣ], reports of events [akhbār], homilies [mawaʿiẓ], admonitions 
[ʿibar], proverbs [amthāl], peculiarities or regions, and wonders of countries 
[gharaʾib al-aqalīm wa ʿajaʾib al-buldān]; and also books of lectures 
[muḥaḍarāt] for the amusement of the caliphs, solace to those to whom obedience 




Books of history are extremely numerous, he continues, before providing a long list of 
authors and titles that are particularly noteworthy. Amongst them is, predictably, Ibn Khaldūn 
whose Muqaddimah, al-Jabartī says, contains “an extensive sea of learning full of jewels of 
articulate speech and understanding.”
66
 The intra-textuality within the genre (both acknowledged 
and not, explicit and implicit) is indeed remarkable, evincing that these ‘historians’ viewed the 
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world from an exalted and holistic textual observatory, marking an important distinction from 
their modern counterparts, with their naturalized categories produced by disciplined history and 
geography.  
 
The ʿAjāʾib begins, as customary, with an invocation of God: “al-ḥamdulillāhi al-qadīm 
al-awwal, al-ladhī la yazūlu mulkihi wa lā yataḥawwal.” Interestingly, these are all temporal 
qualifiers – and it is typical of such scholarship that the formulaic opening would refer to the 
theme of the work. Al-Jabartī thus plunges straight into the topic: it is the concept of time that 
concerns him in this text, and whatever conclusion may arise: God is “the Eternal, the First, 
Whose dominium neither passes away nor changes.” Next he mentions the Prophet, upon whom 
“descended the revelation of the earlier centuries” [al-munzil ʿalāyhi nabʾ al-qurūn al-
ʾawwalīn]. Again, the qualifier is directly related to the matter at hand: knowledge of the past. 
From the very outset then, al-Jabartī places his text squarely in the frame of historical reflection. 
After which, the text proceeds to introduce its author and his plan: “The humble ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
ibn Ḥasan al-Jabartī al-Ḥanafī, may God forgive him and his parents, and may He favor them 
and him, says: I have written some pages concerning the events which occurred…” [fayaqūlu ’l-
faqīr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan al-Jabartī al-Ḥanafī ghafara Allāha lahu wa liwālidāyhi wa 
aḥsana ilāyhumā wa ilāyhi].
67
   
The intriguing displacement of the authorial voice by the introduction of a narrator 
position centers the actual personhood of the author. Thus, from the very beginning is involved 
an idea of scholarship as the ethical forging of the self, symbolized by the construction in the 
first person. The foregrounding of the authorial self is felt throughout the text, and in the balance 
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is God’s favor, on the author himself but also his kin. The quality and value of the text are thus 
made to hinge upon an embodied ethics of writing. 
A recent text by Saba Mahmood, though engaging a totally different time, place and 
problem (namely, the aftermath of nefarious Danish cartoons affair in the early twenty-first 
century), evokes well the (different) epistemic space that such an idea of embodied ethics opens. 
In Mahmood’s reading, the Prophet as icon “refers not simply to an image,” but to “a cluster of 
meanings that might suggest a persona, an authoritative presence, or even a shared imagination” 
by which the subject and the community are able through mimetic practices and everyday modes 
of being (dress, speech, sleep, food, worship etc.) to bind themselves to the object of reverence 
as a way of “inhabiting the world, bodily and ethically.”
68
 At the level of normativity then, the 
sense of moral injury felt by Muslims and described by Mahmood ensued not from the violation 
of some code as in some conventional notion of blasphemy [“thou shalt not make images of 
Muhammad”] but from the awareness that “one’s being, grounded as it is in a relationship of 




The sunna provides and conditions this “structure of affect.” It guarantees its cognitive 
continuity through the isnād-based epistemologies of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ sciences, 
wherein authority, judicial and/or scholarly, presupposed and was predicated upon virtuous 
conduct. As Asad further notes, fiqh was critical to this process, “not as a set of rules to be 
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obeyed but as a condition that enables the development of virtues.”
70
 Fiqh in this sense “is not 
simply a comprehensive structure of norms [aḥkām];” rather, it constituted a virtue-ethics that 
implicated “a range of traditional disciplines, combining both Sufism and the shari’a.”
71 
Such a 
displacement of analytical lens, away from the strictness of codified norms to the richness of a 
lived textuality, also informs Hallaq’s masterful exploration of shariʿa to which I have referred 
at various points above. In a most compelling manner that echoes the arguments of Asad and 
Mahmood, Hallaq explains the fundamental difference between modern law and shariʿa as 
follows:  
Integrally to its being socially-based, and communally and morally embedded, 
the shari’a developed a unique way of textually dealing with the world (…). 
Shari’a’s fiqh was incontrovertibly pluralistic: this is simply one of its most 
essential features. Pluralism was thus a marker of a strong sense of judicial 
relativism, where a blind-folded Lady of Justice has no place whatsoever. A blind 
justice was no justice, for people are never truly the same, and to be just, the law 
could not treat them as a generic entity. (…) This pluralism (…) stood in sharp 
contrast with the spirit of codification, another modern means of homogenizing 




These embodied ideals and social locations are equally evident on the plane of writing 
itself, whereby the organic mediation between knowledge and virtue is performed through a 
multiplicity of authorial choices and maneuvers - linguistic, grammatical, didactical, citational, 
rhetorical, formulaic, generic, etc – all of which staged textual and scholarly authority and its 
forging of an ethical self. It is in this sense that I speak of al-Jabartī’s style and method as 
inhabiting an embodied ethics of writing.  
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This in turn explains the repeated affirmation of the act of personal witnessing, which al-
Jabartī is very keen on highlighting. Most of the events recounted are experienced and articulated 
by the author through bodily senses: precisions like adraknāha or shāhadnāhā commonly recur, 
and the few that he did not personally seen, he affirms as having heard them by his own ears, 
drawn directly from the “mouths of other scholars” (samiʿtuhā wa min afwāhi al-shāykhati 
talaqqaytuhā).
73
 It is simply in the frame of an embodied ethics of writing, that al-Jabartī’s 
mention of ‘primary sources’ needs to be read: “I have therefore had recourse to transmitting the 
words of elderly scholars [farajaʿnā īlā ’l-naql min ʾafwāhi ’l-shāykhah ’l-musinnīn], to 
documents from the registers of clerks and custodians [wa ṣukūki dafātir ’l-kutub wa’l-
mubāshirīn], and to inscriptions on tombstones [wa ma intaqasha ʿalā aḥjar turabi ’l-maqbūrīn] 
from the beginning of the century up to the year 1170.”
74
 These sources are not, as in modern 
historical methodology, apprehended as objective vestiges of some pristine, separate past upon 
which the account can rest assured of its realism. They represent, rather, a further confirmation 
of the authorial self. In other words, it is all about the personal integrity of the scholar, and his 
direct, eyewitness reliability (and indeed, they may be better referred to as secondary sources, 
which are less reliable precisely because they are further removed from the author’s self).  
The reference to ‘other scholars’ above is equally critical: as will be made clear below, 
the class of the ʿulama are at the very heart of al-Jabartī’s moral and political system. This 
ethical self that is fashioned by writing and reading should not be confused with the autonomous 
individual subjectivity of modern regimes, it is rather one that is plurally constituted: it is 
dependent on God, it is pegged to the emulation of the Prophet, it is connected to his immediate 
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kin, for whom the author implored along with his own self divine forgiveness and favor on the 
very first page, and it is embedded, most ardently, within an old chain and wide network of 
scholars, who represent the ethical standard-bearers of the larger circles around them, to which 
they are integrally linked.
75
  
Having explained the ground for the selection of his data, intimately connected to his own 
personal integrity as a member of this celebrated class, al-Jabartī turns to the question of the 
text’s organization and exposition. These various events, moments and biographies  he tells us, 
had to be brought together in a consistent manner: “I desired to assemble them in unity and curb 
their irregularities in pages of consistent order, organized according to years and times” [fa 
aḥbabtu jamʿa shamlihā wa taqyīd shawāridihā fī awrāqin muttassiqat ’l-niẓām murattabah ʿalā 
’l-sinīn wa’l-aʿwām].
76
 The organization of historical events in chronological sequences is thus 
explicitly the product of scholarly labor, which must efface the existing irregularities and unite 
the various parts in a meaningful whole, why? “So that the attentive student may go over them 
and obtain the benefit [al-manfaʿah] he desires.”
77
 Stories are thus not found fully formed in the 
record, but are the result of purposeful, active work on the part of the principled scholar for the 
benefit of the student. And indeed history for al-Jabartī was explicitly didactic in function: “He 
who reads them will learn a lesson from past calamities, will be consoled in whatever misfortune 
befalls him, and will remember the lesson. “Only men possessed of minds remember.” [innamā 
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yatadhakkaru ʾūlū ’l-albābi] {Qur’an 13:19}.”
78
 The marshaling of the sacred word itself can be 
seen as a way to reinforce the standing and aura of the ʿulama: those possessed of minds, who 
know and remember.  
This ethical didacticism is clearly the most important element of the project. Indeed, al-
Jabartī repeats the maneuver in more abstract fashion a few lines later, when he addresses the 
genre within which his text is placed (and he follows here a number of classic authors before 
him, and to which he later alludes in a long list of authorities,
79
 such as for instance the fifteenth 
century as-Sakhāwī, whose famous work on historiography, al-Iʿlān bi’l-tawbīkh liman dhamma 
ahl al-tawrīkh, he emulates much in his introductory section):
80
 
Know that history is a discipline that seeks to learn the changing conditions of 
peoples, their countries, their laws, their customs, their crafts, their lineages, and 
dates of death. Its subject is the circumstances (of the lives) of such past figures as 
prophets, saints, scholars, wise men, poets, kings, and sultans. Its purpose is to 
uncover what the past was and how it existed, to discover the lesson to be gained 
from these events, to be well advised by them, and to acquire the faculty of 
understanding the changes wrought by time, so that the wise person may be 
warned of those situations in which former nations have vanished, follow their 










 ʿAjāʾib, I: 5-6/6-7. 
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The purpose of history for al-Jabartī was thus a matter of setting moral exemplars, of 
guiding the servant on his path to God, of forging an ethical self (in both writer and reader).
82
 
There follows, in conformity with the style of the genre, a fascinating (however derivative) 
account of the origin of the science of history, blending etymology and lexicography (of the 
word taʿrīkh itself, notably) with accounts of pre-Islamic and early Islamic practices of dating, 
recording and analyzing past and present experience.
83
  
Al-Jabartī then returns again to the exemplary purpose of history, noting that in its light, 
“[t]he wise person compares himself with previous persons like him in this world. God Almighty 
has narrated reports of past nations in the Koran, and the Almighty has said, “In their stories is 
surely a lesson to men possessed of minds,” {12:111}.” He further mobilizes the authority of Al-




At the absolute center of al-Jabartī’s cosmological system rests the supreme principle of 
justice: “The Prophet said, “By justice the heavens and the earth are established.”” The second 
key to this cosmological vault is knowledge. “The establishment of justice cannot be properly 
accomplished without knowledge, which is conformity to the rules of the Book and the sunna,” 
he writes. It is this mindful meditation (to follow Murphy), between the “Book [kitāb]” and the 
“Balance [mizān]” – knowledge and justice – that stages the text’s authority and is performed 
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 But it also on this basis that al-Jabartī organizes social categories according to 
which he divides humankind into groups, and by which the broad contours of identity and 
difference are to be apprehended.  
The first of these groups are the Prophets, “the repositories of the decree of the Book, and 
God’s faithful custodians over his creatures,” quickly followed by the ʿulama . The latter are, he 
writes “the heirs of the prophets,” “the stewards of God in the world” and “the elite of the 
humankind.” Indeed, considering the fact that the prophets are no more, it is fair to say that 
scholars sit squarely atop of al-Jabartī’s divine-sanctioned social pyramid. Al-Jabartī’s praise for 
the men of learning knows no bounds: “They approach God with purity of heart, and fly to Him 
on the wings of learning and enlightenment [ṭāʾirūn ilāyhi bi ajniḥati al-ʿilmi wa’l-anwāri]. 
They are heroes in the fields of greatness, and melodious nightingales in the gardens of learning 
and discourse [balābil basātīn al-ʿilmi wa’l-mukālamāti]. (…) Those are the inheritors who shall 
accede to paradise, therein dwelling forever [ūlāʾika humu ’l-wārithūna alladhīna yarithūna ’l-
firdawsa hum fīhā khālidūna] {Qur’an 23:10-11}.”
86
  
In the third category are kings and rulers [al-mulūk wa walāt al-ʾumūr], “the guardians of 
justice and equity among people and subjects [who] achieve order in the realm and establish 
authority”, to whom al-Jabartī devotes long admonitory passages (which need to be read in the 
immediate political context of writing, as Meḥmed ʾAlī was consolidating his absolutist rule, 
partly at the expense of the ʿulama as a coherent class, a move abhorred by the author).
87
 This is 
a recurrent theme in his text, as he often comes back to the question of what makes a good ruler 
– and the answer is, unfailingly, justice and equity, nourished by the ethical counsel of scholars: 
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“Know that the reason for the destruction of kings [hilāk al-mulūk] is their rejection of virtuous 
men [dhu ’l-faḍāʾil]  and their promotion of corrupt men [dhu ’l-razāʾil], their disdain for the 




The next category comprises, somewhat unexpectedly, the “middle class of people” 
[awṣāṭ al-nās], “who observe justice in their dealings and settle their crimes with equity;” and 
then, finally, in fifth place, the simple individuals, “who exercise governance over themselves, 
moderating their faculties and controlling their bodily movements.”
89
  
The communal structure as a whole evoked by al-Jabartī is thus entirely devoted to the 
ethical forging of the self, culminating as it does in individual people, who are defined by their 
disciplining of self, both mental and bodily. 
 
Another element in al-Jabartī brings further to mind Foucault’s exploration of the “care of 
the self” central to the practice of ancient philosophers. In the last years of his life, Foucault was 
particularly interested in what the ancients called parrhesia, free or frank speech, as an important 
example of the process of the ethical self-fashioning. In his Berkeley lectures of 1983,
90
 he 
explained that there were five essential features to the practice of parrhesia: frankness (“the 
speaker is supposed to give a complete and exact account of what he has in mind so that the 
audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks” [12]); truth (“there is always an 
exact coincidence between belief and truth” [14]); danger (“someone is said to use parrhesia and 
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merits consideration as a parrhesiastes only if there is a risk or danger for him in telling the 
truth” [16]); criticism (“the function of parrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, 
but has the function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or of the speaker himself” [17]); 
finally,  duty (“in parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty” [19]).  
These conditions apply remarkably well to al-Jabartī, who says of his own venture:     
In collecting this work, I did not aim at serving any prominent person of high 
rank or at obeying any vizier or amir. I did not, to satisfy an emotional inclination 
or a material purpose, flatter any regime with hypocrisy, or lavish praise or blame 
contrary to good character. I seek God’s forgiveness if I have described a path I 
myself did not follow, or traded with capital I did not own.
91




So, what of the potentiality of reading this text, then? What can it tell us about the past? It 
says, mainly, that the past is indeed a foreign country – but that does not mean that it shan’t 
speak to us. It can, as long as we do not treat it simply as a repository of data, but rather take it 
(and its author) seriously as a rhetorical edifice in its full textual, authorial and performative 
density, so as to let ourselves be taken and shaken in our embodied selves by the practice of 
reading.  
Let us return to the account with which this chapter opened: that of the “Takrūrī” who 
came to al-Azhar “claiming to be a prophet,” and was judged to be mad, beaten, thrown out, 
interrogated again, and finally executed for blasphemy [kufur].) Most interesting here is the 
absence of any sustained articulation of racial or geographical difference in al-Jabartī’s rendition 
of the story. Indeed, besides the appellation “al-Takrūrī,” referring most probably to a loosely 
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defined region in western Africa,
92
 al-Jabartī provides no further information on the identity of 
the main protagonist; identity being understood as cultural/ethnic background, that is. There are 
no indications of appearance, of phenotype, of language, of custom; in short, he could have been 
anyone – and this, to the modern reader, is perhaps awkward. We expect to know whether there 
was a connection between his designation, his skin color and perhaps even his public execution, 
or say, between his native traditions and millenarianism. Al-Jabartī offers no such clues; in fact, 
he mentions the false prophet’s nisba with such nonchalance that we are warranted to assume he 
did not envisage the possibility of such juxtapositions. He explicitly uses a genealogical epithet 
generally interpreted today to be a matter of race (takrūrī), but there is no indication that the 
assumed grid of reading shared by the author and his public involves racial terms. There is not 
even innuendo that points toward any sort of identitarian difference. 
And it should not come as a surprise that what al-Jabartī meant by mobilizing the 
category Takrūrī did not carry the connotations that we ascribe to it today, for indeed all 
evidence runs against the constancy of historical concepts and objects. To begin with, in his 
excavations of the multiple meanings of the term ‘Takrūr’ for example, ʿUmar al-Naqar reveals 
that the historical uses of the term defied any preset geographical or racial boundaries.
93
 For an 
Azhari scholar of the eighteenth century such as al-Jabartī, the designation would have equally 
presaged a vast non-circumscribed terrain encircling various kingdoms and city states in the 
broad area we now call West Africa. And this too is not startling, for if the structure of the riwāq 
system at al-Azhar is indicative of anything, it is an imagined geography that bears little 
resemblance to our own modern one.  
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As noted in chapter one, students at al-Azhar were and remain organized according to 
various riwāqs, or residential lodges, administered often on the basis of the geographical origins 
of the students, but also according to other considerations.
94
 The literature has tended to view 
these classifications anachronistically in “national” terms. Yet, the actual listing, as reproduced 
by Heyworth-Dunne, of the “twenty-five” or so riwāqs in existence during the eighteenth century 
indicates that the designations accorded to them cannot be systematically mapped as such. For 
instance, included in the list are least two riwāqs that were based on jurisprudential affiliation 
(riwāq al-Ḥanafīyah and riwāq al-Ḥanābilah), as well as a riwāq for the blind (al-ʿUmyān), and 
another for “all nationalities” (Ibn Muàmmar, named presumably after its benefactor). For the 
spaces falling under today’s Egypt, Heyworth-Dunne lists ten riwāqs: al-Āqbughāwīyah (for the 
provinces of al-Gharbīyah and al-Minūfīyah), al-Baḥārwah (for the north west Delta), al-
Balābisah (Bilbāys), al-Barābirah (“for Nubians”), al-Faiyūmīyah (for the Fayūm oasis), al-
Fashnīyah (for central Egypt), al-Ṣaʿāydah (“for Upper Egypt”), al-Shanawānīyah (for the 
southern Delta), al-Sharāqwah (for the north east Delta), and al-Ṭāybarsīyah (also “for the 
provinces of al-Gharbīyah and al-Minūfīyah”).
95
 Revealingly, while all these designations cover 
different provinces, some established and others more diffusely amalgamated, in the case riwāq 
al-Barābirah, an exceptional ethno-racial descriptive “Nubians,” is given instead, implying a 
patent distinction from other “Upper Egyptians” (e.g. those from the Ṣaʿīd). 
The remaining riwāqs are given as follows: “al-Akrād (for Kurds), al-Atrak wa’l-Rūm 
(for Turks), al-Baghdādīyah (for ʿIrāqis), al-Birmīyah (for Bornu and the neighbourhood), al-
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Dakārinah (for Takrūr, etc.), Dakārnat Ṣāliḥ (for the country around Lake Chad), al-Jabartīyah 
(for Jabart and Somali coast), al-Ḥaramāyn (for Mecca and al-Madīnah), al-Jāwah (for Java 
etc.), al-Maghāribah (for North Africans), al-Shawwām (for Syrians), al-Sulāymanīyah (for 
Afghanistan and Khorasan), and al-Yamanīyah (for South Arabia).”
96
 Heyworth-Dunne’s 
explanatory parentheses are of themselves indicative of the geo-racial identities of later orders of 
space in many ways, not least, in the different levels of specificity accorded to certain 
designations but not others. For our purposes here, what is most interesting in these designations 
is that for Africa alone at least four different riwāqs are allotted covering various overlapping 
regions of the continent. Hence, by notable contrast to the ways in which these spaces are 
discussed in the literature today, not only are Africans clearly a significant feature of the world 
of al-Azhar, but further: Dakārinah here is not restricted to Takrūr but expands also to cover 
areas around Lake Chad while students hailing from Bornu (which often included in the larger 
framework of bilād al-takrūr) are distinguished by a riwāq of their own; “al-Jabart” extends to 
the entire Red Sea coast and would have no doubt also included students from Ethiopia; and 
Sudan emerges as a broad and indeterminate territorial expanse, if we are to include the riwāqs 
al-Barābirah, as well as those of the al-Sinnārīyah established later by Muḥammad ʿAlī pasha 
and other smaller preexisting ones for students coming from Darfur and elsewhere to the south.
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 This of course is not to say that these spatial imaginaries were free of any political or ideological associations and 
other concerns. The example of ʿAbd al-Rashīd al-Shinqīṭī (from today’s Mauritania) is a case in point. According 
to Stefan Reichmuth, al-Shinqīṭī had settled in Mecca sometime in the 1780s, where he was denied access to 
“stipends from the pious foundations of the Maghribis because they were regarded as people of the Sudan.” He 
subsequently sought a fatwa and even a decree from the Sultan of Morocco to confirm that the Shinqīṭīs were “pure 
Maghrībīs [min khullaṣ al-maghāribah],” but it appears to no avail.  
What is to be objected to however, is the folding of al-Shīnqīṭī’s story and his complaint into modern categories of 
race and geography as Reichmuth appears to imply by reading in the account “a tendency to secure the Islamic 
reputation of these towns and regions and to keep them mentally distant from the black populations of the Bilād al-
Sūdān.” (Reichmuth, “Murṭaḍā al-Zabīdī and the Africans,” op. cit. 129-30). 
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Both ‘slavery’ and ‘race’ – to address the compulsory categories of the incitement to 
racial discourse discussed above – had many faces and many names for al-Jabartī. For one thing, 
there is no term that quite connotes ‘race’ in the ʿAjāʾib: the common translation of jins as race is 
more revealing of the modern scholar’s transposition of concepts across time and space than 
anything else.
98
 The point is further exemplified by in the writings of Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī, the 
Azhari scholar often celebrated as the harbinger of modernity in Egypt. In his famous travelogue, 
al-Ṭahṭāwī, rather amusingly, observes: 
 The people of Paris have a white skin, infused with a red tint. It is rare to find 
a native Parisian with a brown skin. This is because they do not customarily allow 
marriages between a White man and a Negro woman – or vice versa – in order to 
protect themselves against the mixing of their colour. What is more, they consider 
that Blacks can never have beauty at all. To them, the colour black is one of the 
features of ugliness. As a result they do not have two directions in love (...). It is 
also considered inappropriate among the French to employ a Black servant girl for 
the cooking and other household chores of that kind as they have a deep-seated 
belief that Black people are devoid of the necessary cleanliness.
 99
 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī is thus clearly perplexed by these French attitudes, viewing them as 
something strange, even foreign, from a perspective when and where race evidently was not an 
operative category, even while he oscillates between adopting and rejecting European ideas 
concerning the classifications of different people.
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Neither is there a singular term or notion of slavery in al-Jabartī’s text.  Significantly, the 
ʿAjāʾib mentions cases of ‘blacks’ who owned ‘whites’ as well as ‘whites’ who owned ‘blacks’. 
Most importantly, these various instances are never identified by the author as pertaining to an 
over-arching institution or experience of slavery that was pegged to a dichotomous world-view 
hermetically divided between freedom and un-freedom.  
Al-Jabartī himself was born to a ‘slave’ mother. In his necrology of Muḥammad ibn al-
ʿAzīzī, known as “Ibn al-Sitt” on account of his “Greek slave” mother, al-Jabartī writes: “He 
used to visit and affectionately call me “cousin” (ibn khālatī), because my mother and his mother 
were both slave-girls (min al-sarārī).”
101
 The affective inflection here may imply a certain 
symbiotic affinity between the two men, but there is certainly no suggestion that either al-Jabartī 
or Ibn al-ʿAzīzī suffered particularly on account of their ‘slave stock,’ and indeed the stature of 
the former both at al-Azhar and outside, past and present, further testifies to this. Needless to say, 
originating in the Horn of Africa, al-Jabartī’s was presumably ‘black’ by Euro-American 
standards, but nowhere is there any substantiation of that feature (should it have been so) having 
constituted his identity in any way.  
Indeed a remarkable feature of this text as a whole is precisely the presence-absence of 
slavery throughout, let alone the totalizing free-unfree dichotomy pervading contemporary 
understandings of social categories of persons organized around relations of labor and 
productivity. While slaves appear very regularly, they never conform to any coherent and stable 
institution, relation or identity.  
The category mamlūk, for instance, dominates al-Jabartī’s narrative in all four volumes: 
appearing as benevolent aristocrats, scheming murderers and thieves, loyal servants, servants of 
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servants [“mamlūks  of  mamlūks”] and comrades, courageous  fighters, tyrannous rulers, greedy 
tax farmers, feudal overlords, government officials,  protectors of the poor and the populace, 
savvy businessmen and market connoisseurs, unruly plundering soldiers, pious benefactors and 
servants of God, debauched licentious men seeking worldly gains and abandoning all standards 
of religion, justice, established practice and correct comportment and so much more.
102
 The 
spectrum of evaluations is simply staggering, and this makes perfect sense in the context of al-
Jabartī’s overall conception of his work as a true account of events befalling Egypt in the years it 
covers. Yet, interestingly, the ‘slave’ status of mamlūks is hardly ever explicitly mentioned, and 
contrary to hegemonic ideas concerning ‘the slave’ as a coherent subject, it is never mobilized as 
a stigma in and of itself.  
Far from “socially dead” (as the common ascription of Orlando Patterson’s oft-cited 
thesis to other times and places that dominates AIS literature would suggest
103
) slaves of various 
sorts and colors feature recurrently and in different ways throughout the text: sometimes in more 
metaphorical, even poetical, senses – and here, it is perhaps best understood in the mode of the 
other dimension of the ʿubūdīyah spectrum, ‘slaves’ with the meaning of ‘devotees.’ Often they 
appear as symbols of wealth in many of al-Jabartī’s necrologies, and are mostly rhetorical in 
formulation – in the style of ‘such and such a person had (or left behind when he died) many 
slaves,’ meaning he was rich or powerful on account of his retinue. In many cases, slaves also 
appear as gifts, often in the hope of eliciting the favor of those in power. But, as indicated above, 
the range of actual relations and work regimes attached to the various categories and 
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instantiations of servitude was extensive and simply did not comply with any modern dualisms. 
The necrology of al-Hajj Ṣālih al-Fallāḥ is a good example:  
 The honorable Hajj  Ṣālih al-Fallāḥ  [died]. He was the master of the well-
known group of Cairo amīrs known as the Fallāḥ faction, which was related to the 
Qāzdughlī house. He was very wealthy, but miserly. He was born a peasant 
orphan lad from a village in Manūfīya called al-Rāhib, and worked as a servant 
for one of the village shāykh’s sons. When the latter fell in debt, he gave his own 
son and this Ṣalih, both of whom were young boys, as security to the tax farmer, 
Ali Katkhudā al-Jalfī. [Ṣaliḥ and the other boy] lived in ʿAlī Katkhudā’s house 
until the father repaid the debt that he owed [and then sought to reclaim the boys]. 
Ṣāliḥ however refused to return, saying “I will not return to that town.” He had 
become accustomed to living in the house of the tax farmer and continued to 
reside there, serving with the boys of the ḥarīm.  
He was alert, pleasant in spirit, and graceful in movement. He continued 
moving up in rank, until he acquired great wealth. He bought mamlūks,ʿabīd and  
slave girls [sarārī]. He gave them in marriage to each other, bought homes for 
them, assigned them incomes, and placed them in the ocaḳs and army units by 
using his contacts and by bribing people of authority and influence. They moved 
up in positions until they became high officials [themselves]: katkhudās, 
ikhtiyārīya, “amirs of the drums,” jāwīshīya, odabaşis, etc. Ultimately his 
mamlūk’s and the mamlūks of his mamlūks who rode horses (in processions) 
numbered about 100.  They had homes, retainers, mamlūks, and great fame in 
Cairo and they were men of authority and great power. He himself [the 
biographee, Ṣāliḥ] used to ride a donkey while wearing an elegant turban over his 
fez, his servant walking behind him. He died at the age of 70. There remained not 





In this passage is a microcosmic representation of the plurality and dynamism of social 
relations at the time. It is also quite revealing of the perils of translation, and the difficulty of 
transposing words and concepts across time and space: who in this sequence is free or unfree, 
and when, is simply not determinable. In fact, by any reading, ‘freedom’ here appears as a virtual 
category, constantly in flux and anchored in manifold and multilayered relations to the extent of 
altogether irrelevance. In other words, slavery itself was a process, not a state that is mapped 
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according to stable dualities, something difficult to imagine within the absolute strictures of 
modern identities. 
Moreover, the only person in al-Jabartī’s text who bears the actual nisba of al-Aswad was 
again a rather important figure, who moved across social strata in startling ways that unsettle the 
simple binaries dominating the field. Ibrāhīm Katkhuda al-Sinnarī al-Aswad was “a native of 
Dongola, [who] served as a janitor in Mansura.” There, he befriended notables and became one 
of the “retainers [atbāʿ] of Muṣṭafā Bey al-Kabīr.” He eventually “became popular, well-to-do” 
and “bought handsome slaves and white slave girls [al-mamālik al-ḥusun wa al-sarāri al-bīḍ].” 
In short, he was “one of the leading grandees of Egypt [min aʿẓam al-aʿyān al-mushār ilayhim fi 
Miṣr].”
105
 The appellation al-aswad (or al-ashqar (blond), as in the case of the amir ‘Uthman 
Bey al-Ashqar, for that matter) thus did not seem to carry any pejorative connotations; it 
certainly did not restrict its bearer’s prospects for social mobility. Further, this life-story evokes 
the complex articulation of professional and social networks that can simply not be subjected to 
the slave-free dichotomy.  
As already mentioned, slavery was a very personal affair for al-Jabartī (his own mother 
having been a slave), as it probably was for most inhabitants of Cairo at the time. In the long, and 
fascinating, necrology of his father, he addresses this affective dimension directly (quoted her in 
full in order to appreciate it force):  
The following remarkable episode took place at the time of my father’s going 
on pilgrimage in 1156 (1744). While in Mecca [a certain shāykh] commissioned 
my father to buy him a virgin white slave girl who had not reached puberty and 
who was to match a certain description. When my father returned from the 
pilgrimage, he made inquiries among the slave dealers in order to pick out the 
desired girl. Having found what he was looking for, he bought the girl and lodged 
her with his wife (…) until such a time as he might send her back with the man 
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who was charged with delivering her. When the time for departure came, he told 
(his wife), so that she might prepare the necessary provisions for them. However, 
she said, “I have fallen greatly in love with this maid-servant and cannot bear to 
be part with her. I have no children, and she is like a daughter to me.” The girl 
also wept, and said, “I won’t leave my mistress or ever go forth from her 
household.” My father wondered what was to be done. “I shall pay for her out of 
my own money,” said this wife. “Go and buy another girl!”  
He did so, and his wife then freed the girl and arranged for her betrothal to my 
father, and provided her with a trousseau and a separate furnished apartment. 
They were married in 1165 (1751-2).  His wife could never bear to part from the 
girl even for a moment, in spite of the girl’s being her rival wife. The girl bore my 
father children.  
In 1182 (1768-9), the girl fell ill, and my father’s wife contracted the same 
illness. Both were very sick. One morning, the girl arose, and seeing her former 
mistress lying unconscious, broke into tears and said “My Lord and God, if You 
have decreed the death of my mistress, let me die before her.” So saying, she lay 
down. Her condition worsened, and she died that night. They placed the girl next 
to her mistress. Late in the night, the mistress awoke and, touching her with her 
hand, called to her “Zulāykha! Zulāykha!” They told her that the girl was 
sleeping, but she said, “My heart tells me that she has died, for I saw it in my 
dream.” They replied, “Your life remains.” Realizing what had really happened, 
she sat up and cried, “I have no life after her,” and she began to weep and sob. At 
daybreak, they washed [Zulākha’s] body in her presence and readied it for burial. 
When it was carried out on the bier, [my father’s wife] returned to her bed and fell 
into the type of delirium that precedes death. She died later that day and was 
buried the following morning. This was one of the strangest things that I have 




Striking and poignant in its narration, this account brings to mind classic Skakespearean 
tragedies, and is the only one, as far as I can tell, of its kind in the Ajāʾib in which a slave (of the 
‘non-Mamluk’ variety) appears as the main protagonist. Al-Jabartī’s inclusion of this story in his 
father’s necrology, along with its personal tenor, generates many intriguing questions and 
provokes further contemplation, first among which is: what work does this story do for al-
Jabartī? What is certain however is that this passage too bespeaks of the mutable, and vitally 
processual and relational, nature of slavery and freedom. 
                                                 
106




Few AIS scholars have attempted to critically engage these various dimensions of 
slavery, and yet fewer have attended to the conceptual grammars inherent in the compound 
meanings of the concept of ʿubūdīyah itself as articulated in the Islamic textual corpus.
107
 Those 
who mention its polysemic nature consistently drawn hasty bifurcated distinctions between 
“theological” and “socio-legal” domains by which the term is to be understood: in the case of the 
former, ʿubūdīyah is paired with the Qur’anic concept ikhtiyār (free will), while in the latter 
formulation it is counterpoised to “ḥurrīyah,” an equally, if not more, elusive notion that is 
facilely rendered as “the absence of slavery in socio-legal relationships with other human 
beings.”
108
 But is it possible to think through the two realms of servitude - that of all human 
beings as servants/slaves of God (ʿibād Allāh) and slaves to one another (ʿabīd mamālīk) - as 
discursively connected themes through which to approach an understanding of the self or the 
human?  
Murṭaḍā al-Zabīdī would appear to suggest that one could (at least in the eighteenth 
century). In a long and sophisticated entry for the term ʿabd in his important lexicon Tāj al-
ʿArūs, he opens by stating: “the ʿabd is the human being, whether he be free or slave (…) for he 
is in a state of servitude/subjection [i.e. bearing no authority of his own] to his Creator [al-ʿabd 
huwa’l-insān, ḥurrān kān aw raqīqan (…) īlā inahu marbūbun li’bāriʾihi].” He then notes that 
“the slave (who is owned) is different to the free person [al-ʿabd (al-mamlūk) khilāfu’l-ḥurr],” 
for which he provides several examples. Interestingly, as far as the distinction between the slave 
of God and the slave of others is directly concerned, al-Zabīdī explicitly couches this in common 
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utterances and not to any established doctrinal position. He thus writes, citing another scholar: 
“the lay folk have agreed upon the differentiation of the slaves of God from those who are owned 
by others. They say: he is a slave of God, and the others, slaves who are owned (qāl al-Azharīyu: 
ijtamaʿ al-ʿāmmahʿalā tafriqah mā bāyn ʿibād Allāhi, wa’l-mamālīk. Fa qālū: hadhā ʿabdun 
min ʿibād Allāh, wa hūʾlāʾi ʿabīdun mamālīk].” He then affirms that unlike in the case of 
“disbelievers who are worshippers of tyranny [yuqāl li’l-mushrikīn, hum ʿabadatu al-ṭāghūt],” 
the act of worship is incumbent upon and characteristic of all Muslims towards God: “Muslims 
are slaves of God who worship only Him. For He, the Exalted and Noble, has said, ‘Worship 
your Lord,’ meaning be obedient to Him [li’l muslimīn, ʿibādu Allāh yaʿbudūna Allāha. Wa qāl 
Allāhu ʿazza wa jal, ‘aʿbudū rabbakum,’ʾāy ʾaṭīʿu].”
109
 The maneuver thus conjoins the two 
strands of ʿubūdīyah by accentuating the universal subordination to God. 
If we accept the possibility of this suggestion, how might a notion of the self as gleaned 
here map semantically and conceptually on to the modern ideal of the “mature autonomous 
Individual”? Or to put it another way, how might the (re)conjunction of the two dimensions of 
ʿubūdīyah provide avenues into the exploration of the Human subject outside of the liberal triad 
of self-ownership  –  private property  –  and freedom?  The question here is not simply just how 
does the ‘slave’ relate to the ‘free person,’ but in what ways do different labor and social 
relations articulate to one another so as to transcend the hegemonic free-unfree binary? Indeed 
can one speak of “slavery” in the abstract in eighteenth-century Egypt and if so, might this not 
obscure other more pertinent categories of analysis that can better accommodate the relational 
and processual nature of work, social interactions and knowledge practices depicted in the above 
passages from al-Jabartī.   
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My reading argues that al-Jabartī and the world he entexts simply cannot be slotted into 
quick and ready categories of the modern order of things. Outside the stricture of the modern 
state and its attendant project of social engineering and disciplinary power (which produces the 
very ideas of ‘society’, ‘population,’ ‘citizen’ etc.), it simply makes little sense to speak of any 
simple dichotomy of free-unfree, or indeed black or white.  Instead what one encounters in the 
pages of a text such as al-Jabartī’s are multiple loci of subjection, authority and identity, 
anchored in the formation of various communities (sometimes overlapping), which were largely 
autonomous: this is the world of households, clans, guilds, neighborhoods, militias, governed in 
the main by the sharīʿa as described so compellingly by Hallaq, and with the ʿulama at its helm. 
In this world, just as ‘people’ do not constitute a generic entity, neither did the ‘free’ and the 
‘slave’. The domains of life and learning were indivisible and replete with constraints of multiple 
orders, and the organizing principles of norms and behaviors were social harmony and the ethical 
cultivation of the self, absolutely central to which was the basic constitution of human beings as 
subject to the divine. 
A further necrology from al-Jabartī’s text may better serve to elucidate the various 
threads of the argument I am trying to make. The “respected amīr and esteemed celebrity ʿAlī 
ibn Abdallāh” was originally a mamlūk who later became the “chief of the Mutafarriqa corps” 
and a master in the craft of bow-making, indeed, the most “outstanding in his time at producing 
bows and arrows and (wood) oil, [so that] the people of his age could not catch up with him.” As 
head of the guild of bow-makers, he requested of the same Murṭaḍā al-Zabīdī to write an ijāza on 
his behalf to one of his retainers who resided in his home and whom he had been instructing in 
this art for some time. The text of this ijāza is fascinating: for one, it shows that the scope and 
nature of these communities extended far beyond their economic and social functions (and 
240 
 
indeed the semantic confines of what the English term ‘guild,’ and even more so the French 
‘corporation,’ would allow);
110
 secondly, it conforms entirely to the general structure and intent 
of such documents in any other field of knowledge or scholarship thereby highlighting the close 
conceptual affinities between ʿilm and ṣanʿah/ḥarf. It begins, as customary, with a justification 
for the importance of the craft as it has been transmitted over time through a genealogy 
stretching back to the Prophet and beyond, to the prophet Ismāʿīl, the son of Abraham. Having 
grounded the craft in a textured tradition (anchored in the mobilization of elements from the 
corpus of ḥadīth, sīrah, and sunna), the  ijāza then moves to the recipient  himself  –  and the 
most striking feature here (again, as customary) is the primacy of the ethical cultivation of the 
self and its placement in a communitarian web of relations: 
When I saw this proficiency in his craft, and his compliance in his good 
knowledge and his expertness together with his devoted study at all times of the 
principles of his trade, this special authorization goes forth from me to him 
witnessed by the brothers in this craft of noble manifestation. Just as the pious, 
perfect, proficient, outstanding shāykh, the late al-Ḥajj ʿAlī al-Albānī, took from 
from his shāykh (…)  
I advise him just as I advise my brothers and myself to associate it with good 
conduct and modesty of the soul and prompting it [the soul] to the noblest of 
characteristics, and that he not elevate himself above anyone nor should he 
despise anyone whom God had created; and that he make it his habit to remain 
silent and devoted, to be satisfied with little and continuously mention God in 
tranquility and reverence. And (I advise him) that he say Gods name when he 
begins his craft and that he draw strength and energy from God; and that he not be 
exasperated nor despair of God’s spirit. And (I advise him) not to insult himself 
nor his bow nor his arrows, and not to talk himself into failure, for he will attain 
what others have attained, for a man is as he resolves and in the ḥadīth there is 
“the strong believer is more beloved by God than the weak believer, though there 
is good in all.” (I advise him) to constantly watch to know the blemishes which 
happen to bows and arrows and the tying of the strings and that he obligate 
himself to that and the means of removing that blemish if it occurs and know why 
it happened; that he not sell weapons of jihād to any infidel and examine the 
religion of the one who buys whether it be a man or a boy who needs permission 
of his father. When he knows of his being a Muslim and he is certain of that, let 
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him take a pledge from him that he will not shoot a  Muslim  with it, nor one with 
whom he has a pact, nor a dog, nor anything with a soul unless it is game or 
something which must be killed; and that he not teach his craft except to one 
worthy of it, whose religion he is sure of, for it had been related that it is not 
permitted to withhold knowledge from one entitled to it.  He must give him his 
due especially if he is aware of the value of the knowledge and desires it, seeking 
for the sake of god the exalted, not for vainglory or pride. He must train his 
students, unite them and spur them on to work and not scold them except in 
private. Meanwhile he must preserve esteem, be very quiet, unhurried in all 






The larger parallels that may be drawn from this account between the guild practices of 
guild members and those of scholarship in large are significant. Knowledge, whether of a 
specific craft or discipline, is conceived in the first place as a trust contingent upon the conduct 
and character of its bearer and transmitter; and crucially, both domains bound self to community, 
labor to learning, through processes that were valued intrinsically in themselves, as well as for 
their attainment of the good (and just) life, and not simply for the quality of their products alone. 
 
It should be made clear that all this is not to suggest of course that issues of ‘color 
prejudice’, for want of a better term, were entirely absent in the pre-modern world that al-Jabartī 
inhabited. Such a claim would make precisely the same error as the existing literature on ‘race in 
the Middle East’: it would assume the constancy of historical objects. To repeat, what needs to 
be explored is how such concepts as ‘color’ and ‘prejudice’ operate within their specific 
conceptual grammars – and what emerges in al-Jabartī’s text at least is an understanding of 
difference filtered primarily by the five-tiered stratification evoked above, and one in which 
marks of origin, birth or language were rather diffuse, leaving no room for the genetic, 
hereditary, biological reasoning that lies at the heart of the modern episteme, and the types of 
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racial attitudes it engenders as observed by al-Ṭahṭāwī in France. Instead of the singular all-
encompassing modern designation ‘black’, there existed a variegated palette of skin-colors –  
aṣmar, aswad, abyaḍ, aḥmar, qamḥī, etc – which in any case feature only sporadically in the 
‘Ajā’ib. Similarly, in place of the distinct category of African, there existed an assortment of 
identity-markers (zanj, sūdān, aḥbāsh, nūba, barābirah, takārnah, etc) partaking of a different 
geographical imaginary that is reflected in the organization of al-Azhar itself. The very search 
for Africans in al-Jabartī is contingent upon the presence of a unitary ‘Africa’ (black or not), 
which does not exist in the ʿAjāʾib quite simply because there was no place for a continentalist 
vision in al-Jabartī’s worldview. The continent was rather composed of multiple regions, 
provinces and places that varied in nature, size, and regularity.  
One of the regions now associated explicitly with ‘black Africa’ involved al-Jabartī’s 
own direct genealogy: his discussion of it demonstrates both the presence of a particular 
grammar of difference, but also its incompatibility with any grammar of race that we might 
recognize, and with which it may be apt to conclude. 
 
*        *        * 
 
In the lengthy necrology of his father, Hasan al-Jabartī, the author opens with a gleaming 
tribute to the polyvalent scholar (“a verdant garden unequalled in all sciences; uniter of the 
branches of knowledge; pillar of humanity and philosopher of Islam”)
112
 after which he moves to 
a description of his ancestral land: “The land of Jabart or Zaylaʿ, is in Abyssinia. (…) At the time 
of the Prophet, their ruler was the famous Negus who believed in (the Prophet) without having 
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seen him, and for whom the Prophet recited the prayer for the dead for an absent person, as 
related in the books of ḥadīth.” To this historical dimension are added anthropological ones 
derived from an established generic corpus of faḍāʾil (virtue) literature: “the people live a frugal 
and pious life”, “they make the pilgrimage on foot” etc.  
Al-Jabartī here locates his intervention again within an established genre praising 
Abyssinia and its people: “Let whoever desires further information about the dealings of the 
Negus with the Prophet, his gifts to the latter, the Prophet’s gifts to him, as well as reports about 
the wonders, events and monuments of Abyssinia read al-Tirāz al-manqush fi mahāsin al-
Hubāsh, by the learned ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Būkhārī, the preacher of 
Medina, or Rafʿ shaʾn al-Ḥabshan, by the learned Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, or Tanwīr al-ghabash fi 
fadāʾil al-Sūdān wa ’l-Ḥabash, by Ibn al-Jawzī.”
113
 Following these writers, he highlights the 
great esteem that the Prophet had for Abyssinians, their active role in establishing the religion 
and its traditions, and the personalities among them throughout the ages. But at the same time, 
al-Jabartī does not succumb to any sort of idealized monolithic vision about the place: he is 
rather intent on describing difference internal to it (perhaps to display his knowledge), saying 
that the Abyssinians “are of many types, amongst which are the Ṣaḥartī and the Amḥarī [wa hum 
ajnās minhum al-saḥratī wa ’l-amḥarī].” He then explains that they have both common and 
specific traits [fī baynahumā ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ]: of the former are mentioned “beauty, grace, 
eloquence, generosity, softness of cheek, and shapeliness of figure”; of the latter he says: “the 
Amḥarī surpass the Saḥartī in beauty and grace; but the latter surpass Amḥarī in strength and 
courage.”
114
 In all cases, the Abyssinians in general are considered to be “gracious, intelligent, 
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clever, agreeable, honest” among other virtues, and most importantly, are seen by al-Jabartī to 
possess a special nature, “for they are of the people [jins] of Luqmān the Wise.”
115
  
Once again, the whole historical-geographical-anthropological maneuver foregrounds our 
author’s personal integrity and piety by genealogical-mythological association, for Luqmān al-
Ḥakīm is, in many ways, a prototype for the notion of scholarship as the ethical forging of the 
self, which al-Jabartī clearly replicated. Luqmān’s appeal may have to do with the fact that the 
thirty-first chapter (sūrah) of the Qur’an is dedicated to his name, in which he appears as a figure 
of wisdom who delivers essential advice to his son. Interestingly, it is one of only few passages 
in the Qur’an where al-amr b’il-maʿrūf wa’l-nahīy ʿan al-munkar appears as relating directly to 
individuals per se. It is also, revealingly, one of the rare instances in which soliloquious direct 
speech is given to a human without qualifications. What is most relevant for our purposes here is 
that at the heart of the Luqmānic utterances in the Qur’an is the correlation of gratitude (as 
thanks giving) to the attainment of wisdom-knowledge: “Wa laqad ātaynā Luqmāna ’l-ḥikmata,” 
begins the verse introducing the character for the first time {31:12}. This wisdom is given as 
complement to Luqmān’s devotion, “wa man yashkur fa’innamā yashkuru linafsihi” {31:12}. 
Gratitude has a broad range of meanings in the Qur’an, both theocentric but also social and 
personal, denoting an ideal state of moral and spiritual conduct on the part of each member 
involved in the cultivation of an ethical community. Its inverse, ingratitude (and its corollaries, 
conceit, arrogance etc.), against which Luqmān warns his son in the Qur’an, can lead to grievous 
sins including even disbelief.  
Luqmān nonetheless remains an elusive figure, as the Qur’an itself tells nothing of his 
origin. There are numerous other instantiations and layers to the personage, his function and his 
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wisdom, which confirm the general contours of the Qur’anic outline of devotion, steadfastness, 
modesty and justice. Already in pre-Islamic times, the famous poets of Arabia (such as Imru ’l-
Qāys, al-Nabīgha, al-Aʾsha and Tarafa) mention a certain Luqmān’s sagacity and longevity. 
Following the consecration of the figure as the emblem of wisdom and provider of counsel, 
Luqmān appears in more or less all the classical sources: in Qur’anic commentaries and universal 
histories of course, but also in mystical and medical treatises, and in various ḥadīth where the 
Prophet invokes the wisdom of Luqmān.
116
 Perhaps the most extended treatment of Luqmān is 
found in Ibn Kathīr’s monumental work, both in his commentary on the Qur’an (Tafsīr al-
Qurʾān al-‘aẓīm), and his universal history, al-Bidāyah wa’l-nihāyah. Another important source 
is the sīrah of Ibn Hishām, which mentions a book of maxims known as majallat Luqmān, the 
collection of which is attributed to the first century (A.H.) scholar Wahb b. Munābbih, who is 
reported to have read “ten thousand bābs on Luqmān’s ḥikmah.”
117
 Luqmān further made his 
way into Coptic Christian homilies beginning in the fourteenth century, where he is named and 
quoted at various lengths.
118
 In later tradition (beginning seemingly in the Mamluk period), he 
would also appear as the teller of fables, akin to a number of other figures of the region’s lore, 
old and new, such as, most importantly, Aesop, but also Talmudic tales and the stories associated 
with Aḥiqār. Additionally he features as a purveyor of medical advice in some texts, and as a 
judge of the Jews, and even as the counselor of David in others; Al-Mas‘ūdī sees in him the 
brilliant architect of the famous Maʾrib dam; al-Zawzānī refers to him as the teacher of 
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Empedocles; Ibn Khaldūn makes him the forefather of none other than Socrates; al-Rūmī evokes 
him as a pious black slave in a number of anecdotes in his Mathnawī; al-Ṭabarī attributes to him 
the authorship of a manuscript, to which the Prophet himself is said to have marveled but stated 
nonetheless that the book he had was superior; even while he was and remains a prominent 
protagonist in popular literatures from the region today and throughout the ages. 
 
In short, Luqmān al-Ḥakīm is the prototypical figure of proverbial wisdom, whose life is 
offered as model of the ethical self. As the highest station of knowledge, preceded only by 
revelation, ḥikmah (both semantically and symbolically) represents ontological and 
epistemological frames that point invariably to agency in speech, thought and belief. The many 
lives of Luqmān, as archetypal figure and narratological device, are thus bound together by the 
many meanings of ḥikmah, molding a particular ethical-scape that holds knowledge, and the 
cosmos and its multitudes in plural unison. And this is precisely the cognitive panorama that al-
Jabartī rather consciously evokes in his invocation of the Abyssinian sage in relation to himself 







Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī and the Everyday Life of the Occult 
 
 
And Jibrīl had handed him a paper and said: “Anta nabīyun mursal fanzil  
wa balligh al-risālah wa aẓhir al-muʿjazāt [You are a prophet  
sent forth. Go down, convey the message,  





True to his prophetic inclinations, the transient Takrūrī from the previous chapter will 
reappear at a later stage in this chapter too, and also in relation to orders and disciplines of 
knowledge, though this time not those of racial identities (or lack thereof) and the writing of 
history, but rather the orders of knowledge more largely, and formations of orthodoxy, past and 
present, at al-Azhar.  
Through a focused engagement on the life and work of the eighteenth-century Katsinan 
scholar, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī, this chapter will concern itself with the 
shifting place of the occult sciences in the Islamic tradition and the subjectivities it engenders, 
both as doctrine and lived scholarly practice.
2
 Foregrounding questions of classification in the 
modern episteme, it provides a broad genealogical assessment of the concepts of ‘science,’ 
‘religion,’ and ‘magic,’ and their applications to the literature on Islam in Africa more largely, as 
well as al-Azhar more specifically. In parallel, it opens a possible vista onto eighteenth-century 
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 It should be noted at the onset that while the terms “occult sciences” [al-ʿulūm al-sirīyya] and “esoteric sciences” 
[al-ʿulūm al-bāṭinīyah] are differentiated in important ways in Islamic epistemologies and classifications, they are 
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experiential/spiritual and preternatural modes of cognition and apprehension. These extend beyond the realm of the 
manifest natural world [al-zāhir] and, more significantly for us here, they are expressly separated in the schematics 





orders of knowledge, wherein the esoteric fields were respectably incorporated alongside other, 
more ‘traditional’ and ‘scientific’ topics, and studied inside and outside the walls of the 
institution and by leading members of the establishment (including most notably the eighteenth-
century rector of al-Azhar, connoisseur of scientific disciplines and ‘sheikh of sheikhs,’ Aḥmad 
al-Damanhūrī), and even to this day.
3
 
The chapter thus connects the institutionalization of normative and cognitive 
conventions pertaining to the preternatural in the historic and contemporary al-Azhar to broader 
transformations in the epistemological foundations of facticity and science beginning in Europe 
in the late eighteenth century. However, more than simply explicating the so-called ‘impact of 
modernity on Islamic sciences,’ the quest is to unveil (through close reading buttressed by 
extended historiographical analysis, and ethnographic forays into the everyday life of the occult 
– albeit in an experimental and retrospective fashion) an amodern epistemic universe. That is, a 
socially and morally embedded regime of knowledge production in the Islamic discursive 
tradition, which seamlessly integrated the “mundanely mystical,” the “rationally philosophical,” 
and the downright “pantheistic,” all within an ethically determined cosmological worldview that 







Sometime before 1730, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghallānī al-Kashnāwī al-Ashʿarī 
al-Mālikī,
5
 left his native Katsina (in today’s Northern Nigeria) and heeding God’s call set off to 
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the Holy cities of the Hijaz to complete the pilgrimage and seek knowledge pleasing to Him, the 
most Knowing and Wise.  
When the Deliverer of Destiny and Sempiternal Will delivered me, and the 
Usher of Divine Mercy ushered me to visit His good Prophet, upon him be the best 
of prayers and most devoted salutations, and to perform the pilgrimage of His holy 
sanctified House, I stayed there for some time and grew through these prayers... 
[and] spent of my duty to thank Him, the Gracious for variegating an areborerum 
for me, a small utterance [shaʿrat lisānan] indeed for that greatest of graces [niʿam] 





Thanks were indeed owed, for the journey across the African continent to the Hijaz was a 
long and arduous one, physically and financially taxing and replete with perils of all kinds: from 
natural disasters, disease and pestilence to acts of larceny and highway robbery.
7
 Indeed so 
severe was the situation that West African scholars beginning in the seventeenth century would 
reinterpret the force of the obligation of the ḥajj, taking advantage of the wide construal margin 
left open by the Qur’anic verse that stipulated its performance: “It is a duty of all men towards 
God to come to the House a pilgrim if he is able to make his way there…” [wa lillāhi ʿala al-
nāsi ḥijju al-bāyti māmin istaṭāʿa ilāyhi sabīlan {Qur’an 3:97}].  
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Though a stringent interpretation of the requirement to perform the pilgrimage had been 
central to the Mālikī tradition, scholars began to demote its religious importance, invoking 
amongst others authorities that of Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, who in his Mukhtaṣar (the leading manual of 
Mālikī fiqh in West Africa) removed the obligation in situations of extreme or life threatening 
hardship.
8
 The seventeenth-century Shinqīṭī scholar, Muḥammad b. al-Mukhtār, known as Ibn al-
Aʿmash, for example, held that the Qur’anic requirement of istiṭāʿah was unsatisfied if there 
were a discernible risk to life and property, or hardships such that would inhibit the performance 
of other duties such as prayer. Given the prevailing regional tribulations, he concluded that 
pilgrimage was “no longer incumbent upon the people of the West,” adding that: 
God, in his Mercy, did not restrict the attainment of paradise to a single deed 
[i.e. pilgrimage]. A Muslim could achieve the same by obeying God’s orders in 
other respects; in the other duties which Muslims are capable of performing with 
no similar hardship. By so doing the Muslim performs a pilgrimage in kind or in 




Ostensibly then, al-Kashnāwī, would have had the option to forgo the pilgrimage 
altogether, but chose instead to shoulder the physical and financial burden, and sometime in the 
later months of 1729 (perhaps), he bid his family and friends farewell for the last time and 
embarked on a journey from which he would not return.   
At this time three major pilgrimage caravan routes were in operation from West Africa. 
The “western Saharan route,” which began in the vicinity of Timbuktu and commenced through 
the towns of Walāta > Tuāt > Ghademis > Ghāt/Murzūk in Fezzan, through the Aujīla highway 
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to Cairo via Sīwa and Western desert, was a well established one following major historic trade 
routes. West African pilgrims would congregate in Cairo, a major resting hub for the various 
routes, from where they would join the Egyptian caravan to the Hijaz.
10
 It was this route 
incidentally, that the famous royal Malian pilgrimage of Mansa Mūsa (a model for subsequent 
West African pilgrimages) took in the fourteenth century.
11
 The second was the overland route to 
the Nile along the Sudanic belt, which became increasingly popular in the nineteenth century, 
overlapping with the famous darb al-arbaʿīn.
12
 And finally, there was the central and eastern 
Sudan route, which at various points linked Lake Chad through Bilma, the Wadaian capital Wara 
as well as the cities of northern Hausaland (Katsina at first, and later Kano) through Aīr, to the 
Fezzan and Aujila onto Egypt.
13
  
It is possible that this is also the route that al-Kashnāwī had taken to Cairo. According to 
al-Jabartī, who is quoting a now lost Riḥla in which al-Kashnāwī documented his journey: 
“Having asked his shāykh’s permission to travel and go on pilgrimage,” al-Kashnāwī “passed 
through several countries and met with their rulers and learned men. Among the men he met in 
Kāgh Birn was Shaykh Muḥammad Karʿak [Krʿk], from whom he learned many things about 
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esoteric disciplines and geomancy.”
14
  If Brockelmann and others are indeed correct in that 
‘Kāgh Birn’ here refers to “Kāgḫu of Bornu,” then it is more probable that al-Kashnāwī would 
have initially set out on the shorter route from Katsina directly to Agadez, Murzūk and Aujila, 
thus entering Cairo through the western desert in time for the departure of the Egyptian caravan 
sometime in Rajab or Shawwal.
15
   
On this first part of his journey, we can only speculate; however, for its second limb (i.e. 
Cairo to the Hijaz), we fortunately have al-Kashnāwī’s own testimony to go by:  
 
I first entered Mecca al-Musharrafah upon my arrival from Medina, whence 
my visit preceded my pilgrimage. And this is because I came by way of Egypt 
[miṣr] and from there I continued to Suez, a port for Egyptian vessels [marṣa li’l-
marākib al-miṣrīyah] and boarded a boat to Yanbuʿ another port through which 




   
The journey across the sea was particularly grueling for pilgrims who would have already 
endured endless days of thirst, hunger and insecurity just to reach the Red Sea port. There they 
could expect to embark upon the most difficult part of their journey yet. Ibn Jubāyr, who 
performed the pilgrimage in 1183/579, famously described the passage as a major hindrance due 
“the problems of the sea and the traders in death [mashākil al-baḥr wa tujjār al-mawt],” who 
exacted “all manner of tyranny [aḥkamū al-ṭūāghīt]” upon the pilgrims, charging them exorbitant 
fees while, 
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 The pilgrimage season in Egypt began in the month of Rajab, with the departure of a smaller caravan of pilgrims 
intending to reach Mecca before Ramaḍān in order to perform the ʿumrah (holy visit also known as the ‘lesser ḥajj) 
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bearing the maḥmal and the kiswa. See further Bakr, Al-Malāmiḥ al-jughrāfīyah). 
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[p]acking them in boats [julāb] in such a way so that they would sit one above 
the other as though they were crowded chicken coops [kaʾanaha aqfāṣ al-dijāj al-
mamlūʾah] caring little what the sea does to them, and they say “our concern is 
with the planks, and that of the pilgrims is with lives”[ʿalāyna bi’l-alwāḥ wa ʿala 
al-ḥujāji bi’l-arwāḥ’]. (…) Those who survive the turbulations of the sea, reach 
the desert ports [ila marāsa bi ṣaḥrāʾ] (…) as though they were spread upon a 




In any case, al-Kashnāwī made it across the sea and onto Medina. More than a stop along 
the way, the visit to the Prophet’s city was highly recommended by ḥadīths. For Mālikīs, such as 
al-Kashnāwī, it would have constituted a normative pillar of the ḥajj owing to Imām Mālik b. 
Anas’ association with the town. Al-Kashnāwī thus expresses his sense of relief and joy at 
having reached the virtuous abode:  
I reached al-Medina, may God increase her light and perfect the conditions of 
her inhabitants. And this was on Tuesday, the twelfth night of Jumāda I of the 
months of the year one thousand one hundred and forty-one of the Prophet‘s hijra 
[1141 A.H.], may the best of prayers and devoted salutations be upon him and his 
companions. And so my visit [to Medina] preceded my pilgrimage and I 
sojourned there [jāwartu fīha] - blessed and having a good time for a little less 
than three months. From there, I headed in the visitors caravan [qāfilat al-
zuwwār] of [great] fame in those Meccan lands [al-aqṭār al-hijāzīyah], the 





We know little of how al-Kashnāwī spent his time in Medina, but owing to the work of 
John Voll, Khaled el-Rouayheb, Peter Gran, Ahmad Dallal and others we have a good sense of a 
vivacious intellectual world of scholarship (primarily centered on ḥadīth studies) that animated 
the Medinan (and by extension, Meccan) milieux.
19
 This world connected seekers of knowledge 
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from across the Muslim world, from Morrocco and West Africa to the Indian continent and 
beyond, and combined diverse madhhabs and inclinations of all sorts.  
In his analysis of the closely-knit intellectual community that coalesced around the 
eighteenth-century Medinan scholars ʿAbdallāh ibn Salīm al-Baṣrī, and his equally famous 
student, Muḥammad Ḥayyā al-Sindī, John Voll for instance identifies important connections 
between the domains of ḥadīth and that of ṭaṣawwuf predicated upon the study of chains of 
authorization of transmission - isnāds or silsilahs in the Sufi context. The overlapping of ḥadīth 
studies and Sufism was further enhanced by what he describes as “a more philological, textualist 
approach” of interpretation that “could focus on the isnad part of the text directly” (as with the 
case for Murṭaḍa al-Zabīdī for example) or alternatively, it could “lead to a direct analysis of the 
matn or content of the hadith” (as with Shāh Walī Allāh’s method). 
20
 In either case, such studies 
facilitated renewed approaches that often included esoterically inspired interpretations of the 
traditions that were reinforced by the lived practice of the scholars themselves through their 
various personal connections and participation in Sufi ṭarīqas and the like.  
The broad network of scholars in the Ḥaramāyn, extended to Damascus and Cairo, and 
according to al-Jabartī included his own father Ḥasan al-Jabartī who would later become al-
Kashnāwī’s student and intimate friend. Within this eighteenth-century world, the boundaries of 
anything that we might strictly call orthodoxy appear to have been nebulous at best, if not 
altogether absent. The spectrum of scholars included at one extreme a figure such as the young 
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Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (who would later go on to found the ideologically conservative 
movement that promoted a strict literal adherence to the Qur’an and sunna and shunned all 
esoteric forms of knowledge and practice, which we now know as Wahhabism); and at the other 
end, a “miracle-working Ṣūfī recluse, and one said to be ‘beloved of the people of the 
ṭarīqas’;”
21
 with someone like Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Sammān, (who advocated a 
balanced method of spiritual illumination and textual adherence that came to be known as al-
ṭarīqa al-muḥammadīyah),
22
 somewhere in the middle perhaps. 
These circles, moreover, were shaped in many instances by a strong revivalist spirit. As 
Voll notes:  
By the late seventeenth century, people inspired by a vision of renewal for the 
Islamic world tended to articulate their vision in discourses shaped by Sufi 
thought and their critique of existing conditions and practices was often expressed 
in terms that were informed by an emerging textualist mode of hadith studies. In 
this way the network of scholars who combined Sufi affiliation with hadith 
studies in a distinctive mode became the heart of the sentiments and movements 




Leaving aside for the moment Voll’s over-emphasis of the trope of renewal in this period 
(to which it is by no means limited), what is important to note here is that the conjunction of the 
supposedly orthodox fields of study (ḥadīth) with others deemed comparatively more 
contentious (variants of ṭaṣawwuf) would not have been particularly alien to al-Kashnāwī, whose 
own work seamlessly blended esoteric and exoteric disciplines. And while it is difficult to 
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ascertain whether or not he participated directly, as student or teacher, in these Hijazian circles, 
we can assume that he was at least familiar with many of the figures involved, including of 
course Ḥasan al-Jabartī, but also others. Moreover the social and scholarly context of late 
seventeenth- early eighteenth-century West Africa within which al-Kashnāwī was formed was 
one where the discourse of tajdīd or renewal was an equally prominent one.
24
 
Our information on al-Kashnāwī’s early years is hazy, and very little can be glimpsed of 
his formative years from the biographical dictionaries. This is perhaps not surprising since the 
generic form of the entries in these texts focuses primarily on the character’s place in 
scholarship, rendered often retrospectively. Accordingly, we do have a fairly vivid picture of al-
Kashnāwī’s contributions and the scholarly networks and chains of transmission and learning of 
which he later partook, and from which some inferences may be drawn.  
 
It is generally accepted that al-Kashnāwī was born in Katsina; the precise date of his birth 
however, is not known. It has been suggested that the nisba of Danrankāwī (given by al-Jabartī, 
al-Baghdādī and al-Kattāni but omitted by Al-Ziriklī, Kaḥḥāla, Makhlūf and Brockelmann) most 
likely points to Dan Ranko, a Katsinan town noted for its scholarship, as his birthplace.
25
 A 
province of Hausaland, the boundaries of Katsina were in constant flux from the mid-sixteenth 
century as competing powers vied for political control of the province and its wealth.  For over a 
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century Katsina’s fortunes “waxed and waned within the shadow of stronger powers (Mali, 
Songhay, Bornu, Sokoto).” However by the late seventeenth century the city state had arrived at 
an acme of authority that was at once political (as an important seat of Muslim power); economic 
(as a key “entrepôt of Hausaland” specializing in the production of tobacco and leather); and 
scholarly (as one of the most important centers of Islamic learning in the Sūdān attracting 
students and visitors from all over the continent and beyond).
26
 It is in this world that al-
Kashnāwī had been nurtured. 
Al-Kashnāwī’s studies would have probably began at an early age with Qur’anic 
recitation and basic literacy, advancing after a few years to the level of exegesis that would have 
been centered around the style and emphasis of Tafsīr al-Jalālāyn (of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī and 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ṣuyūṭī), a text that was increasingly popular after its introduction to the region in 
the sixteenth century. Once he mastered the foundations of Qur’anic studies, al-Kashnāwī would 
have then moved onto the study the sīrah of the prophet Muhammad and ḥadīth, perhaps 
progressing from Kitāb al-Shifa of Qaḍī Iyād, the Ṣiḥaḥ al-sittah (with special focus on 
collections of Bukhārī and Muslim) on to the Muwaṭṭa of Imām Mālik through which he would 
also have begun to acquire an understanding of the branches of fiqh and its jurisprudential 
modalities in the form of ʾusūl. Having already from childhood been familiarized with the fiqh 
through basic acts of worship and their ritualized meanings, he would gradually move, first 
through the the Risālah of Ibn Zāyd al-Qāyrawānī, to more complex legal matters as expounded 
in amongst other works Saḥnūn’s al-Mudāwwanah al-kubrah and Khalīl b. Isḥāq’s Mukhṭaṣar 
and their various commentaries. In parallel, al-Kashnāwī would have also been exposed quite 
                                                 
26
 See Willis, J.R.. "Katsina," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, (eds.) By P. Bearman, Th. Bianguis, C. E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2013.  Columbia University. Last accessed April 2013; and 
Yusuf Bala Usman, The Transformation Of Katsina (1400—1883): The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta 




early on to the various sciences of Arabic language in the form of naḥw [grammar], ʿarūd 
[prosody], balāghah [eloquence], along with logic [manṭiq] – all of which would have further 
facilitated his studies of ʾusūl al-fiqh.
 27
  
Additionally, he would also have been introduced, if in a less systematic fashion that 
depended on the individual interests of his teachers, to other subjects, including of course the 
esoteric sciences in which he would come to develop a profound interest, but also many other 
disciplines (theological, literary, and scientific), as well as ṭaṣawwuf. Indeed while no direct 
linkage can be established with any specific order, it is very probable that al-Kashnāwī would 
have known, and perhaps followed, the general tenets of the Qādirī tarīqah that was prominent in 
his home town and elsewhere during this period.
28
  
Al-Jabartī, whose biographical entry is the most extensive, names in total five scholars as 
teachers of al-Kashnāwī, stating: “He studied in his homeland with the shāykh and imām 
Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn Muḥammad al-Nawālī al-Birnāwī al-Baghiramāwī, the master and 
shāykh Muḥammad al-Bindū, the perfect Shāykh Hāshim, and Shāykh Muḥammad Fūdū, which 
means “the great” [al-kabīr].” When recounting his travels, he further counts Shāykh 
Muḥammad Krʿk (already been mentioned above) with whom al-Kashnāwī spent five months 
studying “many aspects of the secret sciences and geomancy [ashyaʾ kathīrah min ʿulūm al-
asrār wa’l-raml].” Together, they read Maḥmūd al-Kurdī’s Kitāb al-wālīyah, “a great and highly 
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respected book on geomancy [wa hūwa kitāb jalīl muʿtabar fī ʿilm al-raml]’ as well as “al-
Rajrājī and some books on arithmetic [al-kutubi min al-ḥisāb].”
29
  
Muḥammad al-Fūdū, al-Kashnāwī tells us in his own words, was “the first from whom I 
attained understanding. I studied most of the books of literature with him and accompanied him, 
both in residence and in travel, for about four years.” With him, he also studied “syntax and 
grammar [al-ṣarf wa’l-naḥw],” becoming (according to al-Jabartī, now) so  
[p]roficient [hatta adqana dhālik] in these subjects that his shāykh use to call 
him ‘Sibawayh,’ [and] [e]ven before that, had named him “connoisseur of 
prosimetric verse” [ṣāḥib al-maqāmāt],” since he had memorized them and was 
able to recite them word for word, so that when a word was mentioned, he could 




Hiskett and Bivar read “al-kabīr” as “the Elder” and have suggested that “there is little 
doubt that this person is the father of Usuman dan Fodio,” which if correct would tie al-
Kashnāwī to this “celebrated reformer” and his family.
31
 
About Shāykh Hāshim we know next to nothing. His name appears briefly in Sultan 
Muḥammad Bello’s (Usman dan Fodio’s son and successor) biographical history, Infāq al-
maysūr fi tārīkh bilād al-Takrūr, as a scholar greatly esteemed by al-Ṭahir b. Ibrāhīm al-Fallātī 
al-Barnāwī, a competent man of letters who composed an important versified treatise on the 
diagnosis and treatment of hemorrhoids in addition to a poem in praise of said Hāshim and the 
prominent scholar Ibn Tākuma.
32
 Al-Ṭāhir it should be added had predicted the appearance of a 
mujaddid (for Bello, his own father) and was thus associated with the revivalist school in Bornu 
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 Bivar and Hiskett, “The Arabic Literature of Nigeria,” n.5, 136. (Makhlūf has him as al-Shāykh Muḥammad Jūdū, 
see entry no. 1330 in Shajarat al-nūr , 337) 
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which advocated tajdīd through the combination of scholasticism and a qualified and cautious 
application of the principle of al-amr bi’l-maʿrūf. Amongst this school’s enthusiasts is included 
al-Imām Muḥammad b. al-Hājj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Barnāwī (known as Ājirāmī), author of the 
famous Shurb al-Zulāl, a popular didactic poem at once an instructive exposition of the legal 
categories of al-ḥalāl wa’l-ḥarām and a subtle political critique of the powerful elements of 
society, namely the ruler and his court. Both al-Ṭāhir and Ājirāmī’s poem would come to play a 




Al-Kashnāwī’s tutelage at the hands of Shāykh Hāshim then, not only links him to an 
important revivalist current in West African scholarship, here through the school of Bornu, but 
also to its foundational scholars. As recounted by Louis Brenner, oral traditions speak of a 
certain Buba Njibima (also known as al-Shāykh al-Bakrī) as an original surrogate for the spread 
of Islamic learning in the region: “All knowledge began in Borno from Shehu Buba Njibima, and 
twelve of his students are called the “Stars of Birni.”
34
 Counted amongst these twelve luminaries 
are al-Ṭāhir and Ājirāmī, but also more directly al-Kashnāwī’s immediate teacher, Muḥammad 
al-Wālī ibn Sulaymān ibn Abī Muḥammad al-Fallātī al-Kabawī al-Baghiramāwī al-Barnāwī 
(who is listed also by al-Jabartī).
35
 “A Trodbe Fulani whose father had emigrated from Kebbi to 
Bornu and thence to Baghirmi,” al-Wālī was a well-established authority who appears to have 
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also spent some time in Katsina. Such movements were typical of the peripatetic character of 
West African scholarship;
36
 it is thus unclear whether al-Kashnāwī had studied with al-Wālī in 
Bornu or in Katsina. Al-Jabartī simply states that al-Kashnāwī “attained knowledge in his 
homeland at the hands of the master and shāykh Muḥammad ibn Sulāymān...” [talaqqa al-ʿulūm 
wa’l-maʿārif bibilāduhu ʿan al-shāykh al-imām Muḥammad bin Sulāymān…].
37
 Neither does he 
mention what exactly al-Kashnāwī studied with al-Wālī. Once again this might be inferred from 
al-Wālī’s writings. 
Al-Wālī’s primary interests appear to have been in the field of theology [kalām] with 
particular emphasis on the doctrine of tawḥīd. He authored six works on these topics, amongst 
them two commentaries on al-ʿAqīḍa al-sughra of al-Sanūsī: al-Manhaj al-farīd fī maʿrifat ilm 
al-tawḥid and, in verse composition, Manzūmat al-ḥafīdah. He additionally wrote on related 
themes of doctrinal theology such as the attributes of God, the doctrine of the createdness of the 
world, principles of ʾusūl al-dīn, and a versified rendition of existing critiques against al-Ashʿarī 
(most probably by way of refutation since he had himself had assumed the affiliative nisba to 
that school, as did al-Kashnāwī after him).  
Al-Wālī also seems to have involved himself with the study, and more pertinently the 
teaching, of the sciences of language, especially grammar on which he composed two instructive 
texts: Muʿīn al-ṭālib wa mufīd al-rāghib and Tadrīb al-ṭullab ʿalā ṣināʿat al-iʿrāb. His other 
works included two treatises of advice to Muslim rulers, legal expositions on the illegality of 
smoking tobacco, and finally to him is attributed a qaṣidah of eleven verses attacking astrologers 
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and practitioners of the secret sciences entitled Rāʾīyah fī dhamm al-Munajjimīm, to which we 
will return in some detail below. 
By contrast to al-Wālī, biographical information on Muḥammad al-Bindū (the last of al-
Kashnāwī’s five named teachers) is sparse. He is not mentioned in the entry by Bello, and no 
details are given in the derivative compilations neither of Bivar and Hiskett, or Hunwick and 
O’Fahey, nor for that matter in the later Arabic biographical dictionaries (even though they 
follow al-Jabartī’s entry). For this we must turn once again to Brenner who notes that oral 
sources do recall a certain “Booro Binndi, which in Fulfulde literally means ‘sack of writings’, 
[or] ‘sack of knowledge’,” who “pursued at least some of his education outside of Bornu and 
then returned to become an important scholar in Birni Gazargamu “during the time of Mai ʿAlī 
Fannami.”
38
 Similarly, Sir Richmond Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs of 1928 state that the Kano 
Chronicle mentions a certain scholar of Bornu called “Shehu Bundu” active at the time of the 
Sarkin Kumbari [c. 1731-1743], who along with Shehu Tahiru (Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭāhir 
mentioned above) prevented war at the hands of Mai ʿAlī. Despite the discrepancy in the dates 
pertaining to Mai ʿAlī’s reign and that of Kumbari, which he notes, Brenner concludes that it is 
nonetheless plausible that Muḥammad Bindū and al-Ṭāhir were contemporaries. Beyond these 
rather equivocal references, we know nothing of al-Bindū formation, writings or scholarly 
networks. The extent of our knowledge of this figure is derived almost entirely from al-Jabartī 
necrology of al-Kashnāwī, based, it would seem, on al-Kashnāwī’s compendium of authorities - 
now lost, but cited by al-Jabartī. The picture that emerges is one of a polymathic scholar who 
appears to have been significant influence in al-Kashnāwī’s scholarly career, or at any rate his 
engagement with the occult: 
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With Shāykh Muḥammad al-Bindū [al-Kashnāwī] studied the art of magic 
squares, arithmetic, and chronology in the style of the Maghribī path (of Sufism), 
mastering esoteric disciplines of all kinds, literal and numerological, as well as 
mathematical and calendrical devices. He benefitted greatly from him. As [al-
Kashnāwī] said, “I read with him uṣūl, and topics of rhetoric, eloquence, and 
logic, the Alfīya of al-‘Irāqī, and al-Sanūsī’s six (works) on (theological) doctrine 
in their entirety.” He studied [with al-Bindū] the text of al-Bukhārī; three quarters 
of the Mukhtaṣar of Shāykh Khalīl, from the beginning of the chapter on sales to 
the end of the chapter on contracts for delivery with prepayment, and from the 
beginning of the chapter on rent to the end of the book; about a third of Kitāb 
mulakhkhaṣ al-maqāṣid, which is a book on kalām by Ibn Zikrī, a contemporary 
of Shāykh al-Sanūsī, in 1,500 verses of poetry, together with most of the books he 
composed; and other works. As he said, “I learned from him much that was 
wonderful and useful – amazing stories, reports, anecdotes, and knowledge of the 
transmitters (of ḥadīth), their classes, and their ranks.” He mentioned this in the 




This broad base of scholarship is reflected in the variant writings of al-Kashnāwī, most of 
which seem to have been penned during his travels. To date eight works in total have been 
identified mostly through al-Jabartī’s necrology, although, he also seems to suggest that there 
may have been many more, if we are to go by al-Kashnāwī’s own words. Al-Jabartī thus writes: 
[Al-Kashnāwī] possessed great energy and a genuine desire to acquire the 
knowledge on which the understanding of books depends. He used to say about 
himself, “One of the ways in which God bestowed favor upon me was that I never 
read anything in a loaned book. The least I did when I wanted to read a book 
which I did not own was to copy its text, leaving space between the lines to write 
whatever comment I wanted, or for the remarks of my shāykh when he was 





In his biographical dictionary of Mālikī scholars, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiiyya fī ṭabaqāt 
al-Mālikīyah, Makhlūf alludes to something similar when describing al-Kashnāwī as having “had 
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a long hand [kānat lahu yadin tūlā] in most sciences and complete knowledge of the subtleties 




Two of the eight cited works, the travelogue and compendium of authorities, are as stated 
now lost. A further manuscript entitled Al-Taḥrīrāt al-rā’iqah (concerning the Prophet’s state 
and his deeds after death) does not appear in al-Jabartī’s listing (nor other Arabic dictionaries, 
including al-Baghdādī’s bibliographical collection),
42
 but is reported by Brockelmann who gives 
as its date of composition Rabī‘ I 1156/ May 1743, two years after al-Kashnāwī’s death.
43
 If this 
is indeed so, then clearly the attribution to al-Kashāwī cannot be correct.
44
  
The remaining works are as follows:
 
Bulūgh al-arab min kalām al-ʿarab, a work on 
Arabic grammar dated 1149/1736-7; Bughyat al-mawālī fī tarjamat Muḥammad al-Wālī, the 
biography of Muḥmmad al-Wālī mentioned above; Manḥ al-quddūs , a didactic poem on logic 
drawn from the Mukhtaṣar of al-Sanūsī, on which al-Kashnāwī then wrote an extensive 
commentary entitled, Izālat al-‘ubū ‘an wajh minaḥ al-quddūs; and three major treatises on the 
esoteric sciences: Durar al-yawāqīt fī ‘ilm al-ḥurūf wa’l asmā’, a commentary on Kitāb al-durr 
wa’l-tiryāq fī ‘ilm al-awfāq  of  ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jurjanī on the science of letters and the great 
names of God which he completed 7 Rabī‘ II 1147/ 6 Sep 1734; the aforementioned Bahjat al-
āfāq wa īdāḥ al-lubs wa’l-ighlāq fī ‘ilm al-hurūf wa’l-awfāq – also called Mughnī al-mawāfī ‘an 
jamī‘ al-khawāfī a numerological work on magic square completed Sha‘ban 1145/ 29 Jan 1733.
45
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And finally, Al-Durr al-manẓūm wa khulāṣat al-sirr al-maktūm fī ‘ilm al-ṭalāsim wa’l-nujūm,
46
 
an abridged commentary dealing with three domains of the “secret sciences” [al-ʿulūm al-
sirrīyya], which he began in Mecca and completed in Cairo on 12 Rajab 1146/ 20 Dec 1733, and 




For reasons that are unstated, although one can assume it was for the purposes of 
continuing his quest for knowledge, al-Kashnāwī decided to move to Cairo sometime before 
1146/1733-4, in which year he completed revisions of this text. He secured lodgings in the 
immediate vicinity of al-Azhar, and set about writing, and was indeed at his most prolific, for in 
the short space of less than four years he finalized al-Durr al-manẓūm and completed all of 
Bahjat al-āfāq, Bulūgh al-arab and Durar al-yawāqīt, in that order. Perhaps al-Kashnāwī’s 
inspiration was ignited by his readings in Mecca or his propinquity to the world of al-Azhar, and 
its many resources which brought him into direct contact with Cairo’s elite ʿulama, including al-
Jabartī’s and father with whom he would forge a lasting bond. Indeed, it was from al-Kashnāwī, 




Al-Kashnāwī never returned to Katsina but, for reasons that remain unknown, he died 
some time in the year 1154 A.H. in Ḥasan al-Jabartī’s home. He bequeathed his manuscripts to 
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his friend, who oversaw the management of his estate and presided over his funeral. He was 





Manuscripts, Mosque and Market: Anthropological Meanderings  
 
In the Spring of 2009, and having secured the necessary authorizations to begin my 
doctoral research at the al-Azhar Library in Cairo, I set out in search of the textual remnants of 
al-Kashnāwī’s polyvalent career. I spent a few initial days, as one would, familiarizing myself 
with the workings of the library and contents. In this task I was greatly aided by the eight volume 
(the last two being appendices) manuscript catalogue which true to its stated aims did indeed “lift 
the veil” from the library and “reveal her beauties, the brides of knowledge [takshif ʿan 
maḥāsinaha al-niqābi wa tudnī quṭūf al-ʿulūmi li’l-rāghibīn, li yajlu ma fihā min ʿarāʾisi],” that 
I and countless researchers before and after me sought.  
 The organization of the first five volumes, at the time, seemed commonsensical enough: 
Volume I was devoted to Qur’an and ḥadīth studies; Volume II to the four Sunni schools and 
general jurisprudence; Volume III to legal expositions [furūʿ], theology [ʿilm al-kalām], logic 
[al-mantiq], philosophy [al-falsafah], Sufism [ʿilm al-tasawwuf] and the science of virtues [al-
ādāb wal faḍāʾil]; Volume IV to language in its multiple branches [ʿilm al-lughah; ʿilm al-waḍʿ; 
ʿilm al-ṣarf; ʿilm al-naḥw; ʿilm al-balāghah; ʿilm al-ʿarūḍ wal qāfiyah]; Volume V to literature, 
history and geography [ʿilm al-ādab; ʿilm al-tārīkh,ʿilm taqwīm al-buldan]. The last volume 
however contained a medley of disciplines which gave one the sense of miscellanea, embracing 
as it did everything from: contemporary subjects such as sociology and politics (combined with 
                                                 
49
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practical ethics ʿilm al-akhlāq wa’l-tarbiyah wa’l-ijtimāʿ wa’l-siyāsah), political economy [al-
iqtiṣāḍ al-siyāsī], engineering [ʿilm al-handasah], general studies [al-maʿārif al-ʿāmah], book-
keeping [mask al-daftar]; administration [ʿilm al-qawānīn wal-luwāʾḥ]; to mathematics, algebra 
and fractions [ʿilm al-hisāb, ʿilm al-jabr wa’l-muqabalah], medicine [ʿilm al-ṭibb], music and art 
[al-musīqā, al-ṣuwar wa’l-rusūm], the sciences of war [al-furūsīyah wa’l-funūn al-ḥarbīyah], 
calligraphy and composition [al-khaṭṭ wa’l-rasm wa’l-imlā’], trade and crafts [al-tijārah wa’l-
sināʿa], astronomy [ʿilm al-hayʾa], as well as various esoteric/occult-related fields of astrology, 
physiognomy, supplications and invocations, oneiromancy, letter and sand based magic (but also 
numerology), alchemy and natural philosophy [ʿilm al-falak; al-firāsa wal kaff; al-adʿīyah wal 
awrād; ʿilm taʿbīr al-ruʾyah, al-harf wa’- raml; al-kīmyāʾ wa’l-ṭabīʿah].
50
  
After a few more days, I completed a viewing request for al-Kashnāwī’s Bahjat al-āfāq 
and al-Durr al-manẓūm, both of which were listed under the category “harf wa raml” in the 
catalogue. I handed my order [ṭalab] to the clerk at the issuing desk and waited for my delivery 
to be called.  After an hour and sometime, I approached the desk and politely inquired as to how 
much longer it would take to receive my order. The young clerk apologized for the delay and 
told me he would look into the matter. Soon it was almost closing time, and I still had not heard 
anything about my order. Impatiently, I went back to the issue desk and this time demanded to 
know what was taking so long. The clerk disappeared into the back office and re-emerged with 
an older affable man who explained that he was the supervising librarian (whom we will call 
Ustāz Aḥmad), and proceeded to inspect my library card and passport (which I was required to 
have at all times). Slowly enunciating my full name, “Dahlia El-Tayeb Gubara,” he asked 
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“where are you from ya dicktora? [inti minayn ya diktora?]” Assuming that he was curious as to 
how I came to have a British passport, I retorted with some irritation, “Sudan.” He smiled as 
though he knew something I did not know, and gently told me to be patient, for it is a good 
virtue [“al-ṣabr ḥilu”] and that the problem will be resolved in the morning. I left, not without 
some discomfiture.  
The next day, Ustāz Aḥmad greeted me warmly in his office. After tea and the customary 
pleasantries were out of the way he began to explain that all manuscripts at the library classified 
as “ḥarf wa raml” were restricted to researchers because of their “dangerous nature.” He then 
laughed and added facetiously, “and for you especially they are prohibited [wa laykī intī bizāt, 
mamnūʿ].” I chose to ignore his last comment and asked instead what the danger entailed, at 
which point he began a long discussion explaining that the science of letters [ʿilm al-ḥuruf], its 
related numerological practices, such as the study of magic squares [al-awfāq], as well as the 
production of amulets and talismans [al-aḥjuba wa’l-ṭalāsim] and the predictive sciences of 
astrology and geomancy [khaṭṭ al-raml] are all generally classified “in Islam [fī’l-Islam]” as 
“finūn min ilm al-batin,” that is, “esoteric sciences,” which he explained as ones “relating to the 
hidden (as opposed to the manifest) world, that was of no concern to the servant [ʿabd] but were 
part of “ʿilm al-ghāyb,” knowledge known only to God, the High and Exalted.” When I pointed 
out that ʿilm al-bāṭin was a viable field of study for many Muslims (in Egypt and elsewhere), 
including leading scholars of a more Sufi bent, he responded, “But not all fingers on a hand are 
the same [ya binti, aṣābiʿ al-yad mush zayī baʿḍaha].” “For example,” he continued, beliefs and 
practices related to “prophetic visions or dream interpretation [taʿbīr al-ruʿyah], or certain 
notions of sainthood and miracles [al-awliyāʾ wa’l-muʿjazāt wa’l-barakat] are not strictly legally 




category of ‘discouraged’ practices but are generally tolerated. “What makes ḥarf wa raml 
different,” I asked. To which he responded, “Those who practice them think they can predict the 
future, God protect us [wa’l ʿiyāzu bilallāh]! And they practice magic [siḥr] and hurt other 
people.”  
  
Concerning the details of the ban itself, Ustāz Aḥmad stated that he only knew that “the 
directive [al-qarār] came directly from the mashyakhah [the office of the Rector]”, and that “it 
was a long time ago [min zamān].” However, if I liked, he could introduce me to the director of 
the library [mudīr al-maktabah] who could explain everything I wanted to know. Excited by this 
prospect, I left and for the next few days set about preparing for this meeting and searching the 
pages of the al-Azhar journal, (Majallat al-Azhar, which often included statements of important 
decrees),  as well as the Azhar-related sijils kept at Dār al-wathʿīq for any inkling of the ban. But 
I found no such “smoking gun”. 
Some days later, I arrived at the offices of said Mudīr and we began a general 
conversation concerning the history of the library and its collections, acquisitions and 
centralization in 1896. I noted that al-Azhar is forbidden from commercially acquiring 
manuscripts for its library, rather these come from waqfs, estates, and other donations from the 
community of scholars [āhl al-ʿilm], often earmarked for a particular riwāq but they can also be 
bequeathed more generally to the students of al-Azhar.  
I then went straight to the issue at hand: the ban on the occult manuscripts. Although he 
declined to comment on  matters of ḥalāl, ḥarām or makrūh in respect to the occult (maintaining 
that there are always divergent opinions in Islam, and that this testifies to the religion’s greatness 
and endurance through the centuries), the Mudīr repeatedly affirmed that the reason for the ban 




harmful to its members. It was thus a religious decision necessitated by al-Azhar’s obligation to 
“lead Muslims and serve Islam [li qiyādat al-Muslimīn wa khidmat al-dīn].”  
Realizing that this rather officialized explanation was the most I could hope to elicit from 
him, I moved to ask about the actual order of the ban itself, but the Mudīr did not seem to know 
much more than Ustāz Aḥmad in that regard: the order wasn’t officially decreed by any fatwa or 
authoritative judgment by the mashyakhah (at least he didn’t think so [maftakirshi]), rather it was 
an internal directive [taqrīr dākhilī] that I wouldn’t be allowed to access in any case. Moreover, 
he couldn’t give a precise date for the ban but explained that in his 30 years at the library it has 
been in place. 
In response to my inquiries into the processes and systems of classification used at the 
library, the Mudīr explained that: “We follow the classifications [taṣnīf al-ʿulūm wa’l-funūn] that 
have been established by the ʿulama of Islam, and these are well-known.” He then outlined the 
procedure as follows: “When a manuscript comes to al-Azhar, readers in the cataloguing division 
[qiṣm al-fahrasa] determine the classification by verifying the general subject matter of the 
manuscript and the field to which it belongs [taḥdīd al-mawdūʿ wa’l-fann], which is determined 
on the basis of the manuscripts overwhelming concern. This is important especially if it 
discusses different subjects, in which case they are listed and quantified [maʿdūdīn] so that a 
rough percentage [nisba] is made as a guide. We also look at how the author classifies his book 
[kayf kātib al-makhṭūṭaṭ zat nafsu biṣanif al-kitāb] and its title [al-ʿunwān]. It is then cataloged 
under the relevant fann or subject.” I pointed out that that there have been various classifications 
of knowledge in the tradition, none of which appear correspond to those outlined in the library’s 
catalogue and that surely the current process he described could raise some classificatory 




are understandable, such as for example confusing “ʿilm al-riyāḍah” with “ʿilm al-riyāḍiyyāt”,” 
and not because of any problem with the process itself or the guidelines it follows. (Incidentally, 
this same story was recounted to me later by Ustaz Ahmad, but this time the confusion was 
between “siḥr” and “shiʿr”).  
Before leaving I decided to have one last stab at the issue of the acceptability of occult: 
“You say that ban is due to al-Azhar’s obligation of promoting maṣlaḥah, insofar as the occult 
sciences can be used to inflict harm on others. However, in the eighteenth century, many 
respected scholars from al-Azhar, such as Maḥmūd al-Ḥifnī, Ḥasan al-Jabartī and even Shāykh 
al-Azhar himself, Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī, penned important works on these sciences and certainly 
didn’t view them as ḥarām or unacceptable. When and how did this change?” Without hesitation, 
the Mudīr replied, “But of course! These were after all times of religious and intellectual decline 
[ma ṭabʿan! Di kānat ʿūṣūr inḥiṭaṭ, fikrī wa dīnī].” And then perhaps reconsidering my reference 
to al-Damanhūrī and in an effort to distance the venerable office of Shāykh al-Azhar and its 
historical integrity and sanctity, from what he had just described as “degeneration,” he paused 
and slowly added: “There is a distinction between practicing it [the occult] and studying it 
precisely in order to know its harms and to warn people of them. I am certain that Shāykh al-
Damanhūrī, God have mercy on his him [yarḥamuhu Allāh], must have had, in fact he did have 
this [latter] motive in mind. [yuḥtamal inu’l-shāykh al-Damanhūri kan ʿindu al-fikra di, bal akīd 
innu di kanāt nīytu].”  
He then promptly changed the subject and asked for the reason for my interest in such 
“frivolous” matters. I gave the usual brief synopsis of what my dissertation research was about, 
after which he asked. “You are Sudanese, correct? This is through your mother and father? 




scholar whom he knew who wanted to view such works and who had informed him of the 
presence of a special school in Mecca [fī madrasa khaṣa fī’l-ḥaram] where the occult sciences 
are clandestinely taught [bi’l-sirr], but he didn’t have any further details on this.  
I gathered that the point of this story, beyond the conjunction of Sudaneseness and the 
occult to which I had by now become accustomed, was to emphasize that breaches, whether of 
cataloguing guidelines or indeed institutionally sanctioned Islamic practices (what we may 
loosely call orthodoxy) existed everywhere even in the Islamic heartland of Mecca itself. 
Accordingly, al-Azhar could only do its best to protect Muslims from such infringements.   
Importantly, the peril that was  perceived was not simply at the level of institutionalized 
orthodoxies being undercut by subversive superstition (as noted above the prohibition excluded 
practical manuals relating to prophetic visions or dream interpretation, or indeed hagiographical 
texts expounding miracle making), but crucially and as the Mudīr, repeated invoked, entailed this 
element of maṣlaḥa or public interest. This concept of course has its own genealogies and 
important antecedents in the field of fiqh (especially as relating to political rule – al-siyāsa al-
sharʿīyah), but was used by library officials simply to connote an official obligation on the part 
of al-Azhar to protect Muslims in large from targeted harm that could be inflicted by a few 
overzealous and malicious adepts of the unseen.  
As we will see, a similar notion of maṣlaḥah was at the heart of matters relating to the 
occult and the transgression of accepted doctrine prompting the intervention of Azhari scholars 
and authorities in the eighteenth century. However, unlike their pre-modern predecessors, who 
had little qualms as to the validity or practice of the occult and whose lives and studies were 
intricately interwoven into the very fabric of a society over which they exerted moral authority, 




had little to no control over the persistence of occult dealings that took place noticably just 
outside its walls. 
 
 
Darb al-Atrāk, as the main street linking a labyrinth of dense alleyways just behind al-
Azhar is still commonly known, was and remains a buzzing entrepôt of commercial and 
residential activity. In previous centuries it was the residential quarter for many of al-Azhar’s 
scholars – in fact it was there that al-Kashnāwī had settled upon his arrival from the Hijaz. It was 
also in Darb al-Atrāk that the main market for books and writing equipment, historically known 
as al-warāqa, was located.  
Sources from the period, such as al-Jabartī’s, provide fascinating sketches of scholars and 
students who supplemented their living by copying manuscripts which they then sold at the 
market, or to merchants who traded books from the different corners of the Muslim world in its 
alleyways. Later, at the turn of the twentieth century, the American protestant missionary, 
Samuel Zwemer, would describe the scene in his widely read travelogue, Across the World of 
Islam, as follows: 
In Cairo, tourists seldom wander to what we call “Pasternoster Row,” the 
booksellers quarters. Here, near the Azhar University, piled high, you may see 
huge parcels of Arabic books addressed to Kordofan, Timbuktu, Cape Town, 
Zanzibar, Sierra Leone, Mombasa, and Madagascar. Islam pours out literature and 
extends the area of Arabic literates every year…In the Lake Chad region of 




As Terence Walz notes, Zwemer, who was concerned above all with the spread of 
nationalist “Muhammadan ideas” in the colonies, was principally alluding to the famous 
publishing firm of Ahmad al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī and sons. Founded in 1858 the firm competed with 
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the state sponsored Bulāq press, by producing modestly priced editions of classic texts in Arabic 
and to that end it, commanded a large share of the market for books that were destined for 
different localities in Asia and Africa. Zwemer was also interested in what he considered ‘the 
animist basis of Islam,’ which he perceived as a barrier to spreading a rational Christian faith and 
salvation through the Gospel.
52
  He authored a number of mostly polemical tracts on the topic 
and never failed to point out that in this very presence of al-Azhar, sellers of amulets, 
aphrodisiacs and charms abounded and that in fact “some of [al-Azhar’s] professors and many 
students promote the industry. A favorite among those printed by the thousands and sent from 




In 2009, the scene, while certainly less exoticized than Zwemer’s portrayal depicts it, was 
surprising not all too dissimilar. The book market continues to dominate the landscape of the 
neighborhood and one still finds students and scholars parlaying in the many coffee shops that 
litter the space and/or selling their textual wares in a number of make-shift and concrete stalls of 
various sizes and specializations. And sometimes, amongst their bundles, one finds a whole array 
of books on all aspects of the occult, old and new. In fact it was here that I finally obtained for a 
very reasonable sum a copy of al-Durr al-manẓūm: a 1961 Bābī al-Ḥalabī edition on which this 
chapter is based. The vendor, himself a student of al-Azhar and novice occultist, was in turn 
connected to an entire network of other teachers and masters to whom he happily introduced me 
in the months to come that extended beyond the immediately vicinity.  
The physicality of the book market in relation to the mosque is of course not an historical 
accident and in fact like the mosque itself, it is intricately connected to the dense neighbourhood 
                                                 
52
 See in particular Samuel Zwemer, The Influence of Animism on Islam (New York: Macmillan, 1920). 
 
53




of which it is a part (as well as to a whole network of other mosques, schools, and intellectual 
spaces) and modes of everyday life that shape them. We might thus consider the market as one of 
the ‘spaces’ of al-Azhar, and in many ways an integral one: indeed, on any given day, the lines 
between mosque, market and magic appear fuzzy at best.  
 
The Magic of Modernity: Or White Magic, Black Magic  
In their introduction to the Cambridge History of Science (2013), Katharine Park and 
Lorraine Daston remark that despite the plethora of deconstructivist critiques levied against it, 
the story of the Scientific Revolution, “and its drama of worlds destroyed and reconstructed” 
remains a potently seductive one, retaining its “hold, even on those scholars who have 
contributed to its unraveling.” Part of the “reluctance to relinquish the historical narrative,” they 
argue, “is due to the brilliance with which it has been told and retold in books that are deservedly 
numbered among the classics of the history of science.”
54
 Another reason for the metanarrative’s 
continuing enchantment of the modern scholarly imagination is that the myth of the Scientific 
Revolution is also a “myth about inevitable rise to global domination of the West, whose cultural 
superiority is inferred from its cultivation of the values of inquiry that, unfettered by religion or 
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And, this is despite the fact, that the story’s chief heroes were all in some way or another 
themselves involved in various aspects of the occult sciences.
56
 The larger and obvious lesson to 
be drawn from this point then, is that conceptions of what is ‘real’ as opposed to ‘occult’ science 
are placated ex post facto by the contemporary scholar on what was in fact a much more fluid 
web of scientific practices and beliefs. 
Elsewhere Daston argues that scientific objects can be “simultaneously real and 
historical.” This is because the transformative power of scientific scrutiny is conditioned by its 
context of operation, as well as the discursive and institutional, theoretical and methodological, 
apparatuses that allow for the object’s coherence “as an ontological entity.”
57
 Following Bruno 
Latour, Daston argues that it is this “embeddedness in “local, material, and practical networks” 
that determines “the reality of all objects, scientific as well as technological, natural as well as 
human.” Reality is thus a “relative property” that amalgamates variable phenomena (both 
tangible and evanescent) into coherent categories that are then shaped, delineated and stabilized 
by the very practices, networks and forms that fashioned them.
 58
 
In the very interplay between concealment (exclusion) and revelation (inclusion) then, 
lies the “magic of modernity” and the many illusions it conjures up. Not only can magic now be 
modernized into different forms of enchantment (as for example “the New Age sacralization of 
the self” or “the dazzle of halogen” and celebrity of the magic of film) so as to become “a 
counterpoint to liberal understandings of modernity’s transparency and rational progress;” 
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modernity itself produces its own forms of illusion, (“publicity and secrecy,” or “faith and 




In short, magic, like science, belongs to modernity: as concepts, both are abstractions 
which supplement one another and are rendered real (or unreal) by the discursive and contextual 
spaces within which they are produced. Read in this way, the tale of the Scientific Revolution is 
“also a myth about the origins and nature of modernity.”
60
 It teleologically flattens European 
history (from a dark age of medieval magic, demonic exorcisms and other types of ‘hocus 
pocus,’ quickly passing through the glorious Renaissance, to the revolutionary emergence of the 
Age of Science in all its glory),
61
 and is productive of another “mist-shrouded entity, the modern 
mind”
62
 defined in direct opposition to a “primitive” one: in the first instance medieval, later 
rural and, with the ascendance of early colonial anthropology, non-European.  
More than any other discipline, anthropology would coagulate developmentalist 
interpretations of magic (following organic Darwinian and Social Darwinian frames and the 
subsequent positing of ‘science’ as the apotheosis of human evolution), as antithetical to 
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modernity, approximated ultimately through a temporal distancing of spatial constructs – the 
West and the rest. Pioneering anthropologists of the late nineteenth century such Edward Burnett 
Tylor and James Frazer would thus provide the foundations for the study of ‘supernatural’ 
phenomena in explications of “primitive cultures” as “survivals” or “artefacts” within 
universalized models of human evolution moving from magic to religion to science.
63
  
The paradox, as Peter Pels highlights, is that the “evolutionary confidence” of early 
anthropological theories of magic “arose in a period that can also be regarded as romantically 
“reenchanting” the world.” A product of this “period of high bourgeois anxiety,” the modern re-
enchantment of the world is exemplified in the increased output of folklore studies, nostalgic 
literature, and the discovery of “modern mysteries” in the scientific domain, and culminates in 
the “psychologization” of magic in the proliferating interest in practices such as telepathy, 
clairvoyancy and even oneiromancy, as well as other forms of “modern occultism.”
64
 These 
developments ostensibly undercut confidence in theories of magic as a relic of some primordial 
past and often re-refigured it as a “human universal” associated precisely with “the 
imponderabilities of science.”
65
 The “conversion” of leading advocates of scientific rationality 
(most famously in the case of Alfred Russel Wallace, the pioneering anthropologist and close 
associate of Charles Darwin, and of course Sigmund Freud’s star disciple Carl Jung) to the 
recognition of  the preternatural and occult forces of the universe, the other side as it were, 
further attests to this point. 
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Such examples affirming the centrality of the occult in European intellectual history are 
indeed numerous and well documented, as are their social manifestations, be they in the 
persistence of magical practices in themselves, the popularity of grimoires as a counterforce to 
Reformation dogma, the emergence of Theosophy already during the Enlightenment, or indeed 
other “New Age” esoteric philosophies at the turn of the twentieth century.
66
 And the 
implications of these entanglements (of the natural and preternatural in modernity’s very 
constitution), are significant, evincing (in Vincent Crapanzano’s words) that “[d]espite our 
liberal claims to transparency, reason, and secularism, they lay bare a world shaded by opacity, 
unreason and blinkered faith.”
67
  
It goes without saying that any history of the Other is wrought with contestations and re-
theorizations of all sorts (beginning already with the seminal interventions of Marcel Mauss, 
Edward Evans-Prichard and Bronislaw Malinoski within the discipline of anthropology itself), 
producing a “seesaw movement of denial and recognition” as Pels has it, as regards especially 
conceptualizing the relationship between magic and religion, with science somewhere safe in the 
background. (For instance, magic was further differentiated from religion through a polarity 
between a multiplicity of spirits with a small ‘s’ – connoting pantheistic or animistic cosmologies 
and cultures – and a singular Spirit, or Geist, a distinction that may have been Christian in its 
inspiration, but was also ensconced in a more secular rationalism – as in the Weber’s Spirit of 
capitalism, or Hegel’s Universal Spirit).
68
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Later, a generation of anthropologists would actively reject and revise the older premises 
of the discipline and highlight the imbrications of magic and modernity to produce a spectral, 
even haunted, “New World,”  or a phantasmagoric representation in the case of the colonial state, 
along with the variable expressions arising from it: “occult economies” of late capitalism; the 
“revival of witchcraft in politics”; the constitution of modern identities through magic and other 
ritual activity and performance etc.
69
  
Yet, despite these important interventions, and much like the meta-narrative of the 
‘scientific revolution’ itself, the basic discursive parameters of early anthropology that lent 
magic its conceptual vocabularies and premises stubbornly endures. Having seeped into other 
disciplines, notably history, they conspicuously animate discussions of the occult and reify the 
subjects of the historical saga – such as, most obviously, the Arab, the African and the European 




The field of study designated as “Islam in Africa” is an old one. Its earliest incarnations 
are often attributed to the writings of medieval Arab geographers and travelers, such as Leo 
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Africanus, al-Bakrī, Ibn Baṭūṭṭa and the like, who wrote various descriptions of cities and 
peoples. But this is evidently an anachronism, for these authors had neither a formulated 
conception of Islam nor of Africa, let alone of their conjugation. 
If we were to locate any such origins, these would more accurately be in the writings of 
European explorers, missionaries, colonial officers and writers, which in aggregate assembled 
what Valentine Mudimbe (echoing Said) has described as the “colonial library,” through which 
Africa was “invented.”
71
 Africa would be conceived as a coherent geographical space where 
competing external monotheisms penetrated the fabric of traditional, primitive, pagan host 
societies. The products of these interactions are many, amongst which is the constitution of a 
uniquely composite religious sphere: a “triple heritage” in Ali Mazrui’s problematic terms, with 
which Western power had to contend in various ways, at times by demoting Islam to a barrier 
against progress (and thus the cause of Africa’s obstinate backwardness), at others, elevating its 




Colonial responses to existing social structures they encountered were varied and for the 
most part contingent on local conditions. Often however, they actively sought to demarcate a 
province of things ‘African’ and ‘Islamic’ over which new (European or ‘universal’) systems 
were placated. As Mahmood Mamdani and others have shown, this was most evident in the 
domain of law, through which was enacted an evolutionary cognitive frame that reproduced 
“particular political identities which distinguished between (non-African) races and (African) 
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 See his television series “The Africans: A TripleHeritage” (1986, U.S.Public Broadcasting Service network). For 
an engagement with response to Mazrui’s series and others, see Alexis Wick’s dissertation “Beyond Art and 




ethnicities, with each “living in distinct legal universe[s].”
73
 In the case of Sudan for instance, an 
administrative structure of “Condominium Rule,” had to be carefully negotiated in the aftermath 
of the Mahdist revolt resulting in the further splitting of what was defined as ‘faki Islam,’ 
(associated with the seemingly deviant practices of the Mahdi and his followers) and a more 
properly orthodox ‘Arab Islam’ (allied with Egypt and particularly with al-Azhar).  
On some level, the division was essentially a pragmatic one: Sudan provided the setting 
for the birth of the most potent of Victorian myths, the death of the saintly emancipator of slaves 
and prophet of (Christian) Enlightenment, General Gordon, at the hands of the Mahdist fanatics. 
It is within the powerful legacy of these two “saints” that the British government’s overwhelming 
concern for the first twenty years of their rule was a cautious policy of ‘pacification’ disguised in 
a principle of non-interference in matters of religion. In addition to restricting missionary activity 
in areas demarcated as ‘Muslim’ (as opposed to ‘pagan,’), the policy involved the nurturing of a 
new Muslim leadership (under Azhari tutelage) through three critical organs: a Board of Ulema, 
established in 1904, which consisted largely of former Mahdist defectors; the enactment of a 
Shariah Division of the Sudanese Judiciary under the Muhammadan Law Courts Ordinance 
(1902) as part of a dual court system; and with that, the foundation of a judicial seminary 
(modeled on al-Azhar’s curriculum) with the mandate of training future Sudanese qāḍis.
 74
 For 
the colonial state in Sudan, then, orthodox, Arab Islam was to be methodically promoted as a 
means of disciplining unruly and unorthodox natives.
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By contrast, for missionary representatives it was ‘Arab Islam’ that they blamed for the 
“religious prejudice and fanaticism” of the Sudanese “whose hearts,” they complained, were 
“surfeited with self-satisfaction.”
75
 This they juxtaposed to an African ‘living’ Islam that was 
viewed as comparatively fluid, dynamic, and easily amenable to cultural change. And it is 
precisely on the basis of this distinction that the dedicated Church Missionary Society 
representative and pioneer scholar of the study of Islam in Africa, John Spencer Trimingham, 
argued for “a natural means approach” that would supplement Christianity into the socio-cultural 
expressions of African Islam by advocating such measures as Christian zawiyas, ziara for 
Christian saints, and Christian mawlids.
76
 For Trimingham, Christianity could “give to the life of 
the African a recreation which Islam cannot give (…), it can change the very rhythm of his life, 
whilst Islam condemns him to a staticism from which escape seems almost impossible.” “The 
tragedy,” he goes on to lament, “is that our method of presenting Christ was as static and lifeless 
as the Koran, and even less related to the inner needs and life of the Sudanese.”
77
  
Trimingham’s proscriptions were clearly shaped by the juxtaposition of anthropological 
understandings of ‘African religion and society’ and Orientalist conceptions of Islam (described 
above). These two conceptual strands organize his subsequent writings on Islam in different 
parts of the continent in a series of influential works culminating in the broader synthesis, The 
Influence of Islam upon Africa, published in London in 1968.
78
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The topography of this text fully partakes of the spatio-temporal logics of disciplinary 
thinking identified at the beginning of this dissertation. An indigenous ‘African’ base structure, 
(delineated through geographic, linguistic and racial criteria) divides the continent into distinct 
regions and is fixed in time, over which is laden an encroaching ‘Islam’ to produce a number of 
“Islamic cultural zones” with corresponding histories and characteristics, which the author 
discloses at the onset of the book: 
 
I have not attempted a study of Islam in Africa, but am concerned with a 
historical process. My aim is to show the influence of Islam as a religious culture 
upon Africans, with emphasis on the more strictly religious aspects. The study 
begins with an account of Islam’s historical penetration, which it has been 





Islam here is an external, if determining, force. It is for this reason that although the 
book’s concern is primarily “with African societies south of the Sahara, account is taken of the 
influence of and relationships with Mediterranean Islamic culture [since] this was the main 




 Thus we find a “Mediterranean Africa” represented by Egypt and the Maghrib into 
which “Islam first penetrated in the persons of the early Arab conquerors [and] became so 
deeply implanted as to influence all subsequent history and every aspect of life.”
81
 The two 
regions are however clearly differentiated by their “basic pre-Islamic cultures” – Ancient 
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Egyptian, Coptic and their remnants in the agrarian Nile-bound Egyptian fellāh on the one hand, 
and the delicate equilibrium produced by the belligerent factionalism of desert nomads and 
sedentaries on the other – which provided the blueprint for their particular expressions of the 
faith.  
Second comes the “Western Sudan.” Here the close cultural intermingling between 
“Hamites and Negroes, the first nomadic pastrolists and the others settled agriculturalists” are 
foregrounded as “an essential aspect of the history of Islam in Africa.”
82
 The role of Saharan 
Berber traders is underscored, producing a “pattern which was to characterize Sudanese Islam… 
[as] a class religion of chiefs and traders, with a professional class of clerics, but [it] did not 
become the religion of the people,” who still remained polytheists.
83
 
In the “Central Sudan,” Islam was “not spread noticeably by traders, except perhaps in 
Katsina,” but was introduced “as a legal cult by clerics from Kanem and from west Sudan,” 
resulting in instances of conflict that ensued in “something of the struggle between magico-
religious powers, one native, the other intrusive.” The conflict however was “resolved in the 
Sudanese fashion by absorbing Islamic elements into the state structure and town systems and 
thus neutralizing their power to change.” A “religious hierarchy” was subsequently 
“incorporated into the traditional structure to give the state Islamic support,” while a ‘mixed’ 
society that blended pagan and Muslim elements formed.
84
  
The situation is again somewhat different in the fourth zone, the “Eastern or Nilotic 
Sudan” where a third ethnic element, the pure blooded Arab, is introduced into the admixture of 
Hamitic and Negro “human foundation,” and where “Islamization proceeded along with 
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Arabization.” The zone is also distinguished by a strong adherence to Sufi expressions of Islam 
(derived from the east and from Egypt in the main that are contrasted to the Maghribi variety of 
North and West Africa), as well as the “harmonious blending of fiqh and taṣawwuf, the 
tempering of legalism and mysticism” as “indigenous clerical families who ‘lit the fire of Abd 
al-Qādir’ (that is spread Qādirī allegiance) [formed] in one riverain community after another.”
85
  
Having mapped the Islamization of Africa in space, along with the local expressions of 
the faith that arised, Trimingham moves to plot the “impact of Islam upon Africa” in time 
according to four historical phases (which can be described grossly as 1. peripheral conquest; 2. 
accommodation and dualism; 3. revivalism and jihād; 4. standardization and expansion under 
colonial rule). 
The kernel of Trimingham’s spatio-temporal scaffold is, to repeat, the existence of a 
local African substratum underneath the forceful weight of a global and globalizing Islamic 
superstructure. Indeed the accommodation of Islam as the religion of the elite is precisely 
framed as a “compromise” between the two strata, that of particularist societies and a 
universalist religion.
86
 He thus clearly subscribes to the idea that Islam in Africa is a unique 
phenomenon that is to be studied according to its own internal logics and structural forms, 
amongst which is its characteristic marginality. As far as the occult is concerned, the most 
enduring effect of this schema has been the idea that the superficiality of Islamization allowed 
for the continued flourishing of an indigenous attachment to the occult despite any professed 
doctrinal opposition.  
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With the emergence of African history as part of the larger institutionalization of area 
studies, the field has grown exponentially, reaching institutional consecration in 2000 with the 
establishment of the “first research center in the United States devoted entirely to the study of 
Islam in Africa,” the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA), founded by 
John Hunwick and R.S. O’Fahey.
87
  
Indeed, Hunwick and O’Fahey have dedicated much of their scholarly lives to shattering 
the myths of isolation, orality and irrelevance of ‘African Islam.’ The monumental Arabic 
Literature of Africa series (ALA for short), of which they are general editors, is a bio-
bibliographical project much in the guise of Carl Brockelmann’s seminal Geschichte der 
arabischen Literatur, which it supplements by introducing an ‘overlooked’ African component. 
The series is concerned with the collation, preservation and documentation of Arabic 
manuscripts on the continent and has thus far led to the production of four volumes dedicated 
respectively to the Writings of Eastern Sudanic Africa; The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa; 
The Writings of the Muslim Peoples of Northeastern Africa; and those of Western Sudanic 
Africa (with two more volumes on Mauritania and Western Sahara and the corpus of the 
Tijanīyah sufi order in the making). The volumes are a true testament to a dedicated scholarship 
and are an indispensible tool for the researcher. Organized chronologically and for the most part 
by regional, familial or sectarian affiliation, they combine biographical information with 
extensive bibliographical listings of the title and subject matter of works attributed to each 
author, along with a useful notice on the locations of different manuscripts in various archives 
and repositories in and outside the region, presented in an accessible user-friendly format.  
                                                 
87




The trouble with the series lies less in the important information it furnishes than in the 
overall framing and impetus behind the project as a whole: most evidently, in its explicit aim of 
integrating African Arabic literatures into a larger corpus of Islamic writings precisely to 
overcome the trope of African orality but also to highlight the presence of a viable tradition of 
“African Islamic scholarship.” As already noted in chapter two, such approaches, grounded as 
they are in traditional philological frames, partake of what I describe there as the “bibliographic 
imagination” and its resident civilizational inflections. Moreover, they paradoxically reinforce 
the very notion of African marginality that they seek to combat, precisely by assuming that there 
is such a thing as an ‘African Arabic literarity’ (encapsulated through African libraries, writings 
etc.) that is in need of salvaging.
88
 
In other words, the approach renders real one abstraction (the concept of African orality) 
by integrating it into another (Arabo-Islamic textuality) with the two being reconstitutive of one 
another. In this way it merges ‘Orient’ and ‘Africa,’ often singling out Arabic as the “Latin of 
Africa:”
89
 a total linguistic structure specific to an upper social stratum of ʿulama and the 
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language through which Islamic patterns in Africa are to be apprehended, or not as the case may 
be.
90
 It simultaneously recreates the same set of analytical binaries, identified at the beginning of 
this dissertation and this chapter: namely Arab/African; Islamization of Africa/Africanization of 
Islam; orality/textuality; syncretic/orthodox etc.  
The distinctions are moreover reinforced, in different registers, in the general historical 
overview accompanying each volume. Thus for Central Sudanic Africa, John Hunwick begins by 
affirming that “The history of literary composition in Arabic extends over a period close to eight 
hundred years in this region,” before outlining the gradual processes of Islamization that 
facilitated the emergence of “centers of Arabic-Islamic teachings” with the “real revolution in 
Arabic-Islamic writing” commencing only in the last quarter of the eighteenth-century with the 
establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate.
91
  
The appearance of said Arabic-Islamic writing is often attributed to external impetuses in 
the form of Arab scholars who are credited for the “rooting of Islamic culture” and the 
foundations of “the Islamic intellectual tradition” in Africa: “At the beginning of the 7/13th 
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century,” Hunwick writes, “the first writer [in Arabic] from the region, a poet named Abū Isḥaq 
Ibrāhīm ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kānimī (d. 608/1211 or 609/1212-13), [was] evidently of Arab origin.”
92
  
In the case of Katsina, it was the North African “militant reformist” scholar Muḥammad 
b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī (d. 1504) who, having instigated a well documented massacre of the 
Jewish community of the Saharan oasis town of Tuāt, settled in Katsina, becoming its qadi and 
teacher of a generation of West African scholars and leaders committed to his doctrinaire reform 
agenda (within which his discussions of takfīr in particular are highlighted).
93
 Indeed the 
attribution of the genesis of African Arabic scholarship to originary “Arab” figures is 
conventional in the field. Even before the ALA initiative, Mervyn Hiskett and A.D.H Bivar had 
produced a similar bio-bibliographical anthology, “The Arabic Literature of Nigeria to 1804,” 
that focused on the pre-jihādic period and that was even more explicitly organized around the 
figures of al-Maghīlī and the Sokoto jihad, which chronologically frame the ensuing contents.
94
  
Such organisation is further indicative of another salient feature of the field, its “jihād-
centricism,” and its positing of an opposition between two saliant tendencies by which an entire 
subsequent historiography comes to be defined: that of an “Islamic militancy” (personified most 
immediately in the figure of the Arab al-Maghīlī and his legacy); and the “quietism” of other 
“local African” scholarly traditions (enshrined predominantly in the writings of the sixteenth-
century Mande teacher, al-Ḥajj Salīm Suwar and his followers who established removed centers 
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in the “forests of West Africa”). Thus, as Sean Hanretta critically notes, “one apparently 
indigenous intellectual tradition” is opposed to another locally adapted variant, and in both cases 
what is underscored is the largely “pragmatic attitude of African Muslims.”
95
 He connects this 
type of approach to traditional Orientalist expositions executed by Michael Cook and others for 
whom jihād is “an absolute and constant feature of ‘Islamic thought’.” For not only is jihād 
“religiously foundational and accommodation situationally political, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that reformist Islam, in its ‘authentic’ and intellectualist forms is atavistic and anti-
modern, while its safe, ‘modern’ forms are pragmatic, culturally particularized and a step 
removed from Islamic ‘high culture’.”
96
  
The conditions upon which these and other similar positions are premised (including 
those underlying the the ALA series) have significant consequences (and as we shall shortly see 
bear directly on discussions of al-Kashnāwī in the literature). Most importantly, Hanretta notes, 
is the continuing dialogical interchange between the Africanization of Islam and the Islamization 
of Africa, its corroboration of the insider/outsider logic of so-called centers and peripheries of 
Islam, and the attendant notion of “syncreticism” that accompanies them. The concepts that 
structure the paradigms - ‘Islamization’ or ‘Africanization’ - are themselves left undefined, while 
the referential frames they index are made explicit: whatever it is that is deemed African, 
whether understood in ‘continental,’ ‘racial,’ or indeed more palatably,  ‘local,’ terms, is 




                                                 
95
 Sean Hanretta, “Muslim Histories,” op. cit. 483. 
 
96
 Ibid. 484.  
 
97




Accordingly, affirmations of al-Kashnāwī as representative of a celebrated ‘indigenous 
African Islamic scholarship’ often marshal as evidence the fame that he attained in the East (i.e. 
the Arab heartland), and especially the glorious necrology provided by al-Jabartī.  
It has already been noted that al-Jabartī’s necrology in ʿAjāʾib al-āthār is the most 
comprehensive historical source on al-Kashnāwī that we have to date. It has been subsequently 
reproduced in later Arabic biographical dictionaries, as well as in Brockelmann’s GAL. All 
concur that al-Kashnāwī died in Cairo in the year in 1145 (1741), and most mention that he 
travelled widely and performed the ḥajj. Beyond that, several differences in content and register 
are notable across the different entries. 
Al-Baghdādī’s entry in Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn is perhaps the most prosaic, noting simply al-
Kashnāwī full name (under the nisba al-Sudānī) and date/place of death before listing his works, 
and the “Riḥla outlining what happened to him during his travels/relocations [tanaqulātuhu].”
98
 
The accompanying extensive bibliographical compendium, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī’l-dhayl ‘alā Kashf 
al-ẓunūn, however, subsequently omits the two lost works (the Riḥla and Barnāmij), as well as 
the commentary on al-Jurjānī in its listings, and on two occasions reproduces the opening lines of 
the texts as is common practice.
99
 Kaḥḥāla’s entry closely follows the format of Hadiyyat al-
ʿārifīn (which he cites as a source along with Fihris al-mu’allifīn bi’l-ẓāhira, the library 
catalogues of al-Azhar and the Dār al-Kutub (Fihris al-khudūwīyya), al-Jabartī, Brockelmann 
and al-Kattānī), adding only that al-Kashnāwī “participated in many disciplines” and that he 
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Al-Ziriklī, al-Kattāni and Makhlūf’s entries are however more elaborate: Al-Kattānī’s is 
the closest in format and language to that of al-Jabartī. Indeed it reproduces the latter’s 
laudations of al-Kashnāwī almost verbatim, as well as the details provided on al-Kashnāwī’s 
teachers, travels and his death in the home of Ḥasan al-Jabartī.
101
 The connection with al-Jabartī 
senior is again underscored in the references to al-Kashnāwī’s works, of which his treatise on 
numerology (Bahjat al-āfāq) alone is signalled alongside the lost compendium of authorities 
[Barnāmaj fī mashyakhatihi], on which al-Kattānī says “we reach via al-Dammanhūrī and Ḥasan 
al-Jabartī.” Makhlūf’s entry similarly imitates al-Jabartī’s format, stressing, as cited above, al-
Kashnāwī’s prolificness, or “long hand in most sciences,” as well as his scholarly trajectory and 
travels: “He attained the sciences and knowledge [al-ʿulūm wa’l-maʿārif] in his country form 
various scholars [ʿalā jillah minhuma] (….) from whom he benefitted and read many books 
across multiple subjects [kutuban kathīra fī ’l-funūn al-shatta]. He travelled for the ḥajj and on 
his journey passed through many kingdoms and met with their kings and scholars. He benefitted 
from them and they from him [wa istafād wa āfād]” etc. Yet it is striking that while the entry 
readily reproduces al-Jabartī’s idiomatic praises of al-Kashnāwī with their implicit references to 
his chosen proficiency in the occult disciplines – “the singular knowledgable imam [imām al-
ʿallāmah al-waḥīd],” “the outstanding vast sea [al-baḥr al-khiḍammi al-farīd],” “garden of 
sciences and knowledge [rawḍ al-ʿulūm wa ’l-maʿārif],” “treasure of secrets and pleasantries 
[kanz al-asrār wa ’l-laṭāʾif],” possessor of “complete knowledge of the subtleties of secrets and 
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illuminations [maʿrifah tāmma bi daqāʾiq al-asrār wa’l-anwār]” etc. – it diverts its reader from 
making these associations by declining to name the disciplines in which al-Kashnāwī was 
involved, foregrounding only his work on grammar: “[About his travels] he authored a riḥlah, 
and has works on other subjects, among them Bulūgh al-arab min kalām al-ʿarab on grammar. 
He died in Cairo/Egypt in the year 1154.”
102
 Finally, and less circumspect on this matter is al-
Ziriklī, who cites Shajarat al-nūr as a source for his entry on al-Kashnāwī yet describes him 
quite explicitly as “a Mālikī jurist and grammarian involved in the workings of the science of 
letters [faqih Mālikī naḥawī, lahu ishtighāl bi‘ilm al-hurūf].” Al-Ziriklī then lists all of al-
Kashnāwī’s  writings (including even the disputed Al-Taḥrīrāt al-rā’iqa noted by Brockelmann) 
along with other works. He further concludes that al-Kashnāwī was an established scholar even 
before he began his travels:  “He became famous in the Sudan and visited many countries on his 
way to the pilgrimage [ishtahara fī’l-Sūdān wa zāra bilādan kathīra fī ṭarīqihi ilā ’l-hajj].”
103
  
The Arabic biographical sources then, would mostly seem to intimate, through their close 
adherence to al-Jabartī’s entry, that al-Kashnāwī had already reached an advanced scholarly level 
before commencing his travels, even while they differ in their choice to include his works on the 
occult. And yet, the historiography of Islam in Africa continually evokes the figure of al-Jabartī 
as evidence of his “fame in the East.” ʿUmar al-Naqar for instance mobilizes al-Kashnāwī to 
explain the symbolic dimension of the pilgrimage in these terms: “Like Timbuctu, the scholars of 
Hausaland also sought an enrichment of their academic pedigree through pilgrimage. There exist 
some prominent examples from the ulama who made their mark on the tradition partly because 
of their pilgrimages; for example: Muḥammad b. Muhammad al-Fulānī al-Kashnāwī was a close 
friend of the family of the eighteenth-century Egyptian historian ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī and 
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the historian gave a biographical account of him.”
104
 Though it must be said, that later on, al-
Naqar also explicitly recognizes that scholarly achievement “could be attained within the 
Sudan,”
105
 and in the case of al-Kashnāwī, he relies on al-Jabartī’s necrology to demonstrate this 
point: “The career of al-Kashnāwī illustrates the possibility of attaining recognizably high 
standards in west Africa before making the pilgrimage. According to al-Jabartī’s biographical 
extract on him, al-Kashnāwī had received instruction on the sciences and all branches of 
knowledge in the Sudan under different teachers,” including “the secret sciences.” 
106
   
The reliance on al-Jabartī may in part be explained by the brevity of Sultan Bello’s entry 
on al-Kashnāwī in Infāq al-maysūr, which appears, at least at face value, to reinforce the thesis 
that his fame is due to the high regard in which he was held by the scholars of Egypt.
107
 Still, it is 
striking that rather than cite this local source (one that is in fact contemporaneous to al-Jabartī), 
scholars find it necessary to assert al-Kashnāwī’s prominence through the ‘central Arab’ 
luminary instead. Rather than reading in the esteem accorded by al-Jabartī to his biographee, as 
well as to his various Sudanese teachers, a substantiation which precisely averts the facile center-
periphery axis of the ‘lighthouse model’, these approaches have for the most part paradoxically 
grounded its modular assumptions, against all evidence. For one, it was he, the ‘African’ who is 
recorded as being the teacher of a most urbane and central ‘Arab’, Ḥasan al-Jabartī (amongst 
others). But it is not simply a matter of individual admiration, for ʿAbd al-Raḥmān as we have 
                                                 
104
 Al-Naqar, op. cit. 36. 
 
105
 Ibid. 126. 
 
106
 Ibid. 126-127. 
 
107
 “Among the scholars of these lands [i.e. Dura, Kashna, Kano, Ghobir and Zakzak/Zaria?] is the knowledgable 
Imām Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī al-Fullānī. He traveled [raḥal] to the East, made the pilgrimage and soujourned 
[jāwara] in the Ḥaramāyn. He returned to Cairo and died there. It is said that the scholars of the Ḥaramāyn and 
Egypt bestowed on him knowledge and honor [āqar lahu bi’l ʿilm wa’l-faḍl ʿulamāʾ al-ḥaramāyn wa miṣr]” 




seen equally underscores the learnedness and piety of al-Kashnāwī’s own teachers in Katsina 
within a culture where personal virtue and knowledge were necessarily interdependent, thereby 
creating a sense of its normative value as a place of scholarship in its own right. We are very far 
from a notion of a periphery awaiting orthodoxy from distant and revered centers. Instead, what 
we encounter in the literature are repeated appeals to al-Jabartī words as evidence of the great 
fame and esteem al-Kashnāwī was able to procure in “the East,” that ultimately operate to 
reinforce African marginality and subordination. Indeed, so prevalent is this model that it has 
been formally internalized by the Katsinan establishment in recent decades.
108
 
Discussions of the content of al-Kashnāwī’s studies are equally illuminating, and should 
also be approached with the above discussion of centers-peripheries in mind. We have already 
seen that with the exception of very few interventions, al-Kashnāwī’s fame has been directly tied 
to his expertise in the occult disciplines. It is these sciences supposedly that distinguished the 
Sudanese scholars more broadly and our own al-Kashnāwī in particular who was able to bestow 
them to his Arab students, Hasan al-Jabartī amongst them. Yet his writings have in themselves 
received very little direct or critical attention.
109
  
Louis Brenner is a notable exception. He approaches the question of the permissibility of 
the occult (especially in the writings of Usman dan Fodio) within a larger reflection of certain 
forms of initiatic practices that combined rationalist Sanūsian theology with occult knowledge.
110
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In terms that echo, if not directly engage, Talal Asad’s idea of “Islam as a discursive tradition,” 
Brenner continually locates African intellectual responses, contestations and conditions in 
relation to the occult within the broader textual traditions from which they emanate.
111
 
Furthermore, he completely does away with any claims of the ‘syncretic’ nature of African Islam 
where a separate realm of magic or the occult may be cordoned off from other domains of 
inquiry, and posits instead the intriguing idea of an “esoteric episteme,” which he begins to 
outline in his study on Muslim education in Mali.
112
 To aid him in this, he relies on Foucault’s 
three-tiered archaeology of knowledge as connaissance, savoir, episteme: where in the first 
instance “specific individuals are linked to a specific body of knowledge intended to serve a 
specific purpose;” in the second “knowledge is constituted through broader discursive exchange” 
(i.e. how a certain type of knowledge is talked about); and in the last, knowledge represents a 
more comprehensive mode of discourse that implicates all its branches. Thus for Brenner, an 
episteme, following Foucault’s definition “may be suspected of being something like a world-
view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the 
same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men 
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In this mode, he identifies a shift in twentieth-century Mali away from an “esoteric to a 
rationalistic episteme. The broad contours of which can be sketched (…) with relationship to 
concepts about the nature of Islamic knowledge (ʿilm) and the conditions of its transmission.”
114
 
His basic argument is that Islamic orders of knowledge (although elsewhere he seems to speak of 
this in more specific terms as African) rest upon “hierarchial distinctions” of different fields of 
knowledge and are epistemically contingent upon both rational and esoterically inspired modes 
for its attainment. The two are indivisible in essence so that any dissimilarity between them is 
predicated not upon any discrete cognitive or epistemological criteria, but through the qualities 
of the possessor and transmitter of the knowledge themselves. Accordingly, knowledge (in its 
integrative form, and as embodied ethical practice as described in the previous chapter) is not 
conceived as equally available to any and all persons as the modern concept of education would 
presuppose, but is rather conditioned by the level of spiritual achievement and personal character 
of the seeker as granted to him/her by God. The distinction as to who can attain a specific area of 
knowledge is thus premised on a duality of that which is manifest and secret (i.e. privileged), and 
while both necessitate various forms of training or learning, the latter is by its very nature select 
and initiatic (in other words, relational), with “personal ‘spiritual’ transformation” being a 
preparative stage “for access to the higher levels of ‘spiritual’ knowledge and … even more 
secret or hidden bodies of knowledge.”
115
  
For Brenner, the shift to a “rationalistic epiteme” is marked fundamentally by the primacy 
of the intellect above all other forms of cognition. This is not to be understood as a dismissal of 
the idea of knowledge as revelation, for the Qur’an and divine law continue to influence and 
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structure belief systems and guide human behaiviour in contemporary Mali (and in that respect it 
is not the same as the secularization of knowledge in the European context). Rather, knowledge 
becomes “theoretically available to equally everyone. Reflection and explication are based on 
principles of rational exposition as derived from divine revelation. Religious devotion becomes 
separated from the process of learning, and the individual’s intellectual development is no longer 
associated with divine intervention.”
116
  
If these shifts sound similar to the processes described in chapter one of this dissertation 
by which learning at al-Azhar was transformed into the modern grammar of ‘Islamic education,’ 
it is because they are.  
 
Shaping Azhari Orthodoxy  
The trope of irrationality, and the need to separate religious devotion from scientific 
method, was at the heart of nahḍa discourses and grounded the historicist logic of the paradigm 
of inḥiṭaṭ (decline) and the attendant ‘Golden Age of Islamic science.’  
For nineteenth-century Arab intellectuals, Azharis amongst them, the much sought after 
progress entailed for the most part the reconciliation of science and religion (often with “Islam 
and philosophy” lurking somewhere in the background). Much has been written on this question 
from a number of perspectives that will not be rehashed here.
117
 Suffice it to say that the occult – 
whether manifest as magical and divinational practices or the veneration of Sufi saints – was a 
direct target of modernizing Islamic critiques that called for inter alia, ridding the faith of what 
were perceived as “excesses.”  
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Rida 
would advocate a reformist theology that would seek to synthesize a recaptured traditional or 
pure religion with modernist rationality: one where superstition had no place and where 
revelation could be acquiescent with new ‘scientific’ discoveries, leading famously in the case of 
ʿAbduh for instance to his metaphorical tafsīr of microbes as a species of jinn and angels as 
natural forces.
118
 Yet even for ʿAbduh and his contemporaries, the boundaries between a 
constituted sphere of “religion” as a private realm of belief and “science” as a discursively and 
institutionally integrated enterprise were not fully comprehensible. It would take some years and 
various institutional transformations before the separation would become rooted.
119
  
 The bifurcation of Islamic thought and practice (as mentioned in previous chapters), is 
evident at the level of curricular reform at al-Azhar and its efforts at introducing ‘new scientific 
subjects.’ Glossing over the heavy contestations that such proposals had generated both within 
the al-Azhar itself and beyond its walls, Bayard Dodge tells us that “during the year 1888, (…), 
so many people desired to have modern subjects included in the curriculum, [so] they asked the 
Rector of al-Azhar to give a legal decision,” who “[a]fter consulting the Grand Mufti and other 
authorities,” obliged to look into the matter.
120
 According to Gesink, however, it was by order of 
the khedive that this ruling was to be produced by his personal qadi, Muḥammad Bāyram, an 
intimate of Lord Cromer who had described him in the most glowing terms: “a devout Moslem 
[whose] private life was irreproachable, whose religious faith was founded upon a rock, whose 
patriotism was enlightened, (…) and whose public aims were noble. [Possessed of faith] far more 
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earnest than that of Mohammed Abduh, the subject which mainly interested [Bāyram] was how 
to bring Islam and its ways in harmony with modern science.”
121
 Despite such authoritative 
backing, or perhaps because of it, the qadi respectfully deferred the issuing of said fatwa to the 
Shafiʿī Shāykh al-Inbābī and the Ḥanafī Shāykh Muḥammad al-Banna instead. But as Gesink 
notes, Bāyram nonetheless guided them in issuing it, and with not just al-Azhar in mind, but 




The qadi (whose son incidentally later authored one of the authoritative histories of al-
Azhar cited above)
123
 reminded the shāykhs that the institution of scientific disciplines was a 
“fard kifāyah,” that is, an obligation incumbent only upon representative Muslims, and especially 
the ʿulama, since it was a crucial foundation “upon which may be built increased power [qūwah] 
in the Islamic community [umma], considering the need to keep up with [and defend against] 
contemporary nations.” The shāykhs diligently complied, proclaiming in a long fatwa, the 
permissibilty of studying “the mathematical sciences such as arithmetic and geometry, as well as 
geography, because they do not contradict truth. Anything attributed by them to spiritual 
endeavour is needed, just as medicine is necessary, as al-Ghazālī advised in the passages of his 
Iḥyāʾ ‘ulūm al-dīn [The Revival of the Religious Sciences].” A careful caveat however, was 
inserted which determined that “certain aspects of astronomy and astrology are not legitimate.”  
Furthermore, “the natural sciences are permitted, if studied in accordance with the (Shari‘ah) 
law, but forbidden if approached from the point of view of metaphysics. Alchemy is 
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[categorically] prohibited, but chemical experiments are allowed, provided they do not contradict 
the doctrines of Islam.”
124
  
Just like that, a new orthodoxy was being formed, which not only had serious 
implications for the study of amongst other things the esoteric and preternatural disciplines, but 
more importantly, on the very classifications of knowledge themselves as we have seen above. 
As is well known, questions around the acceptability of the occult in the Islamic tradition 
(both past and present) endlessly abound.
125
 A discussion of the various fascinating debates, 
polemics and positions that have been articulated by scholars in the past can not be discussed 
here. Instead, what is to be emphasized is precisely the multiplicity of the different individual 
outlooks and articulations as they have been historically formulated across time and space, and 
which cohere only through the concept of an Islamic discursive tradition (as espoused by Talal 
Asad); in other words through their continual engagement with the founding texts and with one 
another. These various and multilayed articulations defy clear dichotomies between an 
established realm of orthodoxy vs. that of heterodoxy. More importantly, they emphasize the 
epistemological vicinity of the occult sciences within the larger frames and orders of knowledge 
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of which they fully partake, and which Muslim scholars have painstakingly engaged, revised and 
classified in polystructured ways over the course of centuries and continents. The distillation of 
these efforts into a singular ‘position’ (or predefined camps sorted by a scale of doctrinairism 
identified through key protagonists, such as Ibn Taymīyah, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb or Ibn al-
Qayyim al-Jawzīyah on the one hand, and figures like al-Būnī, Ibn al-ʿArabī, or for that matter, 
Ḥasan al-Jabartī, ʿAḥmad al-Damanhūrī and our own al-Kashnāwī, on the other - with al-Ghazālī 
somewhere in the middle) is quite simply untenable.  Even in the case of a single author and text 
(say, Ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddimah, or Ibn al-Nadīm in his Fihrist) or a collectivity (such The 
Epistles of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ), the neglect of the many other textured engagements and 
embodied practices that inform and condition these works can only befuddle our understanding 
of the occult at any given time or place.
126
  
In lieu of such a detailed study, what follows in this section and the next are a few textual 
samples of ideas, practices and attitudes as regards the occult in and around the eighteenth 
century al-Azhar, which are approached as vignettes, or glimpses, of an epistemic order at odds 
with modernity’s prescriptions of knowledge, religion, science, magic etc. Indeed what a non-
modern source such as al-Jabartī’s Ajāʾib reveals is a ‘cosmology’ (in the everyday, not technical 
sense of the word) where the boundaries between the occult and science-proper were tenuous and 
ethereal, and where both fields of knowledge were for the most part evaluated by the ends to 
which these sciences were ultimately put. In other words, the acceptability or not of a particular 
scholarly practice had less to do with its conformity to some pre-assumed dogma, than with its 
implications for the social order. For it is some version of the notion of maṣlaḥah that prompted 
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the intervention of Azhari scholars and authorities in the eighteenth century, and it was a similar 
logic that still governs the regulations at the al-Azhar library today. The difference, as discussed 
above, is due both to the integrative structure of pre-modern knowledge formations (in their 
various branches) and their embodiment in the class of the ʿulama whose everyday lives and 
studies were intricately interwoven into the very fabric of a society over which they exerted 
moral authority.  
Not surprisingly then, al-Jabartī’s text is simply teeming with necrologies and accounts of 
a colorful array of miracle makers and mystics who were often also adroit scholars of fiqh, 
ḥadīth and theology, as well as a broad segment of respected practioners, many of them notable 
names in the annals of Azhari historiography, of what were then known as the “gharīb sciences.” 
As Jane Holt Murphy documents, these men (and sometimes women) produced works on 
subjects such as medicine, mathematics, astronomy and chronology, the manufacture of 
calendrical and astronomical instruments, logic and language, alongside others on astrology, 
alchemy, talismanology, the sciences of letters and magic squares, divination and other subjects 
of the occult that are often noted and discussed by al-Jabartī. Together these texts and persons 
constituted a prominent world, and everyday life, of shared scholarly interests and personal 
networks that was enlivened precisely by these practices and the social and economic prospects 
they afforded at this time. Murphy’s study, along with those of George Saliba and others, 
reintegrate scientific practices and knowledge production within their variable historical 
contexts, and can be seen to belong the broader field of what has come to be called ‘science and 
society.’
127
 My analysis here owes much to these two important interventions, but in espousing a 
notion of the everyday, what I am concerned with is not solely the social manifestations of occult 
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knowledge as lived practice (this is indeed implied throughout), but the occult as expressive of 
the everyday life of the ideas themselves. Rather than attempting to re-conjoin the two realms (of 
life and the mind, or indeed of common or unusual science, with magic altogether excluded), the 
approach I am trying to initiate here begins by questioning the separation and attempts to 
underscore their imbrications within a more whollistic ideal of ʿilm – or knowledge (as 
explicated in the various chapters of this dissertation). 
Indeed there is no evidence whatsoever in the ‘Aja’ib of any essential contradiction 
between legalism and mysticism, traditionalism and spiritualism, textualism and experientialism. 
The examples of the absence of this rift are legion; such as for instance the case of the “learned 
imām Shams al-Dīn” whose nisba included both al-shafiʿī and al-ṣufī in immediate succession; 
or that of the chief qadi of Cairo at mid-century, Sālif Efendī al-Qastamūnī, “a scholar of the 
principles and branches (of juriprudence)” and “a Sufi by bent in piety;” or yet again “the scholar 
and ascetic Ilyās,” whom the author described as a devotee of the traditional and rational 
sciences and “extremely ascetic.”
128
  
Neither the performance of miracles nor occult practices, including notably the predictive 
sciences, were seen by al-Jabartī as incompatible with prevailing normativity. For example, 
Shāykh Shāhīn ibn Mansūr al-Armanāwī, “a learned imām and shāykh of shāykhs,” who taught 
courses at al-Azhar, also predicted the future of certain events to his own teacher in the 
disciplines of abstract reasoning, “Shāykh al-Islām Muḥammad, known as Sibāwayh.”
129
 In this 
example, divination emerges as a perfectly acceptable practice at the highest levels of knowledge 
and indeed, centers of orthodoxy. There are further cases of more extreme examples of esoteric 
performers from the period, such as Shāykh Aḥmad Abū Shūsha, “the guardian of Bab Zuwāyla” 
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whose “wondrous deeds were manifest,” and which included the act of putting 100 needles in his 
mouth without it affecting his eating, drinking or speaking.
130
 In this example (and others) 
seemingly preternatural deeds appear as an integral part of the social and scholarly fabric, often 
displayed in elaborate performances during holy months and festivities. But these do not 
conform to any reading of ‘popular’ beliefs as distinct from religion or scholarship. Indeed, al-
Jabartī explicitly lauds the prominent Medinan mystic Sayyid ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf Bā 
‘Alawī, who is described as a “performer of miracles and recipient of inspired knowledge,” and 
who initiated (with the express permission of the Messenger of God) into his Naqshabandī order 
no less a figure than Shāykh Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindī (the aforementioned teacher of 
Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb).
131
    
As for the occult sciences as a scholarly field, they were clearly not at odds, or even 
separated from other scientific practices. Sayyid Qāsim al-Tunisī, twice the overseer of the 
Maghribī riwāq at al-Azhar, was known for his mastery of both medicine and magic squares.
132
 
As can be expected, and as is more largely the case with alchemy, physiognomy, humoural 
medicine and other fields, astronomy in particular was often connected to astral magic: Ibrāhīm 
al-Zamzamī, for instance, studied astronomy, magic squares and divination in Mecca with the 
chronicler’s famed father Ḥasan al-Jabartī (and, it is further noted, he owned one of only three 
good copies of the astronomical tables of Ulūg Bey al-Samarqandī).
133
 Al-Jabartī often wrote 
many sympathetic necrologies for the celebrated astronomers of his age (most notably, Ḥasan 
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Efendī al-Ruznāmjī, Yusūf al-Kilārjī, Shāykh Ramaḍān al-Ṣafṭī al-Khawanikī, Shāykh Muṣṭafa 
al-Khayyāt, Muḥammad Efendī Kaklimiyan, Amir Riḍwān al-Ṭawīl, and of course his own 
father).
134
 The attention given in the text to astronomy, and astrology by extension, is no doubt 
due to the fact that the author had himself studied it extensively. Throughout his entries, he 
reveals his familiarity with the various branches of the field, and his adeptness in its 
technicalities. Speaking of a cousin of his, he recollects with some degree of nostalgia, perhaps 
typical of a scholar looking back on his earlier formation: “we would stay up most of the night 
observing the rising, setting and movements of the stars on the roofs opposite the twilight. (…) I 
instructed Sīdī Abū Bakr about the method of drawing a quarter of an arched sphere and its 
sine.”
135
 When discussing present conditions under Muḥammad ʿAlī’s rule in the opening 
section of the fourth volume of ʿAjāʾib, al-Jabartī further makes his own astrological 
determinations, as he discusses the settings of planets, and writes that it “is a sign of the stability 
of the present ruler’s dynasty and of hardship for the subjects,” something that is again in 
keeping with the common practice of astrological history as it developed within the tradition.
136
  
Conversely, although this too is in keeping with the tradition, one reads in al-Jabartī’s 
text various instances where occult practices and ideas appear in a lesser light. The discussion of 
Ḥasan al-Jabartī’s trajectory is revealing in this regard: at some point, one of his teacher sought 
to instruct him on some alchemical practice [ṣanʿāt al-ilāhīyah], but Ḥasan al-Jabartī, we are 
told, was reticent “since he wanted to study only such subjects as improved the mind.”
137
 If we 
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were to take this statement at face value, it would imply an ostensible distinction in attitudes 
towards the different branches of the occult; where some (magic squares for instance) are seen as 
worthwhile scholarly pursuits and others (alchemy), not. That may, or may not, be so, but in 
either case the matter is clearly not one of pre-formulated dogmas, for what is perhaps most 
interesting in the account is that Ḥasan al-Jabartī had to empoy “various pretexts to avoid the 
subject,” which would indicate that questions of orthodoxy with regards to these fields were 
never inflexible or even clear-cut.
138
  
Moreover, al-Jabartī, expresses his disapproval of his own of some practices that may be 
associated with the occult. He condescends for example upon the established pilgrimage to 
Shāykh al-‘Afīfī’s tomb, as well as the commoners’ faith in questionable holy men (such as, 
most notably, Sayyid ‘Alī al-Bakrī).
139
 He also approvingly quotes a poem by al-Idkāwī which 
explicitly reviles astrology: “God knows what is, and wherefore the wind blows, and why/the 
firmament turns/Then leave the astrologer to his error, leave his prophecies/For in what he says 
to you there is falsehood/Beware lest you believe him and perish ignorantly, you who/Feign faith 
in one who is doomed/God’s knowledge is hidden, except to his favoured messengers/and 
angels.”
140
 Yet elsewhere, in his necrology of poet Sayyid Jaʿfar al-Baytī al-Saqqāf, he 
appreciatively cites long passages from the scholar’s diwān, including eulogies that employ 
occult content (alchemical, astrological, divinational etc.) both directly and metaphorically.
141
 He 
is likewise sensitive to the issue of the possibility of union with God, as evinced in his discussion 
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of the mystic Ḥusāyn al-Ṭāʾifī, wherein he writes: “there are those who have described him as 
loosening from the noose of compliance and accused him of (believing in) incarnation and union 
(with God), but he was – God willing – innocent of what was ascribed to him.”
142
  And finally, 
he is obviously dismissive of the use of magic for petty or evil purposes (such as lust, for 
example).
143
 But again these objections are never framed in terms of contraventions of any 
proper doctrine, and hence the seeming contradictions in the text between passages that extol 
mysticism, magic or astrology, and others that denounce them. Nor is it ever a question of the 
actual internal belief of the subject, which remains (as the case of Ḥusāyn al-Ṭāʾifī evokes) 
always a matter of the individual’s personal relationship with God.  
Crucially, the main concern for al-Jabartī always seems to lie elsewhere, and these may 
be elucidated by further attention to two events which he narrates concerning public disturbances 
emanating from esoteric matters which led to the decisive involvement of the religious and 
political establishment and its restoring of the social order. Both events entailed interventions by 
Azhari scholars, but interestingly, their respective positions in each case (like those of al-
Jabartī’s in the necrologies just outlined) appear to fall on different sides of the imaginary battle 
between textual religion and popular superstition.  
The first story was that involving the false Takrūrī prophet, which we have already 
encountered at the beginning of this chapter and the previous one. The second story occurred in 
the month of Ramaḍān in the year 1711 (1123 A. H) at a time of intense civil strife between 
competeing Mamluk households, and involves a “Turkish preacher” who rallied the masses with 
                                                 
 
142
 ‘Aja’ib, II: 237/396..  
 
143




denunciations of saint veneration and other superstitious customs. “He established himself,” al-
Jabartī tells us “in the Muʾayyad Mosque…,” where 
[c]rowds came to hear him, and the mosque filled with listeners, most of 
whom were Turks [rūm]. From preaching, he turned to criticizing the practices of 
the people of Egypt concerning saints’ shrines, the lighting of candles and lamps 
at their tombs, and the kissing of the thresholds of these places. He called such 
practices unbelief [kufr], said that people must abandon them, and that it was the 
duty of the authorities to try to abolish them. Furthermore, commenting on what 
al-Shaʿrānī had said in his Ṭabaqāt - namely, that some saints had seen the 
Preserved Tablet in heaven – he said that this was not possible; not even the 
prophets had seen the Preserved Tablet, let alone the saints. He further denounced 
the construction of domes above the tombs of saints [takīyas], claiming that that 
they should be demolished, as well as the loitering of Sufi mendicants at Bāb 
Zuwāylah during the nights of Ramadan. 
 
The preacher’s sermons energized his listeners who in a frenzy of excitement armed 
themselves with clubs and weapons with which they vandalized “ornaments and cut the cloth 
hangings” attached to the saints’ tombs at Bāb Zuwāylah. They further terrorized and taunted 
those who were there, saying “where are the saints [now]?” As a result a group of people 
complained to the ʿulama of al-Azhar who immediately issued a fatwa stating that “the miracles 
of saints do not cease with their death; that it was not right for [the preacher] to deny that the 
saints have seen the Preserved Tablet; and that the ruler ought to restrain him from uttering such 
things.” But the matter did not end there: the preacher subsequently turned his attacks against the 
ʿulama (having challenged them to further debate these questions with him) and even the qāḍī 
ʿaskar, who was for his part subjected to violence at the hands of the angry mob. Finally, the 
Governor intervened with the backing of the leading Mamlūk amīrs, Ibrāhīm Bey and Qīṭās Bey, 
who acquiesced to his complaint that “the crowd had behaved disrespectfully [towards him and 
and his qadi], that the preacher’s intensions were to stir up seditious insurrection and that unless 
something was done, he would leave the city.” The Beys immediately responded by sending a 




and most of his followers had disappeared and those found were beaten, and others banished. 
And thus, “the insurrection was quelled.” A leading poet rendered the story in verses that are 
repeated by al-Jabartī at the close of the narrative:  
A preacher came to Cairo; he strayed from the path of truth.  
He displayed ignorance in sayings that would cause the  
pregnant to miscarry immediately.  
He cast aspersions on certain saints, on whom the principles  
of religion are raised (…).  
He spoke so much prattle, of the sort for which tongues deserve  
to be cut off.  
He went too far, was outrageous and haughty, and stirred up  
the troops against us (…)  
[The Governor] urged the amirs and sancak beys to bestir themselves  
and suppress [the crowd] decisively.  
So they rose against him in truth, and they did away with [them] all  
The preacher fled, or, as it was rumoured, was killed. Ignominy  
settled upon him.  
God has preserved us from this trouble. Refer to him as “a  
sickening reproach.”  
Al-Badrī, who is called Ḥasan, calls him a hypocrite and an  
unbeliever.  





Rather than exposing anachronistic notions of orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy, these events 
should again be read as evidence of the centrality of the ʿulama in al-Jabartī’s world-view. The 
ʿulama serve here as a sort of ethical compass embedded in the social and political body. Neither 
story moreover, involves notions of blasphemy as unbelief (even for an author as explicitly pious 
as al-Jabartī), but rather both hinge on issues of public order, or maṣlaḥa. The turning point in 
the first story for instance was not the revelation of the true inner feelings of its protagonist, 
instead what the scholars at al-Azhar sought to prevent was the seduction of the populace and the 
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disruption of a fragile equilibrium.
145
 In the second story, and for the same reasons, al-Jabartī, 
can be seen to take the other side in the mêlée, backing the position of the the ʿulama in their 
defense of supposedly un-orthodox or superstitious practices. 
 
Let us return now more directly to al-Kashnāwī and Durr al-manẓūm to draw out a few 
points that may better explain the various interwoven arguments detailed in this chapter.  
 
Al-Durr al-Manzūm: Glimpses of an Esoteric Episteme 
As stated above, al-Durr al-manẓūm is an abridged commentary of the more famous 
work, al-Sirr al-maktūm fī mukhāṭabāt al-nujūm (attributed to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, d.1209), and 
it too concerns itself with three interlapping spheres of the occult sciences: siḥr (astral magic, as 
conditioned by ʿilm al-nujūm wa ‘l-tanajjum more largely); ʿilm al-ṭalāsim (talismanology); and 




The extended prolegomena [khuṭbat al-kitāb] outline the contents of the book and 
anchors the more technical chapters which follow, into a larger world-view, for it is in these 
sections that the author justifies his venture most explicitly, and orients the reader in approaching 
the work. It is also here that al-Kashnāwī speaks of his pilgrimage and the immediate context and 
conditions for his composing the book.  
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For reasons of historiographical bias that were detailed above, these prefatory passages 
have been read as evoking the author’s racial and scholarly estrangement from the heartland of 
Arab orthodoxy, and thus as confirming the particular affinity between ‘African Muslims’ 
personified by al-Kashnāwī and the engagement with the occult.
147
 To the contrary, I will argue 
that these sections paint an utterly different picture than that conforming to the conventional 
contours delineated by assumptions concerning the dualities of Africa/Islam, occult/real science 
and orthodox/heterodox. They reveal instead a thoroughly integrated world of scholarship, where 
“Africans” and “Arabs” (and not doubt many others) rubbed shoulders continuously, and, most 
importantly, one in which the domains of the occult were not barricaded from other disciplines, 
but rather partook in a wider scientific cosmos grounded in an embodied ethics of learning. My 
reading of the text, and these passages specifically, provincializes orthodoxy (both religious and 
scientific), and normalizes the occult, the superstitious, the charismatic. Indeed, there is nothing 
in the structure and positioning of the text (as expressed most compactly in the introduction) that 
would differentiate it from any other scholarly work in another field of learning. Crucially, the 
problem of magic (or the occult more largely), like in the case of al-Jabartī and his Azhari 
colleagues, is never mobilized by al-Kashnāwī as a simple matter of belief, but one of public 
implications. 
 
Al-Durr al-manẓūm opens, in formulaic fashion, by bestowing thanks to God for its 
author’s safe and privileged arrival to the Ḥaramāyn: 
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In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful, may His prayers be upon 
our master Muḥammad and upon his family and companions: Oh Allāh 
[allāhuma], there is no gratitude [ḥamd] due but to You and no dependence 
[tawakkūl] except upon You, for You are Sufficient [inta al-makāfī] and the 
Forgiver of my shortcomings in fulfilling my duty to thank You [īdā ḥaqq wājib 
shukrak]. I take refuge in You and repent for my knowledge [istaghfarak wa 
ʾātūbu ilāyk liʿilmī] for none can forgive sins but You. None but You can provide 
[yuʿīnunī] for me, or preserve my interests and assist my condition [yudabir ḥālī] 





Al-Kashnāwī then reaffirms his proclamation of the faith: “ashhadu ana lā ilāha ila ant, 
waḥdaka lā sharīk lak,” before describing God by the miracle of His celestial creations:  
I bear witness that You are the the Creator of the celestial universes [al-aflāk] 
and what they contain of planets [kawākib] and those which are owned [al-āmlāk] 
and the two earths [al-arḍayn] and what they contain of lands [al-barārī] and 
meadows [al-murūj] and seas [al-abḥār].And I bear witness that the seal of Your 
creations [khulaṣat khalqiq] and revealers of Your grace [muẓhir faḍlak] 




In the next segment, he continues to express gratitude even as he describes his 
providential journey to the Hijaz, and the opportunity it conferred to visit God’s House and his 
Prophet. The experience of the ḥajj is expressed here not simply as the fulfillment of a normative 
obligation, but moreover, as a spiritual gratification, which the author duly accentuates along 
with the power of God’s hidden hand in directing all his affairs.  
At this point, he also begins to weave in an explanation of the circumstances that 
prompted his desire to write al-Durr al-manzūm, which are relayed through his equally fortuitous 
encounters with certain individuals during his stay in the holy city: according to al-Kashnāwī, it 
was written at the behest of a Meccan notable by the name of Ismāʿīl bin Ḥamza al-Duḥāydiḥ to 
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whom al-Kashnāwī had been introduced by a “friend” and fellow Sudanese pilgrim, Yūnus b. 
Muḥammad al-Ḥawsāwī al-Kanāwī. He writes: 
 
[In] Mecca al-Musharafa, may God increase her honor and greatness, (…) I 
came upon a veritable friend [al-muḥib al-ṣahīḥ], the righteous and sincere, of 
pure descent and noble distinction, our brother in God the Exalted, Shaykh Yūnus 
b. Muḥammad al-Sūdānī al-Ḥawsāwī al-Kanāwī who sojourns in God’s land, the 
sanctuary, may He improve his condition and remove his restriction [fak 
asrahu]… 
He wanted me to meet with him [al-Duḥāydiḥ] and relate to him something of 
what I know of the secret sciences and their letter-based types [al-ʿulūm al-
siḥrīyah wa anwāʿiha al-ḥarfīyah]. So he [al-Kanāwī] pursued me on this matter 
with plentiful and exaggerated laudation [of al-Duḥāydiḥ], his pleasing 
dispositions, and his graceful virtues until he had me lean towards appreciating 
him [istamālnī…īlā maḥabatihi] for it is normal to love those who are loved by 
one’s companions, and “it may be that you hate something that is good for you” 





Al-Kashnāwī repeats more than once that it was only at al-Kanāwī’s continual urging, 
that he grudgingly agreed to meet with al-Duḥāydiḥ: “He kept inciting me to this matter, and I 
refusing [fa mā zāl yuḥaridunī ʿalā dhālika ’l-āmr wa ānā āmtaniʿ] …until finally I agreed 
simply to avoid any blame or rebuke but not for the sake of any true acceptance [ʿalā sabīl al-
khurūj min al-malāmah lā lī ajl al-ṭāʿah al-ḥaqīqīyah]. And so I met with that faḥl [important 




One reason which he gives for his initial uncertainties is framed in broad terms along 
what he viewed as the unethical treatment by the Hijazians of others in their midst:  
I was suspicious of him because I find that in most cases in these lands, they 
don’t like anyone, especially if he be of our people the Sudanese, [lā yuhibūna 
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aḥadan, khuṣūsan man yakūn min jinsuna al-sūdāniyīn] except where they seek to 
benefit from him but without any real affection or true care. And when they attain 
what they want of him, they abandon him [iʿtazalūhu] and he becomes to them 





This passage has been read as evidence of racist thinking, implying a haughty disdain on 
the part of Arabs towards black Africans. Stefan Reichmuth attributes al-Kashnāwī’s 
reservations to his having “gained his own experiences with Arabs which made him careful,” but 
that al-Duḥāydiḥ “finally proved to be an exception; in the end al-Kašnâwî  found him as cordial 
as his people at home,” and he goes on to cite al-Kashnāwī’s description of the generous 
treatment of strangers that he had known amongst the qualities of the Sudanese [ahl bilāduna],
 
before concluding: “In these remarks al-Kašnâwî, apart from his nostalgia, shows a clear sense of 
being differenciated by his African social habits from the Arabs among whom he lived. At one 




This analysis wildly overstates the simple self-reference to “jinsuna al-sūdāniyīn.” When 
he discusses his interactions with al-Duḥāydiḥ, nothing of the sort can be read into al-
Kashnāwī’s words, quite the contrary:  “all the while I was examining his loyalty and the 
sincerity of his friendship and other things of his conditions one after the other until it became 
clear to me as is the daylight that the man is all that Shāykh Yūnus had described him to be and 
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more for his qualities were immeasurable… and so I thanked God for this and for making shāykh 
Yūnis a path [in this regard]”
154
 Indeed, in the course of their readings, the two men appear to 
have forged a great friendship and mutual respect and affection for one another that gradually 
placated al-Kashnāwī’s initial suspicions: “I found him to be the opposite of what I had 
suspected. I found him of highest ability (qadran) amongst those of his times, the widest of 
chest, most bountiful of forebearance [ḥilm] and mind, the most robust in chivalry, the most 
exquisite of dispositions, the deepest in glory and the most loyal to his promises.”
155
 And he then 
proceeds to extol at length al-Duḥāydiḥ’s exceptional virtues, asking God to improve his lot and 
enhance his standing in both worlds.  
Rather than racial distinction, predicated on modern subjectivities of Arab vs. African, 
what is certainly palpable in this segment and elsewhere is al-Kashnāwī’s sense of relief at 
having had fears of abandonment and destitution assuaged. Such alienation of the mujāwir 
cannot be solely reduced to being an ‘outsider in a host land’ (let alone the haramāyn a space 
theoretically conceived and experienced as God’s sanctuary and the abode of Islam tout court). 
Denoting the intense sacrifice and hardship one endures for the sake of God’s pleasure as his 
devoted servant, the trope of exile was a central aspect of the ideal of talab al-‘ilm: it emanates 
from the scholar’s acute awareness of being in a perpetual quest for learning, and to the pious 
conviction that ultimately all are guests in this world, and especially the pilgrim. Any sense of 
exile or “nostalgia” that al-Kashnāwī may have felt would thus have been part and parcel of the 
condition of mujāwarah writ large – and what is longed for is partly one’s real home, but also a 
spiritual home. Such yearnings reverberate through al-Kashnāwī’s own words and are most 
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perceptible in poignant verses he had written which very much epitomize a journey, both 
spiritual and actual, in the typically self-deprecating tone of he who seeks to settle his worldly 
soul in knowing anticipation that its true enlightenment is in the World to come, and through 
which al-Jabartī chose to conclude his necrology:  
I sought a domicile in every land, but I found no domicile  
for me on earth. 
I followed my ambitions, and they enslaved me; had I been 




The connections between exile, mujāwarah, pilgrimage and ṭalab al-ʿilm, are further 
marked in the formulaic opening of the text itself: always critical statements of intended 
beginnings, they flag authorship, piety, eloquence as well as the contents and aims of the text to 
come. In the case of al-Durr, they evoke a mantra of thanksgiving accompanied by enunciations 
recognizing that it is God alone, who determines one’s affairs. Indeed this discourse of gratitude 
and acceptance of one’s predicament is performed throughout the framing openings and resounds 
through the rest of al-Kashnāwī’s text.  
 
Another reason which al-Kashnāwī gives for his reluctance to pursue al-Duḥāydiḥ’s 
proposal is of direct interest to us here in as much as it concerns the acceptability of the occult in 
Meccan society of that time. He relates that he had been advised by those who considered him 
dearly (“qad awṣānī wa naṣaḥanī min al-aḥibah) and who were not to be faulted for their 
sincerity and astute judgment that he must not boast of his involvements in the occult sciences 
while on his travels:  
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If I reached the countries of the East [al-bilād al-mashriqīyah] and especially 
the Ḥaramāyn, I should not reveal to any of their inhabitants that I know 
something of those letter-based sciences, and what is resembles them of the sand-
based sciences, [tilk al-ʿulūm al-ḥarfīyah wa ma tashbahuha min al-ramlīyya], on 
account of their prevalent uses in these countries for causing corruption, 
tribulations and dissension [among people] in plain sight of those of discerning 
minds [li mā yataratab ʿalā taʿāṭīhā ghāliban fī tilk al-bilādi min al-mafāsid 




This would appear to corroborate the position of the director of the al-Azhar library (al-
Mudīr, cited in the second segment of this chapter) when referring to the statement of a Sudanese 
acquaintance concerning the prevalence of the occult in the most ‘central’ of Islamic heartlands, 
in turn disrupting the africanity that scholars may be tempted to associate with the occult 
sciences in Islam.
158
 More importantly the passage makes clear that the primary concern once 
again is pegged to the uses to which occult knowledge is put, and the modalities of its 
applications.  
Indeed in terms that are reminiscent of Ḥasan al-Jabartī’s reticence to study subjects 
which did not “impove the mind,” Al-Kashnāwī states that at their initial meeting he 
categorically stipulated as a condition to his agreement to instruct the Meccan that they focus 
their readings on ‘quality works,’ and above all, on what he considered most beneficial and 
fruitful for the next world as well as this one [ma narāhu anfaʿ wa akthar jawdah wa ārjā 
thamran fī’l-ākhirati wa’l-ūūla].
159
 To this clause, his prospect student acquiesced, and in this 
manner they proceeded for some time. And again as in the examples drawn from al-Jabartī in the 
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preceding section, for al-Kashnāwī and his loyal counsellers, the chief objection to practices 
emanating from the occult sciences that is underscored was their potential in causing corruption 
and discord, and the incapacity of ‘those of discerning minds,’ presumably the ʿulama, in 
protecting the people from such harm.  
It is in this vein that the above mentioned qaṣīdah attacking astrologers (the Rāʾīyah fī 
dhamm al-Munajjimīm attributed to Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Wālī) should be 
apprehended.
160
 Given al-Kashnāwī’s dealings in astrology and other occult sciences, his 
tutelage under al-Wālī, and indeed his express esteem for his teacher for whom he had composed 
a hagiographic eulogy, scholars have not surprisingly questioned the attribution of this poem. 
Further complicating matters is al-Kashnāwī inclusion in the authoritative isnād for his work on 
magic squares (Bahjat al-āfāq) of a certain “Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Fullānī al-Māsīnī, father 
of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, known as al-Wālī.”
161
 As Brenner notes, this in addition to al-
Wālī’s documented interest in rational Sanūsian theology, which at this time was closely 
integrated with the initiatic esoteric practices (of the kabbe) would suggest that al-Wālī may have 
been trained in these disciplines.
162
 Or at any rate, the isnād would link him through his own 
father to al-Kashnāwī and Mūhammad al-Bindū, from whom al-Kashnāwī (according to al-
Jabartī) received these sciences, and beyond that to figures such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Biṣtāmī 
(d. 1454); ʿAḥmad al-Būnī (d. 1225); and the prophet’s nephew, ʿAlī ibn abī Ṭālib and all the 
way back to the first man and God’s viceregent on earth, Adam, himself.
163
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In as much as al-Kashnāwī’s scholarly trajectory testifies to a broad, polymathic and 
comprehensive program of scholarship where the occult and ‘actual’ sciences were seamlessly 
integrated alongside one another, Brenner is right to conclude that it would be perfectly 
reasonable that al-Wālī too would have had many varied interests. Indeed, al-Jabartī’s necrology 
indicates that neither al-Kashnāwī nor his teachers could be differentiated by strict fields of 
specialization, but are reported to have been fluent in many domains of scholarship: geomancy, 
magic, mathematical and calendrical devices are mentioned in the same breath as syntax, logic, 
transmission of traditions, eloquence and jurisprudence. The seeming paradox between al-Wālī’s 
possible authorship of the Rāʾīyah and his attachments to al-Kashnāwī is in some sense then a 
red herring, for these features need not be mutually exclusive in the first place. 
The oversight in foregrounding this organic permutation of esoteric and exoteric sciences 
is in part due to the strictures of the modern orders of knowledge that have been already 
discussed. But in the case of the historiography on Islam in Africa, it is further compounded by 
the general lack of adequate attention to the intellectual role of the occult sciences.
164
 The 
emphasis rather has been on the social dimensions of occult practices and, as Hanretta notes, is 
often juxtaposed to “textualized Islamic doctrines” thereby precipitating discussions of the 
militant orthodoxy of reformists such al-Maghīlī, Usmān dan Fodio and other key protagonists of 
the literature. For instance, justifications for the Sokoto jihād are often rendered comprehensible 
through dogmatic discourses of takhlīt (syncretism) and takfīr (declarations of unbelief), and in 
many cases these tendencies are attributed to external Arab influences (such as Wahhabī 
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Here again Brenner’s work stands out as a rare corrective in shunning the jihād-centricist 
propositions identified by Hanretta (and Orientalist distinctions between theory and practice that 
inform them), and instead the esoteric dimensions of the Shehu’s thought (evinced in his own 
Sufi-inspired expressions of religiosity). Likewise his reading of the Shehu’s condemnations of 
the “mutakallimun,” demonstrates that far from an outright doctrinaire dismissal of theology, 
esotericism or occult knowledge, these were rather refutations of the “sectarian,” and hence 
divisive, doctrines of the kabbenkoobe according to which only those “who could recite the texts 
of the kabbe were true Muslims.” To these claims, the Shehu responded emphatically: “any 
person who affirmed the shahada was a Muslim and could fulfil his duties and obligations 
simply by following the lead of the ʿulama. (…) what a person believed was a matter between 
himself and God, and could not be judged by his fellowmen.”
166
  
A careful reading of the Rāʾīyah makes clear that its author had similar concerns in mind 
when denouncing astrologers, i.e. the harm to which such knowledge may be put. The qaṣīdah 
opens with the lament: “How sorry I am for those who divine from the stars/ They have 
corrupted the religion and begot all harms [“ma ʿadhīrī min unāsin najjamū /afsadu ’l-dīn wa 
abdaw kul ḍarar].”
167
 While the poem accuses astrologers of “abandoning the knowledge of the 
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Revelation [tarakū ʿilm al-kitāb al-munzal]  (…) tradition (…) and the jurisprudential sciences 
[ʿulūm al-sharʾ wa’l-fiqh] which benefit humankind and protect from peril;” the emphasis 
throughout the succeeding verses is especially on those who employ such knowledge (whether 
actually or by way of deceit) for worldly personal gains: pecuniary in the first place [li ʾiktisāb 
al-māl] but also for the sake of attaining status or special favour, and perhaps most gravely, for 
creating mischief between people, exploiting the unsuspecting and/or diverting them, and 
themselves from the correct path: “They have been diverted by their acquisitive nature from the 
most important concerns to the ephemeral things (of this world) which do not endure/They prefer 
the world to the Hereafter/They are not concerned with what harm will come…[ātharu al-dunyā 
ʿalā ākhirāhum/ wa lam yubālu mā yuʾudīhum liḍarin].”
168
  
It is, then, as a form of protection (both of himself and the world around him) that al-
Kashnāwī was advised by his friends to conceal what he knew of the concealed, so to speak: “I 
came to him [al-Ḍuḥāyḍiḥ] and we read in his home for the sake of concealment and so as to 
extinguish any fires of intrigue [that may arise, ṭalban li’l-khafīyah wa iṭfāʾ li-nār al-fitnah]”
169
  
Moreover, the poem does not deny the possibility of humans achieving “secret knowledge” in 
itself but underlines who it is that is worthy of its accomplishment, “the friends of God and 
masters of discernment” [awliyāʾ Allāh, aṣḥāb al-naẓar wa āhl al-baṣar], for the occult sciences 
require a requisite disposition on the part of their practitioners – and this might explain why al-
Kashnāwī launches into a extended celebrations of his Meccan courtier’s ethical character, 
which also tallies with the evaluation, later on in the book, of the virtues and misuses of the 
secret sciences.  
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Unfortunately, al-Kashnāwī gives no further details of these reading sessions, but he does 
provide some comments concerning his approach to composing the text. “And we remained,” he 
writes,  
in this state of reading and attaining books on magic squares [al-kutub al-
wafaqīyah] and magical illusion [al-nīrandjīyah] and several other registers 
[ʿiddah min al-taqāyīd], until one day admidst our discussions, the conversation 
turned to the book al-Sirr al-maktūm and its compilation of many astrological, 
talismanic and magical benefits and other multiple kinds [jamʿīyatahu li-ākthar 
al-fawāʾid al-nujūmīyah wa’l-ṭalsamīyah wa’l-siḥrīyah wa’l-nīrandjīyah bi 
ʾanwāʿiha al-samīyah wa ghayrahā]. From this I understood a desire on his part 
to read the aforementioned book, which was in my possession. I brought it to him 





Al-Kashnāwī does not give the name of the author of this book in this segment but it is 
most likely the celebrated theologian philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.1209), whom al-
Kashnāwī appears to have greatly admired, and with whose work he was intimately familiar. He 
then explains that the introduction to the book was long and complicated, expounding various 
points of natural philosophy [al-ʿulūm al-ajnabīyah al-ṭabīʿīyah] and others that in al-
Kashnāwī’s estimation were not geared to the novice student seeking to learn the magical 
sciences. This then prompted him to produce an abridged commentary:  
So I began to summarize the text as stated and when I wrote some folios or 
more, I gave him [al-Duḥāydiḥ] that précis. He examined it in depth and was 
pleased with the manner and course that I presented [aʿjabahu al-naḥw aladhī 
naḥutuhu wa’l-maslak aladhī salaktahu] because it eased matters for him greatly 
by simplifying the benefits to be attained from it [tashīl al-fawāʾid] and 
summarizing it aims [ṭalkhīs al-maqāṣid] so that it may be more easily understood 
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Al-Kashnāwī’s method of simplification, which he describes in his own words as being 
of a strange and unusual type (“hadhā al-namaṭ al-ʿajīb wa’l-islūb al-gharīb”) was above all a 
practical one driven entirely by the needs and desires of his student (and presumably patron at 
this stage), a point which he is keen to underscore (“hadhā huwa maṭlūbuhu,” “ishtāqat nafsihu 
ʿalā hadhā” etc.)
172
 This maneuver repeatedly underscores the pragmatic and didactic dimension 
of the work, and also gives us a sense of how embedded these sciences were in the everyday life 
of students and scholars. Everything is geared towards the simplification and distillation of the 
original classic.  
Again al-Kashnāwī tells us: “I capitulated to his wishes and delivered on his needs and 
exerted great effort and mental energies to collate the different statements [in the book] and 
organize them by their resembling characters and every correspondence to an overarching 
heading [jamʿ shitāt tilk al-ʿibārāt bi’ḍamm kulli shabbah īlā shabīhah wa kulli naẓīr īlā 
naẓīrah] and elucidating its meanings that often read like riddles [al-ghāz] (…)” Until finally 
there emerged a text that brought together what was “in that book [al-sirr al-maktūm] and that 
was free of the stresses of eloquence [mukhil ʾījāz] or the monotony of verbosity [malal ʾiṭnāb].” 
The original text, we are told, was great and well known, but had become like “a 
necklace that has been cut, and whose seeds were scattered [kaʾanahu ʿiqdun inqaṭaʿa silkahu 
wa tabaddat ḥabātuhu].” However, due to al-Kashnāwī abridgment and the extracting of what is 
valuable in al-Rāzī’s book, the new text has made the contents, course and concerns of the latter 
more easily reachable [suhila bihi tanāwaluhu wa quriba masālikahu wa inḍabaṭat masāʾilahu], 







so that its arguments became clearer [tabāyanat aḥkāmuhu] to every student and seeker without 
“blurring thought or causing confusion [min ghāyr tashwīsh fikr wa lā ḥīrah].”
173
   
Despite the modest inflection in these passages that are intended to convey his faithful 
approach to the original, the al-Kashnāwī is at the same time keen to stress his own authorship: 
“but with all this [restructuring]” he tells us, “this book of ours is not devoid of good additions 
[ziyādāt tustaḥsan] and notifications that cannot be ignored [tanbīhāt latustahjan], which are 
required by the beginner [al-mubtadī] but also useful to the expert [al-muntahī]. For this reason,” 
he concludes, “I named it “al-Durr al manẓūm wa khulāsat al-sirr al-maktūm” [The Ordered 
Pearls and the Summa of “al-Sirr al-maktūm” – the Hidden Secret] and I organized it into an 
introduction and conclusion and five chapters and have provided its subject matters for those 
who wish to understand its contents as a whole [ijmālan].”
174
 
Less linear than the author would suggest, the text is in fact structured through 
overlapping secitions that are not always easy to navigate, and is certainly not free of repetitions. 
That aside, the extended introduction begins by addressing the place of the occult sciences within 
a broader discussion of the virtues of knowledge (to which we will return). While he treats these 
fields separately, al-Kashnāwī indicates that all three are finally based on the determination of 
the nature and characteristics of the spheres [al-kawākib] and their earthly active vectors [al-
qawābil al-arḍīyya al-munfaʿila]. Under each heading he provides a definition of terms and of 
the main aims of the science in question and gives brief sketches of debates that relate to certain 
details or aspects concerning the locations and influence of the planets as they played out in the 
tradition. His own position, which is interwoven in his discussion of ṭalāsim, is clearly defined 














The subsequent three chapters then elaborate on various dimensions of the three fields. 
For example, for magic, [al-siḥr] he delineates four major schools [mathahib] and engages also 
judgments concerning the teaching and application of this knowledge. Here he draws a 
distinction between magic that is “true” [al-siḥr al-ḥaqīqīy] and that which is “un-true” [al-ghāyr 
ḥaqīqīy] relying instead on forms of illusion and prestidigitation.
176
 The different approaches for 
marshalling the the former in the four methods or schools are further elaborated. Thus we learn 
amongst other things that the Indian method [ṭarīqat ahl al-hind] was based in the first instance 
on the purification of the soul and the suspension of illusion [taṣfiyat al-nafs wa taʿlīq al-wahm]; 
the Nabatean method [al-nabṭ] revolved principally around the invitation and supplication of the 
planets [ʿazāʾm wa taḍḍarʿāt al-kawākib]; the Greek [al-yūnān] entailed the subjugation of the 
planetary spirits by way of fasting and sacrifices [taskhīr rawḥānīyāt al-kawākib bi’l-ṣiyām wa’l-
qurbānāt]; and finally, the way of the Hebrews, the Copts and the Arabs [al-ʿibrānīyah, al-qibāṭ 




Throughout these sections, and especially when outlining the properties and astral 
influences of the zodiacal signs [al-burūj], al-Kashnāwī thus displays extensive knowledge of 
scientific and cosmological theories that had prevailed over the centuries in all of the Islamic, 
Christian and Jewish traditions, as well as their precursors in classical Antiquity. And often, he 
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engages these various strands in a critical fashion: as for example, his five “complaints” of Greek 
speculations on the force of zodiacal provocations upon humankind (personal traits, illnesses, 
physical appearances, classes amongst people) as well as their effects on countries, plants, 
minerals, animals, water bodies and winds. Or for instance, in his discussion, of the views of 
those he calls “the previous,” presumably pre-Islamic, Arabs [al-ʿarab al-qudamāʾ] on the seven 
itinerant planets [al-kawākib al-sabaʿah al-sayārah], their various natures (masculine/feminine, 
night/day, east/west), powers and effects, and their ability to impact one’s fortunes [al-saʿāda aw 
al-nuḥūsa]. 
Moreover, under the discussion of ʿilm al-ṭalāsim [talismanology], he provides a dazzling 
list of the many functions to which talismanic seals may be put, drawing on such authorities as 
Abū Thāṭīs and Zakhīra al-Iskandar, and their correspondence to each of the seven planets and 
their known natures and methods for their subjugation.
178
 Encompassing almost every aspect of 
everyday human life, these sections read very much like a step by step manual, and for al-
Kashnāwī they categorically affirm the premise that for “every earthly movement or section, 
there is a guiding spirit [li’kulli juzʾīyah aw ḥarakah arḍīyah, rūḥan mudabbirah…]”. 
This claim is repeated at various points throughout the book, and if taken in conjunction 
with the all encompassing modalities and applications of the occult sciences, is indicative of 
what I have been calling here the everyday life of the occult as a vital component of knowledge 
writ large. Thus in expounding the ideals of absolute knowledge [al-ʿilm al-muṭlaq], al-
Kashnāwī reiterates the basic principle of the convergence of belief, knowledge and practice: 
where knowledge (both semantically and symbolically) represented ontological and 
epistemological frames that point invariably to agency in speech and thought, as well as belief or 
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action (the basic tenet being the requisite permutation of knowledge with action based upon it), 
and together they arguably encompass all aspects of worldly and other-worldly existence.  
Following his introduction, al-Kashnāwī then, moves to describe science [ʿilm] and its 
virtues, along with the qualities and conditions incumbent upon its practitioners, in ways that 
clearly resonate with the type of non-modern orders of knowledge that this dissertation has as a 
whole sought to underscore. He begins by contrasting the virtue of “absolute knowledge” to 
“absolute ignorance.” “Know that science and wisdom [al-ʿilm wa’l-hikma],” he writes, “cleanse 
souls from the filth of tenebrous/vile natures just as soap cleans clothes.” And he goes on to 
explain, on the basis largely of a few classical sources and formal affirmations that the essence of 
knowledge is to grasp what changes, not that which is static or current. He quotes Socrates as 
proclaiming “is alive not he who indulges in appetites and kills the soul by plunging it in 
immediate desires; he is alive who knows of the extinguished desires of the past, and becomes 
certain that what will come next is like the past in its ephemerality...” Building on dichotomies 
contrasting knowledge and habit, the spiritual and the bodily/natural, al-Kashnāwī thus develops 
a notion of the live, enlightened soul as the one that gets beyond its current, immediate existence 
to embrace wisdom of a deeper, more enduring and more powerful nature.
179
 
Having formulated the fundamental idea of the virtue of knowledge in general, al-
Kashnāwī delves into the details of the virtues of the secret sciences in particular. “This 
knowledge,” he begins, “is of the most delectable and most noble of sciences because it provides 
the secrets of the other/higher and nether/lower world [al-ʿālam al-ʿalawī wa’l-suflī], because it 
makes one an observer of and converser with the spirits [mushāhidan li’l-ruhānīyyāt wa 
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mukhāṭiban lahum], indeed, it causes one to become mixed with them [the spirits, that is], and as 
if one with them [mukhṭaliṭan bihum wa kū [sic.] wāḥidan minhum].”
180
  
At a more concrete level, al-Kashnāwī  then outlines five basic virtues of the secret 
sciences, to which he adduces examples and references, often classical (i.e. Greek) but also 
sometimes Islamic: first, it allows its practitioners to cure difficult diseases that medical doctors 
cannot; it lets one vanquish one’s adversaries without going to war; it can give tidings of events 
before they occur; it may save the oppressed from the clutches of tyranny; and finally, its permits 
the observation and manipulation of things from afar.
181
However, the achievement of such 
objectives (which are further detailed in the sections devoted to each branch of the various 
subfields of talismanology, magic and nīrandj) is conditional upon a entire series of requirements 
on the part of the practitioner, which are then outlined in great detail, first for the secret sciences 
as a whole and in general, and then, for each field more specifically. The general requisites are 
most fascinating, as they provide for the type of ethical subjects, character traits and embodied 
practices that al-Kashnāwī envisioned as the human, personal, relational horizon upon which his 
scholarship depended.  
There are, in total, twelve “absolute, general and comprehensive conditions” for works in 
the secret sciences [al-shurūṭ al-‘āmmah al-muṭlaqah al-shāmilah li’l-aʿmāl al-talsamīyah wa’l-
siḥrīyah wa’l-ḥarfīyah].
182
 The first condition that the practioner be “absolutely certain and 
determined in the completion of the work, because whosoever does such a work while 
harbouring doubts will not benefit from it.” The logic is quite straightforward: since spirits only 
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answer when one wholeheartedly believes in them, soul power [al-quwwah al-nafsānīyah] is 
crucial to the work, and is compromised by uncertainty. On this point, the subsequent warning 
(tanbīh) that follows explains that the prerequisite is confirmed by both reason and transmitted 
through tradition (al-‘aql wa’l-naql): and two further authoritative prophetic statements [aḥadīth 
ṣaḥīḥah] are cited (including the commonly known, ‘innamā ’l-aʿmālu bi’l-nīyyat’)].
183
  
The second condition echoes the first, and involves the “continuance upon the service 
[i.e. the work] and the avoidance of boredom and weariness [al-dawām ‘alā ’l-khidmah wa 
ʿadam al-malal wa’l-sāmah”].” This point is explained further, with quotes attributed to 
Aristotle and from other proverbial sayings.
184
   
The third condition is the vow of secrecy, concealment or silence [al-kitmān] which we 
have already encountered above in his description of his reading sessions with al-Ḍuḥāyḍiḥ, 
upon which he further elaborates: “the scholars and sages have agreed that one of the conditions 
of these sciences is al-kitmān for it is done in an empty place [fi mawḍiʿin khālī], where no one 
can see the practioner, who in turn may not say to anyone ‘I did this, and I didn’t do this, and 
such and such was done to so and so’.” Again, the point is elaborated upon, with classical 
sources mobilized to explain why. In large part, this too has to do with some form of maṣlaḥah, 
since the fear is that the knowledge should not fall into the hands of the wrong people (those full 
of conceit, pride, and who are driven by concerns of achieving flattery and power, or who would 
use it to further vile ends in this world, with disregard for the next).
185
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This leads the author to the fourth condition: piety/devotion (al-ṭaqwah): “and in piety is 
included the consuming what is ḥālal, the avoidance doing harm to others [tark idhāyat al-nās], 
restraint from falsehood, slander and self-aggrandizement, and the adherence to sincerity, the 
giving of friendly advice to both common folk and elite [al-naṣīḥah li-ʿāmmati ’l-khalq wa 
khāṣṣatihim], and to regard with them with mercy, compassion, and sympathy [wa’l-nadhr 
ilayhum biʿayn al-raʾfah wa’l-raḥmah wa’l-shafaqah].” “And this is why,” he continues, “the 
Imām al-Rāzī originally said, ‘all scholars and sages agreed that, concerning the practitioner of 
this science, the more he seeks and approaches the good, the more successful his work will be, 
for whosoever fears God, then everything becomes subservient and obedient to him.”
186
  
The next two conditions involve the frequency and objectives in the utilization of the 
secret sciences: it should not be overused (since, by calling on the spirits too often diminishes 
potency) or employed for petty goals (for which other means can be called upon).
187
  
The seventh condition concerns the ‘soul’ of the practitioner, which must be a “live soul, 




The next three conditions return to procedural matters of the efficiency of the practice: it 
requires the full description [tashkhīs] of the person on which the art is to have an affect, 
including a full physiognomic description, and not just naming; and one must remember by heart 
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The eleventh condition evokes the need for an ijāza from a shāykh authorizing the 
practice of the science: “and it is learned and gained by obtention and earning from shāykhs in 
the same manner as a (political) pledge [ka’l-baīʿah] or the instruction or inspiration [talqīn] of 
the sufis [ʿinda’l-sādah al-ṣufīyah].” Al-Kashnāwī furthermore cautions that “whoever learns 
this science without obtaining such an ijāza is like the child without a father to whom he can 
relate and from whom he may be instructed.”
190
 
Finally, the last condition is also the most obviously technical: a basic knowledge of 
astronomical observation [al-raṣd, wa huwa al-ruṣūdāt al-falakīyah wa’l-ittiṣalāt al-
kawkabīyah] is essential. And, indeed, much of the subsequent lessons he then ellucidates 
involve the effect of celestial forces.
191
 
These then are only the most general requisitions for practical and scholarly engagements 
in the secret sciences in large– others are further mentioned specifically for more particular fields 
(often involving such things as calibrated periods of fasting, sacrifices and other ritual 
commitments, for example, among others).  
 
*       *       * 
 
To conclude, what is most striking with these conditions is the extent to which they 
resemble the contours of the epistemic fields of other disciplines in that time and place (such as 
for instance al-Jabartī’s practice of history): an embodied ethics of learning, an almost physical 
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proximity to the subject-matter, a focus on the ends and results of the science, a relational system 
of validation and transmission. Al-Kashnāwī’s text, and the introduction in particular, certainly 
bespeaks of an “esoteric episteme,” in Brenner’s terms, but there was nothing African or 
heterodox about it: its countours are farther-reaching extending to a larger edifice of knowledge 
production and transmission wherein the occult, the rational and the transmitted sciences 
seamlessly cohabitated, and in that respect, perhaps the adjective “esoteric” is even redundant.  
Furthermore, what is crucial to recognize is that this episteme hinges in its entirety, whether it 
relates to the occult or other sciences, on the constant ethical fashioning of the self. It is always, 
in the end, about how to practice this or that science as a faithful subject living the good life. 
This is also a direct result of the fact that these sciences, all of them, from formal jurisprudence 
to talismanology, were ultimately discursive practices that were intimately rooted in the 
surrounding community and inherently embedded in a thoroughly textualized world. 
Al-Durr thus concludes by explicating the power and virtue of the greatest talismanic seal 
[al-khātim al-akbar] as the template by which all others are to be approximated, and the means 
and prayers by which to benefit from its blessing [barakatihi] with God’s will, thus providing a 
certain symmetry with the muqaddimah with established the cosmological proofs for the 
existence of the two worlds (the celestial and the material) and their correlation  as a reflection of 
God’s Wisdom and Ability [bayān ḥikmatuhu jalla wa ʿulā al-dālah ʿalā qudratihi]. And with 
that reference, al-Kashnāwī subordinates the entire book and its contents to God’s final and only 
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 Having briefly introduced the scope of his work and announced its title, and before 
moving on to a discussion of the science of history, al-Jabartī ends the very first segment of the 
ʿAjāʾib with the following invocation: “I hope that whoever reads [this book] and finds it useful 
will not forget to remember us in his pious prayers [daʿawātihi] and will overlook whatever 
mistakes [hafawāt] he may find in it.”
2
  
Neither simply an exculpation in advance for inevitable lapses, nor the false modesty of a 
pedant, this was an affirmation of the scholar’s place in a wider relational network, binding 
author and reader, text and utility, past and present, this world and the next, through inherent and 
dialogic connections. And this is perhaps the greatest lesson that may be derived from al-
Jabartī’s work in particular, and, more generally, the larger paradigm that I have been calling 
here the ‘embodied ethics of writing’ according to which scholarship in late eighteenth-century 
Egypt was approximated and practiced. It is not merely a matter of recognizing that an 
engagement with the past is necessarily performative and transformative, for if we accept that 
any historical text contains both documentary and worklike aspects, then perforce our own 
products too are thus composed: a dialogue runs in both directions. As LaCapra affirms: 
Insofar as it is itself “worklike,” a dialogue involves the interpreter’s attempt 
to think further what is at issue in a text or a past “reality,” and in the process the 
questioner is himself questioned by the “other.” His own horizon is transformed 
as he confronts still living (but often submerged or silenced) possibilities solicited 
by an inquiry into the past. In this sense, the historicity of the historian is at issue 
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both in the question he poses and (pace Weber) in the “answers” he gives in a text 




The four substantive chapters of this dissertation have sought to unveil a historical 
process of establishing borders to some existing ideational (but of course also functional) 
frameworks, thus calling into existence and institutionalizing a series of environments which had 
previously not possessed that quality of structural boundedness. This occurred, as we have seen, 
over several decades, and was part of the self-appointed mission of modernization, the modern 
being conceived by the Egyptian political and pedagogical elite as a universal condition, which 
they had established as their overarching objective, their telos in other words. The cases at hand 
were the university, the library, the human, and the magical. As I hope to have made clear, the 
task of becoming modern did not simply entail a maneuver by which a given space was endowed 
with a given practical purpose, as for instance in the case of al-Azhar and its library (in chapters 
one and two). Instead, and along paths similar to those trodden in the European Enlightenment 
precursor-model, the institutional reforms that took place at al-Azhar rested on a reconsideration 
of much broader concepts, and their subsequent compartmentalization, and in particular those 
pertaining to the realm of the humanities (and the various subdivisions of the human, in chapter 
three), and of science (as a discrete field of knowledge and practice at once opposed to the 
magical and the religious, in chapter four). The development was thus possessed of what was 
seen as universality, and al-Azhar redefined as a key part of that overarching whole, whose role 
it was, in typical lighthouse fashion, to project it to the Muslim world and beyond, so that it too 
may leave the darkness behind.   
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 In more direct terms, this dissertation has thus interrogated the past through a cluster of 
four interrelated lines of inquiry – all of which ended up returning the gaze onto our 
contemporary practices and ideas.  
The first chapter concerned the quintessential category of education and pedagogical 
reform, which in so many ways is central to our conception of ourselves as moderns in general 
and as scholars in particular. It showed that the making over of al-Azhar into a modern Islamic 
university, a new space of modern time, was effected through a series of radical breaks from the 
past that were themselves part and parcel of larger shifts in the social and political state of Egypt, 
beginning in the 1860s with the institution of a model of patrimonial centralism. These 
transformations indeed made the past a foreign country, for what occurred was not the natural 
evolution of a traditional and eternal object to accord with the demands of modernity, but the 
coming into being of an altogether new field. This was the case on the multiple levels of both the 
form and content of learning: the constitution of a coherent faculty, the fixing of the location of 
teaching, the restriction and control of a student body, the delimitation of a curriculum, the 
introduction of diplomas and certifications. Most dramatically, the momentous law of 1908 
introduced into Azhari discourse the idea of religion as a constituted, separate domain (cut off, 
that is, from secular planes), and asserted the specifically Islamic role that the institution should 
henceforth play. The chapter then goes on to seek answers to what the non-modern al-Azhar may 
have looked like – and here too it can be seen as posing us probing questions concerning current 
models of education and their execution. In showing that al-Azhar had been one of the most 
dynamic channels of social integration and mobility in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, for 




contrast, appear as essentially factories for the reproduction of a predominant social order and its 
techno-political class of experts.  
 The second chapter focused on another institution integral to our modern self and its 
relationship with the past: the Library. Here too the account oscillated between contemporary 
yearnings on the part of Azharis (and others) to join the civilizational scale set by the colonial 
modern, and the incongruence of that model with the non-modern episteme, in which there 
simply was no equation between a civilization, its heritage and a representative Library. Indeed, 
the words for these concepts are themselves products of modernity. The chapter’s explorations 
into a different order of things in and around the eighteenth-century al-Azhar, where books 
mattered enormously but where the same could not be said of any sort of constitutive libraries, 
again implicitly questioned our present – and the stakes, here, involved the very idea of  
institutions claiming putative authority to collect and represent a nebulous multitude. Who has 
the right to enshrine Islamic civilization in a sort of national library? And why should there be 
such a right? What kinds of horizons of possibility are lost when a culture espouses a form 
whereby it can have a heritage and a representative metonymic library? 
 The third chapter moved on to an ever-present and urgent dimension of living and 
knowing: the classification of human beings. It anchored its exegesis more specifically on the 
above-cited Azhari scholar, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī’ and his ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fi’l-tarājim 
wa’l-akhbār, the foundational source for the history of Egypt in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. The chapter probed, on the one hand, contemporary analyses that seek to 
impose onto the text anachronistic categories (notably of a racial, cultural, and geographical 
order), showing that these assumptions concerning the constancy and universality of concepts 




mishaps, but more gravely, they partake of a larger incitement to discourse on racial identities 
that have severe repercussions in today’s world. On the other hand, the chapter pursued an in-
depth textual exegesis in the effort to determine the ways in which al-Jabartī himself 
conceptualized identity and difference and classified human beings. And it emerged that there 
were no Africans or Arabs as self-explanatory categories in the text, nor indeed was there any 
diachromatic concept of race (that could be distilled into white/black), but rather a panoply of 
colors and identities that bespoke a world not divided into nations, races and continents. Instead, 
the determinant marker of identity for al-Jabartī was a group’s place in a social order devoted to 
the furtherance of ethics and justice, at the beating heart of which were the ‘ulama. These 
however were no techno-political experts, but first and foremost the enablers of proper practices 
of the good life, integral to which was the attainment of knowledge as an embodied ethical quest. 
 The fourth chapter continued the reflection on questions of geography and history, 
subjectivity and knowledge, threading through all of the preceding parts of the dissertation. And 
like chapter three, it too took as its focus a particular scholar and a specific text. In this case, 
however, the objective was to reflect (albeit through a broad and variegated lens) upon the 
ordering of knowledge as a whole, and, more specifically what is deemed properly scientific or 
not. Seeking, if ambitiously, to reclaim past scholarly practices from what E. P. Thompson 
famously called “the enormous condescension of posterity,”
4
 the analysis followed the travels 
and travails of the Katsinan polymath Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī that brought him into the 
proximity of al-Azhar and its scholars, first in ‘real’ life, then in the existing literature, and 
through many loops and turns, before exploring the field of the occult sciences and magic more 
generally and his influential book on the subject in particular. Addressing this theme also evoked 
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the question of orthodoxy, since it is generally understood that magic and the occult are of 
domains wholly extraneous to pre-formulated dogmas – indeed to the point where the 
scholarship has tended to assume a connection between ‘African’ origins and the unorthodox 
nature of the subject. The startling discovery, however, was that in both presentation and 
approach, al-Kashnāwī’s occult manual al-Durr al-manẓūm resembles any other scholarly 
treatise in the tradition. This, and the fact that alongside his work on magic, he also wrote and 
taught on other subjects (more palatable to modern tastes of what is properly scientific or 
scholarly), further drives home the vital point that there is no such thing as a stable, trans-
historical meta-concept of science, but rather, that what is proper scientific practice is always 
embedded in personal, institutional and discursive structures and conducts. This too has 
extensive consequences as far as the global production of knowledge is concerned, to which I 
will now turn.   
  
 Clearly, the order of things, words and people changed radically with the onset of the 
modern age – and the new paradigm is integrally linked to the question of the subject of 
knowledge. As Walter Mignolo asserts, the founding assumption of colonial modernity involves 
what another scholar revealingly labels “the hubris of the zero point.”
5
 “From a detached and 
neutral point of observation,” Mignolo explains, “the knowing subject maps the world and its 
problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them.”
6
 And yet, as Mignolo points 
out, Frantz Fanon long ago demonstrated the vacuousness of such hubris and its anchoring in the 
equally erroneous idea of the autonomous individual (which is why, even in his psychiatric 
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practice, he advocated sociodiagnosis alongside the ontogenetic approach). Importantly, this was 
articulated, for Fanon too, in the enduring power of the word: “To speak means to be in a 
position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means 
above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization...”
7
 And the power of the 
word is not unrelated to the power of the fact, and in turn, to the power of the global political: 
“For the colonized subject, objectivity is always directed against him.”
8
  
What is so invigorating about Mignolo’s approach (and Fanon’s) is that it is active: 
against an epistemology of the point zero, he advocates epistemic disobedience, that is, a 
constant de-linking from the very “idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were 
also universal.”
9
 The primary epistemological and ontological questions thus lose their sum-zero 
character, and become framed as “who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather 
than produced, like cars or cell phones)?”
10
 These are the types of questions that I have tried to 
ask in each chapter of this dissertation.  
 Furthermore, the non-colonial past may even offer avenues, or at least clues, to de-
colonial options, as Mignolo hints at. “In the process of globally enacting the European system 
of belief and structure of knowledge,” he explains, “human beings who were not Christian did 
not inhabit the memories of Europe, from Greece through Rome, were not familiar with the six 
modern imperial European languages and, frankly, did not care much about all of that until they 
realized that they were expected and requested to submit to the European (and in the 20
th
 century 
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 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004): 37. 
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to the United States’ also) knowledge, belief, life style and world view.”
11
 This may be an 
exaggeration in the case of the scholarly culture of the Islamic discursive tradition (where the 
relationship to ancient Greece and Rome was not as alien as Mignolo presupposes), but the point 
is well taken, and what is even more important is what follows: “Responses to the contrary came, 
since the eighteenth century, from all over the globe, but imperial theo- and ego-politics of 
knowledge managed to prevail through economically sustained institutions (universities, 
museums, delegations, state officers, armies, etc.).”
12
   
In other words, decolonial exemplars exist in the records of the past, from which we may 
find inspiration today. And perhaps it is to that effect (however subconscious) that the chapters 
here may seem structured as altercations between the modern and the non-modern. The greatest 
gift that al-Jabartī and his predecessors and peers bequeathed to us in this regard is what I have 
described as the embodied ethics of learning, in which the very practice of scholarship was 
envisioned as a quest for the good life, as a molding of the self. It was thus that the guaranty and 
value of scholarship lay in the virtue of its practitioner, which is precisely what was passed on in 
the transmission of learning (as opposed to, say, positive data or proper methodology). And it is 
in this sense too that Edward Said envisioned the role of the intellectual as that of “speaking truth 
to power.”
13
 (Or as al-Jabartī would put it in reference to shāykh al-Azhar, Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī: 
“kāna qawwālan bi’l-ḥaqq, ʾammāran bi’l-maʿrūf.”)
14
 
The truth of which Said spoke was not that of the expert; it was not confined to its 
positive computability. It involved an attitude, an ethics of being and knowing, similar to the one 
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identified in this dissertation and advocated by al-Jabartī, al-Kashnāwī and others whom it 
encountered. It is this attitude above all, I would argue in response to Bruce Lincoln’s final 
reflections on myth, ideology and scholarship, beyond any structural facet or academic 
convention (such as the footnote) that can begin to ensure the “best in scholarship” (“hard work, 
integrity and accountability”); and indeed guard against the perfidious ideologies that are 
supported by the power and privilege of the “structurally strong” to speak (epic mythos), as well 
as their actual words (logos). And in that respect, Lincoln is absolutely right to conclude, “If 




And while we are on the topic, a few truths must be said of this dissertation. For although 
its conclusions are presented as precise and focused, it and the larger project of work of which it 
is a product have been anything but. The path to be sure was an arduous one, replete with 
minefields and collisions of all sorts, and the debris is embedded in the words, thoughts and 
interstices of every chapter as well as the collectivity as a whole. Perhaps one need not look too 
closely to see the many omissions and tensions permeating through its various parts.  
Amongst those most glaring perhaps is the irresolvable conflict of temporality, or more 
exactly between the portrayals of historical continuity and rupture that are mobilized. Thus, a 
figure such as Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905), for instance, appears at times to represent a 
decisive break from the past (such as in the case of the foundation of a centralized Azhar library 
in chapter two), and yet to still be operating within the tradition (as in the case of curricular 
reforms in chapter one).  The oscillation is on some level explainable by the immensity of shifts 
and responses occurring in Egypt during his times, but it nonetheless requires a more focused 
                                                 
15





reflection, and all the more so in light of Talal Asad’s important formulation of Islam as “a 
discursive tradition, which “precisely because it is established, has a history.”
16
  The preposition 
allows for both the presence of multiple ruptures within, as well as attentiveness to the specificity 
and magnitude of the rift engendered by the modern episteme (notably through its introduction of 
new concepts and institutions). A methodological challenge arises however in trying to excavate 
that history and with the disciplinary tools and research possibilities (and indeed constraints) at 
one’s disposal. Take for instance the portrait of al-Kashnāwī presented in chapter four. My re-
enactment of a probable program of studies that he may have followed has had to rely in part on 
secondary works that are themselves conditioned by the types of historiographical and 
conceptual problematics that I set myself up against, and I think rightly so. But if we accept that 
exercises of bio-bibliographical inference can never be exhaustive, are often speculative and may 
themselves partake in reifying modernity’s bibliographic imaginaries, how else might al-
Kashnāwī’s story be told? Or to put it differently, how can one give due discursive value to ideas 
while maintaining an attachment to their historical and social context, and narrate this through 
the life-trajectories of their authors?  
 
It is clear that these issues cannot be resolved here. The task of “finding the baby,” as 
Asad brilliantly challenged those “who habitually react to critiques of orientalism with indignant 
cries about babies being thrown out with the bathwater,” is only just underhand. This dissertation 
(however leaky or murky it might be in its final form) is part of that effort. Instead of any 
totalizing realist depiction of the past, I have tried to suggest and explore modes of reading that 
may begin to point in the direction of another way of knowing and being in the world. And here 






too, Asad’s final words in The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam are prudent. “To write about a 
tradition,” he cautions,  
[i]s to be in a certain narrative relation to it, a relation that will vary according 
to whether one supports or opposes the tradition, or regards it as morally neutral. 
The coherence that each part finds, or fails to find in that tradition will depend on 
their particular historical position. In other words, there clearly is not, nor can 
there be, such a thing as a universally acceptable account of a living tradition. 
Any representation of tradition is contestable. What shape that contestation takes, 
if it occurs, will be determined not only by the powers and knowledges each side 
deploys, but by the collective they aspire to – or to whose survival they are quite 






 Unfortunately, Asad does not expand on this important cautionary statement, nor does he 
provide any details as regards to the form of the commitments and engagements he has in mind, 
choosing (perhaps deliberately) to leave the field open. In promoting the basic idea that writing 
about a tradition means establishing a narrative relation to it, this dissertation is in a small part an 
attempt to enter the game in so far as its explorations of the past were always also forays into the 
present and the future too. 
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